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The domestic violence movement has had remarkable success illuminating the 
scope, prevalence and consequences of battering, but has been more limited in its ability 
to successfully intervene and prevent abuse of women by their intimate male partners.  
Surprisingly, there has been little research directed at understanding why intervention 
strategies with perpetrators are only minimally effective.  Studies have focused on 
assessing the degree to which and for whom individual components such as arrest, 
prosecution and psycho-educational programs for abusive men are successful, but few 
explorations have attempted to describe limitations and challenges to the domestic 
violence intervention system as a whole.   
Employing a systems approach, a process-oriented evaluation of the domestic 
violence intervention system in Portland, Oregon was conducted.  Ten focus groups were 
facilitated with key stakeholders in the coordinated community response.  Participants 
included police and probation officers, victim advocates, victim/survivors, batterer 
intervention program providers, and batterer intervention program participants.  The 
focus group discussions were analyzed using constructivist grounded theory and 
emergent themes were identified.  Based on stakeholder testimony, it appears as though 
seven interacting features may limit the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention 
strategies with abusive men: 1) attempting to simultaneously punish and rehabilitate 
perpetrators, 2) dominance of a “one size fits all” approach, 3) insufficient accountability 




collaboration, 6) confusion created by complex domestic violence dynamics, and 7) 
reactivity instead of activism and prevention.   
These and other findings are discussed in light of their capacity to illuminate 
fundamental tensions associated with relying so heavily on the criminal justice system to 
intervene in domestic violence (e.g., the contradictions that surface when attempting to 
protect and empower victims, the difficulty of balancing consistency with an individually 
tailored response when sanctioning perpetrators).  Despite these and other challenges, 
complete dismissal of the criminal justice system‟s role in holding abusive men 
accountable seems unwise.  Instead, it will be important for movement activists, 
practitioners, and researchers to critically reflect upon its limitations and work to redress 
and refine its use, while simultaneously developing new strategies that engage a wider 
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Chapter One: Overview     
Despite three decades of political activism, domestic violence continues at 
epidemic levels within the United States.  Commonly defined as a pattern of abusive and 
coercive behaviors perpetrated on an intimate partner, domestic violence can include 
physical abuse or the threat of physical abuse, psychological abuse, emotional abuse, 
sexual abuse, social isolation, and economic control (Dobash & Dobash, 1998; Pence & 
Paymar, 1993).  Although there is some debate regarding the equivalence of perpetration 
rates between men and women (Archer, 2000; Dutton & Nicholls, 2005; Fiebert, 1997; 
Kimmel, 2002; Saunders, 2002), it is generally acknowledged that women are 
overwhelmingly the victims of this abusive pattern and suffer more severe physical 
consequences (Archer, 2000; Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003; Dobash, Dobash, Cavanagh, & 
Lewis, 1999; Saunders, 2002).  Estimates suggest that between 2 and 4 million women 
are physically assaulted by an intimate male partner each year (Bancroft, 2002; Collins, 
Schoen, Joseph, Duchon, Simantov, & Yellowitz, 1999) and according to the American 
Psychological Association (1996), one in three women will be assaulted by a male 
partner at some point during her lifetime.  The physical, psychological, and financial cost 
to these women, their children and our society as a whole is staggering (Bancroft, 2002; 
Healey, Smith & O‟Sullivan, 1998).   
Women who are abused by an intimate partner are at an increased risk for death 
(Eisenstadt & Bancroft, 1999; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2001), physical injuries 
(Rand & Strom, 1997), post-traumatic stress disorder (Astin, Ogland-Hand, Coleman, & 
Foy, 1995; Dutton, 1992), somatic disorders, depression, suicide attempts (Campbell, 
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Kub, Belknap, & Templin, 1997; Moscicki, 1989; Walker, 1991), substance abuse 
(Stewart & Israeli, 2002), work-related absences, job loss (Center for Disease Control, 
2003), and homelessness (Bufkin & Bray, 1998).  Children exposed to domestic violence 
are at risk for physical injuries (McKay, 1994, Straus, Gelles & Smith, 1990), behavioral 
and developmental problems (Fantuzzo & Mohr, 1999), substance abuse, suicide, and are 
more likely to either be victimized or perpetrate abuse in the future (Dutton, 1999; 
Dutton, 2000; Healey et al., 1998, Hotaling & Sugarman, 1986, Whitfield, Anda, Dube & 
Felitti, 2003).  While the impact on extended family members, community members and 
society as a whole is difficult to quantify, a recent Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention study (2003) estimated that the annual health care costs associated with 
intimate partner violence exceed 5.8 billion dollars.  
In the last 30 years, the domestic violence movement has had remarkable success 
illuminating the scope, prevalence and consequences of battering (Carlson & Worden, 
2005; Klein, Campbell, Soler & Ghez, 1997), but has been somewhat less successful 
intervening with perpetrators and preventing them from re-assaulting their intimate 
partners (Stover, 2005).  While there is certainly an enhanced criminal justice system 
response, as well as a proliferation of intervention programs for abusive men (Gondolf, 
2002), the effectiveness of these strategies remains questionable (Babcock, Green & 
Robie, 2004; Babcock & Steiner, 1999; Feder & Wilson, 2005; Haaken &Yragui, 2003; 
Healey et al., 1998).  There is only minimal evidence to suggest that women who seek 
police protection are less likely to be abused in the future (Gross, Cramer, Forte, Gordon, 
Kunkel, & Moriarty, 2000; Maxwell, Garner, & Fagan, 2001) or that men who are 
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arrested and mandated to attend batterer intervention programs are less likely to be 
abusive upon completion (Dunford, 2000; Feder & Dugan 2002; Feder & Wilson, 2005; 
Harrell, 1991).  Though an impressive array of support services, such as emergency 
shelters, crisis lines, and legal advocacy now exist for victims of domestic violence 
(Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 2003; Gordon, 1988; Haaken, 2010; Jolin, 2008; Pleck, 1987), 
successful interruption and prevention of men‟s abusive behavior is essential if the 
problem of domestic violence is to be successfully addressed.  
Surprisingly, there has been little research directed at understanding why 
domestic violence intervention strategies with perpetrators are only minimally effective.  
Studies have focused on assessing the degree to which and for whom individual aspects 
of domestic violence intervention such as arrest, prosecution and psycho-educational 
programs for abusive men are successful, but do not illuminate why, on the whole, 
intervention strategies are not more effective.  The vast majority of evaluations report 
high levels of post intervention violence (Dobash & Dobash, 1997), but with little 
analysis, explanation, or discussion of what factors contribute to this failure.  The studies 
that do expressly target failure focus narrowly on describing characteristics at the 
individual level that are associated with program attrition and abuse recidivism (Daly, 
Power & Gondolf, 2001; Gerlock, 2001; Gondolf, 1997; Hamberger & Hastings, 1990; 
Jones & Gondolf, 2001; Taft, Murphy, Elliott & Keaser, 2001), rather than on identifying 
potential systemic limitations.  Focusing attention explicitly on why current domestic 
violence intervention approaches are not more successful in reducing intimate partner 
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violence could prove quite illuminating, and is likely to reveal candidates for practice and 
policy improvements.  
In this context, I embarked on an exploratory study with three overarching goals: 
1) describe and critically analyze limitations of current domestic violence intervention 
strategies with abusive men, 2) identify and describe additional opportunities for 
engaging community resources in domestic violence intervention with abusive men and, 
3) create opportunities for key stakeholders within the domestic violence intervention 
system to dialogue about its limitations, thus facilitating possibilities for action and 
change.  I provide an overview of my project in the remainder of this chapter.   
Chapter Two comprises a three-part literature review.  I begin by outlining 
theories of domestic violence causation, then briefly describe the evolution of current 
strategies for intervening with abusive men, and conclude with a discussion of evaluation 
literature on domestic violence intervention.  Commencing with a review of theories or 
conceptualizations of why men are abusive to their intimate partners is useful for two 
reasons.  In order to meaningfully evaluate current domestic violence intervention 
strategies, it may be helpful to understand the explanations of men‟s violence that have 
given rise to the development of these strategies.   
Community psychologists have a long history of trying to understand social 
problems and the solutions for impacting those problems.  One of the most persuasive 
explanations they have advanced for intervention failure is entitled the ecological fallacy 
(Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch 1974).  The ecology fallacy is the erroneous 
assumption that a problem conceived on one level of analysis can be effectively 
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understood or impacted by an intervention that targets a different level of analysis.  In 
other words, the ecological fallacy suggests that for maximum effectiveness, the levels of 
analysis between our problem definitions and our solutions should align.  For example, if 
the problem of incomplete homework assignments is attributed to the low value that 
children‟s parents assign to the completion of school work at home (social/familial level 
explanation of the problem), an effective intervention would target parental attitudes and 
values regarding homework (social/familial level intervention) rather than focusing solely 
on the children (individual level intervention). Subsequently, it may be helpful to 
consider the dominant level of analysis in the theories regarding the problem of domestic 
violence (e.g., what causes men‟s violence towards women) and assess their alignment 
with corresponding intervention strategies.     
Anthropologists, evolutionists, socio-biologists, psychologists, political scientists, 
and sociologists (Harway & O‟Neil, 1999) have each advanced theories of what causes 
men‟s violence against women. These theories have attributed responsibility or blame to 
a wide range of individual, social and societal factors including biology, physiology, 
mental illness, social learning, poverty and patriarchy (Harway & O‟Neil, 1999). Over 
the years, mainstream activists within the domestic violence movement have critiqued, 
and subsequently marginalized, most explanations for men‟s violence against women, 
concerned that they either re-victimize and endanger women or minimize men‟s 
responsibility for their abusive choices (Schechter, 1982). 
For example, in the late 1970‟s and early 1980‟s, anti- violence activists 
expressed concern regarding explanations for men‟s violence that relied on mental 
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illness, drug and alcohol abuse, or childhood trauma, because it was feared that they 
diverted attention away from a socio-political analysis of men‟s violence towards women.  
“Activists and family sociologists took on the psychopathological model of wife abuse, 
challenging the notion that battering was an individual rather than social problem” (Yllo, 
1988, p. 39).  Similarly, family systems theories were denounced, as they were 
interpreted to hold victims partially accountable and responsible for their own abuse and 
suggested the use of couples counseling, an intervention strategy believed to directly 
endanger battered women (Gondolf, 1993; Yllo & Bograd, 1988).   
Feminist domestic violence activists theorized that male domination and control 
of women, a key feature of patriarchy, was the most valid explanation for men‟s violence 
against women (Bograd, 1988; Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Pence & Paymar, 1993).  
Attributing responsibility to mental illness, drug or alcohol abuse, and or dysfunctional 
relationships shifted attention away from a societal level explanation, and was perceived 
to give men excuses for their violence.  Feminist activists preferred to endorse an 
explanation of violence that targeted the institutionalized power differential between men 
and women and which held men responsible for their choice to exhibit abusive behavior 
(Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Haaken, 2010; Pence & Paymar, 1993).   
Despite the fact that there is growing interest among academics and practitioners 
to develop integrated theories that advance multi-determined explanations for domestic 
violence, few such theories exist and none have widely influenced the development of 
interventions (Harway & O‟Neil, 1999; Rigazio-DiGilio & Lanza, 1999).  It may be 
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worth exploring the impact this theoretical restriction has on the efficacy of current 
domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men.     
Current domestic violence intervention is not a singular enterprise, but rather a 
collection of strategies.  This collection is known in most areas of the United States as the 
Coordinated Community Response (CCR) to domestic violence and is modeled on an 
approach developed in Duluth, Minnesota (Pence & Paymar, 1993).  The Duluth model 
contends that domestic violence intervention will be most successful when the 
independent efforts to protect victims of abuse and confront perpetrators of abuse are 
coordinated.  “A coordinated community response involves police, prosecutors, probation 
officers, battered women‟s advocates, counselors and judges in developing and 
implementing polices and procedures that improve interagency coordination and lead to 
more uniform response to domestic violence cases” (Shepard, 1999, p. 2).  
Although perhaps not originally intended as such, the coordinated community 
response to perpetrators of domestic violence is primarily a coordination of facets of the 
criminal justice system.  In striving to hold individual men accountable for abusing their 
female partners, and simultaneously pointing a finger of blame towards patriarchal 
institutions for sanctioning men‟s violence towards women, mainstream activists within 
the domestic violence movement chose the criminal justice system as an “ally” in 
domestic violence intervention (Pence, 1999).  By identifying, and targeting for change, 
the police and courts as locations where victims of domestic violence were also victims 
of patriarchal indifference, activists accomplished two goals.  First, abusive men began to 
be held accountable for their actions; they began to be arrested, jailed, placed on 
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probation and sent to educational intervention programs.  Second, by lobbying the 
criminal justice system to make substantial practice changes on behalf of abused women, 
activists were able to make a dent, albeit an arguably small one, in the patriarchal 
stronghold.   
Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that this criminal justice response 
(e.g., arresting, jailing and or mandating men to education programs) sufficiently reduces 
the propensity of perpetrators to abuse their partners (Fagan, 1996; Feder & Dugan, 2002; 
Healey et al., 1998).  Most studies report unsettlingly high rates of recidivism (20-60%) 
following arrest (Babcock & Steiner, 1999; Schmidt & Sherman, 1996), prosecution 
(Murphy, Musser & Maton, 1998), and batterer intervention program completion (Feder 
& Wilson, 2005; Gondolf, 2002; Saunders, 1996). “Research has not clearly shown that 
the enhanced and innovative efforts made by the criminal justice systems adequately 
address … domestic violence” (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003, p 1).   
Additionally, primary reliance on a criminal justice response to domestic violence 
has been identified as problematic (Collins, 2000; Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; Guzik, 2009; 
Mankowski, Haaken & Silvergleid, 2002; Mederos, 1999; 1993; Messerschmidt, Mills, 
2003; Ms. Foundation for Women, 2003; Pence, 1999; Ptacek, 2010; Ritchie, 2000; van 
Wormer, 2009). Many of the new policies, such as mandatory arrest and no-drop 
prosecution, have been critiqued as disempowering for victims and disproportionately 
applied based on race and socio-economic status (Guzik, 2009; Ptacek, 2010; Ritchie, 
2000).  The impact of criminal justice involvement differs depending on the race, socio-
economic status and cultural background of both victims and perpetrators (Mederos, 
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1999).  Mederos (1999) contends that women of color are less likely than white women 
to consider the police as allies and men of color are less likely to respond positively in 
batterer intervention programs, which traditionally ignore the impact of racial and class 
oppression (Gondolf & Williams, 2001).  Furthermore, concerns have been raised about 
the efficacy of creating lasting attitudinal and behavioral changes in perpetrators through 
the use of coercion and punishment (Dutton & Corvo, 2006; Guzik, 2009; Lehmann & 
Sinmons, 2009).  
In striving to understand why domestic violence intervention strategies with 
abusive men are only minimally effective, it may be worth considering limitations 
associated with the heavy reliance on a criminal justice response to domestic violence.  
Additionally, it may be worth considering whether the criminal justice “community” 
being coordinated in the CCR is a sufficient use of the community in the effort to stop 
domestic violence, or whether informal social support networks (Budde & Schene, 2004), 
neighborhoods, community groups, faith based organizations, educational settings, and 
cultural groups might also be helpful (INCITE! 2003; Smith, 2009.   
Chapter Two concludes with a brief discussion of the state of evaluation literature 
on domestic violence intervention.  Most evaluation studies conducted to date have 
focused solely on documenting outcomes (Gondolf, 1997; Gondolf, 2002).  These 
evaluations have not only failed to demonstrate satisfactory efficacy of domestic violence 
intervention strategies with abusive men (Dunford, 2000; Feder & Dugan, 2002; Ford & 
Regoli, 1993), but more importantly, have provided little guidance for policy makers 
wishing to improve current intervention approaches. This lack of guidance is partially 
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due to the shortage of process-oriented evaluations, evaluations that focus primarily on 
understanding how a program or intervention works or fails to work (Patton, 1990), and 
partially due to the fact that only a handful of evaluations to date have attempted to 
evaluate domestic violence intervention holistically, recognizing the entire intervention 
system, as opposed to isolating the success or failure of individual components or pieces 
(Gondolf, 2002).   
Researchers have recently responded to these gaps.  A handful of studies focusing 
on processes of change in batterer intervention (Pandya & Gingerich, 2002; Scott & 
Wolfe, 2000; Silvergleid & Mankowski, 2006) and on the combined impact of different 
elements of the coordinated community response have been published (Klevens, Baker, 
Shelley, and Ingram, 2008; Murphy et al., 1998; Orchowsky, 1999).  Unfortunately, an 
organized attempt to explicate what is not working on a systemic level has not been 
made.  “System-wide evaluations are necessary to understand the impact of different 
components of a coordinated community response, and the effectiveness of the overall 
response” (Shepard, 1999; p. 5).  In order to garner this type of information, it may be 
necessary to adopt a methodological approach that is specifically designed to study 
processes within complex systems. 
In Chapter Three, I describe the benefits of engaging a systems approach to 
evaluate domestic violence intervention with abusive men, asserting that a systems 
approach is particularly appropriate for assessing domestic violence intervention 
holistically.  A systems approach recognizes and accommodates the impact of the 
relevant environment, allowing integrity of the whole system to be maintained, as well as 
Chapter One: Overview 11 
 
attending to processes, particularly nonlinear processes, among system components 
(Lendaris, 1986).  Ultimately, a systems approach provides a unique lens or framework 
through which to view the problem and shifts the way we study it.  Instead of asking an 
outcome-focused, one-dimensional question, “do isolated components of domestic 
violence intervention work?”, a systems approach inspires a more process-oriented, 
multi-level query such as “what theoretical restrictions and intervention decisions do key 
stakeholders believe interact to limit the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention 
with abusive men?”  Shifting our question in this fashion enables us to explore new and 
potentially valuable information.   
I conclude Chapter Three with a review of the dissertation goals and discuss how 
these goals, and subsequently this project, reflect my commitment to community based 
action research (Hills & Mullett, 2000; Kaufman et al., 2006; Kelly, Mock, & Tandon, 
2001).  They emerged directly from conversations and deliberations I held with key 
stakeholders in the domestic violence field over a period of several years and are 
orientated towards problem identification as a pathway for initiating change within the 
system of study.  As Fine & Vanderslice (1999) clearly state, “applied social 
psychological research is designed to not only explain, but also to provide social change” 
(p. 199).   
In Chapter Four, I describe the methodological details of my study, outlining my 
intention to achieve the project goals by addressing five interrelated research questions: 
1) What do key stakeholders within Portland‟s Coordinated Community Response (CCR) 
identify as current domestic violence intervention with abusive men? 2) What do key 
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stakeholders within Portland‟s CCR believe limits the effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention with abusive men? 3) How do key Portland CCR stakeholders make sense of 
any discrepancies between theorized antecedents for men‟s domestic violence and the 
current intervention strategies? 4) How do key Portland CCR stakeholders make sense of 
any discrepancies between the Duluth model of coordinated community response and 
current intervention strategies for domestically abusive men? 5) What do key Portland 
CCR stakeholders believe the role of community should be in domestic violence 
intervention with abusive men?   
In order to gather data and respond to these questions, a series of focus groups 
with police and probation officers, victim advocates, victim/survivors, batterer 
intervention program providers, and batterer intervention program participants was 
conducted.  The focus group discussions were analyzed using an iterative, constructivist-
grounded theory approach and emergent themes organized into a coherent analytic 
framework (Charmaz, 1995).   
In Chapter Five, detailed findings from my exploration are reviewed.  Drawing on 
stakeholder quotes to support generalizations and summary statements, I walk the reader 
through each major research question.  I present what police and probation officers, 
victim advocates, victims/survivors, batterer intervention providers and perpetrators 
identified as the current response efforts to abusive men, followed by their detailed 
critiques of existing strategies, and their suggestions for how to better engage the 
community in domestic violence intervention.   
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At the conclusion of Chapter Five, I synthesize the vast quantity of material that I 
collected by applying a systems lens to the question, “what features or components 
interact to limit the success of intervention strategies with abusive men”.  Assessed from 
this perspective, seven subunits emerged: 1) attempting to simultaneously punish and 
rehabilitate perpetrators, 2) dominance of a “one size fits all” approach, 3) insufficient 
accountability within the system for abusive men, 4) rampant victim blaming, 5) barriers 
to effective collaboration, 6) confusion created by complex domestic violence dynamics, 
and 7) reactivity instead of activism and prevention. 
In the final chapter, I discuss the ways in which these seven themes or subunits 
operate together to manifest the attribute “limited effectiveness” of dominant domestic 
violence intervention strategies with abusive men.  More specifically, I note how these 
seven themes illuminate fundamental tensions that coincide with heavily reliance on the 
criminal justice system to intervene in men‟s intimate violence.  I then review limitations 
of the project design and suggest implications for theory, practice and research.   
Engaging a systems approach shaped the way I defined the problem and guided 
my methodology to a unique end.  By not constricting the theories about what causes 
men‟s abuse, the best methods for how to intervene, or the subunits available to study, I 
was able to gather and integrate multiple perspectives on the numerous processes 
impacting the success of domestic violence intervention with abusive men as a whole.  
The net result of this theoretical and empirical expansion is a set of recommendations that 
bridge and join multiple exciting new trends in the field including the use of strengths-
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based batterer intervention treatment, restorative justice, intimate abuse circles, and 
community-based prevention models.    
While heavy reliance on the criminal justice system is clearly somewhat 
problematic for stakeholders, a complete dismissal of its role in protecting victims and 
holding abusive men accountable is also risky.  Instead, movement activists, practitioners 
and researchers must continue to reflect critically on its limitations and work to redress 
and refine its use, while simultaneously developing new strategies that better meet the 
needs and goals of the stakeholders involved.  Given the complexity of domestic violence 
dynamics and the diversity of victims and perpetrators, a single solution for how best to 
intervene in men‟s violence is neither realistic nor desirable.  Rather, we must strive to 
draw on the diverse strengths and collective wisdom within our communities to advance 
responses that avoid the ecological fallacy and address antecedents of domestic violence 
at the individual, social, organizational, and institutional levels of analysis.  
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Chapter Two: Mapping the Terrain of Domestic Violence Intervention: 
A Review of Conceptualization, Intervention and Evaluation 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with general background 
information about domestic violence intervention; specifically, what theories or 
conceptualizations have been advanced, critiqued, and endorsed to explain men‟s 
violence towards women, what intervention practices have been adopted, and how 
researchers have evaluated these practices.  One of the greatest challenges in presenting 
this information is that these three areas are not distinct.  In fact, the relationship between 
domestic violence theory, practice and evaluation is quite transactional (Altman & 
Rogoff, 1987).  Theories about what causes men‟s violence against women have been 
used to justify the endorsement of some intervention approaches over others, just as 
perceptions about safe versus unsafe intervention practices have been used to legitimize 
the validity of some theories over others (Adams, 1988; Dutton & Nicholls, 2005; Yllo, 
1988).  Not surprisingly, researchers conducting evaluations of domestic violence 
interventions have been influenced by dominant conceptualizations of domestic violence 
and the practices available to study (Gordon, 1988).  It is for the sake of organization, as 
opposed to accuracy, that I review these areas sequentially.  My intent is not to provide 
an in-depth review of all the existing theories, intervention strategies, and evaluation 
findings, but to provide the reader with a sense of the range of theories that have been 
postulated, an understanding of the dominant strategies for intervention, and an 
awareness of the pattern of research that has been conducted as context for a meaningful 
assessment.   
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Theorizing Men’s Violence against Women 
In order to understand and critique current domestic violence intervention 
approaches, it is helpful to be aware of the theories explaining men‟s violence against 
women that have guided interventionists‟ efforts (Corvo & Johnson, 2003).  I have 
chosen to organize, as have others (Gelles & Straus, 1979; Harway & O‟Neil, 1999), the 
theorized antecedents of men‟s violence towards women in terms of their level of 
analysis.  By level of analysis, I mean the primary domain of responsibility identified by 
the theory.  Commonly identified domains include the individual level, the group or 
social level, and the societal or institutional level (Rappaport, 1977).  I begin by 
describing some of the individual level theories that have been advanced to explain men‟s 
violence towards women, followed by a brief description of some of the concerns that 
victim advocates in the domestic violence movement have expressed regarding these 
theories.  After following a similar pattern for social level theories, I describe the societal 
level explanation for men‟s violence that has been widely endorsed within the field.  I 
then discuss how this societal level theory has been oversimplified and rigidified over 
time, casting much aside.  I conclude by describing a multi-level conceptualization of 
men‟s violence against women, one that embraces and integrates individual, social and 
societal level explanations.   It is worth noting that many of the theories explaining men‟s 
violence against women, as well as their critiques, have targeted only one level of 
analysis.  Exploring a multi-level critique and analysis of the problem of men‟s violence 
towards women creates opportunities, particularly with respect to understanding the 
limited effectiveness of current intervention approaches.   
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Individual level conceptualizations of men’s violence  
Physiological or biological causes of male aggression.  Physiological and 
biological theories of male aggression include the role of genetics, hormones, and brain 
dysfunction (Green, 1999; Janssen, Nicholls, Stefanakis, Spidel, & Simpson, 2005).  
Some biologists have suggested that the Y chromosome carries with it a propensity 
towards aggression as evidenced by the fact that in general, human males are more 
aggressive than females (Green, 1999).  Others have suggested that it is not the genes, but 
the differential excretion of particular, sex-linked (e.g., testosterone) hormones that 
explain men‟s predilection to violence (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994).  “The best conclusion 
seems to be that endocrinological factors are related to aggressive and violent behavior, 
such as battery, perhaps by indirectly potentiating impulsive acts or by their role in 
adaptation to the demands of a stressful environment” (Green, 1999, p. 55).  Still others 
contend that frontal lobe dysfunction, particularly damage to the fronto-temporal-limbic 
area that appears to regulate violent and aggressive behavior, may be responsible for 
much of men‟s abuse of women (Raine, 1993).  Rosenbaum, Hoge, Adelman, Warnken, 
Fletcher & Kane (1994) compared the history of head injuries in 130 men, 53 of whom 
were abusive to their intimate partners.  Medical evaluations revealed that 53% of the 
maritally abusive men had experienced a significant head injury, and in 93% of the cases, 
these head injuries occurred prior to the first incidence of aggression.  “Logistic 
regression, which statistically controlled for the contribution of potential demographic 
confounders (ethnicity, age, education, and occupational status), indicated that a history 
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of significant head injury increased the chances of marital aggression almost sixfold” 
(Rosenbaum et al., 1994, p. 1191).   
 Mental illness.  Mental illness or psychopathology has frequently been advanced 
as a contributing factor or cause of men‟s violence against women (Ehrensaft, Moffitt & 
Caspi, 2004).  “A psychopathological explanation suggests that individuals who are 
violent towards women have some sort of personality disorder or mental illness that 
might get in the way of otherwise normal inhibitions about using violence” (Jasinski, 
2000, p. 8).  Donald Dutton (1995) who has been working with abusive men for over 25 
years believes that most domestic violence is perpetrated by men who suffer from a 
borderline personality disorder, specifically brought on by the combination of three 
childhood sources: shame, insecure attachment to one‟s mother, and direct experience of 
abusiveness in the home.  “I posit that a triad of childhood events found retrospectively in 
populations of batterers constitutes a powerful trauma source and that many aspects of 
the personality structure and function of intimately abusive men are best understood from 
a trauma response framework” (Dutton, 1999, p. 431). 
Extreme personality “disorders” or psychopathology, such as narcissistic and anti-
social personality disorders, have also been credited with at least a portion of men‟s 
violence against women (Dutton & Starzomski, 1994; Hamberger & Hastings, 1990; 
Saunders, 1992).  Narcissism is defined as “a pattern of traits and behaviors which signify 
infatuation and obsession with one's self to the exclusion of all others and the egotistic 
and ruthless pursuit of one's gratification, dominance and ambition.” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 715).  Anti-social personality disorder is defined as a 
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“pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since 
age 15 years” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 706).  Current estimates 
suggest that approximately 25% of men arrested for domestic violence exhibit symptoms 
of narcisstic or antisocial personality disorders (Gondolf, 1999; Holtzworth-Munroe & 
Stuart, 1994).  These personality disorders are credited with inhibiting men‟s ability to 
empathize with their victims or experience remorse over their actions, fostering rigidity 
in thinking, and creating a propensity to abuse drugs and alcohol.   
Substance abuse.  Research has repeatedly demonstrated a link between substance 
use and domestic violence (Johnson, 2000; Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2005; Quigley & 
Leonard, 2000; Schafer, Caetano & Cunradi, 2004; Stuart, Moore, Kahler & Ramsey, 
2003; Tolman, & Bennett, 1990), with some studies indicating that rates of alcohol abuse 
among men who batter approach 70% (Brookoff, O‟Brien, Cook, Thompson, & 
Williams, 1997; Easton & Sinha, 2002; Davidovich, 1990; Roberts, 1988).   O‟Farrell 
and Murphy (1995) reported that martial violence was “four to six times more prevalent 
and substantially more frequent for alcoholics and their wives than it was in the 
nonalcoholic comparison sample” (p. 259).  In one large multi-site study involving 840 
men who were entering batterer intervention programs, 50% were diagnosed with either 
an alcohol or drug abuse problem (Gondolf, 2002).   
Those who contend that substance abuse plays a role in domestic violence suggest 
drugs and alcohol impact men‟s abuse in a variety of ways.  Some claim that substance 
use reduces men‟s tolerance for negative emotions such as frustration, pain, and 
disappointment making it more likely that they will “overreact” and lash out at the source 
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of their discomfort (Murphy & O‟Farrell, 1996).  Others suggest that substance abuse 
reduces men‟s inhibitions such that even if they normally do not utilize violence in their 
intimate relationships, they are unresponsive to these inhibitions in their altered state 
(Collins, 1982). Finally, there are some who suggest that a combination of alcohol related 
changes are responsible for the association with battering.  
The role of physiological and cognitive changes brought on by alcohol, the 
 interaction of alcohol and frustration in producing aggression, and needs for 
 personal power in men who drink and then aggress all appear to be promising 
 explanations for the alcohol-battering link. We can assume that none of these 
 theories alone is adequate to account for alcohol related battering. (Conner & 
 Ackerley, 1994, p. 147) 
Cognitive-emotional skill deficits.  Some psychologists have suggested men are 
violent because they lack the necessary skills to avoid violence (Sonkin & Durphy, 
1997).  Specifically, they lack the skills to manage their feelings of anger, or they lack 
critical communication skills and are therefore unable to secure attention for their needs 
in non-abusive ways.  Abusive men are “less assertive in expressing their wants and 
needs in a socially appropriate and growth oriented manner” (Maiuro, Cahn & Vitalian, 
1986, p. 285).  Proponents of this explanation for men‟s violence, point to the differential 
socialization practices for boys and girls.  While girls are encouraged to express both 
emotively and verbally a wide range of feelings, boys are traditionally discouraged from 
expressing any feelings other than anger (Kivel, 1992).  The cultural ideal for manhood 
(Brannon, 1985) involves a stoic, non-communicator who does not need to express his 
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emotions because he basically does not “need” anything from anyone and therefore does 
not have any reason to learn to verbally communicate his needs or desires.     
Critiques of individual level explanations of men’s violence Mainstream anti-violence 
advocates have historically downplayed the legitimacy of theories linking domestic 
violence with individual level explanations (Schechter, 1982; Straus, 1974).  Arguing 
from a strictly statistical perspective, activists have contended that not all men are 
abusers, not all men with brain disturbances and head injuries are abusers and not all 
abusers have brain or head injuries (Rosenbaum et. al, 1994).  Similarly, not all men who 
abuse substances or suffer from mental illness commit domestic violence and not all 
perpetrators of domestic violence abuse substances or suffer from psychopathology.   In 
other words, activists have contended that while many batterers may have head injuries, 
abuse substances and experience mental illness, these are likely not the primary causes of 
their abuse.  Articulating the tenor of this argument, Michelle Bograd (1988) concludes 
that, “the search for psychological causal factors or distinct personality configurations 
associated with wife abuse has not proven very useful.  Not all abusive men evidence 
psychopathology and those who do reveal no consistent psychological patterns” (p. 16).    
Anti-violence activists have expressed similar concern with the cognitive-
emotional skill deficit explanation for men‟s violence towards women.  They have argued 
that men who batter women often do not simultaneously batter their co-workers, friends 
and other family members.  In other words, if batterers are simply men who lack the 
skills necessary to avoid violence, one might expect that perpetrators of domestic abuse 
would physically strike out every time they became angry or had difficulty getting their 
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needs met (Schechter, 1982).   “Approaches that point to external stress or poor coping 
skills cannot explain why women are often the sole targets of men‟s abuse.  Nor can they 
adequately account for the evidence that many men who lack basic interpersonal and 
stress-coping skills do not beat their wives” (Adams, 1988, p. 190). There are lots of men 
who are raised to not express feelings other than anger and they do not all batter their 
partners.  If an absence of skills could explain domestic violence then why aren‟t more 
men abusing their wives and girlfriends?   
On an intervention level, victim advocates were alarmed that adoption of these 
individual level explanations for men‟s violence would suggest mental health 
intervention as opposed to a criminal justice intervention (Dutton & Nicholls, 2005; Yllo, 
1988). The two-fold concern for advocates was that if perpetrators of domestic violence 
are treated as men with illnesses or skill deficits instead of men who have committed a 
crime, victims of domestic violence would not be appropriately recognized as citizens of 
the state entitled to the same protections as other victims of violence and they might 
actually be in greater danger.  Criminals are arrested and often sent to prison as a means 
of punishing and containing them for their illegal actions.  People with mental illness or 
skill deficits receive counseling or training and are often subject to our sympathies as 
they struggle to heal and educate themselves.  Subsequently, not only would society be 
discounting the crime of domestic violence and depriving women of their right to safety 
in their homes, but victims might be more inclined to remain with their abusers, 
supporting them through their therapy and re-education (Gondolf, 1988). 
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Didactic or group level conceptualizations of men’s violence  
Family systems.  Family systems psychologists were at the forefront of theorists 
suggesting that there is a pattern of couple interaction that creates and maintains battering 
(Cook & Frantz-Cook, 1984; Neidig, Freidman, and Collins, 1985).  A foundational 
principle of system science is that it is difficult to understand behavior when you isolate it 
from its environment.  In other words, it is important to examine and analyze the 
immediate context in order to explain behavior.  Applying this principle to domestic 
violence suggests a shift in focus from men‟s violence against women in isolation to how 
violence or conflict is managed within the relationship (Anderson & Scholossberg, 1999).  
The assumption within this paradigm is that in violent relationships both partners play a 
role in escalating and reinforcing the violence (Flynn, 1990; Straus & Gelles, 1990).   
Adams (1988) nicely describes this perspective, writing that for interactionists, “battering 
is not characterized as one partner attempting to control or dominate the other but by the 
couples‟ combined communication deficits and the attempts of both partners to coerce 
and otherwise incite the other” (p. 185).  Theorists drawing on the couple‟s interactions to 
explain men‟s violence have highlighted ways that women‟s gender role socialization to 
be dependent, submissive, nurturing and overly focused on relationships (Nutt, 1999) 
impacts their actions in intimate relationship with men.  For example, they take into 
consideration that women‟s socialization to meet their partners‟ emotional needs 
predisposes them to have difficulty setting and maintaining boundaries (Nutt, 1999; 
Pittman, 1985) and that this inability contributes to the cycle of abuse.  Non-violent 
couples are theorized to be distinct from violent couples not because of differences in 
Chapter Two: Mapping the Terrain 24 
 
 
men‟s behavior and predispositions, but because of differences in the way the couple 
interacts (Jacobson, Gottman, Waltz, Rushe, Babcock, & Holtzworth-Munroe, 1994). 
Social learning theory.  Social learning theory suggests that as human beings we 
learn how to behave by observing and then modeling others (Bandura, 1973).  One of the 
central uses of social learning theory to explain men‟s violence is suggesting that boys 
learn to abuse women by watching their fathers abuse their mothers.  Often referred to as 
the intergenerational transmission of violence (Alexander, Moore, & Alexander, 1991; 
Mihalic & Elliott, 1997; Jasinski, 2000; Whitfield et al., 2003), the supposition is that 
boys learn that violence and abuse are an acceptable and efficient means to get what they 
want from the women in their lives.  Empirical evidence suggests a relationship does 
exist between watching abuse in the home as a child and adult perpetration of abuse 
(DeMaris & Jackson, 1987; Kalmuss, 1984; Straus & Gelles, 1990), with 10-80% of 
batterers typically reporting having witnessed their fathers beat their mothers (Hotaling & 
Sugarman, 1986; Tolman & Bennett, 1990; Waldo, 1987).   In a recent Adverse 
Childhood Experiences study with 8, 629 participants that explored the impact of 
childhood experiences of abuse and trauma on future perpetration and victimization of 
interpersonal violence, Whitfield et al, (2003) reported that witnessing domestic violence 
as a child doubled the odds of violence perpetration in adult relationships.   
The implications of social learning theory are far-reaching when it comes to 
explaining men‟s violence towards women.  Some argue that in addition to witnessing 
their fathers control and abuse their mothers, boys frequently are subject to and are 
influenced by seeing other men abuse and dominate women, either in their extended 
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family or with friends (Bowker, 1983; Katz, 2006; Smith, 1991).  Not only are boys often 
subject to destructive modeling as they mature, but under the principles of social learning 
theory men can continue to be influenced by their social networks, peers (Bowker, 1983), 
family members, and public figures, throughout adulthood.   
Critiques of didactic or group level explanations of men’s violence  
Activists in the domestic violence movement were alarmed by both the theoretical 
and intervention implications of family systems and social learning explanations of men‟s 
violence towards women (Adams, 1988, Bogard, 1984, Edelson, 1985, Schechter, 1982).  
On a theoretical level, both explanations appeared to divert responsibility for the 
perpetration of abuse from the male abuser.  Responsibility from a family systems 
perspective was co-joint or shared with the victim of the abuse (Anderson & Schlossberg, 
1999; Bogard, 1984, 1988; Brygger & Edleson, 1987) and in the case of social learning, 
the responsibility for men‟s abusive behavior was transmitted to fathers and other role 
models.  In other words, batterers were victims of either their dysfunctional marriages or 
their problematic developmental environments.  After decades of victim blaming in 
mainstream discourse explaining family violence, activists were understandably uneasy 
about explanations that placed any amount of responsibility for abuse on the shoulders of 
victims.  They were equally uncomfortable painting perpetrators of violence against 
women as puppets of their upbringing especially given that many men who experience 
this particular childhood trauma do not go on to abuse their partners (Dobash & Dobash, 
1979; Schechter, 1982).   
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The intervention implications of family systems and social learning theories were 
similarly problematic.  Family systems solutions often involved marital or couples 
counseling which was considered by many advocates to be extremely dangerous 
(Mederos, 1999).  
Besides clouding the issue of who is responsible for the violence, couples 
counseling places the battered women in an impossible bind.  Though she is 
expected to be open about her feelings, air her grievances, and report her 
husband‟s violence, to do any of these things places her in grave danger of 
continued violence. (Adams, 1988, p. 187) 
It was undesirable for most in the domestic violence movement to advance a theory, and 
subsequently an intervention, that in any way appeared to implicate women in their own 
victimization.  Activists were working too diligently to re-educate the public about 
women‟s role in the cycle of violence to endorse an approach where the implication is 
that women are partially responsible for the violence they experience. The question of 
laying blame or responsibility was similarly challenging when interventions based on 
social learning theories were proposed.  A question for victim advocates was how to 
direct effective intervention if the source of the problem was outside of the perpetrator.  
Shifting responsibility or blame to misogynistic modeling in childhood appeared to leave 
little room for holding individual men accountable for their choice to abuse.      
A societal and institutional level conceptualization of men’s violence  
In their historical accounts of the movement to end family violence, Linda 
Gordon (1998) and Elizabeth Pleck (1987) identify three distinct periods in American 
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history characterized by efforts to protect women from their abusive husbands.   During 
the 17
th
 century, the Puritans of colonial Massachusetts theorized the problem of 
domestic violence to be one of “sinful” men who were not properly protecting the 
sanctity and peace of the home.  Later, during the early 19
th
 century, antebellum feminists 
aligned with temperance reformers to suggest that the evils of alcohol caused husbands to 
beat their wives (Gordon, 1988; Pleck, 1987).  It was only when second wave feminists in 
the late 1970‟s turned their attention to the plight of the battered woman that an 
explanation for men‟s violence explicitly implicating the institutionalized oppression of 
women was advanced (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).  Fresh from their successes and 
frustrations during the civil rights, antiwar, and anti-rape movements, radical feminists 
saw the tragedy and injustice of the battered wife as an opportunity to highlight the brutal 
consequences of patriarchy (Gordon, 1988, Haaken, 2010; Pleck, 1987).  “The bruises 
and broken bones of beaten wives viscerally displayed what second-wave feminists 
advanced in pamphlets and at rallies: the home is a dangerous place for women” 
(Haaken, 2010, p. 8).    
In developing a satisfactory theory or explanation of men‟s violence against 
women, feminist activists sought to avoid the dangers they perceived in theories 
previously advanced.  In particular, they wanted to steer clear of theories focused on 
explaining why an individual man might hit an individual woman and instead desired to 
design “a theory of why men as a group direct their violence at women” (Schechter, 
1982, p. 214).  “The priority is to understand why abuse is directed at women, not why 
each individual man abuses” (Schechter, 1982, p. 216).  Dobash & Dobash (1979) were 
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among the first to articulate an explanation of wife abuse that implicated male-dominated 
social structures as well as dichotomized socialization into rigid gender roles in the 
perpetration of domestic violence.  There are many variants of, what I will refer to as, the 
“patriarchy as cause” explanation for male violence against women, however most tend 
to point to the institutionalized power imbalance between men and women as a training 
ground and justification for men to abuse and control the women with whom they are 
intimately involved (Dobash & Dobash, 1979, Pence & Paymar, 1993; Schechter, 1982).   
Patriarchal culture depends on relationships of dominance between men and 
women, politically, socially and interpersonally (Pence & Paymar, 1993).  Therefore, 
feminist activists suggested that men are violent towards women as a way of maintaining 
the power and control promised to them as members of a patriarchal society.  As such, 
domestic violence is understood as a pattern of controlling behavior executed with the 
purpose of establishing and maintaining an imbalance of power between male 
perpetrators and their female victims (Adams, 1988).  Men raised in patriarchal cultures 
develop attitudes and values consistent with patriarchy and with battering (Bancroft, 
2002). These “misogynistic attitudes function as disinhibitors, legitimizing women as a 
target for violent behavior and paving the way for the transmission of arousal, anger and 
aggression directed toward women” (Marin & Russo, 1999, p. 32). A central tenant of the 
“patriarchy as cause” theory is that men are abusive to women because they can be.  
Control and domination of women is condoned in patriarchal society, subsequently men 
experience few negative consequences (Carden, 1994) for their abuse of women and have 
very little motivation to treat women differently (Kivel, 1992).   
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A societal level analysis of the problem of men‟s violence towards women offered 
the potential for exciting intervention opportunities.  By implicating patriarchal systems 
in men‟s violence against women, and framing the issues as a violations of women‟s civil 
rights (Haaken, 2010), feminist activists were poised to lobby for significant changes in 
childcare, education, financial equity, legislation, and political power.  If public outcry 
over the plight of victims of domestic violence could be mobilized, feminist activists 
hoped that substantial gains in the women‟s liberation movement might be possible.  
Implicating men‟s social, financial, and political power over women in women‟s 
victimization at the hands of men provided a perfect opportunity to lobby for greater and 
more unilateral gender equality.  
Oversimplifying the “patriarchy as cause” explanation of men’s violence  
Unfortunately, over the years the “patriarchy as cause” explanation for men‟s 
violence has been oversimplified and constricted within mainstream domestic violence 
discourse.  While original theorists (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Schechter, 1982) created 
space in their analysis for the inclusion of individual, social and societal level forces 
impacting men‟s violence, the translation or dominant script about why men abuse their 
intimate partners has rigidified over time into a singular and consequently more limited 
explanation that essentially claims that men are violent because they choose to exercise 
their patriarchal rights and privileges (Haaken, 2010).  While there are certainly 
advantages to focusing responsibility for men‟s abuse of their intimate partners 
exclusively on men themselves, this explanation captures only part of a much more 
complex story.   It disregards the impact that individual and social level forces (such as 
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mental illness, drugs and alcohol, or childhood abuse) have on any given man‟s decision 
to “choose” violence and it marginalizes feminist analyses of men‟s violence that 
incorporate the ways that societal level forces such as race and class oppression interact 
with patriarchy to influence the actions of individual men (Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 
1994; Haaken, 2010; Ritchie, 2000).   
It is not particularly surprising that constriction towards a singular or narrow 
explanation of men‟s violence has occurred within the mainstream domestic violence 
movement; this often happens within social movements as they turn to sound bites or 
slogans in order to galvanize and unify activists.   In her recently published book entitled, 
Hard Knocks: Domestic violence and the psychology of storytelling, Jan Haaken (2010) 
notes that important strength was derived from creating a unifying statement or story to 
explain men‟s violence; however she cautions that this unification was achieved at the 
cost of other important stories. “Although mobilizing around a unifying story of woman 
battering was an advance, the search for a single voice in resisting male violence in the 
household also meant that some voices were inevitably shouted down” (p. 8).  
The stories most ardently silenced were those that involved men‟s experiences of 
victimization, whether that victimization occurred at the hand of individual level factors 
such as mental illness or social level factors such as witnessing marital abuse as a child, 
or institutionalized factors such as race or class oppression.  Haaken (2010) speculates 
that mainstream feminist activists have been operating as though theorizing men‟s 
violence were a zero sum game where acknowledgement of any suffering or hardship 
experienced by abusive men takes something away from abused women. “One of the real 
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difficulties in feminist theorizing concerning abusive men is that any concession of the 
suffering and humanity of violent men seems to lead to lost ground for women” (p. 168).  
While this approach is understandable given centuries of theorizing about men‟s violence 
that displaced responsibility onto the devil, stress, poverty, and women (Gordon, 1988; 
Pleck, 1987), ignoring the sources and impact of men‟s victimization has severely limited 
the usefulness of the “patriarchy as cause” theory for explaining why they perpetrate.   
Feminists of color like Kimberele Crenshaw (1994), Beth Richie (2000), and 
Angela Davis (1990) have been insisting for decades that while patriarchy may be 
responsible for men‟s violence against women, it is not solely responsible. Instead, 
patriarchy operates in conjunction with race and class oppression to impact men‟s use of 
violence towards their intimate partners.  “The systematic oppression of women in our 
society cannot be accurately evaluated except as it is connect to racism and class 
exploitation” (Davis, 1990, p. 50).  In other words, while feminists of color may concur 
that men‟s violence towards women is influenced by patriarchy, their conceptualizations 
include an analysis and recognition that men of color and men in poverty suffer from 
oppressions that interact and limit the power and control that they experience under 
patriarchy.  “Each individual derives varying amounts of penalty and privilege from the 
multiple systems of oppression which frame everyone‟s lives” (Collins, 2000, p. 287).  
For men who have been subjected to racial and economic oppression, the dominant and 
narrow version of the “patriarchy as cause” explanation for their violence is likely to be 
incongruent with their own personal histories and realities (Kaufman, 1994).  The notion 
that their abuse stems from the power and control society imparts to them through 
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patriarchy is consistent with some aspects of their relationship to women, but not others.  
Certainly a poor, undocumented, migrant farm worker from Mexico may have difficulty 
connecting to the theory that he batters because he holds the belief that it is acceptable to 
dominate all women.  He may feel domination over his wife, but he likely does not feel 
the same sense of power when confronted with affluent White women.   
In his book entitled, Masculinities and Crime: Critique and Reconceptualization 
of Theory, James Messerschmidt (1993) suggests that while under patriarchy, crime (and 
violence) may be used to accomplish masculinity, each man‟s construction of masculinity 
is also significantly impacted by their socio-economic status and race. 
Men are positioned differently throughout society and, therefore, share with other 
men the construction of masculinities peculiar to their position in society.  A 
sociology of masculinity must acknowledge that socially organized power 
relations among and between men are historically constructed on the basis of 
class, race, and sexual orientation.  In other words, while there is a complex 
interlocking of masculinities, these masculinities are quite clearly unequal (p. 81). 
An interpretation of “patriarchy as cause” that suggests men are abusive because they 
choose to express their socially endorsed power and control may be less helpful for 
describing poor men or men of color if it doesn‟t account for and incorporate the 
influence of race or class oppression.   
Ironically, it appears as though the “patriarchy as cause” explanation has been 
distilled within mainstream discourse in such a way as to contradict its origins as a 
societal/institutional level explanation.  By focusing so narrowly on individual men‟s 
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choice and ignoring the multi-faceted ways that patriarchy exerts influence, one is left to 
wonder, how exactly does patriarchy cause men to choose domestic violence?  In other 
words, how does patriarchy at the societal level translate into individual men‟s choice to 
use violence towards their intimate partners?  To respond to this question, additional 
sources of influence might need to be considered.  In other words, one might need to look 
at how patriarchal values get transmitted.  Is it through the schools, media, workplace and 
governmental practices, community groups and organizations, peer groups, or extended 
family?  Additionally, it seems plausible that individual men‟s willingness to grab the 
power promised to them under patriarchy may be linked to their mental health, education, 
income, or experiences of oppression due to race and ethnicity?   Acknowledging the 
individual level forces (such as mental illness and substance abuse), the group level 
forces (such as family dynamics, modeling, peer groups, work environments, community 
groups) as well as the societal level forces (such as racism and classism) that work 
together in order to translate patriarchal values, beliefs, and privilege, suggests the need 
to re-broaden the “patriarchy as cause” conceptualization in order to embrace the ways in 
which patriarchy impacts men at multiple levels of analysis.   
A multi-level conceptualization of men’s violence against women   
There is a burgeoning trend towards the development of multi-faceted 
explanations of men‟s violence, ones that incorporate knowledge from various 
disciplines, rather than privileging one at the expense of the others (Brooks & Silverstein, 
1995; Harway & O‟Neil, 1999).  This trend, however, is still marginalized and there are 
only a handful of theories that attempt “a more complete theoretical framework [that] 
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would complement macro-level explanations with individual-level explanations” 
(Magdol, Moffitt, Caspi & Silva, 1998, p. 375).  It is more common for theorists to 
acknowledge that domestic violence is multi-faceted, but still focus primarily on their 
specific discipline‟s level of analysis when identifying antecedents.  Rigazio-DiGilio & 
Lanza (1999) have articulated what a growing number in the field believe: “it is our 
contention that the field would benefit from ecological frameworks that advance the 
integration of factors, such as biology, interpersonal communication and power 
discrepancies, gender socialization, socio-cultural factors and historical determinants 
because these are [all] understood to contribute to relational violence” (p. 153).   
Michele Harway and James O‟Neil (1999) offer precisely this type of framework 
with their multivariate model explaining men‟s risk factors for violence against women.  
In What Causes Men’s Violence Against Women, they extensively review the range of 
theories that have been advanced to explain men‟s violence against women and propose a 
multivariate model that strives to acknowledge the role of all previously summarized 
influences on men‟s violence, suggesting that for each particular man the constellation of 
influences interact in idiosyncratic ways (see Figure 1).   Their model recognizes the 
influences of societal violence and cultural oppression, sociocultural factors such as race, 
class, age, men and women‟s gender role socialization, couples‟ interactional patterns, 
men‟s conscious and unconscious psychological processes, as well as biological, 
hormonal and evolutionary factors.  Specifically, they suggest that there are multiple risk 
factors that interact to create an individual‟s propensity for violence towards women.  
These risk factors fall into seven categories: biological, psychological, relational, 
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socialization, macrosocietal, and psychosocial and interacting risks.   The biological risk 
factors include physiologic predispositions to violence, including genetics, hormones, and 
neuroanatomy.  The psychological risk factors include a man‟s mental and emotional 
processes that support attitudes, values and behaviors that lead to violence against 
women.  Relational risk factors include the dynamic patterns of interaction within the 
couple that lend themselves to violence.  Socialization risk factors include narrowly 
defined masculine gender role and their corresponding values, attitudes, and behaviors, 
and macrosocietal risks include institutional structures and forms of oppression such as 
racism and classism.  The psychosocial and interacting risk factors take into 
consideration the transactional relationship that exists between the psychological, 
socialization and macrosocietal risk factors.   
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Harway and O‟Neil offer the following advice in concluding their book: 
Future study on the risk factors of men‟s violence against women needs to be 
multidisciplinary and collegial…  Given the complexity of men‟s risk for 
violence, multiple theories are needed.  This implies that sociological, 
psychological, biological, evolutionary and family systems and relational theories 
need to be integrated...We indicated that the previous theories on the causes of 
violence against women sometimes appeared fragmented, rigidly bound by 
discipline or political agendas and developed in reaction to the predominant 
paradigm of each decade… We think it is time for theoreticians, researchers and 
practitioners to move on with more collaborative, constructive, and 
interdisciplinary dialogues about the causes of men‟s violence. (O‟Neil & 
Harway, 1999, p. 213) 
Advancing a multi-level conceptualization of men‟s violence against women does not 
diminish the importance and influence of patriarchy; rather it seeks to understand its 
influence in concert with forces or factors at the individual, social and societal level.  
Unfortunately, as described earlier, conceptualizations like O‟Neil and Harway‟s (1999) 
are not widely endorsed or discussed within the field, an absence that likely impacts the 
range of intervention strategies available, as well as their efficacy. 
In the next section, I provide a brief narrative on the evolution of current domestic 
violence intervention strategies with abusive men.  Given the suggestion that we 
intervene most successfully when our interventions match our definition of a problem 
(e.g., what causes men‟s violence against women) at the level of analysis (Watzlawick, 
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Weakland, &  Fisch, 1974), it may be important to observe the intended and actual 
targeted level of analysis in our dominant strategies.  In other words, if a primarily 
societal level explanation (e.g., “patriarchy as cause”) has emerged as the dominant 
conceptualization of men‟s violence, it may be important to ascertain whether dominant 
strategies successfully target societal level changes.  It may also be worth noticing 
whether our interventions are inextricably limited by our theoretical boundaries and vice-
versa.  If theoretically we are still in a nascent state with regard to multi-faceted 
explanations of men‟s violence, it may be reasonable to suspect that our interventions 
may be more uni- than multi-dimensional.  Similarly, the scarcity of multi-level theories 
explaining men‟s violence may partially be a result of the impracticality of implementing 
more complex strategies.  Perhaps it is just too difficult to design and manage 
interventions based on multi-variate models such as O‟Neil & Harway‟s (1999).  What 
would it look like to design interventions that respond to each individual man‟s risk 
factors for recidivism at seven levels of analysis?   
Intervening in Men’s Violence Against Women 
Current domestic violence intervention strategies for abusive men in the United 
States are the result of a confluence of pressures, most of which are attributable to the 
steady growth and influence of the domestic violence movement (Pence & Shepard, 
1999).   As the number of women accessing victim advocacy services grew in the 1970‟s, 
awareness increased that something also needed to be done with the perpetrators of abuse 
(Dobash, Dobash, Cavanagh, & Lewis, 2000; Pence & Shepard, 1999).  Victim advocates 
reasoned that it was not a wholly effective strategy to merely aid women in escaping their 
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battering partners, because quite often women would return to their abusers after a brief 
hiatus in a shelter (Adams & McCormick, 1982; Geffner & Rosenbaum, 2001; Jennings, 
1987; LaViolette, 2001).  Additionally, shelter workers noticed that they often provided 
assistance to multiple victims of the same abuser (Gondolf, 1987; LaViolette, 2001).  
Those few abusive men whose partners somehow managed to leave them would often 
just move on to victimize a different woman (Geffner & Rosenbaum, 2001).   
Recognizing that they neither had the expertise, nor the desire to prioritize work 
with these men, victim advocates enlisted the assistance of male counselors (Jennings, 
1987).  In the late 1970‟s, shelter workers in Boston encouraged a group of male 
therapists to develop an intervention program for abusive men.  The resulting Emerge 
Collective became the first program in the United States for male batterers (Adams & 
McCormick, 1982).  The initial treatment goals were to help men recognize responsibility 
for violent behavior, question their socialized ideas about sex roles, and become more 
attuned to their emotional needs and dependency on women (Jennings, 1987).   
The rapid proliferation of programs like Emerge (Adams & McCormick, 1982), 
now commonly referred to as batterer intervention programs, was in many ways the 
direct result of advocates‟ increased efforts to engage the criminal justice system as an 
ally to protect battered women (Shepard & Pence, 1999).  It was neither realistic nor 
excusable that the only protection abused women could secure was in the form of 
“underground”, under-funded shelters.  Subsequently, advocates began exerting intense 
pressure on the criminal justice system, insisting that it recognize women‟s status as 
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equal citizens by prosecuting domestic violence like any other crime against the citizen 
state (Miller, 2001).   
Activists in the U.S. battered women‟s movement [sic] argued successfully that 
the state has an obligation to intervene in personal relationships to protect women 
from their abusive partners, that it can and should remove violent husbands from 
their private homes to protect women in their private homes, that the police 
should arrest husbands for assault, and that the state should prosecute them. 
(Pence & Shepard, 1999, p. 5) 
By the early 80‟s, advocates‟ lobbying efforts to secure greater responsiveness 
from law enforcement began to meet with some success.  States began to expand police 
powers, allowing officers to make arrests for misdemeanor domestic assault without a 
warrant and without having witnessed the assault as long as there was “probable cause” 
that an assault had taken place (Brygger & Edleson, 1987).  In 1984, The Minneapolis 
Police Experiment (Sherman & Burk, 1984) demonstrated a substantial deterrent effect of 
arrest on subsequent domestic violence, prompting even greater willingness and urgency 
to criminalize domestic violence (Jolin, 2008).  The result was the adoption of mandatory 
arrest laws by most states (Miller, 2004).  Mandatory arrest laws require police officers 
called to the scene of a domestic violence dispute to make an arrest, as opposed to 
mediation or separation, if there is evidence to support such an action.   
The advantages of warrantless arrests are several.  It is easier to take a suspect 
into custody at the scene than to locate him after obtaining a warrant from the 
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court [and] police are more likely to initiate prosecution if they can arrest at the 
time they respond to the domestic violence call. (Hart, 1993, p. 22)  
The procurement of the criminal justice system as an ally in the intervention of 
domestic violence has been protracted (Gordon, 1988; Pleck, 1987).  An enforcer of 
patriarchal privilege for generations, genuine change within the system has been slow 
(Fusco, 1989).  It took years of consistent pressure to get police to begin responding to 
calls for help by victims (Roy, 1977; Saunders & Size, 1980) and even more time and 
energy to get district attorneys to prosecute perpetrators in the absence of testimony from 
battered women (Hartman & Belknap, 2003).  The struggle to convince judges to 
sentence perpetrators continues today (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003; Hemmens, Strom, & 
Schlegel, 1998).  However, in partnering with the criminal justice system, victim 
advocates successfully initiated a critical paradigm shift.  Responsibility for ending 
domestic violence began to move from individual victims to the state (Brygger & 
Edleson, 1987), which grudgingly acknowledged that it should protect victims of 
domestic abuse and prosecute perpetrators as it would any other criminal.  Mandatory 
arrest, probable cause arrest, no-drop, and pro-prosecution policies served to move the 
responsibility for action away from the victim to the legal system (Weisz, Tolman, & 
Bennet, 1998).    
It is notable that in targeting the criminal justice system as a site for change 
(Pence, 1999), advocates were attempting to correct historically unjust disparities in the 
treatment of battered women (Fagan, 1996).  This type of institutional level reform 
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aligned with their societal level conceptualization (e.g., patriarchy as cause) of men‟s 
violence against women.   
The law is on board. Now what do we do with the perpetrators? 
  According to Miller (2004), over 700 enactments (either amendments to old laws 
or adoption of new laws) related to domestic violence were approved between 1997 and 
2003.  “Legislative attention to the problem of domestic violence led … to the enactment 
of an avalanche of new laws in the 50 states” (Miller, 2004, p. 1).  Unfortunately, the 
courts were ill-equipped to manage the influx of men arrested as a result of this 
“criminalization” (Fagan, 1996) of domestic violence.  Judges were hesitant to send first 
time offenders to prison, yet felt compelled to respond to victim advocates‟ insistence on 
consequences (Holtzworth-Munroe, 2001).  Though batterer intervention programs were 
rather new and untested as an effective “treatment” for domestic violence, they seemed a 
reasonable compromise to a dismissal of all charges or prison time (Gelles, 2001; 
Gondolf, 2002).  Judges began mandating attendance at intervention programs as a 
condition of probation following arrest and conviction or in some cases as a way to defer 
conviction (Ganley, 1987; Hamberger & Hastings, 1993; Harrell, 1991; Pence, 1999; 
Soler, 1987).   
A wide range of programs initially emerged under the rubric of batterer 
intervention (Fagan, 1996; Gondolf, 2002; Healey et al., 1998).  Although most programs 
shared some common elements such as professionally led, single gendered groups of 
mostly court-mandated men coming together once a week for several months, the 
curriculum, structure, and practices for attempting to change participants varied (Babcock 
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et al., 2004; Mankowski, Wilson, Silvergleid, Chamberlain, Truesdell, & Huffine, 2002).  
In other words, the theories about what causes men‟s violence towards women that the 
interventionists relied upon to develop curriculum varied (Fagan, 1996).  This variation 
can be loosely summarized by three orientations: psycho-dynamic, anger 
management/cognitive behavioral, and feminist psycho-educational (Gondolf, 2002; 
Mankowski, Haaken, Silvergleid, 2002).   
Groups oriented towards a psycho-dynamic or analytic approach developed in 
response to individual level explanations of men‟s violence and target men‟s mental 
distress or inner psychic turmoil as the root of their abusive behavior (Brown, Saunders 
& Staecker, 1997).  These programs are designed to provide a supportive environment 
within which men can “heal” from their past or present emotional injuries, thereby 
nullifying the source of their violent behavior.  In these programs, insight and the client-
therapist or client-client relationship are seen as the primary processes responsible for 
change or improvement.  Group sessions are unstructured in that the facilitator guides the 
discussions around certain themes, but only as they emerge naturally from the members 
themselves (Jennings, 1987).  This approach relies heavily on self-help principles of 
reciprocity and self-disclosure, as well as mutual responsibility (Levine, 1988).  Men 
change because they are inspired through the support of the other men in the group to 
change.   
Anger management/cognitive behavioral interventions are also derived from 
individual level theories; ones that suggest men are abusive to their partners because they 
do not have appropriate skills and tools to manage their emotions, including anger 
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(Tolman & Edleson, 1989).  Consequently, groups in this genre focus on providing 
education and training regarding more appropriate methods (i.e., non violent) of dealing 
with and communicating emotions and desires.  These programs rely heavily on 
structured skill building activities such as exercises in anger reduction (e.g., “time-outs”), 
self-observation such as journaling, cognitive restructuring, relaxation training, and role 
plays that illuminate acceptable responses to conflict (Tolman & Edleson, 1989).   
Feminist psycho-educational groups developed in response to the “patriarchy as 
cause” analysis of men‟s violence suggesting that domestic violence is a conscious choice 
by men to use power and control in abusive ways.  Advocates of this analysis postulated 
that what batterers need in an intervention program is education about how their violence 
is an unacceptable choice and the alternatives at their disposal (Babcock et al., 2004).  
This model of batterer intervention is more explicitly political and assumes that male 
violence towards women is a symptom and mechanism of male dominance and control 
over women, that is, of patriarchy (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).  Physical violence is not 
seen as a result of past or present trauma or skill deficits, but as a deliberate, intentional 
choice to establish and or maintain authority and control over women.   Advocates of 
psycho-educational groups suggest that men will change when they are held accountable 
for and directly confronted with their patriarchal attitudes, beliefs and behaviors (Pence 
& Paymar, 1993).  The goal of these programs is to educate men.  This education is 
accomplished through presentations, role play and by challenging and confronting the 
men in the group, drawing attention to each instance when a man tries to escape 
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responsibility or accountability for his behavior by either blaming his partner, his past 
traumas or current problems.    
Coordinating a more effective response to domestic violence 
Institutional change is difficult to accomplish and victim advocates became 
increasingly frustrated by what appeared to be a lack of consistency and coordination 
among the facets of the criminal justice system (Gamache & Asmus, 1999).  Advocates 
started to believe that battered women would not be safe until abusive men were 
consistently confronted both by the criminal justice system through arrest, prosecution 
and sentencing, and by batterer intervention programs regarding the inappropriateness 
and unacceptability of abuse and violence towards their intimate partners (Gamache & 
Asmus, 1999; Pence & Paymar, 1993; Stover, 2005).  These views regarding what was 
necessary in order to protect women from intimate partner violence were translated into a 
model of intervention now commonly referred to as the Duluth Model (Pence & Paymar, 
1993).  The Duluth Model, developed by the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project 
(DAIP) in Minnesota, calls for a coordinated community response to domestic violence.   
A coordinated community response involves police, prosecutors, probation 
officers, battered women‟s advocates, counselors and judges in developing and 
implementing policies, and procedures that improve interagency coordination and 
lead to more uniform response to domestic violence cases (Shepard, 1999).   
Advocates for the Duluth Model argued that men would only be held truly accountable 
for their actions when law enforcement, victim advocates, the courts, and batterer 
intervention providers coordinated their efforts and services.  Common elements of the 
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coordinated community response include victim advocates, legislative reforms, law 
enforcement, district attorneys, judges, batterer intervention providers, and child 
protective services (see Figure 2).        
This vision for how best to intervene in domestic violence received a critical 
endorsement upon the passage of the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act, which provided crime prevention and response assistance to states and local 
communities (Ptacek, 2010).  One section of this act specifically targeted violent crimes 
against women.  Entitled the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), this congressional 
action set aside 1.3 billion dollars to prevent and respond to the domestic and sexual 
abuse of women (Orchowsky, 1999).  One distribution requirement was that a portion of 
funds had to be utilized for enhancing collaboration and coordination among law 
enforcement, prosecution, victim services, and the courts (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).   
It has been suggested that one of the reasons the Duluth Model of coordinated 
community response is so wide-spread today is the result of the federal funding that 
became available under the VAWA act (Grauwiler & Mills, 2004).  Prior to VAWA, 
federal and state funding for domestic violence intervention was virtually nonexistent.  
VAWA provided desperately needed resources to develop and offer training to law 
enforcement, district attorneys and judges about domestic violence, enhance 
communication and accountability among the key players, and improve victim services.  
It is interesting to note that communities did not get rewarded (i.e., they did not receive 
funding) if their efforts at coordinating a response to domestic violence did not include 
collaboration with law enforcement and the courts.  It other words, it was not considered 
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a coordinated community response if faith communities, mental health agencies and 
educators came together to address the problem of domestic violence.  In essence, the 
VAWA act codified the central role of the criminal justice system in the intervention of 
domestic violence.    
In many communities, the principle mode for establishing the requisite 
collaboration involved setting up domestic violence coordinating councils.  These 
councils were made up of representatives from the various agencies privileged by the 
VAWA act: law enforcement, probation, courts, and victim advocates.  Although 
coordinating councils vary from community to community, most have traditionally 
focused on improving police responsiveness to distress calls, enhancing prosecutorial 
efforts, encouraging judicial use of strict and immediate sanctions for perpetrators and 
insuring that batterer intervention programs receiving court referrals adhere to an 
appropriate model of intervention (Allen, 2006).  
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What is “appropriate” batterer intervention? 
The rapidly growing number of men arrested for domestic violence led to an 
explosion of batterer intervention programs with varying structure, curriculum and 
practices.  This variation was troublesome to many involved in the coordinated 
community response (Geffner & Rosenbaum, 2001).  “There was no central 
administrative agency that coordinated the programs, no standards for who could offer 
the programs, and no requirements regarding the qualifications of the clinicians who 
treated batterers.  There was no oversight whatsoever for the treatment modalities and 
their effectiveness (or lack thereof)” (Gelles, 2001, p. 12).   If batterer intervention 
programs were going to be mandated as a condition of probation following a domestic 
violence conviction it was not appropriate for men who committed similar crimes to 
receive vastly different legal consequences (i.e., intervention programs).  Additionally, 
victim advocates maintained that domestic violence was a symptom of patriarchy, of 
men‟s domination over women, and that to say that it was about anger or about 
unresolved childhood trauma, or for that matter substance abuse or mental illness, was to 
essentially excuse men‟s choices (Corvo & Johnson, 2001).   
In the mid-90‟s, states began to develop standards or guidelines regarding 
acceptable practices for batterer intervention programs (Holtzworth-Munroe, 2001).  
Topics traditionally addressed in these standards include degree of participation in a 
coordinated community response, length of program time, completion requirements, 
qualifications of facilitators, partner contact, and content to address during the program 
(Austin & Dankwort, 1999; Bennett & Piet, 1999).  Standards also often dictate what is 
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not acceptable, often barring practices such as couples counseling, individual therapy, 
and anger management (Austin & Dankwort, 1999).  In Oregon, the state standards 
suggest, among many other guidelines, that batterer intervention programs need to be part 
of the coordinated community response, promote recognition and accountability for 
patterns of controlling and abusive behavior, avoid suggesting, offering or recommending 
couples or family counseling, and avoid identifying anger, substance abuse, or mental 
health problems as the primary cause of battering (Oregon Department of Justice, 2005).   
The movement to standardize batterer intervention programs might have been 
handicapped without buy-in from the criminal justice system.  Certainly standards could 
be developed and adopted; however, most states lack the means through which to 
regulate compliance.  Given that approximately 75% of clients in batterer intervention are 
mandated to attend programs by the courts (Gondolf, 2002), a highly effective method for 
regulation was for judges to sentence men to attend only those programs that meet 
statewide standards.  Obviously, this became a powerful incentive for programs to adhere 
to guideline specifications.    
 The fact that victim advocates have been successful in shaping what constitutes 
acceptable domestic violence intervention with abusive men through the widespread 
adoption of the Duluth Model and statewide standardization of batterer intervention 
programs is encouraging in that it suggests a triumph in their efforts to engage patriarchal 
institutions on behalf of battered women.  That the knowledge and wisdom of victim 
advocates is being honored, and by proxy the lived experiences of battered women, is 
certainly a reason to celebrate.  After centuries of turning a blind eye and blaming women 
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who are victims of men‟s violence, it is commendable that the criminal justice system has 
become a pillar of the domestic violence movement. Unfortunately, the success of the 
victim advocacy community to engage the criminal justice system on behalf of battered 
women has not been without problematic consequences (Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; 
Guzik, 2009; Mankowski et al., 2002; Pence, 1999; Ptacek, 2010), consequences that 
feminist activists have been among the first to acknowledge (Stark, 2005).  
Too much of a good thing? Unintended consequences of the criminal justice response  
A growing number of analysts in the domestic violence field have expressed 
concerns regarding current intervention strategies, recognizing that “the criminal justice 
system is no panacea for a problem as complex and persistent as domestic violence” 
(DeLeon-Granados, Wells, & Binsbacher, 2006, p. 368).  A report issued following a 
round table sponsored by the Ms. Foundation for Women, entitled Safety & Justice For 
All: Examining the Relationship Between the Women’s Anti-Violence Movement and the 
Criminal Legal System (2003) outlines concerns that many activists within the field 
experience with regard to current dependence or perhaps “over-reliance” on the criminal 
justice system.  Issues raised include unintended negative consequences for victims when 
the State enters their lives, the complexities that surface when we consider the interplay 
of race and class in the appropriation of policies and services (Guzik, 2009; Haaken, 
2010; Jolin, 2008; INCITE! 2003; Messerschmidt, 1993; Ritchie, 2000), and the lack of 
alternative, innovative community-based solutions to domestic violence (Ptacek, 2010).  
In light of these issues, one question that emerges is, “How can the anti-domestic 
violence movement be reflective and self-critical about their analysis of battering and the 
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role of criminalization without demeaning or devaluating the integrity of activists‟ work 
or their accomplishments over the last 30 years?” (McMahon & Pence, 2003, p. 61).   
The problem with mandatory arrest and pro-prosecution policies. There has been 
a surge of research and writing in the past 10 years regarding the problematic 
consequences of mandatory arrest policies (Guzik, 2009; Smith, 2001).  “Serious 
unintended consequences can occur as a result of police interventions, including 
retaliation against victims by their abusers, dual arrests, and the potential lack of cultural 
sensitivity to victims and perpetrators” (Danis, 2003, p. 4).  One of the greatest concerns 
stems from the rapid increase in the number of women being arrested for domestic 
violence (Erwin, 2006).  Current estimates suggest that women now constitute 
approximately 20% of those arrested for domestic violence (Henning & Renauer, 2005; 
McMahon & Pence, 2003).  DeLeon-Granados et al. (2006) report that between 1987 and 
2000, women‟s rates of arrest increased by more than 500%.  Although there are certainly 
a handful of researchers and theorists who argue that this increase simply reflects the fact 
that domestic violence is a behavior that both women and men perpetrate (Dutton & 
Nicholls, 2005), most suggest that this increase reflects a tragic inability of the 
monolithic criminal justice system to respond to the complexity of domestic violence 
cases (Chesney-Lind, 2002; Melton & Belknap, 2003).  For example, the fact that the 
criminal justice system is “incident-driven”, such that circumstances, meaning, and 
motivations associated with violent action are irrelevant, has been credited by some with 
the increase in female arrestees for domestic violence (Miller, 2001).  “By following the 
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letter of the law, … law enforcement officers often disregard the context in which victims 
of violence resort to using violence themselves” (Miller, 2001, p. 1340).   
Others explain the increase by alluding to the fact that there may be two 
qualitatively different forms of violence occurring within intimate relationships, common 
couple violence and patriarchal terrorism (Erez & King, 2000; Johnson, 1995; Melton & 
Belknap, 2003).   
Evidence from large sample survey research and from data gathered from 
women‟s shelters and other public agencies suggests that a large number of 
families suffer from occasional outbursts of violence from either husbands or 
wives or both, while a significant number of other families are terrorized by 
systematic male violence enacted in the service of patriarchal control. (Johnson, 
1995, p. 283) 
Proponents of this explanation suggest that one result of mandatory arrest laws is that 
women engaging in common couple violence are now being arrested under the guise of 
laws originally designed to protect them from patriarchal terrorism.  Regardless of the 
explanation, arresting women who are violent in self-defense (Miller, 2001; Renzetti, 
1994) is certainly an unintended outcome of the criminalization of domestic violence.   
Another concern frequently raised in discussions regarding the impact of the 
criminalization of domestic violence stems from the shift of power that occurs when the 
state gets involved in private lives.  Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecutorial strategies 
have been identified as particularly disempowering to women (Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; 
McDermott & Garofalo, 2004; Ms. Foundation for Women, 2003; Orchowsky, 1999).   
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Mandatory processes do not allow women to make their own decisions about how 
to address the violence in their lives, contributing to a feeling of powerlessness for 
battered women.  Some feel that the system exerts control over women‟s lives, 
comparable to the batterer.” (Ms. Foundation for Women, 2003, p. 6) 
 No longer are women able to choose whether or not to have their perpetrator arrested and 
prosecuted.  Originally designed to protect victims from having to make these tough 
choices, as well as to protect them from retaliation for those choices (Jordan, 2004; 
Mears, Carson, Holden, & Harris, 2001; Orchowsky, 1999), these policies have largely 
taken control and power away from women (Ford, 2003). 
Of particular concern is the fact that these policies may disproportionately impact 
poor women who are more likely to be dependent upon their abuser‟s income for survival 
(Iovanni & Miller, 2001).   “Women who reach out to the court for protection may have 
some ambivalence about having a partner arrested and may be fearful regarding the 
ability to financially provide for herself and her children if she is financially dependent 
on the offender” (Jordan, 2004, p. 1413).  While women from lower socioeconomic 
groups may be more reliant upon the criminal justice system to intervene (Hutchinson, 
Hirschel, & Pesackis, 1992), often lacking other means and resources to leave an abusive 
situation, they are also more likely to become victimized by the intervention they invite.  
McMahon & Pence (2003) point out that the police are often the only options available to 
poor women.  Who else is “legally obligated to come and stop the violence?” (p. 60). 
Unfortunately, when they do call for police assistance, they also turn over all decision-
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making authority to the criminal justice system, often exacerbating their feelings of 
powerlessness (Ms. Foundation for Women, 2003).   
The situation is equally, if not more complicated for women of color and 
immigrants (Erwin, 2006; INCITE!, 2003; Miller, 1989; Ms. Foundation for Women, 
2003; Richie, 1996; Williams, 1998).   
The historic conflict and mistrust between the police and communities of color 
has its roots in U.S. slavery and is evidenced by the disproportionate number of 
people of color arrested and convicted of crime in this country.  Therefore, 
women of color may be reluctant to request police intervention because it may be 
viewed as disloyalty to their race, and they often feel obligated to protect their 
batterers from police and the criminal justice system. (Danis, 2003, p. 4)  
There are some who argue that women from some minority groups are more likely to call 
the police (Hutchinson et al., 1992), while others  indicate that for a variety of reasons 
(e.g., concerns regarding deportation; institutionalized racism) minority women are often 
more relunctant to engage the legal system (Ms. Foundation for Women, 2003; Rasche, 
1995; Ritchie, 2000).  Whether they choose to engage the legal system or not, this choice 
is clearly impacted by the knowledge that the legal system involves fundamentally 
problematic terrain.     
What about additional community solutions?  In discussing the centrality of the 
criminal justice system in our response to domestic violence, The Ms. Foundation for 
Women (2003) and others have questioned what it would look like if other aspects of 
community were empowered to respond as well (Shepard, 2005).   
Chapter Two: Mapping the Terrain 56 
 
 
What might it look like if communities had the resources to explore effective 
interventions that keep decision-making power within the community, and make 
it possible for women to stay in their community?  Where might we be if 
government accountability did not aim its efforts at criminal legal punishment, but 
instead centralized responsibility for basic needs and human dignity, and affirmed 
the human rights of all?” (Ms. Foundation for Women, p. 16) 
Unfortunately, promoting human rights through vital services for women remains 
woefully unfunded (Erwin, 2006; Hart, 1993).  Emergency and temporary housing is 
largely under funded, dependable child-care remains unattainable for many, flexible 
employment opportunities remain scarce, and alternative forms of batterer accountability 
such as restorative justice, reparation and community service remain largely underutilized 
and untested (Hart, 1993; Ms. Foundation for Women, 2003).  Until these services are 
supported, criminal justice efforts may continue to target only the symptom of the 
problem.   
Legal strategies collapse if the consciousness of the community is not aligned 
against violence, if emergency services and housing are not available to battered 
women and children, if human service institutions are not cognizant of domestic 
violence and are not employing strategies to safeguard victims and hold batterers 
accountable, and if the family and friends of the battered women and the batterer 
do not reject violence as an option in intimate relationships and offer support for 
safety and change.  (Hart, 1993, p. 27) 
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Most troubling perhaps is the fact that an over-reliance on the criminal justice 
system means that many victims of domestic violence go unserved (Tjaden & Thoennes, 
2000).  “Although a criminal justice focus is certainly a key component of fostering 
batterer accountability, it is important to recognize that many (if not most) survivors of 
domestic violence will not come into contact with the criminal justice system” (Allen, 
2006, p. 61).  Statistics suggest that only 2.5-15% of domestic violence is reported to the 
police (Bachman & Saltzman, 1995).  Additionally, most forms of domestic violence 
(e.g., psychological abuse, financial abuse, emotional abuse, and verbal abuse) are not 
illegal.  It seems reasonable to conclude that pursuing alternative intervention strategies 
that do not rely on these reports might enable a greater impact on domestic violence. 
 The trouble with standards.  Though standardization is not a direct result of the 
criminalization of domestic violence, it has certainly been facilitated by this trend.  As 
described in the previous section, state standards would have been hampered if an 
alliance with the criminal justice system did not exist.  It is primarily because of the 
courts‟ willingness to sentence men to approved programs that enforcement takes place.  
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the movement towards standardization stemmed from 
well-intentioned efforts to prevent the development and sustenance of ineffective or 
damaging programs, many believe that too little is known about what works and does not 
work to demand adherence to guidelines (Buttell & Carney, 2005; Corvo & Johnson, 
2003; Fagan, 1996; Feder & Wilson, 2005; Holtzworth-Munroe, 2001; Lehmann & 
Simmons, 2009).   
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Because no one treatment model of modality has demonstrated superiority over 
the others, it is premature for states to issue mandates limiting the range of 
treatment options for batterers.  Battering intervention agencies are more likely to 
improve their services by adding components or tailoring their treatments to 
specific clientele, than by rigidly adhering to any one curriculum in the absence of 
empirical evidence of its superior efficacy.” (Babcock et al., 2004, p. 1048) 
Implied in the movement towards standardization is the premise that one type of 
batterer intervention is appropriate for all men (Lehmann & Simmons, 2009).  This 
notion is consistent with the idea that the primary cause of men‟s violence is patriarchy 
(Dutton & Corvo, 2006; Lehmann & Simmons, 2009).  Ironically, there is only minimal 
evidence to suggest that batterers have more negative attitudes towards women than men 
who are not physically abusive to their female partners (Crossman, Stith, & Bender, 
1990; Date & Ronan, 2000; Moore & Stuart, 2005).  Instead, batterers tend to 
significantly vary from non-batterers on factors that strongly correlate with general 
violence perpetration, such as mental illness and drug and alcohol use.  Surprisingly, 
interventions for domestically abusive men have developed seemingly in isolation from 
what is known about general criminal recidivism (K. Henning, personal communication, 
February 27, 2007).  It may be instructive to examine intervention successes with other 
violent crimes (i.e., assessing and responding to individualized risk and matching 
treatment to offender needs and learning styles, [Andrews & Bonta, 2006; Dowden & 
Andrews, 2000]). For example, within the field of sex offender treatment, there is a 
growing recognition that a one-size-fits-all model may be inappropriate given the 
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significant differences between the needs and treatment prognosis for low versus high 
risk offenders (Andrews & Bonta, 2003; Conroy, 2006).   
Matching domestic violence perpetrator profiles to treatment strategies holds 
promise.  Holtzworth-Munroe, Meehan, Herron, Rehman, & Stuart (2003) found 
remarkable stability and predictability across previously identified subtypes of batterers: 
family only, generally violent, and dysphoric or borderline personality batterers 
(Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, 1994).  These types were significant predictors of 
treatment outcome and suggest the need to modify treatment approaches to meet some 
specific needs of men.   
Thus, across the available studies of this issue, the data suggest that identification 
of subtypes of men who are martially violent is predictive of treatment outcome in 
standard batterers‟ treatment programs.  A clinical implication of these findings is 
that treatment outcome might be improved by matching interventions to batterer 
subtypes.” (Holtzworth-Munroe & Meehan, 2004, p. 1385) 
There is also strong evidence to suggest that attending to the drug and alcohol issues of 
perpetrators may directly affect the success of batterer intervention programs (Jones & 
Gondolf, 2001, Stuart, 2005; Stuart et al., 2003; Stuart & Ramsey et al., 2003).  “Data 
suggests that batterer treatment outcome results could be dramatically improved with 
integrated or adjunct substance abuse interventions” (Stuart, 2005, p. 390).  For example, 
in a sample of 840 batterers, Jones & Gondolf (2001) found that violence recidivism was 
reduced by 30-40% if substance abuse treatment was provided in addition to batterer 
intervention.   
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It is not hard to speculate why men of color may not be best served by a one size 
fits all model (Cervantes & Cervantes, 1993; Yoshioka & Choi, 2005).  A message that 
does not include an acknowledgement of and discussion of the role that 
disenfranchisement from dominant culture plays in men‟s experiences perpetrating 
domestic violence may not be as well received as one that does examine this complex 
relationship.  In 1997, Gondolf reported, 
A disproportionate percentage of court-referred batterers in urban areas are men 
of color, but few racially specific programs have been established and few 
experienced minority staff are available.  Program staff … report that minority 
participants often perceive, interpret, and justify their abuse differently, and their 
experiences with the criminal justice system and social services in general are 
often different than those of other men in batterer groups. (p. 92) 
In addition to concerns regarding standardization and the efficacy of a one size 
fits all model of batterer intervention programs for men of color, concerns have been 
raised about even utilizing the criminal justice system to intervene with minority men.  Is 
it appropriate, wise, and effective to draw upon a historically racist institution to 
intervene with men of color? 
The link between race, ethnicity, and domestic violence … raises questions about 
the coordinated community response model.  If either low-income levels or 
race/ethnicity predispose some men toward violent behavior, and our response is 
to create a system in which incarceration is a very likely outcome for men of color 
who are physically abusive, this is a highly problematic response in a social 
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environment that already overly criminalizes men of color. (Mederos, 1999, p. 
143) 
Has the domestic violence movement fallen victim to the ecological fallacy? 
Finally, it may be worth exploring whether the criminal justice response 
sufficiently targets the societal level for change and aligns at the level of analysis with the 
dominant “patriarchy as cause” explanation.  While it is clear that changes in the criminal 
justice system can be understood as shifts in institutionalized patriarchy, it is also clear 
that patriarchy does not exist solely within the criminal justice system.  If the target of 
change is patriarchy, then it seems reasonable to expect successful intervention to target 
multiple institutions and engage multiple facets of society.  Certainly information about 
domestic violence has permeated other institutions such as the educational system, the 
health care system, and the media.  However the focus remains largely on recognizing 
and intervening with victims and perpetrators of domestic violence through the criminal 
justice system, as opposed to directly challenging patriarchy by shifting power dynamics 
and socialization practices towards greater gender equality.   It is interesting to note that 
the Duluth model was never intended to be so reliant upon the criminal justice system.  
Ellen Pence (1999) explains that,  
The DAIP staff saw the legal system as a starting point for community 
confrontation of domestic violence.  Unfortunately, it has failed to expand its 
institutional reform work to other community institutions (religious, economic, 
medical, media, education), which in fact have a much more powerful impact on 
creating social norms than does the reactive institution of criminal law.  (p. 33). 
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It is interesting to consider the degree to which the criminal justice response represents a 
societal level intervention.  Although it can be effectively argued that bringing awareness 
regarding domestic violence to the forefront of the criminal justice system represents a 
significant change in that institution, it is also true that the system‟s response is ultimately 
aimed at individuals.  The focus of most legal changes regarding domestic violence is on 
arresting, prosecuting, and mandating individual perpetrators to attend batterer 
intervention programs.  The dominant discourse within the criminal justice system is that 
individuals (mostly men) choose to use violence and this choice is disconnected from 
individual (i.e., substance abuse, mental illness), group (i.e., peer culture, family culture), 
and ironically, institutional (i.e., patriarchy, race, class, education, employment) level 
forces.  “Although the early days of the battered women‟s movement explicitly linked 
violence and gender subordination, this understanding has been transformed by 
increasing criminal justice intervention that introduces gender-neutral legal standards…” 
(Erwin, 2006, p. 199). 
Evaluating Domestic Violence Intervention with Abusive Men 
The domestic violence movement‟s hesitancy to embrace multi-faceted 
explanations for men‟s violence against women has gone hand in hand with somewhat 
restrictive intervention practices and limited evaluation findings (Corvo & Johnson, 
2003).  The fact that it has been so challenging to integrate multiple theoretical 
antecedents has likely delayed development of more complex, multi-faceted interventions 
just as concerns over dangerous intervention practices (e.g., couples counseling and anger 
management) prompted endorsement of theoretical explanations that made these 
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practices obsolete.  Unfortunately, these trends in theorizing and intervention in men‟s 
violence against women have contributed to a less than optimal state of research on 
domestic violence intervention. 
For over 20 years, research on the effects of increased criminal justice 
involvement in domestic violence has emphasized systemic reforms and efforts to 
increase the rate at which legal sanctions are applied.  Yet there remains 
inconsistent and inconclusive knowledge about the effectiveness of criminalizing 
domestic violence on controlling repeat victimization. (Fagan, 1996, p. 40).   
Although written well over a decade ago, Fagan‟s (1996) concerns with the state 
of research on the efficacy of domestic violence intervention with abusive men remain 
remarkably legitimate.  In particular, the existing body of research is characterized by a 
preponderance of inconsistent findings regarding the impact of the criminal justice 
system,  For example, despite the well-intentioned push for mandatory arrest laws in 
most states, the impact of arrest on future abuse remains uncertain (DeLeon-Granados, 
Wells & Long, 2005; Kingsnorth, 2006).  Early studies indicated that arrest functions as a 
deterrent (Sherman & Berk, 1984), particularly for married, employed men, however 
later research suggested that arrest for certain populations might actually increase the 
rates of future domestic violence (Schmidt & Sherman, 1996; Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, 
& Rogan, 1992).  A recent re-examination of six high profile arrest experiments, known 
collectively as the Spouse Assault Replication Program (SARPs), revealed a modest, but 
consistent deterrent effect (equating to a 4-10% decrease) of arrest on future recidivism 
(Maxwell, Garner, Fagan, 2001).  Despite the adoption of no-drop prosecution laws in 
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many states, rates of prosecution vary, ranging from 5 to 70% for misdemeanor domestic 
abuse cases (Fagan, 1989; Ford, 1993; Ford, 2003; Henning & Feder, 2005).   When 
prosecution is pursued, there is not conclusive evidence supporting its deterrent effects 
(Kingsnorth, 2006; Thistlethwaite, Woolredge, & Gibbs, 1998; Tolman & Weisz, 1995).  
Fagan (1989) reported that men with prior arrest records or histories of severe intimate 
partner violence were actually more likely to re-offend if prosecuted.   
The findings on the impact of court mandated batterer intervention programs are 
similarly unconvincing.  Most men (between 50-80%) mandated to attend batterer 
intervention programs never show up for their initial intake interview (Babcock & 
Steiner, 1999; Gondolf & Foster, 1991; Gondolf, 2000).  A similar number of men (60-
80%) who do attend one session never complete their assigned program (Gondolf & 
Foster, 1991; Gondolf, 2000; Grusznski & Carrillo, 1998).  Research suggests that 
between 20 and 60% of those few men who do manage to complete the program by 
attending the required number of sessions or activities will reassault a female partner 
within 15 months after starting their program (Babcock et al., 2004; Buttell & Carney, 
2005; Gondolf, 2002; Harrell, 1991; Henning & Holdford, 2006) and those most likely to 
recidivate often have a history of substance abuse (Hamberger & Hastings, 1990), past 
criminal behavior, and severe psychopathology (Gondolf, 2002; Grann & Wedin, 2002). 
Recent experimental and quasi-experimental studies specifically designed to 
clarify the impact of batterer intervention have produced mixed results.  For example, 
Feder & Dugan (2002) reported disappointing findings in the Broward County 
Courthouse randomized experiment where 404 male defendants convicted of 
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misdemeanor domestic violence were either assigned to one year probation or one year 
probation plus court mandated counseling.  No significant attitudinal or behavioral 
differences were noted between the control and treatment groups when self-report, 
victim-report and police reports were compared one year later.  Dunford (2000) 
completed an experimental evaluation at a Naval base where 861 men were randomly 
assigned to either a cognitive-behavioral group counseling program, couples counseling, 
strict monitoring or a control group in which women received some safety planning and 
men received minimal supervision.  Producing results similar to Feder & Dugan (2002), 
no differences in terms of repeat abuse and reassault during the one-year follow-up 
period were found among the four conditions.  On the flip side, Davis, Taylor & Maxwell 
(2000) reported more encouraging findings from their Brooklyn experiment where 376 
men convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence were either assigned to 40 hours of 
community service or 40 hours of a Duluth Model intervention program.  The men 
assigned to the 26 week Duluth program were half as likely (10% versus 26%) to 
recidivate as the men assigned to community service.     
Attempting to draw some definitive conclusions regarding the efficacy of batterer 
intervention programs, two meta-analytic reviews of existing experimental and quasi-
experimental studies were recently conducted.  The conclusions reached by these reviews 
suggest that batterer intervention programs have minimal impact.  Feder & Wilson (2005) 
reported a barely negligible effect size across 15 studies, particularly when evaluations 
solicited victim reports and utilized pre-treatment control groups.  “The results from the 
meta-analysis do not provide confidence that [batterer intervention] programs will be 
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found to be effective.  Therefore, it would prove beneficial for the criminal justice system 
to begin looking at other types of interventions for addressing the problem of domestic 
violence” (Feder & Wilson, 2005, p. 258).  A meta-analysis conducted one year earlier by 
Babcock et al., 2004 resulted in similar findings.  Their review of 22 experimental and 
quasi-experimental studies suggested a “small” effect size.  Putting the effect size into 
practical terms, they conclude, “there is a 5% increase in success rate attributable to 
treatment.  To a clinician, this means that a woman is 5% less likely to be re-assaulted by 
a man who was arrested, sanctioned, and went to a batterers‟ program than by a man who 
was simply arrested and sanctioned” (p. 1044).   
One of the greatest challenges in interpreting these results is not specific to 
research on batterer intervention programs, but is a limitation of experimental and quasi-
experimental designs.  Experiments can only ascertain a program effect if participants are 
actually exposed to the program.  In other words, if we merely compare men assigned to 
batterer intervention with men not assigned to batterer intervention, we may fail to find a 
very legitimate program effect if the men assigned to the treatment group never 
participate.  “Program dropouts in the experimental group, which also includes 
completers, may offset possible program effects among the completers and suggest that 
the program treatment effect is statistically negligible or ineffective” (Jones, D‟Agostino 
Jr., Gondolf, Heckert, 2004, p. 1003).   
It has been suggested that it may be more appropriate to compare men who 
complete batterer intervention (or receive a substantial dose of the program) with men 
who do not complete the program (Gondolf, 2002; Gondolf, 2001a).  When researchers 
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compare these two populations, findings are a bit more promising.  For example, Gordon 
& Moriarty (2003) evaluated the impact of batterer intervention on 258 men, 132 of 
whom received BI treatment.  Comparing the two groups, there was no significant 
difference in recidivism rates.  However when they compared the treatment completers 
(n=81) to treatment drop-outs (n=51), the men who completed were significantly less 
likely to reoffend within the one year follow-up period.  Hendricks, Werner, Shipway & 
Turinetti (2006) also reported that program completers had significantly lower rates of 
recidivism (10.6%) than those men who did not complete a mandated 14 week group 
treatment program (38.8%).  There are countless studies comparing treatment completers 
to non-completers suggesting similar results (Dutton, 1986; Gondolf, 1997a; Gondolf, 
2002; Hamberger & Hastings, 1990).  In one of the more rigorous and respected studies 
evaluating the impact of four different batterer intervention programs in four 
communities on 840 perpetrators, Gondolf (2002) reported a 36% reassault rates for men 
who attended at least two months of their assigned program compared to 55% for men 
who had dropped out, even when controlling for demographics, personality traits, and 
behavioral differences.  
Naturally, a comparison of treatment completers to treatment drop-outs raises the 
question of self-selection.  Men who choose to complete treatment are known to be 
different from those who drop out (e.g., more educated, more likely to be employed, 
married, Caucasian, and court-mandated, and less likely to have a criminal record) 
(Babcock & Steiner, 1999; Daly & Pelowski, 2000; Gondolf, 1997a).  Additionally, it has 
been determined that non-completers are more likely to be young, low income, less 
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educated, and consume greater amounts of alcohol (Cadsky, Hanson, Crawford, & 
Lalonde 1996; Daly & Pelowski, 2000; Gondolf, 1999a).  Attempting to determine 
whether individual self-selection is responsible for lower rates of recidivism among 
treatment completers as opposed to genuine treatment impact, remains challenging.  
However, even if treatment completers are unique from treatment drop-outs in ways that 
correlate with recidivism, this finding may not negate the impact of batterer intervention 
treatment. Would men, who are perhaps more likely given their demographics to change, 
be able to do so without the information, tools and support offered during batterer 
intervention?  More importantly, given that batterer intervention programs are currently a 
mainstay of dominant intervention strategies with abusive men, might a more useful 
question to consider be, what can be done to improve their efficacy? 
Unfortunately, outcome focused evaluations have produced few suggestions for 
how to modify and enhance programs.  Even if these studies were not riddled with 
methodological challenges, (i.e., difficulty maintaining random assignment, intention to 
treat versus actual treatment, low response rates, and a decontextualization of program 
impact [Gondolf, 2001a]) and their results could be tentatively accepted to imply that 
current domestic violence intervention strategies do not seem to change violent men, we 
have not learned anything about what might enable programs to intervene more 
effectively with perpetrators of domestic violence.  Furthermore, since most studies 
isolate and evaluate one component of the coordinated community response at a time, we 
know even less about how to improve domestic violence intervention with abusive men 
as a whole. 
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Promising new directions in evaluation 
In the last few years, researchers have recognized and begun to respond to these 
gaps by focusing on understanding how abusive men change during a batterer 
intervention program as well as attending to the impact of the coordinated community 
response as a system (Murphy et al., 1998; Pandya & Gingerich, 2002; Scott & Wolfe, 
2000; Silvergleid & Mankowski, 2006; Wangsgaard, 2001).  Exploring how men change, 
or documenting the processes of change, can identify candidates for improvement.  If we 
understand and document what activities, experiences, and opportunities facilitate shifts 
in values, cognitions, reactions and ultimately behaviors, programs can be modified to 
incorporate and emphasize those processes (Silvergleid & Mankowski, 2006).     
A small number of investigations have recently focused on the processes of 
change in batterer intervention, attempting to explicate the processes that account for 
program effectiveness (Pandya & Gingerich, 2002; Scott & Wolfe, 2000; Silvergleid & 
Mankowski, 2006; Wangsgaard, 2001).  Studies have revealed the importance of 
overcoming denial and engaging new ways of thinking (Pandya & Gingerich, 2002), the 
impact of recognizing and taking responsibility for past abusive behavior, developing 
empathy for others, reducing dependency, including accepting full responsibility for 
changing abusive behavior and improving communication skills (Scott & Wolfe, 2000), 
and the role of having an emotionally safe treatment environment or “asylum”, created 
through respect, “talk-share-common ground,” and support from the other group 
members and the facilitators (Wangsgaard, 2001).  Of particularly interest are results of a 
study conducted by Stefanakis (2000) who after interviewing 20 previously violent men 
Chapter Two: Mapping the Terrain 70 
 
 
who were violence-free for two years reported the importance of environmental cues and 
supports as well as the men‟s own ability to utilize them. 
Ending one‟s use of violence is an interactive process.  In other words, change 
requires both the individual and the environment to promote the end of violent 
behavior.  The individual is responsible for attempts to change and for seizing (or 
not seizing) opportunities for change, but he is not responsible for the availability 
of these opportunities. (Stefanakis, 2000, pg. 130) 
Silvergleid & Mankowski (2006) also found support for critical influences at multiple 
levels of analysis during interviews with 9 batterer intervention program participants and 
10 program facilitators.  Specifically, we identified processes of change at the level of the 
individual (i.e., new skills, self-awareness, deciding to change), the group (i.e., support 
and confrontation by other men, sharing and hearing stories, modeling and mentoring, 
and resocialization), the organization (i.e., program facilitators), and the community (i.e., 
criminal justice system). 
Unfortunately, these studies have focused exclusively on one component of 
domestic violence intervention with abusive men rather than looking at intervention 
strategies in their entirety.  Given the prevalence of the coordinated community response, 
it makes little sense to evaluate components of domestic violence intervention in 
isolation.  The components do not operate in isolation; they operate as part of a collective 
and until we understand how that collective is working as a whole, we will not truly 
know much about the impact of our strategies.  Gondolf (2002) concludes his large multi-
site evaluation of batterer intervention programs by insisting that the “system” matters.  
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Subsequently it is no longer sufficient to evaluate batterer intervention programs in 
isolation, rather that they must be understood as only one piece of the intervention 
system.  For example, Gondolf notes that the cultural climate (actions, values, and 
procedures of probation officers, district attorneys, judges) in which a program operates 
greatly impacts its effectiveness.  For example, when men are required to appear in court 
30 days after sentencing and show proof of program attendance, programs in the area are 
likely to see an increase in intake appointments (Gondolf, 2000).  Similarly if probation 
departments monitor program attendance and issue arrest warrants for men who fail to 
complete the required number of program sessions, men are more likely to complete their 
programs (Dehart, Kennerly, Burke & Follingstad, 1999).   
What might happen if intervention components were systematically coordinated 
and then evaluated?  There is one study that explicitly attempted to assess the impact of 
the successive layers of the coordinated community response to domestic violence 
(Murphy et al., 1998).  Murphy et al., (1998) evaluated the combined effects of the 
coordinated community response on domestic violence in Baltimore, Maryland.  
Tracking 235 men charged with domestic violence related offenses for 12 to 18 months, 
their results indicated that each successive layer of intervention correlated with a lower 
rate of recidivism.  Men who were successfully prosecuted recidivated less than those 
who were not (23% versus 29%), those men who were placed on probation recidivated 
less than those who were not (21% versus 23%), those men who were prosecuted, placed 
on probation and ordered to counseling recidivated less than those not ordered to 
counseling (18% versus 21%) and those few men who actually completed court-ordered 
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counseling, were placed on probation and were successfully prosecuted had no recidivist 
charges.  Murphy et al. (1998) conclude, “the current results provide evidence that 
coordinated interventions may have a cumulative effect on recidivism risk.  The 
combined effects of prosecution, probation, and court-ordered counseling were associated 
with significant reductions in recidivism” (p. 278). Unfortunately, only 9 men (out of 
235) actually received the maximum level of intervention and completed the court 
ordered batterer intervention program.  Furthermore, more than 25% of the total sample 
did recidivate.  It is regrettable however that this study focused narrowly on outcomes 
(rather than also on processes) in order to assess the coordinated community response, as 
very little information was garnered to assist policy makers in improving these results.   
In the next chapter, I discuss opportunities that emerge when we embrace the 
holism of domestic violence in our conceptualization, intervention and evaluation.  By 
focusing the field so narrowly on one theoretical explanation for men‟s violence against 
women, (i.e., “patriarchy as cause”), one approach for intervening in men‟s violence, 
(i.e., primarily criminal justice based), and one dominant strategy for evaluation (i.e., 
outcome and single component focused), much has been ignored.  The value of a multi-
level, ecological, systems approach when explaining, intervening and evaluating men‟s 
violence is explored.   
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Chapter Three:  Perceiving the whole: 
Advancing a systems approach to domestic violence intervention 
In the previous chapter, I offered a critique of the dominant conceptualizations, 
intervention strategies, and evaluations of domestic violence intervention with abusive 
men.  My concern, shared by a growing number of others in the field (Adler, 2002; 
Goldman & Du Mont, 2001; Gondolf, 1997b; Gondolf, 2002; Laing, 2002; Eisikovits & 
Edleson, 1989; Tolman, 2001), revolves principally around the restricted range of 
acceptable theories to explain men‟s violence towards their intimate partners, the stunted 
development of more inclusive strategies to intervene in men‟s domestic violence, and 
the limited diversity of evaluation methods engaged to study the impact intervention has 
on men‟s perpetration of violence.  I then suggest that this constriction within the 
domestic violence field may be partially responsible for the limited effectiveness of our 
intervention strategies.  To achieve optimal intervention effectiveness we must align the 
levels of analysis between our problem definition and our solutions (Watzlawick et al. 
1974), a process that is enhanced by the availability of theories and interventions at many 
levels of analysis.  Currently in the field there is a trend towards endorsing a single-level 
theory to explain men‟s violence, one that defines the problem primarily at the 
institutional/societal level (i.e., patriarchy), as well as a push towards a somewhat single-
level criminal-justice based intervention which manifests primarily at the individual level 
(i.e., arrest, conviction, and sentencing individual men to treatment).  Subsequently, not 
only is the field reduced to one level of analysis both in terms of theory and practice, but 
the levels are mismatched.  “It is paradoxical that despite the wide acceptance of socio-
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political explanations for domestic violence most interventions with men who perpetrate 
violence in intimate relationships have been individualized” (Laing, 2002; p. 3)  
Unfortunately, the dominant evaluation methodology utilized in the field provides 
few empirically based suggestions for how to enhance the success of current strategies.  
As previously indicated, most of the studies conducted to date have utilized individual 
outcome measures of recidivism to determine efficacy and have narrowly focused on one 
component of domestic violence intervention at a time, rather than attempting to 
represent, capture, and evaluate domestic violence intervention as a system.  Even the 
recent trends to study processes of change in batterer intervention and the systemic 
impact of the coordinated community response to domestic violence typically get reduced 
to a study of individual men‟s process of change or the effects of coordination on 
individual men‟s recidivism outcomes (Murphy et al., 1998; Shepard, Falk, & Elliott, 
2002).  In lobbying for the need for more holistic, theory-based, systems oriented 
evaluations of domestic violence intervention, Adler (2002) lamented that, “evaluation 
studies typically focus on assessing the performance of programs within various 
components of the system (judicial, crisis intervention, social services, health care)…[as 
opposed to] modeling the structure of, and linkages among, the system components” (p. 
203).   
Embracing the Ecology of Domestic Violence Intervention 
 The relationship between conceptualization, intervention and evaluation is not 
discrete or linear; therefore it is incorrect to place responsibility for the constriction 
affecting all three solely on the shoulders on any one area, but rather it is important to 
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recognize the ways in which choices and decisions in each area impact the others.  
Certainly evaluation methods that privilege the role of the individual, primarily assess 
outcomes, and focus exclusively on criminal justice responses to domestic violence 
compound the problem by legitimizing the current paradigm.  For this reason, it seems 
especially important that evaluators strive to conduct research that opens, rather than 
closes conceptual and intervention pathways.   
It has been suggested that invoking an ecological analysis to understand the 
causes of men‟s violence against women and assess the limitations of current intervention 
strategies would better acknowledge the multi-leveled complexity of domestic violence 
(Phillips, 2000; Tolman, 2001).  Ecological theory recognizes that social phenomena do 
not exist in isolation, but are inextricably embedded within its environment.  This 
embeddedness is dynamic such that a fundamental interdependence exists making it less 
meaningful to study phenomena without attempting to explicate and appreciate the 
impact of the relevant context or environment.  Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979) is often cited 
for his innovative description of the levels of environmental influences on individuals, 
though he was certainly not the first to suggest equalizing the importance of the 
environment and the individual when studying behavior.  Kurt Lewin (1942), often 
considered the founder of social psychology, was among the first to articulate the critical 
role that environment plays in understanding behavior.  In his famous field theory, 
symbolically expressed B=f(P,E) Lewin suggested that human behavior is a function of 
both the person and the environment. Years later, Bronfenbrenner more specifically 
articulated the role of environment on human behavior by describing several nested 
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layers of influence.  Bronfenbrenner suggested that we must remain aware of at least four 
layers of environmental influence: the microsystem which involves each direct contact 
that an individual has with others, the mesosystem which involves the connections that 
exist among the various microsystems that involve the individual, the exosystem which 
includes those systems or organizations which indirectly impact the individual‟s life but 
do not include the individual, and finally the macrosystem which includes institutional 
and cultural contexts which shape and influence exosystems.   
Several authors have articulated the benefits of applying an ecological model to 
the problem of domestic violence intervention (Corvo & Johnson, 2003; D. Dutton, 1995; 
M.A. Dutton, 1992; Edleson & Tolman, 1992; Phillips, 2000; Tolman, 2001).  Tolman 
(2001) suggests that an ecological analysis can help evaluators explain failings of the 
coordinated community response to domestic violence.  He claims that the coordinated 
community response requires several mesosystems (probation, courts, program staff) to 
interact regularly in order to hold individual men accountable.  The intervention‟s success 
is compromised if these systems fail to collaborate; for example, if program staff neglect 
to notify probation officers of participant truancy or probation officers fail to follow up 
when they receive paperwork suggesting that one of their charges has not been attending 
the court-mandated program.  In other words, Tolman suggests that failure often is not 
the responsibility of one individual component of the system, but rather the lack of 
connection between components in the system or the ecology enveloping the perpetrator.   
Deborah Phillips (2000) suggests that more comprehensive domestic violence 
interventions might be developed if we matched our policy responses to our problem 
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definitions at multiple levels of analysis.  She, like O‟Neil and Harway (1999), articulates 
a problem definition at several levels of analysis: individual (e.g., unaddressed mental 
health and substance abuse problems), microsystem (e.g., dysfunctional family 
interaction dynamics), mesosystem (e.g., lack of appropriate social supports and 
controls), exosystem (e.g., poverty and associated strains, and dependency), and 
macrosystem (i.e., social, cultural and gender norms that condone violence and male 
domination).  Phillips then suggests that intervention success will be greater if each of 
these levels or antecedents is sufficiently addressed.  For example, at the individual level 
she suggests that mental health and substance abuse services might be necessary in order 
to stop the perpetration of domestic violence, whereas at the exosystem level, where 
factors such as economical climate and social support may be contributing factors, 
income support may be necessary.  She also suggests responding to macrosystem 
contributors to domestic violence through the use of community-wide education and 
prevention programs as well as policies that equalize power and resources between men 
and women in our society (e.g., the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Equal Pay 
Act).     
A handful of ecological models, in line with Phillips‟ suggestions, for intervening 
in domestic violence do exist.  While on the periphery and typically oriented towards 
marginalized populations, some innovative approaches are being implemented (Bowen, 
Gwiasda, & Brown, 2004; Sabol, Coulton, & Korbin, 2004).  Almeida & Dolan-
Delvecchio (1999) in their article, “Addressing Culture in Batterers Intervention: The 
Asian Indian Community as an Illustrative Example”, highlight a model of batterer 
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intervention that recognizes and embraces a man‟s unique cultural community and 
effectively utilizes that community to confront his violence and power abuse.  The 
Cultural Context Model (CCM) that Almeida and Dolan-Delvecchia review evolved from 
a desire at the Institute for Family Services to more adequately address “social justice 
concerns arising from differences of race, gender, class, ethnicity and sexual orientation 
[that are at] the heart of family therapy” (p. 668).   Recognizing that the impact of culture 
on domestic violence is not “additive”, in other words it can not be effectively addressed 
by simply adding a didactic lesson on the ways in which race, ethnicity, and or class may 
influence men‟s violence, they describe the need for a more integrated, multi-layered 
approach.     
The CCM involves seven resocialization components or layers: sponsorship, 
socio-education, men‟s and women‟s culture circles, couple, individual, family or origin 
and family sessions, children‟s and adolescents‟ culture circles, graduation, and 
community outreach.  Men who are mandated to the Institute for Family Services for 
battering are first assigned a sponsor.  “A sponsor is a person of the same sex as the client 
whose role is essentially to connect the client to the collective experience of his or her 
gender, racial and cultural group” (p. 669).  One of the critical roles of sponsorship is to 
dismantle the privacy that typically surrounds and covertly supports men‟s abuse of 
power within the home, instead providing an immediate source of accountability and 
connection.  During the socio-education component, didactic material is presented in an 
effort to raise consciousness regarding gender, race, culture and sexual orientation.   
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The difference between CCM and dominant approaches to batterer intervention is 
that attempts are made to raise consciousness not just about the impact of men‟s violence 
on women, but rather the impact of men‟s violence on women within specific cultural 
contexts.  Explicit discussions are held regarding how a video-clip scenario might be 
different if the characters were Black instead of White or poor instead of middle-class.  
Discussions are facilitated about how race and class impact not only the victim 
differently but the perpetrator.  Socio-education takes place during same sex meetings, 
called culture circles, modeled on the work by Paolo Freire (1972).  “Culture circles are 
where men and women, with the facilitation of a team of therapists and with the support 
of same-sex sponsors, work toward expanding their definitions and experiences of 
socially prescribed roles” (p. 677).  After perpetrators demonstrated a consistent ability to 
be fully accountable for their abuse of power, and victims agree, couple sessions are 
scheduled.  These sessions are often held within the context of the culture circles to 
ensure greater support for the victim and greater accountability for the perpetrator.   
The fact that CCM includes space for maintenance and integrity of the family 
diverges from the traditional approach to domestic violence intervention where victims 
are encouraged to leave their abusers, retreating to the safety of hidden, woman only 
spaces, while men are sent to male-only intervention programs and couples counseling is 
strongly discouraged (Grauwiler & Mills, 2004).  CCM recognizes that the unity of the 
family is an important cultural value in the Asian Indian community and works to 
embrace that value by striving to achieve safety for all members of the family.  
Appreciating the inter-generational transmission of violence, CCM also works directly 
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with children and adolescents.  “Culture circles for adolescents and children explore 
issues of power and control, presenting didactic materials for socio-education that reach 
children at their age-appropriate levels of understanding” (p. 679).  Recognizing that men 
who have abused power with their wives, have likely also abused power with their 
children, the CCM provides space for fathers to visit their children‟s culture circles and 
are coached regarding how to parent more effectively without resorting to power over 
behaviors and attitudes.  Completing the “program” signifies more of a beginning than an 
ending.  Men and women who graduate or finish the formal process often stay involved 
as sponsors and many become quite engaged in community outreach and education.   
Despite the fact that CCM is offered by Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio (1999) as a 
model that more appropriately meets the needs of men of color, or men not a part of the 
dominant culture in the United States, I believe this program is an example of how 
interventions might more fully recognize and address multiple antecedents of domestic 
violence while simultaneously drawing more deeply on community resources to intervene 
with abusive men.   
Adopting a Systems Approach to Evaluate Domestic Violence Intervention 
 What does it mean to adopt a systems approach, and how does a systems 
approach more adequately create space for acknowledging the social ecology of domestic 
violence?  I will begin by establishing what I mean by a system.  Drawing on a definition 
articulated by Lendaris (1986),  “a system is a) a unit with certain attributes perceived 
relative to its external environment and b) a unit that has the quality that it internally 
contains subunits and those subunits operate together to manifest the perceived attributes 
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of the unit” (p. 604).  Lendaris goes on to suggest that “systemness” is in the eye of the 
beholder, such that how a system gets defined, what constitutes the relevant environment, 
the unit, and the subunits is determined largely by the perceptual filters of the beholder. 
Though there are countless implications of this definition of system for a systems 
approach to evaluation, I will be focusing on three key ideas: the importance of context, 
processes, and multiple perspectives.   
At no place in Lendaris‟ definition of system is there room to understand a unit 
discrete from its environment.  The very essence of a system according to this definition 
is that it possesses certain attributes in relation to its environment.  In other words, the 
system attributes only have meaning when understood in their relevant context.  This idea 
clearly embraces ecological theory, which suggests that individuals are inextricably 
connected with their environments such that it is difficult to understand them in isolation 
(Kelly, 2006).  If we apply Lendaris‟ definition of a system to our subject of study, we 
notice that our unit, domestic violence intervention with abusive men, has the attribute 
“limited effectiveness” perceived relative to goals of the domestic violence movement.  
The only way that we can understand the system of domestic violence intervention 
having the attribute of limited effectiveness is because the domestic violence movement 
or the context for this unit desires to stop all battering.  When there was not a domestic 
violence movement in this country with the desire to end violence against women, this 
particular system or unit would not have existed because domestic violence intervention 
would not have been perceived as limited.   
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The second lesson we can glean from Lendaris‟ definition of system is that 
processes matter.  If one examines the second requirement of his definition, one 
recognizes that what is critical is not necessarily the individual subunits, but rather the 
way in which they operate together to manifest the attributes of the unit.  The processes 
among and between the subunits are key.  When domestic violence intervention is 
perceived as limited relative to the goals of the domestic violence movement, it is not 
only the subunits themselves that matter, (i.e., the dominance of the “patriarchy as cause” 
explanation, the criminalization of domestic violence, and the absence of alternative 
community based strategies) but also the ways in which these subunits operate together to 
manifest the perceived attributes of the unit.  Adopting Lendaris‟ definition of system 
suggests that it is important to understand what is happening when the various subunits 
work together rather than simply focusing on individual subunits and their relative 
success or failure.  This perspective allows us to ask, for example, what is it about the 
way in which these subunits interact or the processes among and between them that leads 
to the attribute limited effectiveness?   
Finally, Lendaris‟ definition suggests that more than one perspective on the 
problem may be necessary.  Each beholder possesses a unique set of values, beliefs, and 
experiences, which function as perceptual filters and affect what he or she sees and 
understands.  Specifically, these filters affect what the beholder identifies as the unit, the 
relevant environment, the subunits and the system attributes.  Lendaris suggests that, 
“every system has a subsystem… and every system is an element of a suprasystem” (p. 
605).  Simplified, this means that for every beholder who perceives a system relative to 
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its external environment, there is a beholder that perceives that external environment as a 
system with its own relevant environment and its own subunits, one of which is the first 
beholders‟ system.  Similarly, for every subunit perceived by a beholder, there is another 
beholder who perceives that subunit as the unit, with its own subunits.  As a beholder, I 
view domestic violence intervention as a unit with the attribute unsatisfactory 
effectiveness relative to the environment of the goals of the domestic violence movement 
with various hypothesized subunits which operate together to manifest marginal 
effectiveness in reducing men‟s abusiveness towards their intimate partners (see Figure 
3).   





Lendaris‟ (1986) definition of a system applied to the proposed subject of study.   
 
Environment = Domestic Violence Movement 
(Goal of eliminating violence against women) 
System (A level) = Domestic Violence Intervention 
Attribute: Limited effectiveness 
Subunits (B level) = Units that operate together 
to manifest the limited effectiveness  
of domestic violence intervention 
Dominance of single level, “Patriarchy 
as Cause”, explanation for men‟s 
violence against women 
Absence of alternative, multi-level, 
community based intervention strategies 
for abusive men 
Dominance of outcome focused 
evaluations providing little guidance for 
how to improve current strategies 
Criminalization of domestic violence 
and subsequent centrality of criminal 
justice responses to domestic violence 
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In order for the domestic violence movement to exist as a suprasystem or 
environment for my unit, there must exist a beholder who views the domestic violence 
movement with the desire for ending domestic violence as a unit with its own relevant 
environment, such as the feminist movement.  Similarly, there need to be beholders who 
view my subunits (i.e., dominance of “patriarchy as cause”, criminalization of domestic 
violence, and absence of alternative strategies) with their own subunits, which operate 
together to manifest those attributes.  For example, the “criminalization of domestic 
violence”, which I perceive as a subunit in my system, is perceived by a different 
beholder as a unit, perceived relative to the external environment domestic violence 
intervention, and possessing the subunits of mandatory arrest laws, pro-prosecution 
policies, and punishment versus rehabilitation focus.   
 In adopting a systems approach to the understanding or evaluation of domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men, I acknowledge context, focus on processes and 
engage multiple perspectives in my methodology.  Specifically, I acknowledge context 
by recognizing domestic violence intervention to be an embedded, multi-faceted 
phenomenon that can best be understood within its relevant environment.  I privilege 
processes by focusing on how various aspects of domestic violence intervention interact 
to limit effectiveness as opposed to either measuring individualized outcomes or 
evaluating pieces of the dominant strategy in isolation.  Finally, I engage multiple 
perspectives by recognizing that each member of the domestic violence intervention 
system possesses a unique and valuable perspective and that a systems analysis of the 
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limitations of the current strategies requires that these perspectives be explicated and 
synthesized.   
As reviewed in the introduction, I have three goals for this study: to describe and 
critically analyze limitations of current domestic violence intervention strategies with 
abusive men, to identify and describe additional opportunities for engaging community 
resources in domestic violence intervention with abusive men, and to create opportunities 
for key stakeholders within the domestic violence intervention system to dialogue about 
its limitations, and by doing so, facilitate possibilities for action and change.  To best 
accomplish these goals, I endeavored to answer five research questions: 1) What do key 
stakeholders within Portland‟s Coordinated Community Response (CCR) identify as 
current domestic violence intervention with abusive men? 2) What do key stakeholders 
within Portland‟s CCR believe limits the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention 
with abusive men? 3) How do key Portland CCR stakeholders make sense of any 
discrepancies between theorized antecedents for men‟s domestic violence and the current 
intervention strategies? 4) How do key Portland CCR stakeholders make sense of any 
discrepancies between the Duluth Model of coordinated community response and current 
intervention strategies for domestically abusive men? 5) What do key Portland CCR 
stakeholders believe the role of community should be in domestic violence intervention 
with abusive men?   
The rationale for my first question is relatively straightforward.  I was interested 
in mapping the perceived terrain of domestic violence intervention with abusive men in 
Portland, Oregon.  I believe it is essential to establish an understanding of how key 
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stakeholders define efforts to intervene in domestic violence, as this provides the context 
for any critique.  My second question was designed to generate candidates for the 
subunits of the domestic violence intervention system, (e.g., the subunits that together 
manifest the attribute limited effectiveness).  I recognized that there were likely 
implementation explanations such as funding, resource limitations, and communication 
breakdowns, but I also suspected that there might be some philosophical barriers to 
greater success and I was interested in ascertaining what key stakeholders perceived these 
to be.  This interest also compelled questions three and four.  Given my discussion of the 
theoretical restriction in explaining men‟s violence against women, the possibility that the 
field has fallen victim to the ecological fallacy, and the unintended consequences of the 
criminal justice response to domestic violence, I was specifically interested in 
ascertaining what challenges key stakeholders identify with the current approach, and if 
they recognized discrepancies, how they manage them in their day-to-day work.  My 
final question stemmed from a critique of the coordinated community response.  Though 
the term community is used to signify the importance of collaboration among various 
subunits of the domestic violence intervention system, these subunits traditionally include 
components of the criminal justice system and rarely involve other community 
organizations such as churches, synagogues, schools, neighborhood associations, or 
workplaces.  I was curious whether key stakeholders believe that there is a role to be 
played by any of these other mediating community structures (Berger & Neuhaus, 1977) 
and perhaps whether their absence in the current strategies accounts for some of the 
system failure.   
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It is my contention that engaging a systems approach begins to ameliorate some 
of the limitations I illuminated in Chapter Two regarding existing evaluations of domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men.  In the next chapter, I move beyond offering a 
rationale for utilizing a systems approach for exploring this subject and describe the exact 
methods I engaged.   
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
This study enlists a systems approach to describe and analyze limitations of 
current domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men.  As executed, this 
query most appropriately fits under the rubric of “process evaluation”, as opposed to a 
more traditional outcome oriented evaluation.  Process evaluations typically focus on the 
how or the internal workings of a program (Patton, 1990), rather than documenting its 
output.  Researchers conducting process evaluations strive to produce information 
regarding the interaction and dynamics that enable or interfere with program operation 
(Chen & Rossi, 1983; Johnson, 1998).  This characterization of my study seems most 
appropriate, given my focus on exploring whether there are conceptual or implementation 
processes interfering with optimal domestic violence intervention with abusive men in 
our community. 
Process evaluations are particularly well served by the techniques of naturalistic 
inquiry (Patton, 1990).  Naturalistic inquiry assumes a world that is multiple and 
constructed, where causality is mutual rather than linear, and context is privileged 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  Additionally, naturalistic inquiry embraces, rather than reduces, 
complexity and is therefore particularly appropriate for the study of processes.  Finally, 
naturalistic inquiry‟s fundamental assumption that reality is constructed such that no 
single truth exists about any particular phenomenon of study, suggests the need for a 
multiplistic approach (Cook, 1985).  As such, this form of inquire shares many of the 
fundamental ontological and epistemological assumptions of a systems approach.  Of 
particularly note is the fact that naturalistic inquiry parallels a systems approach in its 
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focus on context, processes and multiple perspectives.  Engaging these methods enabled 
me to remain focused on domestic violence intervention as a system embedded in 
multiple relevant environments while simultaneously creating space for me to explore the 
nonlinear processes occurring among the various subunits or system components that 
working together create less than optimal effectiveness.   
Naturalistic inquiry traditionally employs the use of qualitative data collection and 
inductive data analysis, both of which are considered adept at describing processes and 
context dependent phenomenon (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  Qualitative data collection can 
involve individual interviews, group interviews, direct observation, or written documents 
(Patton, 1990).  The goal with qualitative data collection is to gather in-depth, rich and 
detailed information from a small number of participants, as opposed to gathering 
discrete, structured information from a large number of participants.  Qualitative data can 
be particularly useful during exploratory research where little is known about the target 
of study.  Qualitative data collection methods are considered highly flexible, capable of 
accommodating and responding to unexpected material in ways that quantitative data 
collection often cannot.  Given that I was interested in exposing previously unidentified 
barriers to more effective domestic violence intervention as well as revealing additional 
opportunities for engaging community resources in our strategies with abusive men, 
qualitative data collection seemed most appropriate.   
Collecting information from multiple sources is indicated by both a systems 
approach and naturalistic inquiry.  “Naturalistic inquirers focus upon the multiple realities 
that, like the layers of an onion, nest within or complement one another.  Each layer 
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provides a different perspective of reality, and none can be considered more “true” than 
any other” (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 57). Gathering multiple perspectives, or 
triangulating, does not discount any one specific experience, but does help facilitate a 
fuller and potentially more trustworthy understanding of the phenomenon (Cook, 1985; 
Johnson, 1997).  “Much of the credibility of qualitative findings [on domestic violence] 
hinges on the ability to contrast or combine different subjective perspectives (Murphy & 
O‟Leary, 1994, p. 214).   
Linstone (1999) suggests consciously engaging at least three specific perspectives 
when assessing complex socio-technical systems: a technical perspective, an 
organizational perspective and a personal perspective.  Each perspective yields unique 
insights and the triad provides a prescription for collecting, organizing and synthesizing a 
vast amount of information from a variety of sources.  When viewing the system from the 
technical perspective (T), one focuses on quantifying and reducing data.  For example, 
when evaluating the limitations of domestic violence intervention, the technical 
perspective might calculate how many men are arrested, how many men attend batterer 
intervention and how many men recidivate after interfacing with the system.  The 
technical perspective might also point to the number of times batterer intervention 
programs fail to notify probation when a man drops out of treatment or the number of 
times police officers are mandated by law to arrest a woman they believe is the primary 
victim.  Linstone argues that the technical perspective alone is not sufficient for 
understanding complex systems.  He suggests that it is also necessary to engage an 
organizational perspective (O), which focuses on processes within an organization that 
 
 
Chapter Four: Methodology 92 
affect decision-making such as standard operating procedures, policies, and 
organizational culture.  The organizational perspective can also capture pressures that are 
exerted from outside the system and which significantly impact decisions within the 
system.  Specifically, the organizational perspective seeks to reveal power dynamics and 
value struggles.  Finally, Linstone advocates for gathering information and viewing the 
system from the personal perspective (P).  This perspective focuses on viewing the 
system through the mental processes of individuals; it focuses on intuition and feeling, 
and can provide a story for understanding what is happening within the system.  
Consciously engaging Linstone‟s T.O.P. framework proved particularly useful given my 
interest in both the implementation (technical) barriers as well as the conceptual barriers 
(which might include both personal and organizational) to more successful domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men.    
In selecting populations from which to draw participants, I privileged two criteria: 
adequate involvement in the system of study and the ability to provide either a technical, 
organizational, or personal perspective on the system.  In qualitative inquiries, sampling 
criteria depends most significantly on appropriateness rather than representativeness 
(Morgan, 1997).  Can potential participants talk articulately and with detail about the 
target phenomenon, current domestic violence intervention?  Additionally, does the 
sample include knowledgeable informants who are similar enough in their experience so 
that relevant similarities and themes can surface (Morse, 1991)?  Obviously, it is useful to 
gather data from sources close enough to the phenomenon of interest to have meaningful 
insight.  This approach is often labeled purposeful sampling (Morgan, 1997; Morse, 
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1991; Patton, 1990).  Second, given the complexity of my target, and my interest in both 
concrete as well as more abstract limiting factors, I wanted sources that had the potential 
to speak to the three perspectives identified by Linstone (1999).   In other words, I 
wanted to access sources likely to possess detailed technical, personal or organizational 
information regarding domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men.   
At least six groups of people met both of my conditions: police officers who arrest 
abusive men, probation officers who supervise abusive men, victim advocates who work 
with women who have been abused by their intimate male partners, victims/survivors of 
domestic violence, facilitators of batterer intervention programs, and abusive men who 
have been arrested and mandated to attend batterer intervention.  Representatives from 
each of these populations view the system or unit, domestic violence intervention, with 
distinct perceptual filters (e.g., technical, organizational or personal).  By gathering data 
from these different stakeholder groups, I was able develop a fuller description of the 
barriers they perceive, as well as compare and contrast the perspectives that each group 
offered,  yielding useful information regarding dynamics within the system.  
To best capture collective attitudes from my stakeholder groups, I decided to rely 
on focus groups (Morgan, 1997) for data collection.  Focus groups are perceived to be 
particularly useful for extracting in-depth collective knowledge from a homogenous 
group of people (Hughes & Dumont, 1993).  As I was particularly interested in a 
generalized script containing a range of beliefs, as opposed to what just a few individual 
probation officers or victim advocates believe limit the effectiveness of domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men, focus groups seemed especially appropriate.  
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“Focus groups are invaluable for examining how knowledge, ideas, story-telling, self-
presentation and linguistic exchanges operate within a given cultural context” (Barbour & 
Kitzinger, 1999; pg. 5).  In arguing the benefits of focus groups, Wilkinson (1998, 1999, 
1999a) asserts that they are a contextual method in that they allow us to examine 
phenomena within an interactive social context, rather than in isolation.  In a focus group, 
members are able to correct each other (Morse, 1991), as well as concur with each other, 
thereby providing the researcher with a wider range of information (Hughes & DuMont, 
1993) and a window into the collective construction of meaning.  For this reason, focus 
groups appear particularly suited to a systems approach.  
Collecting data through focus groups also increased the potential to fulfill my 
commitment to community-based action research.  Focus groups “shift the balance of 
power away from the researcher towards the research participants” (Wilkinson, 1999a, p. 
64).  As they are less structured and the interest is on the dialogue among participants 
rather than between the researcher and participants, control is more easily shared.  This 
enhanced empowerment means that focus groups have the unique potential to serve as 
interventions (Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 1996).  As stakeholders come together to 
discuss challenges or inadequacies in the current intervention approach, discourse can 
shift, creating opportunities for new approaches. “For the researcher, the new knowledge 
generated in focus groups comprises „data‟.  For participants, the outcomes may be future 
action and altered perceptions of self, peers, or others involved in the research project” 
(Baker & Hinton, 1999; p. 97).  When individuals come together and begin to recognize 
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that others share their frustrations, they often are moved to organize and initiate change 
(Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999).  
As recommended by experts in focus group methodology, I made every attempt to 
collect data during naturally occurring groups, “networks in which people might normally 
discuss (or evade) the sorts of issues likely to be raised in the research session” (Barbour 
& Kitzinger, 1999, p. 8). Barbour & Kitzinger (1999) suggest that whenever possible, it 
is advisable to conduct research during established meetings.  It can prove quite 
advantageous for recruitment purposes not to have to persuade informants to attend an 
additional meeting.  More importantly, having some degree of rapport among the 
participants can facilitate communication and discussion.  I feared that police and 
probation officers, victim advocates and program facilitators might be apprehensive 
about voicing their concerns, since they are such integral components of the domestic 
violence intervention system, and I hoped that this apprehension might be mitigated by an 
existing sense of trust and camaraderie among the focus group members.  If I had thrown 
participants who did not know one another together and asked them to dialogue about 
potentially provocative material, there was a chance that only what was considered “safe” 
would have emerged.  I believed this to be particularly true of the men attending batterer 
intervention and the victims/survivors participating in support groups.  My experience 
with men in perpetrator programs is that they develop a very strong attachment to their 
particular group.  Within their group they feel a sense of trust and shared experience that 
does not appear to easily generalize to men in other groups.  For victims/survivors, I also 
believed that they would be more comfortable discussing their concerns, fears, 
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frustrations and hopes in a room filled with women with whom they have already shared 
so many difficult details.  For these reasons, I utilized naturally occurring groups 
whenever possible.    
The specific number of focus groups was influenced by saturation or information 
redundancy and available resources.  Saturation is a term used by qualitative researchers 
to describe the point at which new information is no longer being produced by additional 
interviews (Morse, 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  Ideally, saturation is an emergent 
process in that the exact number of data collection opportunities is not predetermined.  
Unfortunately, resources (time, money and capacity) dictated that I pre-set the number of 
focus groups conducted with each stakeholder population to two.  However, in order to 
remain faithful to the principles of saturation, I did create space in my data collection 
plan for the possibility of conducting additional groups if during the second group I found 
myself noting widely divergent ideas regarding limitations to more effective domestic 
violence intervention, the criminal justice response to domestic violence or the role of 
community in intervening with abusive men.  As it turns out, the victim advocate 
population was the only stakeholder group that I would have preferred to have queried a 
third time, not because the material provided in the second group diverged significantly 
from the first group, but primarily due to the relatively small number of participants.  
Unfortunately, given how difficult it was to secure attendance at the first two meetings, it 
was determined that organizing a third group within this population would prove too 
challenging.   
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In order to insure greater sampling success, as well as develop more appropriate 
focus group questions and advance more legitimate interpretations, I assembled a small 
advisory group composed of representatives from the professional populations.  
Developing an advisory board of this nature is highly recommended in community-based 
action research (Kaufman et al., 2006) and responds to Williams (2004) and others who 
have “suggested that the researchers take steps to ensure the active involvement of 
advocates, practitioners, and survivors in the research especially in formulating questions, 
determining the research design, and participating in discussion and dissemination of 
findings” (p. 1352).  Not only does it lend greater credibility to the research when 
members of the targeted study populations are represented during design, implementation 
and interpretation, but it greatly facilitates the recruitment of appropriate samples. 
Functioning in some ways as gatekeepers, these community representatives can facilitate 
sampling in several ways: by direct invitation, by providing accurate contact information, 
and by offering suggestions for how best to approach potential study participants.   
My initial advisory group comprised a batterer intervention provider, an executive 
director of a victim advocacy organization, and a probation officer from a domestic 
violence unit.  In addition to consulting with each member individually during project 
development, I met with them as a group in December 2003 to review my proposed 
methodology, research questions, and discussion guide.  Following this gathering, their 
feedback regarding relevance of the questions, proposed sampling and language 
accessibility was integrated.  Community advisors from these three professional domains 
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continued to provide feedback and assistance throughout the project.  In particular they 
assisted with recruitment of focus group participants and analysis of focus group data. 
The Research Environment 
  Focus groups were conducted with police and probation officers, victim 
advocates, victims/survivors, program facilitators and program participants from within 
the Tri-County Portland Metropolitan Area.  As of the 2000 census, there were 
approximately 338,000 residents in Clackamas County, 666,000 residents in Multnomah 
County, and 445,000 in Washington County.   In 2004, 1009 incidents of domestic 
violence were reported to the police in Clackamus County, 4551 in Multnomah County, 
and 1017 in Washington County (A. Neal, personal communication, February 2, 2007).  
Twelve batterer intervention programs are recognized within the Tri-County area and in 
2004 they served approximately 891 men (Huffine, Moore, Moore, Johnston, Llohn & 
Mankowski, 2004).  There are 16 organizations specifically providing services for 
battered women and their children within the Tri-County area and in 2005, these 
organizations provided shelter or support services to approximately 10,000 women and 
children (Oregon Department of Human Services, 2005).   
Study Participants 
Police and Probation Officers  
Police officers are often the first members of the coordinated community response 
to interact with abusive men and have great technical (T) knowledge of the system.  They 
respond to the 911 calls, most often initiated by victims, and actually implement many of 
the laws, including mandatory arrest.  They are also often the first system members to 
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witness its failings when they are called out to make arrests after perpetrators recidivate.  
Subsequently, I presumed they would have provocative insights regarding the impact and 
limitations of current strategies.   
Once a man has been arrested for a domestic violence assault, he is likely to either 
receive probation in addition to being mandated to attend batterer intervention, or in some 
cases is given the option of deferring probation if he completes a required program.  In 
most cases, he is assigned a probation officer whose job it is to insure that he either 
attends his mandated program or is held accountable for his absence by the court.  As an 
integral part of the criminal justice response to domestic violence, probation officers are 
in a unique position to speak about what limits the effectiveness of current strategies.   
Furthermore, as part of the coordinated community response, it is expected that they have 
some contact with victim advocates, representatives from the district attorney‟s office, 
police, batterer intervention providers and other subunits of this system.  As such, they 
were presumed to possess both technical and organizational (T and O) perspectives on 
the system.    
I conducted two focus groups with police and probation officers who work with 
domestic violence offenders in Clackamas and Multnomah counties.  I chose to combine 
representatives from these two stakeholder groups primarily due to sample availability.  
Police and probation officers assigned to work with domestic violence cases are typically 
in smaller units (2 to 3 officers) and it would have been difficult to organize a large 
enough focus group if I did not combine them.  I began by securing contact information 
from my advisory group members for the gatekeeper or coordinator for two teams of 
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police and probation officers that meet regularly to discuss domestic violence cases.  
Once I made initial contact with each of these coordinators, I broached the idea of 
convening a focus group at one of their upcoming meetings.  See Appendix A for script 
that I used when I approached these gatekeepers.  The first probation/police officer focus 
group (FG 3) was assembled by the coordinator of the specialized domestic violence unit 
and took place in one of their regular meeting rooms.  The gathering included 2 probation 
officers and 3 police officers, all between the ages of 36 and 55, four with bachelors‟ 
degrees and one who completed 12
th
 grade.  The participants were all female and White 
and had been serving in their positions for an average of 13.8 years.  The discussion 
lasted for 68 minutes.  The second focus group (FG 9) was assembled by the acting 
coordinator of the specialized domestic violence unit and took place in one of their 
regular meeting rooms.  This group included 7 participants, ranging in age from 26-55, 
six with bachelors‟ degrees and one who completed 12
th
 grade.  The participants included 
3 male and 4 female officers, six of whom identified as White and one who identified as 
Black or African American.  Participants had served in their positions for an average of 
5.2 years. The discussion lasted for 59 minutes.        
Victim Advocates 
I conducted two focus groups with victim advocates employed within the Tri-
County Portland area.  As representatives of the movement that has consistently been in 
the forefront both in terms of theorizing and practice when it comes to domestic violence 
intervention, victim advocates have valuable insight on what may be preventing greater 
intervention success.  In addition to the unique perspective that they possess as innovators 
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of the current intervention approach, they are also vital participants.  Victim advocates 
are key members of the coordinated community response and subsequently have ongoing 
contact with police and probation officers, district attorneys, and batterer intervention 
providers, offering a unique organizational perspective (O).  Finally, victim advocates are 
first and foremost the spokespeople for the intended beneficiaries of the domestic 
violence intervention.  
I solicited victim advocates in a manner similar to the police and probation 
officers in that I first contacted gatekeepers for regularly scheduled meeting of advocates; 
the gatekeeper‟s names were once again provided to me by my advisory group.  The first 
focus group (FG 4) included members of a DVERT (Domestic Violence Emergency 
Response Team) team that meets regularly as well as additional advocates that 
occasionally work with the team and was conducted in a meeting room frequently used 
by the DVERT program.  The second focus group (FG 6) was a subset from a larger 
group of advocates that convenes on a monthly basis and was conducted in their regular 
meeting room. 
There were 5 advocates present during the first advocate focus group (FG4), three 
were members of a DVERT team and two were from partnering domestic violence 
advocacy organizations.  Four of the participants were between the ages of 26 and 35, 
and one was between the age of 56 and 65.  One of the advocates had her master‟s 
degree, three had bachelor‟s degrees and one had completed high school.  Four of the 
participants were White and one identified as Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.  The advocates 
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had served in their positions for an average of 8.4 years. The discussion lasted 75 
minutes.  
There were 4 advocates present during the second focus group (FG6), though 
seven had originally confirmed their attendance.  Three of the advocates were between 
the ages of 26 and 35, and one was between the ages of 36 and 45.  One of the advocates 
had her masters‟ degree, two had their bachelors‟ degrees and one had completed high 
school.  The women all identified as White and had been in their role for an average of 5 
and ½ years.  The discussion lasted 77 minutes.  This is the one stakeholder group that 
might have benefited from a third group.  While in one sense saturation was achieved, in 
that the material I collected from the second focus group confirmed and overlapped 
material I collected in the first group, it would have been nice to have been able to 
conduct at least one additional group as several advocates cancelled from the second 
gathering at the last minute.  It is possible to speculate about the reasons why it was more 
difficult to get advocates to participate; perhaps it is because traditionally victim 
advocates are woefully overworked or perhaps it is because victim advocates are not 
compelled to prioritize research on intervening with abusive men.  One advocate, who 
was unable to attend the victim advocacy focus group due to a time conflict, attended one 
of the batterer intervention providers‟ focus groups (FG5).  Her comments were indexed 
and analyzed along with the advocates.  She identified as being between the ages of 26 
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I conducted two focus groups with women who identify as victims/survivors and 
who participate in a domestic violence abuse support group within Clackamas, 
Washington, or Multnomah County.  Ultimately, victims of domestic violence are the 
reason the domestic violence intervention system exists.  The primary goal of most 
intervention strategies is to respond to the abuses they have suffered and attempt to 
prevent future abuses.  Consequently, it is essential that their voices and their personal 
perspectives (P) are represented.  Victims/survivors of domestic violence are in a unique 
position to talk about what they perceive as effective and ineffective.  They are directly 
impacted by most, if not all, of the strategies being analyzed and critiqued in the current 
proposal.  They are frequently the ones contacting the police for assistance, struggling 
with whether to engage the criminal justice system in their intimate relationships, and 
facing the consequences when their partners/perpetrators are arrested and sent to batterer 
intervention programs.   
I approached two agencies that serve domestic violence victims/survivors within 
the Portland Metropolitan area and asked if they were willing to let me conduct a focus 
group at one of their upcoming meetings in lieu of their regularly scheduled program 
activities.  A member of my research team was a support group leader at one of the 
agencies and agreed to approach one of her groups regarding participating.  At the other 
agency, an advocate intrigued by my project agreed to approach one of her support 
groups. I asked both gatekeepers to think carefully about which of their groups would 
provide the richest material.  It is imperative in purposeful sampling that participants be 
willing to provide detailed information.  Once groups were identified, I asked both 
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women to present information about the study and garner approval for the focus group at 
their next scheduled meeting.  See Appendix B for script that I provided to guide the 
advocates when they introduced the focus group idea to their group members.   
Nine survivors participated in the first focus group (FG7) which was co-facilitated 
by my colleague (their regular group leader), conducted during their regularly scheduled 
support group meeting time and took place in their regular meeting room.  Three of the 
women were between 18 and 25, five of the women were between the ages of 26 and 35, 
and one of the women was between 36 and 45.  Five of the women had not completed 
high school, two graduated from high school and two of the women held bachelors‟ 
degrees.  Eight of the women identified as White, one woman identified as “other”.  
When asked how long they had been involved in the role of “victim/survivor of domestic 
violence, participating in a support group”, they answered on average 3.9 years.  The 
discussion lasted for 62 minutes.        
Four survivors participated in the second focus group (FG8).  The focus group 
was conducted during their regularly scheduled support group meeting, in their regular 
meeting room.  One woman identified herself as between the ages of 26-35, one woman 
identified herself as between the ages of 36-45 and two women were between the ages of  
46-55.  One woman had not completed high school, two had completed high school and 
one woman held a bachelors‟ degree.  One woman identified as White, two identified as 
Black or African American and one woman identified as both White and American 
Indian (Blackfoot tribe).  When asked how long they had been involved in the role of 
“victim/survivor of domestic violence, participating in a support group”, they answered 
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“off and on since I was three years old”, “way too long and off and on”, 1.5 years and 4.4 
years.  The discussion lasted for 75 minutes.        
Batterer Intervention Providers 
I conducted two focus groups with batterer intervention program facilitators.  My 
selection of batterer intervention program facilitators was motivated by their critical role 
in domestic violence intervention with abusive men.  Many men arrested for domestic 
violence are frequently mandated to attend a batterer intervention program. These 
programs are delivered in weekly groups by trained facilitators.  These facilitators are in 
the unique position to “witness” change when it occurs, or fails to occur.  They are not 
only privy to weekly interactions with the intervention targets, abusive men, but 
frequently interact with other members of the coordinated community response.  They are 
able to offer both technical and organizational perspectives (T and O).   
A member of my advisory group coordinates monthly meetings of the Tri-County 
Batterer Intervention Providers Network, a group that I participated in for many years.  I 
was subsequently able to propose conducting a focus group at one of their regularly 
scheduled meetings.  They were eager to participate and this gathering constituted FG5.  
Not all of the local batterer intervention providers regularly attend this group.  In order to 
better represent the batterer intervention community, I personally contacted each program 
within the Portland Metropolitan area not represented at FG5 and directly solicited 
participation over the phone (see Appendix C), asking them to send a representative to a 
separate gathering (FG10).  I was able to successfully draw upon personal contacts and 
relationships that I‟d developed over the years to bolster attendance at this group. 
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There were 12 participants in FG5 (one of whom identified as primarily a victims 
advocate and her comments were indexed as such).  Of the remaining 11 participants, 
three indicated that they were between 26-35 years of age, five indicated that they were 
between the ages of 36-45, two indicated that they were between 46-55 and one identified 
as being between 56 and 65 years of age.  Two of the participants completed high school, 
three held bachelors‟ degrees, five held masters‟ degrees, and one held a Ph.D.  Six of the 
participants were female and five were male, nine were White and two were Black or 
African American.  Participants identified that they had occupied their role as batterer 
intervention providers for an average of 6.1 years. The discussion lasted for 102 minutes. 
There were 5 participants in FG10.  Three of the participants were between the 
ages of 46 and 55, and two of the participants were between the ages of 56 and 65.  Two 
of the participants held bachelors‟ degrees and three of the participants held master‟s 
degrees.  The participants identified as White men who had served in their role as batterer 
intervention provider for an average of 8.8 years.  The discussion lasted for 53 minutes. 
Perpetrators 
I conducted two focus groups with men enrolled in a batterer intervention 
program within Clackamas, Washington, or Multnomah County.  I was interested in 
speaking with men court-mandated to attend batterer intervention because as the 
intervention targets they are uniquely capable of talking about ways in which domestic 
violence intervention has been successful for them as well as ways in which it seems to 
have failed.  Though they may not be able to reflect as generally about the domestic 
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violence intervention system, their personal perspectives (P) and experiences shed 
valuable light on why intervention efforts are not more successful.   
  I approached two different programs within the Portland Metropolitan area and 
asked their facilitators if they were willing to have me conduct a focus group at one of 
their upcoming meetings in lieu of their regularly scheduled program activities.  As with 
the victim advocates, when they agreed I asked them to think carefully about which of 
their groups would provide the richest material.  It is my experience that program 
facilitators are adept at identifying which groups possess the necessary culture and 
experience (i.e., they have been in the program long enough to be willing to open up and 
talk with one another) to satisfy this criterion.  Once each facilitator identified a group, I 
asked them to present and obtain approval for the idea at their next scheduled meeting.  
See Appendix D for script that guided facilitators when they introduced the focus group 
idea to their group members.   
There were 9 participants in the first perpetrator focus group (FG1). Two of the 
men identified as being between 26-35 years of age, five of the men indicated they were 
between 36-45 years old and two of the men indicated they were between 46 and 55 years 
old.  Four of the participants indicated that they completed high school, three of the men 
wrote in that they completed high school plus a two year degree, and two of the men had 
earned bachelors‟ degrees.  Seven of the men self-identified as White, one man identified 
as Spanish/Hispanic/Latino and one man identified as Native Hawaiian or other Pacific 
Islander.  The participants had been involved in batterer intervention for an average of 6.3 
years.  The discussion lasted for 110 minutes. 
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There were 12 participants in the second focus group (FG2). One man was 
between 18 and 25, five men were between 26 and 35, three men were between 36 and 
45, and three men were between 46 and 55 years of age.  Three of the men did not 
complete high school; the remaining nine participants completed all 12 grades.  Eleven of 
the men self identified as White and one man self identified as Black or African 
American.  On average, they had participated in batterer intervention for nine months.  
The discussion lasted for 94 minutes. 
Procedures 
 The focus groups were semi-structured in that a discussion guide (see Appendix 
E) was used to direct the discussion towards my specific research questions (Hughes & 
Dumont, 1993).  The discussion guide was developed with assistance and input from my 
advisory group.  As the moderator, I made every effort to create an atmosphere of safety 
and self-disclosure in order to maximize the range of individual responses and yet 
balance this focus with the desire to determine some of the underlying shared experiences 
of the population.  Self-management of the group was encouraged in order to facilitate 
lively discussion and interactions among the group members.   
 For almost every focus group (FG 10 was the only exception), data collection 
took place in the same room as one of their regularly scheduled meetings.  This was done 
in order to enhance participants‟ attendance, comfort and convenience.  
Researchers should choose a venue easily accessible to the people they wish to 
include in the research.  In our experience, people are more likely to turn up for a 
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group which takes place in a familiar venue, rather than having to travel to an 
unfamiliar place (such as the university).” (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999, pg. 11) 
Participants were asked to budget between 90-120 minutes for the focus groups; 
however, each group imposed their own restrictions based on their availability.  For 
example, the second police/probation officer group and the second batterer intervention 
provider group were only able to allocate 60 minutes for data collection.  As a result, 
groups lasted 77 minutes on average.  They were digitally recorded with multi-directional 
microphone and later transcribed by a professional transcriber.  Prior to beginning each 
group, a consent form (Appendices F, G, & H) describing the general focus of the 
program of research as well as the fact that the participants could leave the group at any 
point, was reviewed orally and signed by each participant.  Participants were also asked 
to complete a short demographic survey, soliciting information such as age, birth country, 
educational background, race/ethnicity, and role in the coordinated community response 
(Appendix I).   
Focus Group Guide 
An eleven-item discussion guide (Appendix E) was developed for use in the focus 
groups.  The guide was produced with assistance from the advisory group and piloted 
with a domestic violence intervention research team.  It served as a template for each 
focus group, providing structure and consistency.  “The structure that a guide imposes on 
discussions is valuable both in channeling the group interaction and in making 
comparisons across groups in the analysis phase of the research” (Morgan, 1997, p. 47).   
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Each question in the guide was designed to elicit responses addressing one or 
more of the project‟s five research questions.  For example, responses to “what are the 
dominant strategies for intervening in men‟s violence against women” helped map the 
terrain of what stakeholders identify as current domestic violence strategies, the domain 
of research question number one.  Responses to “in your opinion, why isn‟t domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men more effective” directly correspond to research 
question number two which focuses on what key stakeholders believe limits the 
effectiveness of domestic violence intervention with abusive men.  “What discrepancies, 
if any, do you perceive between the dominant conceptualization of domestic violence and 
our current strategies for intervening in this violence” directly correlates to research 
question number three regarding how key stakeholders make sense of these 
discrepancies.  Similarly, “what discrepancies, if any, exist between the Duluth Model of 
coordinated community response and current domestic violence intervention strategies 
for abusive men” equates directly to research question number four.  Finally, “what 
strategies or interventions for domestically abusive men do you wish were being 
implemented in addition to the current strategies and what resources in our community do 
you think should be involved in intervening in men‟s violence against women” provided 
material for research question number 5, which focused on discerning what key 
stakeholders believe the role of community should be in domestic violence intervention 
with abusive men. 
In projects of this nature, employing naturalistic inquiry and stemming from a 
commitment to community based action research, it is important to recognize that the 
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precise questions shift over time in response to material revealed or not revealed during 
early focus groups.  Additionally, the exact phrasing of each question was modified as 
appropriate for accessibility within each specific focus group and some questions were 
withheld from certain groups.  For example, I quickly discovered that the perpetrators 
and victims/survivors did not appear to understand the term “coordinated community 
response”, necessitating that I remove that phrase from my questions.  Furthermore, these 
two stakeholder populations really struggled in response to questions that required them 
to compare two abstract concepts (see questions 4 and 7).  In order to maximize 
discussion flow and minimize disempowering dialogue, I removed or modified the 
comparison questions from the focus groups with perpetrators and victims/survivors.  
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Adopting a systems approach to evaluate domestic violence intervention 
strategies with abusive men shaped my understanding of the problem, as well as my 
selected methodology.  In particular, I drew on three key ideas: context, processes and 
multiple perspectives from Lendaris‟ (1986) definition of a system to guide my project.  
Acknowledging context encouraged me to recognize the ecology of domestic violence, 
shaping how I defined the problem.  It also influenced how I chose to gather data.  
Focusing on processes suggested engaging methods consistent with process evaluation, 
such as naturalistic inquiry and focus groups, both of which strive to capture rather than 
ignore dynamics within the system.  Recognizing the role of the beholder and the benefits 
of consciously invoking multiple perspectives to understand complex systems led me to 
select stakeholders who were poised to provide technical, organizational and personal 
perspectives.  In order to engage a systems approach during analysis, I needed to employ 
a technique that could acknowledge and embrace context, focus on processes, and 
recognize that information is ultimately constructed from human understanding.    
Constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 1995) is an iterative, subjective 
analytic process that enabled me to embrace Lendaris‟ (1986) key ideas while assessing 
my data.  Charmaz (1995) describes constructivist grounded theory as a compromise 
between the positivism of grounded theory which some have argued relies too heavily on 
deduction, and the total relativism of post-modernism which suggests that there is only 
induction.  “Constructivism assumes the relativism of multiple social realities, recognizes 
the mutual creation of knowledge by the viewer 
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and the viewed, and aims toward interpretive understanding of subjects‟ meanings” (p. 
510).  With a constructivist grounded theory approach, data and induction are privileged 
over hypotheses and predetermined categorization, but there is a critical recognition that 
the inductive process is constructed.   
A constructivist grounded theory recognizes that the viewer creates the data and 
ensuing analysis through interaction with the viewed.  Data do not provide a 
window on reality.  Rather, the “discovered” reality arises from the interactive 
process and its temporal, cultural, and structural contexts. The viewer then is part 
of what is viewed rather than separate from it (Charmaz, 1995, p. 524). 
Constructivist grounded theory parallels fundamental assumptions of a systems 
approach; in particular, the assertion that analyses are contextual (as opposed to abstract), 
dynamic and interactional, and do not exist distinct from the beholder.   
Given my role as the beholder or investigator in first defining the system or unit of study 
and then constructing the information gathered related to that system, it was necessary 
that I remain conscious of my own perceptual filters during the analytic process.  A 
practice of self-reflexivity or “critical self-reflection” is common in naturalistic, 
qualitative endeavors and is considered essential for establishing trustworthiness and 
credibility (Kidder & Fine, 1997).  According to Merrick (1999), “assumptions that all 
findings are constructions incorporating one‟s personal view of reality and that these are 
open to change and reconstruction entail the need for qualitative researchers to make 
explicit the process through which their understandings were formed” (p. 32).   
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In order to assist in the explication of my values, I maintained a field journal in 
which I documented my reactions and insights related to the focus groups that I 
conducted and the analyses I developed.  This field journal provided a structured venue 
where I could acknowledge and process personal responses on an ongoing basis.  As my 
analytic framework took shape, I found it valuable to review this journal and 
acknowledge the ways in which my views, values, and experiences might be shaping my 
understanding of the material.  For example, my professional and personal experiences 
are unique with respect to domestic violence in that I have been closely involved with 
both victims and perpetrators.  I have worked directly with victims as a shelter night 
manager and crisis line volunteer and I have spent significant time observing and 
interviewing perpetrators.  These professional vantage points as well as my own personal 
experiences as a survivor allow me to feel empathy for both victims and perpetrators.   
Having endured the challenge of deciding whether and when to end an abusive 
relationship, and having negotiated the many internal and external barriers that exist 
when attempting to make that departure, I can easily relate to the plight of 
victims/survivors.  Additionally, having observed so closely the pain and struggle that my 
abusive partner experienced trying to make different choices, it is not possible for me to 
define the causes for his violence (and subsequently the solutions) in simplistic terms.  It 
is clear to me that my own experiences influenced my reactions to what was expressed 
during the focus groups with victims and with perpetrators and prompted me to hear their 
complaints and frustrations with potentially greater compassion than someone who has 
not had as much close contact with either population.   
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Finally, my position as a feminist researcher positioned outside the criminal 
justice response to domestic violence affords me a certain freedom and latitude from 
which to offer critiques and express concerns.  The fact that I have not directly toiled to 
secure criminal justice system strategies as a key component of the coordinated 
community response to domestic violence surely influences my eagerness to assess their 
unintended and undesirable consequences.  Had I, for example, spent the past twenty 
years lobbying for mandatory arrest laws and no-drop prosecutions, I would likely be less 
inclined to critically reflect on their problematic effects. 
Self-reflexivity is not the only practice suggested in order to enhance the 
trustworthiness and credibility of qualitative research.  Guba & Lincoln (1988) have 
suggested that in qualitative inquiry, trustworthiness and credibility can be enhanced by 
several activities, including prolonged engagement in the environment of study, 
triangulation, and peer debriefing (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  To one degree or another, I 
engaged all three of these activities throughout the research process.  First, in keeping 
with Lincoln & Guba‟s (1985) suggestion, I have been engaged in the research setting for 
a prolonged period of time.  For four years, I was actively involved with the batterer 
intervention community in Portland, conducting collaborative research on processes of 
change in batterer intervention, actively participating in the Tri-County Batterer 
Intervention Provider Network, and presenting to groups of victim advocates, probation 
officers, program providers, and court representatives on the effectiveness of batterer 
intervention.  My motivation for this project grew out of my exposure to this domestic 
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violence intervention community, and my interpretations are likely affected by my 
regular interactions with key stakeholders.   
I applied the principle of triangulation not only in terms of multiple data sources 
(police and probation officers, victim advocates, victims, batterer intervention program 
providers, and program participants) but also in terms of Linstone‟s (1999) three distinct 
perspectives that I consciously invoked to interpret the data.  For example, when 
analyzing results from the focus group discussions, I summoned first a technical, then 
organizational, then personal perspective.  I made efforts to understand what was being 
said through these three lenses and attended to information that spoke to these 
perspectives.  I attended to quantification when invoking the technical perspective, 
focused on power dynamics, value struggles, and norms when invoking the 
organizational perspective and attended to intuition, feeling and individual stories when 
invoking the personal perspective. I believe that engaging these three distinct lenses 
enabled me, as the beholder, to construct a more complete understanding of the system of 
study. 
The process of peer debriefing or peer review, in which I discuss my 
interpretations with others, both knowledgeable and naïve about the project, was engaged 
throughout the data collection and production phases.  I met with representatives from a 
domestic violence intervention research team at Portland State University, members of 
which also served as focus group assistant moderators, as well as members of the 
stakeholder advisory group to discuss my experiences and reactions to the material.   
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 In his widely cited text on qualitative evaluation, Patton (1990) synthesized the 
analytic process by saying that “the challenge [of qualitative inquiry] is to make sense of 
massive amounts of data, reduce the volume of information, identify significant patterns, 
and construct a framework for communicating the essence of what the data reveal.” (p. 
372).  Below, I outline the steps that I took towards this endeavor.   Immediately upon 
completing each focus group, I met with my assistant moderator to review our field notes 
and answer the following set of questions suggested by Krueger (1998).  “What are the 
most important themes or ideas discussed?  How did these differ from what we expected?  
How did these differ from what occurred in earlier focus groups?  What quotes should be 
remembered? Were there any unexpected findings?” (p. 50). This debriefing was digitally 
audio-taped.  Within two days of each focus group, I listened to the recording of the 
discussion in order to insure complete data collection.  At that time, I recorded in my 
journal reactions, thoughts, ideas, and interpretations of the discussion as well as made 
notes to myself regarding upcoming groups.  For example, I noted if a question seemed 
difficult for the group to answer or if the timing or ordering of the questions needed 
adjustment.  A professional transcriptionist then transcribed the recordings.  Once the 
transcripts were available, I listened to each focus group audio-tape while reviewing and 
correcting each transcript.  There were numerous small errors that needed to be amended 
and several observational comments provided by the assistant moderator that needed to 
be inserted.  For example, if the assistant noted that five focus group members nodded 
vigorously in agreement with a comment that was made by one member of the group, I 
noted this within the typed transcript.  I also relied on the assistant‟s notes (and my own 
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memory) regarding which participant was linked with what comments and was able to 
identify and numerically label speakers within the transcripts most of the time.  Later, 
speaker identification enabled me to assess whether a collection of comments about a 
particular topic was made by multiple speakers or just one.  It was during this second re-
listening process that I began to develop a running list of emergent themes which I shared 
with my dissertation chair at three week intervals.    
Once I re-listened to all of the focus group discussions, I began a more structured 
process of identifying and categorizing themes.  I began by reading and re-reading the 
transcripts, noting frequent or significant discussion topics related to my five research 
questions -- 1) What do key stakeholders within the Portland Coordinated Community 
Response (CCR) identify as current domestic violence intervention with abusive men? 2) 
What do key stakeholders within the Portland CCR believe limits the effectiveness of 
domestic violence intervention with abusive men? 3) How do key Portland CCR 
stakeholders make sense of any discrepancies between theorized antecedents for men‟s 
domestic violence and the current intervention strategies? 4) How do key Portland CCR 
stakeholders make sense of any discrepancies between the Duluth Model of coordinated 
community response and current intervention strategies for domestically abusive men? 
And finally, 5) What do key Portland CCR stakeholders believe the role of community 
should be in domestic violence intervention with abusive men?  I then compiled a list of 
these emergent themes and organized them into logical groupings (Krueger, 1998).   
On the advice of my dissertation chair, I developed an index tree anchored around 
each of my five research questions.  In other words, my initial tree had 5 nodes (1 per 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
119 
research question), and several sub-nodes reflecting emergent themes.  The decision to 
structure the index tree around my research questions rather than around emergent themes 
was primarily a data management decision due to the quantity and type of material that I 
had gathered.  The semi-structured nature of the focus group discussions meant that 
stakeholders frequently addressed more than one research question simultaneously.  For 
example, when stakeholders were asked to describe current intervention strategies 
(Research Question 1), they would often do so by critiquing current strategies, thereby 
providing material relevant to Research Question 2, (What limits the effectiveness of 
current intervention strategies?).  Subsequently, we felt that it would be prudent to 
organize the material in such a way as to insure that I would ultimately be able to respond 
to each of my original questions.    
Once I developed an initial index tree, I imported the focus group transcripts into 
NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorizing), a 
qualitative data analysis program (Richards & Richards, 1994) and began scanning for 
and indexing material that addressed each of my nodes and sub-nodes.  Software such as 
NUD*IST is considered particularly useful when managing large sets of text (Krueger & 
Casey, 2000).  As I began working my way through the transcripts, my index tree 
expanded in order to accurately describe the material.  When I read a passage with a 
significant idea that was not easily encapsulated by one of the existing nodes or sub-
nodes, I would simply create a new node.  The final index tree included 16 sub-nodes 
supporting the five major research question nodes (see Figure 4).    





Final NUDIST index tree 
 
1 – What is current intervention? 
 
2 -  What limits effectiveness? 
 2 1 – Society‟s general acceptance of violence 
 2 1 1 – Male norms 
 2 2 – Punishment vs. rehabilitation 
 2 3 – One size fits all vs. individualized approach 
 2 4 – System‟s level of involvement is too little/lenient 
 2 5 – System not coordinated (parts not whole)  
 2 6 -  System‟s level of involvement is too much 
2 7 - Invisibility of perpetrators 
2 8 – Victim blaming 
2 9 – System components are failing 
 
3 – How make sense of the discrepancies between antecedents and interventions? 
 
4 – How make sense of discrepancies between CCR in theory and CCR in practice?  
 4 1 Human factor 
 4 2 Women being arrested instead of men 
 4 3 Money 
 4 4 DV is messy and complex 
 
5 – What should the role of community in DVI be? 
 5 1 – School education 
 5 2 - Media 
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Faced with the task of moving from dozens of pages of quotes in support of each 
node to an organized and reasonably concise presentation of the findings, I set out to 
create summary statements for each research question.  I began by reading over the 
material I had indexed for a particular node and its corresponding sub-nodes.  While 
reading, I identified and in a new document typed key quotes or paraphrases from the 
material.  For example, under Research Question 1 “What do stakeholders identify as 
current domestic violence intervention with abusive men?” for the stakeholder group 
“Perpetrators”, I typed “relationship counseling” “post-attack response” “we get 
counseling”, etc.  Once I had typed up all the significant comments, phrases, and ideas 
for a particular node for a particular stakeholder group, I drafted a summary statement to 
capture and describe what that stakeholder group had to say about that node/research 
question.  In other words, I wrote a paragraph describing what each key stakeholder 
group seemed to be saying in response to each of my five major research questions.   
Once I completed summary statements for all five stakeholder groups for a particular 
node/research question, I wrote a final summary statement for that research question.  For 
ease of reading, I then compiled all of my summary statements in a “Summary, 
Summary” document.   
At this stage in analysis, four sub-nodes seemed particularly salient and I had a 
tremendous amount of material indexed for each of them (punishment vs. rehabilitation, 
one size fits all, invisibility of perpetrators/victim blaming, and human variance).  While I 
was not sure how these sub-nodes would ultimately fit into my final thematic 
presentation, I felt they were important enough to single out and so I completed a similar 
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process to the research questions for each of them.  In other words, I noted quotes, 
phrases, ideas that each stakeholder group offered in support of each of them and then 
wrote summary statements.  In the end, I had summary statements for each stakeholder 
group for each of the four sub-nodes as well as an overarching summary statement for 
each sub-node.    
In order to help me synthesize the material even further, I then produced a series 
of matrices (Richie & Lewis, 2003).   I started by creating a matrix with stakeholder 
groups on the X axis and research questions on the Y axis (see Appendix J).  Within each 
box, I inserted summary statements and phrases taken directly from my “Summary, 
Summary” document.  Next I created a matrix with stakeholder groups on the X axis and 
the four sub-nodes on the Y axis (see Appendix K), again inserting summary statements 
and phrases within the corresponding boxes.  Finally, I created a matrix with TOP on the 
X axis and my five research questions on the Y axis (see Appendix L).  It was during this 
process, that it became clear to me that I did not need to create a matrix with TOP on the 
X axis and the four sub-nodes on the Y axis because the four sub-nodes were adequately 
encompassed by the summary statements for the five research questions.   
Qualitative data collection produces a tremendous amount of material.  For 
example, this project produced over 450 pages of typed transcripts.  It is the job of the 
investigator or beholder to make sense of that material and share it in such a way that the 
reader can resonate with and subsequently trust in the conclusions that are being drawn.   
Navigating the balance between simply presenting the transcripts in their entirety and 
presenting only summaries or conclusions of the transcripts can be difficult.  Summarize 
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the findings too much and the reader will feel disconnected from the participants.  Present 
too many quotes and the reader will feel discombobulated and disoriented, unsure of what 
the findings ultimately reveal (Krueger, 1998).   I‟ve attempted to remain mindful of this 
challenge by alternating between summarization and raw data throughout my 
presentation.  I begin by providing a general summary response for each research 
question, followed by a more detailed account of what each individual stakeholder group 
reported, illustrating with quotes as often as possible.  In order to demonstrate consensus 
or agreement, I often supply more than one quote to support an idea.  When I do this, I 
use new quotation marks to differentiate between speakers.  So while I might place two 
quotes next to each other in order to illustrate the dialogue that ensued, comments by 
different stakeholders are demarked by the start and end of each set of quotation marks.   
When applicable, I note differences among the stakeholder groups, as well as 
differences within each group.  I remained continuously mindful of the context in which I 
collected the data and regularly represented whether or not a comment appeared 
supported within a group or was an outlier.   Barbour & Kitzinger (1999) provide a key 
suggestion for those wishing to analyze focus group data.  
Analyzing focus group data involves essentially the same process as does the 
analysis of any other qualitative data.  However, the research needs to reference 
the group context.  This means starting from an analysis of groups rather than 
individuals and striking a balance between looking at the picture provided by the 
group as a whole and recognizing the operation of individual voices within it.  
The researcher should try and distinguish between opinions expressed in spite of, 
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or in opposition to, the group and the consensus expressed or constructed by the 
group (p. 16).  
In addition to informing the reader of these dynamics throughout the findings section, 
pointing out if a comment was well endorsed by the group or if it was a unique 
perspective, I also include a review of the negative case analysis I conducted in order to 
insure that outlying perspectives are adequately represented in my presentation.   
I conclude the chapter with an assessment of the findings from a system 
perspective.  By consciously invoking Linstone‟s (1999) technical, organizational and 
personal lenses, I was able to synthesize the vast amount of material that I collected and 
present a “final framework” for understanding what stakeholders reported about current 
domestic violence intervention with abusive men.  This final framework involves seven 
sub-unit candidates that, according to key stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County area, 
appear to be operating together to manifest the attribute “limited effectiveness” of 
domestic violence intervention with abusive men. 
During analysis and especially as I began to write up the results, it became 
exceedingly clear that Research Questions 3, 4 and 5 are best understood as follow-up or 
subset questions of Research Question 2.  They are essentially my hypotheses about what 
might be limiting the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention with abusive men.  
Research Question 3 assumes that perhaps the mismatch between our conceptualization 
of men‟s abusive behavior and our interventions for this behavior may be limiting the 
system‟s effectiveness (i.e., the ecological fallacy), just as Research Question 4 assumes 
that whatever is standing in the way of implementing an ideal version of the CCR may be 
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limiting the system‟s effectiveness.  Research Question 5 asks participants to describe 
how else they think the community should be involved in domestic violence intervention, 
implying that the limited utilization of community might be partially responsible for the 
less than optimal effectiveness of current strategies.    
Given the interrelated nature of these research questions, it is not altogether 
surprising that stakeholders often provided responses addressing Research Questions 3, 4, 
and 5 while addressing Research Question 2.  In other words, when they talked about 
what limits the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention with abusive men they 
frequently discussed challenges created by not aligning intervention strategies to their 
conceptualization of the problem, or challenges to realizing the Duluth model of CCR, or 
limits created by a restricted utilization of community.  However, in an effort to reduce 
redundancy, I have chosen to separate as much as possible the material and only report 
themes or ideas in response to one research question at a time.  Obviously, complete 
separation was not possible or even desirable given the fact that the participants did not 
respond in perfectly segmented chunks.  However, to the best of my ability, I focus in 
each section on quotes and themes that best capture their responses to that particular 
research question and which are not more fully addressed in response to a later question. 
Clearly, this separation is somewhat artificial; however, I feel it is helpful in order to 
retain clarity and distinction between and among the research questions.  Ultimately, a 
complete picture of what stakeholders discussed during the focus groups is constructed 
(see Appendix M for summarization of findings) and a framework or for organizing and 
making sense of their comments is discussed.   
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Research Question One:  
What do key stakeholders within Portland’s Coordinated Community Response identify 
as current domestic violence intervention with abusive men? 
Stakeholders  were not interested in spending a great deal of time identifying 
elements of current domestic violence intervention with abusive men; they were far too 
anxious to begin talking about the challenges or limitations of the current system.  When 
pressed to describe current intervention strategies with abusive men, most stakeholders 
responded similarly, frequently identifying a combination of victim services and criminal 
justice system involvement in the form of arrests, probation and mandated batterer 
intervention programs.  Additionally, several stakeholder groups expressed that current 
strategies were primarily reactive (i.e., responding to domestic violence assaults after the 
fact) as opposed to preventative in nature (i.e., school based education programs focused 
on dating and relationship violence). There was a great deal of homogeneity within 
stakeholder groups (i.e., officers tended to agree or concur with other officers and victims 
tended to concur with other victims, etc.), though a few differences did emerge and are 
noted below. 
Police and Probation Officers 
 When asked about current intervention strategies for abusive men, police and 
probation officers began by explaining that current efforts are often reactive, “I think it‟s 
reactive.  We‟re just reacting to it.  We‟re not, I don‟t think the whole preventing part of 
it, we‟re not doing a whole lot on that part.”  They acknowledged that a component of 
current strategies involves reaching out to potential victims, providing information and 
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resources; however they immediately questioned the effectiveness or impact of these 
preventative efforts.  “Yeah.  I was gonna say, there‟s certainly a level of outreach in 
communities.  I don‟t think it is sufficient by any means; and I don‟t know how you 
would measure prevention.  How many people did you prevent from getting involved in 
domestic violence by passing out 400 leaflets at a Take Back the Night?  There‟s no way 
to account for that.”   
When pressed to describe what else is being done locally to intervene with 
domestically abusive men, probation officers discussed the traditional criminal justice 
response coupled with batterer intervention treatment.  “They‟re arresting him and either 
they get prosecuted or they don‟t get prosecuted.  If they get prosecuted and they come to 
us, they‟re usually mandated to do some type of treatment, which we have treatment 
programs that we refer them to.”  There was no discussion by the police and probation 
officers of intervention strategies beyond victim outreach, the criminal justice system, 
and batterer intervention programs. 
Victim Advocates 
 Victim advocates spent significantly more time than police and probation officers 
discussing current intervention strategies.  After a cursory mention of the police response, 
probation, and batterer intervention programs, the first focus group turned their attention 
to the Department of Human Services: Child Welfare and what it means for victims when 
that particular system gets called in as part of the larger intervention response.  “I think 
when child welfare is responding, it means a lot of services for the women. So, support 
groups for the women, parenting classes for the survivor.”  Other advocates readily 
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agreed and explained that the system‟s current response to perpetrators‟ violence is to 
focus on mandating services for victims.  “That‟s their response to men‟s violence against 
women.  Women have to jump through all these hoops.” Another advocate explained, “I 
feel like I‟ve seen a lot of women referred to domestic violence specific services and to 
services about parenting and men tend to be referred to anger management or not as 
many services.  It‟s just interesting, like the focus definitely seems to be on women or on 
mom.”  
 In the second focus group, advocates similarly discussed services for victims in 
addition to services for perpetrators, but were more inclined to view this balance as 
helpful.  “Then there‟s you know, victim based services, services for kids, services for 
kids and services for adults.  In Multnomah County, for example, it‟s pretty holistic.  We 
try to reach each different group.  We try to work together.  Like, batterer‟s intervention 
program, victim‟s services, and I think it‟s important because it‟s really helping to serve 
better.  To do services better for them and for us.  We look at family as a whole.  
Different parts of abuse. We‟re looking at both sides of the equation.  Three sides, 
children also.”   
This group also discussed the fact that current intervention strategies involve 
trying to get information about domestic violence out into the larger community and into 
organizations that are likely to regularly interface with victims/survivors, such as the 
medical community.  However, they acknowledged that efforts to this end are pretty 
limited.    “I think there‟s been some movement to go sort of multidisciplinary, to try to 
get out to places that see survivors of domestic violence.  So medical is one thing I think 
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of.  And yet, I think sometimes we are very insular [laughs] and talk a lot with each 
other.” 
Victims/Survivors 
When asked what was being done locally to hold domestically abusive men 
responsible for their behavior or to stop these men from being violent, victims expressed 
disappointment and frustration.  They essentially identified that little or nothing was 
being done.  When I asked about current efforts, “Nothing!” was voiced loud and clear by 
several women. “A month in jail and then nothing” was offered by another.  When asked 
directly about the police, victims offered that the police do not help. “Police will say, 
„just leave or go home and work it out‟”.    When prompted by me to think through 
different aspects of the criminal justice system‟s response to men‟s violence such as 
“batterer intervention, the police”, I was interrupted by a victim who said, “Not the 
police” to the chorus of vigorous head nodding.    
Batterer Intervention Providers 
Standing in sharp contrast to the responses offered by victims, batterer 
intervention providers identified a coordinated, multi-faceted response to domestically 
abusive men.  They identified a strategy that includes arrests, adjudication, batterer 
intervention programs, Department of Human Services, services for victims, Family 
Violence Coordinating Council (FVCC), Domestic Violence Enhancement Response 
Team (DVERT) as well as community awareness building and prevention education.  In 
general terms, they spoke of “putting men in the system, you know? The system enters 
their lives in one way or another and then they‟re required to do a variety of things.”  
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When asked to provide more detail, they explained, “That would include the police 
making the arrest and the district attorney pursing charges, the judge adjudicating those 
charges and the probation supervising those men.  Those would be some of the parts of 
that system.”  They discussed momentum in the field towards coordinating services for 
victims and perpetrators, though noted that the police are not always as involved as other 
partners.  An example would be the “Family Violence Coordinating Counsel, where we 
have monthly, usually monthly meetings and you have hopefully, hopefully, 
representatives from every different aspect of the field.  Ours has some problems getting 
law enforcement involved, police officers, specifically, probation and parole are 
involved.”   
More than any other stakeholder group, batterer intervention providers spoke 
about a response that included more than just the domestic violence and criminal justice 
communities.  They talked about how many of them were targeting the faith community 
and mental health professionals with training and information in an attempt to build a 
larger and more effective community safety net.  “The bulk of it, though, is to do 
community outreach training.  The culture that we‟re working with, faith culture, to train 
those leaders who have influence in these people‟s lives.”  
Perpetrators 
When asked about current intervention with domestically abusive men, 
perpetrators in the first focus group talked about the system‟s response being reactive, 
“Post-attack, after the attack”, occurring after the violence, and most often consisting of 
counseling.  “We get counseling”.  They also mentioned that the criminal justice system 
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is the vehicle that brings them to the counseling. “The justice system is just trying to do 
what they can do to get us to the counseling.” 
Perpetrators in the second group expressed tremendous resentment towards 
current strategies, so much so that they had difficulty describing the current response 
without simultaneously criticizing it.  Embedded in their critical comments are references 
to the use of arrest, adjudication and mandated counseling.  They began by suggesting 
that they were unfairly arrested.  “To just throw you into the system when you and 
another person are involved in something, they say it takes two people to fight.  Your part 
in it may not have been right, but it still takes two people to fight, two people to have 
domestic violence.”  Next they discussed how district attorneys invent charges to unjustly 
persecute them. “District attorney gets the report, then they pad it up and then you got a 
bunch of charges against you and they just kind of throw all this other crap on.”  They 
then commented on the fact that what happens to them in court is determined by people 
who are not qualified. “Lawyers and people who know the law, these aren‟t, these aren‟t 
marriage counselors.  These aren‟t psychologists.”  Finally, they remarked on the fact that 
the current strategies require excessive attendance in batterer intervention programs “48 
weeks for a one time mistake”. 
Summary Research Question One 
 Stakeholders‟ descriptions of current intervention strategies with abusive men 
were somewhat truncated due to their strong interest in beginning to identify their 
perceptions of their limitations and challenges.  However, when urged, most stakeholders 
identified a primarily criminal justice based strategy (i.e., police respond, make arrests, 
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the DA prosecutes, men get assigned to probation, and then mandated to batterer 
intervention programs). Additionally, officers, advocates and providers mentioned the 
availability of victim services and community outreach.  
Most interesting perhaps are the areas of distinction among the stakeholders.  
Police and probation officers focused on the reactive and potentially futile nature of the 
response, while victim advocates talked about the Department of Human Services: Child 
Welfare and the challenge this system‟s involvement often presents for victims/survivors.  
Victims were sarcastic and expressed so much frustration over the inadequacies of the 
current system that they essentially stated that there is no meaningful response to 
perpetrators.  Batterer intervention providers talked about current efforts towards 
coordination and collaboration among the multiple partners involved with domestic 
violence including victim services, the mental health community and the faith 
community.  Finally, perpetrators emphasized that the current response unfairly and 
excessively punishes them.   
Research Question Two:  
What do key stakeholders within Portland’s Coordinated Community Response believe 
limits the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention with abusive men? 
As noted above, stakeholders were extremely eager to discuss factors that they 
believe limit the effectiveness of current domestic violence intervention strategies with 
abusive men, frequently struggling to answer my opening question related to mapping the 
current response without offering commentary on what is not working well and why.  At 
no point did stakeholders struggle to offer constructive criticism of the existing strategies, 
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stating for example that “nothing” limits the effectiveness.  Each group was quite clear 
that the current system response, while perceived by some as an improvement over 
historical responses, is far from adequate.   
In general, stakeholder‟s concerns were more similar than they were dissimilar. 
For example, police officers, victim advocates and victims all discussed the impact of 
insufficient accountability for perpetrators, ineffective and potentially dangerous batterer 
intervention programs, and rampant victim blaming.  Additionally, officers, advocates, 
providers and perpetrators questioned the effectiveness of using a punishment based 
system for inspiring long term behavior change in abusive men and in one way or another 
each stakeholder group questioned or expressed concern about utilizing a “one size fits 
all” approach to perpetrators.    
A couple of distinctions among the stakeholders‟ responses are particularly 
noteworthy.  Victim advocates and victims were incensed about the re-victimization that 
occurs for abused women when the “system” enters their lives and batterer intervention 
providers spent a great deal of time discussing the debilitating impact of societal 
messages that condone or even encourage intimate violence as well as the challenge of 
providing treatment for perpetrators when they are vilified or ignored by other parts of 
the system.  Finally, perpetrators discussed at length the ways in which they are unfairly 
treated by the criminal justice system and insisted that they will only change when they 
decide to do so.   
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Police and Probation Officers 
Police and probation officers expressed a great deal of frustration with the 
system‟s current response to men‟s abusive behavior, identifying several components that 
they believe limit the effectiveness of current domestic violence intervention.   They 
articulated concerns with incarceration, “no contact” orders, and batterer intervention 
treatment programs, suggesting that we still have not found the prescription to altering a 
perpetrator‟s violent behavior.  “It just seems like we‟re not really hitting what the root 
cause is, what the problem is.  So, there are sanctions, there are consequences, to some 
degree, not that they‟re great or consistent, even.  But what is happening from the 
standpoint of altering a batterer‟s behavior.  I don‟t see anything that has significantly 
worked.”   Additionally, they discussed how a one-size fits all approach limits the 
effectiveness of domestic violence intervention by failing to adequately meet the diverse 
needs of their clients.  Finally, they commented on the pervasiveness and ramifications of 
victim blaming attitudes in their departments, in the courts, and in society at large.  
  The problem with punishment.  Police and probation officers discussed with some 
resignation the criminal justice system‟s limited ability to change men‟s abusive behavior 
through punishment based strategies such as incarceration, acknowledging that prison is 
not an ideal environment for abusive men.  “Prison isn‟t gonna, they‟re not gonna get it 
there.  They‟re not going to learn how not to be assaultive or abusive.  They‟re going to 
learn how to be more abusive and assaultive.”  Even if the goal is for prison to merely 
separate perpetrators from victims, the problem, according to many officers, is that the 
separation is not nearly long enough. “It‟s not like it‟s a solution to just say, „we‟re going 
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to put him in jail and everything will be okay,‟ because they‟re going to be out in six or 
seven months and it could be even worse then.”  In other words, the criminal justice‟s 
system‟s ultimate punishment is not effective because it does not help men learn how to 
be non-abusive, it usually does not protect victims for very long, and when men are 
released they often retaliate against their partner for getting them arrested in the first 
place.  
Their ambivalence regarding the success of punishment based strategies was not 
limited to prison.  Police and probation officers also questioned the effectiveness of 
mandating treatment as a condition of probation and broad utilizations of “no contact” 
orders, specifically discussing how challenging it can be for perpetrators to fulfill these 
probation requirements.  In their opinion, the system is setting perpetrators up to commit 
probation violations, rather than setting them up to change.  “They don‟t have money to 
pay for the treatments, so they don‟t go and then they get arrested and back to court.”  
According to these officers, the strain of paying for treatment, while in many cases also 
maintaining a second household apart from the victim in accordance with a “no contact” 
order, does not appear to be helping perpetrators make more constructive choices.  Many 
violate their probation by not attending classes or by having contact with their victim or 
both, which ironically leads to more probation and more expensive treatment which they 
cannot afford.  “They have this 52 week batterer‟s intervention program they have to go 
through, but in the meantime their whole life is destroyed.  I mean, the fact that they have 
committed a crime, that‟s a given.  There‟s justice in that.  They‟ve gone to court, now 
their whole life is being flipped upside down.  They can‟t see their children, they don‟t 
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have a place to live and you don‟t really know how much they‟re abiding by the „no 
contact‟ order, anyways, so it seems like half the time they seem to ignore it and probably 
violate it weekly.”    
Clearly, officers are concerned that the punitive aspects of the criminal justice 
system response may not actually be deterring additional crimes or violations.  In fact, in 
their experience, mandatory participation in batterer intervention programs as a condition 
of probation often leads to probation violations when men simply cannot afford to 
continue to attend.  Additionally, for some families, the financial strain of the “no 
contact” order is so great that the victim actually encourages her perpetrator to violate the 
order in order to make ends meet.  “So now he has to support himself, pay for an 
apartment or a motel or pay rent at his uncle‟s house or something to where now you‟re 
taking money away from that household.  And the wife is going bankrupt or is gonna 
have to sell the house.  It causes all kinds of problems financially because maybe the wife 
is a stay-at-home mom and if you take him out and he‟s gotta pay to live somewhere else 
and now they have nothing.  They don‟t have money to put food on the table.”  Probation 
officers talked about how frequently they receive phone calls from victims begging them 
to release the “no contact” order so that the probationer can stop dividing the income of 
the family and return home.  If they are not able to or willing to try and get the “no 
contact” order lifted, probation officers were quite clear that their probationers simply 
violate the order.  Obviously, the issue of whether the “punishment” of mandated 
treatment and “no contact” orders is effective is intertwined with the issue of money; a 
limitation that I‟ll return to more fully in response to Research Question Four.     
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The trouble with treatment.  The fact that the fees to attend batterer intervention 
treatment are cost-prohibitive for some men was not the only concern that officers 
expressed with respect to batterer intervention treatment; they were equally dissatisfied 
with the treatment programs themselves.  Some officers went so far as to suggest that the 
programs might be doing more harm than good.  “All of corrections should be evidence-
based right now and there is no data indicating that domestic violence intervention 
programs are evidence-based, that they reduce recidivism, that they work.  Actually, there 
is data evidence indicating that they could be making them worse.”    
Not all the police and probation officers attributed batterer intervention 
treatment‟s lack of success to the programs themselves.  Many were empathetic to the 
fact that treatment is not going to work if the participant is not ready.  “In thinking about 
my guys …and why this hasn‟t worked for them, I think some of it is because they‟re not 
ready to hear the message.  They‟re not ready to learn it.  They‟re not at the stage where 
they‟re open to saying, „I‟m really screwing up my life,‟ and it‟s catching them at that 
moment where that message will click and you can get your most work done.”  Others 
agreed that change most often occurs when a client is receptive to the treatment.  
“Sometimes it happens, if they‟re ready.  It‟s sort of like the alcoholic that hits bottom.  If 
they‟re ready to change, then they can change and it‟s successful.”  Officers went on to 
explain that this internal “click” is not something that can be mandated and therefore for 
many men, mandating treatment may not be effective.   
For some police and probation officers, the problem is that the treatment is not 
long enough given the complex nature of the material and the tenacity of behaviors built 
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over a lifetime.   “It seems like we send people to batterer intervention every day.  And 
they can go, but it‟s sort of a learned behavior from childhood.  A lot of times, they‟ve 
witnessed it, they‟ve seen it, they‟ve experienced it and we can send them once, and I just 
think sometimes that‟s just not enough because they really have to approach, change their 
whole way of being, have to learn how to talk about things and express their emotions.  It 
takes the victim that long to leave, sometimes maybe seven times.  It takes these guys a 
long time to catch on to the material.”  Others concurred and lamented that “we aren‟t 
treating domestic violence in the same way that we treat mental health or a medical issue.  
There isn‟t a program that is sufficient enough or time intensive enough to make a change 
in thinking that might then change behavior.”   Obviously, officers were somewhat 
ambivalent with respect to whether programs should be shorter or longer.  Some felt that 
the difficulty of the material and the entrenched nature of the behaviors warranted longer 
programs.  “Personally, I think they should be in groups for two or three years…because 
I think it takes that long for people to start grasping those kinds of concepts.”  However, 
others expressed concerns with how long they currently are, given how expensive they 
are for their clients.  “I think a huge gap is some kind of treatment that works, that‟s 
effective.  I mean because the treatments that we do have are so long and they cost the 
offenders quite a bit of money.  They have to present their homework and it takes you 
know, 20 weeks for them to present one piece of homework and so a 52 week program 
gets pushed out to 80 weeks, while they pay the whole time.”   
Finally, officers expressed concern that because the treatment is mandated by the 
courts and therefore perceived as a punishment, clients are simply concerned with 
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successful completion rather than actually changing their behavior.  “And these are 
skilled group participants often, so the other thing that happens is that they become very, 
very tactful about what to say, how to say it, how to successfully complete the program.  
How much behavior modification is being internalized when all of your energy is spent 
trying to out-think the program‟s rules and requirements?” The bottom line appears to be 
that police and probation officers do not have a great deal of confidence in batterer 
intervention programs to change men‟s abusive behavior and are therefore speculating 
about whether the problem is that the programs are too short, too expensive, or too 
“punitive”. 
Negotiating punishment and rehabilitation. As indicated above, police and 
probation officers struggled to balance the criminal justice system‟s punishment-based 
approach to abusive men with the goal of rehabilitating perpetrators.  In addition to 
discussing their concerns with incarceration and with the impact mandatory participation 
has on men‟s ability to engage in treatment, they discussed the impact that navigating 
these two intentions can have on stakeholders and implied that this tension is a potentially 
limiting factor in the effectiveness of the system‟s response to domestic violence. “As we 
mentioned, and everybody kind of agreed that, the response of probation and the 
correction system is typically reactive and mostly punitive like, „Caught you having 
contact with the victim.  Bad.  Shame on you.  Go do this, as a punishment for that.‟ 
Those kinds of things.  And, the introduction of people participating in batterer‟s 
intervention programs, everyone that‟s being referred is being referred to a 52 week 
program, 48 weeks with after care.  You know, what that program is about, from my 
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understanding, is about changing behavior.  It‟s a very, very time consuming, tedious 
slow process.  One that requires a lot of flexibility.  And I think when you have a person 
who‟s coming from approaching their work purely reactive and punitively and then to put 
on this sort of, in my case I view it more social worky counselor kind of, „Come on, 
we‟re gonna introduce new ideas about how to think about women.  We‟re gonna 
introduce new ideas, new language about how to refer to partners, you know?‟  That kind 
of a roll.  It‟s challenging, and I think there‟s, there‟s a lot of confusion that floats to the 
surface in trying to do both of those things.” 
One size fits all.  In addressing questions regarding what limits the effectiveness 
of domestic violence intervention with abusive men, police and probation officers were 
quick to suggest that the current approach is not individualized enough to be successful.  
They insisted that each situation and each perpetrator may need something different and 
the system just is not set up to respond.  “I don‟t think we‟re a one-stop shop for 
everybody.  I think each situation is individual in itself and may need something different 
than somebody else.”  Several officers suggested that what is most needed is a better 
assessment protocol enabling a more tailored response. “We need better assessment at the 
beginning, a more accurate, in-depth, clinical way to assess probably more factors than 
we look at now.”  Some suggested that in the absence of a screening device, the approach 
feels somewhat random and uniformed.  “I think if the orientation component of domestic 
violence supervision was way more intense and way more in-depth, then we might be 
able to extract from that some better interventions and tailor things more appropriately to 
the person than we are doing now, which is to throw all the spaghetti against the wall and 
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hope some of it sticks.”  Others, responding to differences that they experience or witness 
between and among clients, suggested that not only is every perpetrator unique, but every 
situation is unique as well and warrants consideration.  “There needs to be differences in 
the type of treatment based on assessment and based on the type of charges they have and 
who the victim is.”  It might be a dosage differentiation (i.e., how many groups) or a 
treatment differentiation (i.e., batterer intervention treatment model) that is needed, but 
regardless, it is their assertion that treating each perpetrator with the same response is not 
effective.  “Evidence-based practice suggests that it doesn‟t work to put everybody in the 
same square peg.” 
 Police and probation officers‟ frustration with a “one size fits all” approach was 
not limited to treatment.  As described earlier, they were particularly concerned about the 
limitations of uniform issuances of “no contact” orders given the financial strain that 
these orders can cause.  “The „no contact‟ order is definitely something that becomes 
emotional for everybody involved because you don‟t want to cause, you want to see 
people be safe, but you don‟t want to cause more damage than was there before.”   
Officers suggested that for some perpetrators having contact with their victim, remaining 
in their homes might enable them to focus on their treatment and actually make 
improvements that they might otherwise not be able to make.  “One of the things that 
contributes to [DV intervention] not working is uniform application of the „no contact‟ 
order by the court.  I think in some cases forcing the partners to be apart creates or can 
have the potential to create some additional barriers that might now come on the scene... 
Like if that guy could stay there, regardless of even how dysfunctional it is, where he‟s 
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receiving support from the primary victim and if in that comfortable dysfunction he 
would participate in the batterer‟s intervention program and maybe actually show up for 
it in a different way than being completely stressed out and freaked out and I don‟t know 
where I‟m gonna live and I don‟t have bus tickets and all so I‟ll just take off?  Might that 
be better?” Another officer agreed that one benefit of having perpetrators remain in the 
home is that they could continue to work on real time issues that come up in the 
relationship, something that would be particularly beneficial if the couple is planning to 
reunite at some point.  I cannot help wondering if the officers would still support the idea 
of perpetrators remaining in the home if the “dysfunction” and “real time issues” 
involved violence and abuse.   
Victim blaming/Invisibility of perpetrators.  When asked what limits the 
effectiveness of current domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men, 
police and probation officers were quick to identify the persistence of victim blaming 
attitudes and beliefs within society at large, as well as within their departments.  “I think 
in our country, maybe everywhere, there is still a lot of blame that‟s placed on the 
survivor in the situation, or the victim in the situation.  And I think that‟s still the case 
here, even among police officers.”  Officers suggested that societal attitudes were 
particular problematic when victims reach out for help from friends and family.  “I think 
society, too… I mean, when a woman calls her mom and her mom says, „What did you 
do to provoke it?‟ I think there‟s still a piece of that running around out there.  It‟s better, 
but it‟s real slow going.”  The implication in this statement is that that when family 
members reinforce the idea that victims are responsible for their abuse, it creates barriers 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
143 
to successful intervention.  A woman who hears that she is to blame from someone close 
to her is perhaps less likely to reach out for support from either a victim services agency 
or the police.   
Unfortunately, even if a victim does reach out to the police, officers were clear 
that she will not always be met with the support she needs.  In fact, they explained that 
the “perception within the police department is that it is mostly the victim‟s fault, almost 
all the time.”  Apparently the belief that the victim is responsible is particularly acute if 
there are children involved.  “There is a cultural attitude within the police agency about 
domestic violence.  A lot of responsibility is portrayed and it might not be completely 
overt, but in sometimes very subtle ways, [that] the whole situation is the responsibility 
of the victim.  Particularly if there are kids involved.”  The officers I interviewed did not 
seem proud of this cultural norm among their peers, but were being honest about what 
they know victims experience.   
One place where officers identified that victim blaming has a particularly 
devastating impact is with respect to dual arrests.  The officers that I interviewed 
recognized the problems inherent in dual arrests and the benefits of identifying a primary 
aggressor.  They were resigned, however, to the fact that there are some officers within 
their departments who will never be convinced that it is harmful and unjust to arrest a 
women who is violent in self-defense. “We try to train vigorously about not doing dual 
arrests and why they‟re bad, but you‟re always going to get them for whatever reason.  
And it seems it kind of comes in waves where we‟ll see a bunch of them for a while and 
then you won‟t see so many.  Or you‟ll see the female has been battered for years and 
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finally maybe fights back in self-defense, but then ends up getting arrested because they 
were the ones that don‟t have the injury.  So it‟s just training.  It‟s pretty much pounding 
that in that it doesn‟t do anybody any good.  But you‟ll get officers that just insist [on 
making a dual arrest].  That person committed a crime and that person committed a crime 
and they‟re both going to jail.” 
The picture that the officers painted of victim blaming beyond their departments 
was not much brighter.  The courts were specifically mentioned as a place where victim 
blaming abounds, with judges often demonstrating significant ignorance when it comes to 
domestic violence dynamics.  “I think sometimes it‟s the courts…. Sometimes the court 
isn‟t educated itself on domestic violence issues.  I remember going to DVERT and 
hearing them, they have quotes that judges said that were really insensitive to women, but 
also insensitive to the issue of domestic violence, so I think there‟s an education piece 
that needs to happen on that end.” 
Ironically, despite their articulation of the presence of victim blaming and their 
assertion that attitudes that hold victim‟s responsible for their own abuse limit the success 
of domestic violence intervention strategies, the officers demonstrated a subtle form of 
victim blaming themselves when they were unable to suggest alternative strategies for 
how to deal with abusive men and instead chose to talk about how they would prefer to 
work with victims.  In fact, the police and probation officers I spoke with were unable to 
even brainstorm about how they would intervene with abusive men if they had unlimited 
resources.  When I asked them point blank, “what would you do with perpetrators if you 
had unlimited resources”, there were no answers and a little laughter.  Finally, an officer 
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said, “I think another way I look at it is offering more services to victims and 
empowering them to make the right, to make the right choices for themselves.  I guess I 
feel like the best thing I can do sometimes is to empower the victim and to get services 
for that victim because I guess sometimes I see more of a benefit of working with the 
victim than in trying to change this person over here.”  Whether the officers realize it or 
not, implicit in this response is the idea that victims can somehow control the violence in 
their lives by making better choices, and that there is little or no hope for rehabilitating 
perpetrators.   
In sum, police and probation officers expressed disturbed resignation regarding 
the limitations of current domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men and 
described several significant challenges to success.  Their criticisms can be loosely 
grouped into two primary categories: insufficient and ineffectual response to perpetrators 
and inappropriate victim blaming.  Perhaps more than any other stakeholder group, they 
expressed ambivalence regarding the efficacy of “punishment” based criminal justice 
strategies to alter a batterer‟s behavior.  They suggested that prison is not effective 
because perpetrators are neither rehabilitated while they are incarcerated, nor contained 
long enough to provide any real safety for their victims.  They were similarly 
unenthusiastic about the efficacy of treatment, concerned that it is too punitive (i.e., 
mandated and expensive), not evidence-based, and not long enough.  Police and 
probation officers were consistently disturbed by the “one size fits all” approach currently 
in place for perpetrators, both in terms of the criminal justice response, particularly with 
respect to “no contact” orders, as well as the batterer intervention treatment.  They were 
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particularly frustrated that this homogeny persists in the face of their belief that evidence-
based practice data exists to suggest that this is not the most appropriate approach.  The 
officers suggested that conducting a more thorough initial assessment and then making a 
more informed and specific placement according to that assessment would be more 
effective.  Finally, they discussed the fact that victim blaming is still rampant throughout 
the police and probation departments, the courts, and society and that these attitudes and 
beliefs significantly affect the efficacy of domestic violence intervention strategies. 
Victim Advocates 
Victim advocates were exceptionally eager to discuss their analysis of what limits 
the effectiveness of current domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men 
and were animated and emotional while addressing this topic.  They readily agreed with 
one other regarding the severity of the challenges associated with the current response 
and the detrimental impact these limitations have on their clients.  They spoke at length 
regarding the challenges to effectiveness posed by insufficient and inconsistent 
accountability within the criminal justice system for perpetrators of domestic violence, 
ineffective and potentially harmful batterer intervention treatment, and the absence of a 
victim-centered approach.  
Insufficient accountability for perpetrators.  Advocates uniformly expressed 
concern about the lack of sufficient punishment or accountability for perpetrators of 
domestic violence, specifically noting how frequently the system inappropriately holds 
their clients responsible for stopping the violence.  One advocate offered this reflection.  
“I think there‟s still not a lot of accountability within a lot of systems for men.  I think 
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systems still look to the women to protect herself rather than looking to the men to stop 
the violence or stop the abuse.” Another advocate agreed and spoke specifically about the 
fact that the system inappropriately depends on victim‟s participation to hold men 
accountable and that this dependence is a limitation. “Well, for the law enforcement 
aspect, so much emphasis is put on the victim, that without her participation in this, then 
he‟s not going to be held accountable.  And that means even less men are being held 
accountable.”   
Advocates spoke at length about the challenges created by truncated prison 
sentences for perpetrators, noting that not only do short incarcerations pose a significant 
physical hazard to their clients, but they send a harmful message to the community 
regarding the seriousness of domestic violence.  Advocates described how stunted 
sentences or overnight holds fail to adequately provide any sense of security or safety for 
victims.  “It seems like short sentencing is a limitation.  Because as far as reporting and 
having batterers go to jail, women can report, an incident can happen, they can call the 
police, the person‟s arrested and then released the next day.  So then, that‟s really scary 
for a woman to know that she can call the police and he‟s only going to stay in jail 
overnight and then maybe not get more jail time.  It seems like sentencing is really, 
really, short.  So there‟s no safety for the survivor.”  This concern was echoed by every 
advocate in both focus groups.  Not only are victims protected for insufficient periods of 
time when perpetrators are released so quickly, but according to the advocates I 
interviewed, they are at greater risk of retaliatory injury when perpetrators are released 
than if they had never been locked up in the first place.  “I just feel like there‟s issue with 
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how much time an abuser gets.  So he gets arrested and he‟s released the next day after 
arraignment and then she gets it even worse when he gets back.”   Advocates went on to 
explain that the impotence of the current response results in worse consequences for their 
clients both immediately (when he is released) and in the long run when clients will not 
reach out for help because of what did or did not happen the last time they contacted the 
police.  “Like I said, she often gets it worse.  So then women often won‟t call the police.  
So [there‟s] an escalation of violence because of intervention.”   
In addition to fearing for the immediate and future safety of their clients, 
advocates were concerned about the message that is being sent to their clients, to 
perpetrators of domestic violence, and to society at large by short incarcerations.  They 
suggested that part of the problem is the fact that the laws concerning domestic violence 
are not strong enough to result in longer sentences.  “I also feel like the laws that are in 
place around domestic violence… I feel like they‟re not very strong.  Like, I know that 
for a long time there was no law specifically regarding strangulation and that a lot of us 
in the field advocated for that to happen…. Strangulation is [now] a Class A 
misdemeanor.  I mean strangulation is a pretty big freaking deal, and within the field, it‟s 
one of the ways we assess someone‟s danger, it‟s a risk assessment and for it to not carry 
much weight…”   The crime of strangulation was discussed for some time, with one 
advocate telling a story to illustrate how ludicrous it is in her opinion that this crime is 
identified as a misdemeanor.  “A woman I work with always tells the story of how she 
worked with a woman who was strangled six times, passed out, in one evening and he 
would wake her up.  He would slap her to wake her up, strangle her again, and he was 
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charged with a misdemeanor because he obviously didn‟t want to kill her because he 
would slap her to get her to wake back up.  And so for that to be a misdemeanor is just 
ridiculous.”   
Advocates lamented the fact that domestic violence crimes do not appear to be 
taken seriously and suggested that the fact that domestic violence offenses do not warrant 
severe consequences by the criminal justice system sends a problematic message about 
the acceptability of domestic violence to the public. Their fear is that what gets 
communicated to victims, perpetrators and the society at large is that domestic violence is 
not a serious crime.  “Yeah, it really feels like the message is that it‟s not taken all that 
seriously, you know?  And that‟s a message that batterers and abusers get loud and clear 
all the time.” Another advocate suggested that “maybe if the criminal justice system took 
it more seriously and jail sentencing was higher, the whole community would take it 
more seriously?  See it as more of an issue.”  In the end, advocates expressed that short 
sentences simply do not constitute sufficient punishment for the crime of domestic 
violence.  “What is the worst that can happen with abusive men, he will spend a couple 
days in jail, that‟s it.  In my opinion, there‟s not enough punishment.” 
Advocates did not unilaterally suggest that increasing prison sentences would 
solve the problem.  Several were ambivalent as to whether or not extending or expanding 
prison sentences would be helpful in preventing and intervening in men‟s abusive 
behavior.  Their concerns stemmed partially from the fact that a disproportionate number 
of men of color are incarcerated and partially from the fact that they, like the police and 
probation officers I interviewed, are unconvinced that prison rehabilitates perpetrators of 
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domestic violence.  “Jail, prison?  I just feel like the state of that in our country is in bad 
shape just in terms of the disproportionate men of color and poor men who are jailed, as 
opposed to, sort of, who‟s predominantly doing crimes, committing crimes.  And then 
also, there‟s never really been, in my mind, a decision as to whether or not prison is 
punishment or rehabilitation.” 
One size fits all.  Victim advocates expressed frustration with what they perceive 
to be an inconsistent response from the criminal justice system to perpetrators of abuse, 
particularly when it comes to probation.  “What I notice at the parole and probation 
office, and it makes a lot of sense because they have huge caseloads, but that guys are 
required to do lots of really different things.  Like, for example, one person might require 
the guy to have anger management, whereas someone else is always recommending [a 
local BIP program], or somebody else is recommending some other group in the 
community.  So some sort of consistency around how we are going to respond to these 
guys, I feel that is important.”  Contrasting the concern expressed by police and probation 
officers that the current response is not individualized enough, advocates were primarily 
concerned that the current response is not consistent or uniform enough (i.e., perpetrators 
are not held equally accountable).  They related that in their experience a man can 
commit one act of violence and end up in jail, where other men can repeatedly violate 
restraining orders and not be prosecuted.  “I don‟t see a pattern. Is pattern really not 
connected to crime?  It‟s just this guy was unlucky enough and another was lucky. My 
opinion is that it should be handled with consisten[cy].”   
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While most of the advocates acknowledged that the response often appears 
inconsistent, one advocate, echoing opinions expressed by the officers, did suggest that a 
“one-size fits all” response might not be ideal either, offering instead that each 
perpetrator might need a more tailored or individualized response.  “I think it‟s 
consistency in the message, not necessarily in the intervention.  You can have a 
consistent message about the way things are done or not done, and yet know that 
individual kids learn differently, so you interact with them, you treat them differently.”  
The trouble with treatment. Advocates described two distinct limitations 
associated with batterer intervention treatment that they believe contribute to the 
inefficacy of the current response.  Specifically, they expressed concern about whether 
batterer intervention treatment was rehabilitating or enabling perpetrators and discussed 
the fact that mandating attendance often translates into an intensification of anger by 
perpetrators towards victims.   
In their experience, it seems as though the programs often appear to support, 
enable and sometimes enhance the perpetrator‟s abusive behavior.  In other words, 
according to advocates, batterer intervention programs do not appear to sufficiently 
challenge participants‟ attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.  “When they talk with each other, 
it almost sound like a support group for them.”  This particular advocate went on to 
suggest that instead perpetrators should be placed in a group with men who do not 
condone their abusive behavior in order to show them that society at large does not 
support and will not tolerate their abuse. “Batterer‟s intervention classes, I understand 
them, but if one batterer [was] invited to a group of men who is like church group or 
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some kind where he feels more comfortable, but [the participants] are not having this 
issue [are not batterers] and he is by himself then maybe can be turned around.  He will 
feel like he is isolated, like he‟s by himself.  Nobody shares his opinion, shares his view, 
you know?” Another advocate chimed in and agreed that it was necessary to, “show them 
how society doesn‟t accept it, so they know that they are not supported.”   
Additionally, advocates expressed concern and frustration over the fact that often 
the programs seem to increase the likelihood that their clients will be abused.  “One of 
my clients called me and said, „can you please explain to me what they are doing in these 
classes?  Because he comes home every time more angry.‟ She said he become[s] just 
evil when he comes back from these classes.”  In this particular situation, the victim‟s 
partner was specifically angry about not only having to attend, but having to pay for the 
classes. 
The current response is not sufficiently victim-centered.  In discussing limitations 
of the system‟s response to abusive men, advocates spent the bulk of their time talking 
about the ways in which domestic violence intervention strategies re-victimize their 
clients as opposed to protecting, assisting, and empowering them.  They talked at length 
about how the treatment that victims receive at the hands of the criminal justice and child 
welfare systems often mirrors how they were treated by their abusive partner.  Advocates 
reported that victims are regularly bullied by the system to participate in holding their 
perpetrators accountable, deprived of a voice in determining the fate of their 
relationships, not communicated with openly and directly, blamed or held responsible for 
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the abuse that is perpetrated upon them, and more and more often being arrested for 
defending themselves.   
Advocates expressed dismay when reporting that their clients are often bullied 
into helping the criminal justice system hold their perpetrators accountable even if they 
are not interested in being part of the process.  Victims‟ reasons for not wanting to be 
involved may vary from concerns regarding retaliation to the need to emotionally 
distance themselves from their abusive situation.  Regardless, their reasons do not appear 
to be respected by representatives of the criminal justice system, a failure that infuriates 
advocates.  “I think a lot of times, women, we‟ve talked to a lot of women who have 
made a report but then want to drop charges or don‟t want to testify or are fine with 
charges being pressed, but they don‟t want to be a part of it, and they get really bullied 
into it.  One woman said she felt like the DA‟s office was stalking her because they were 
calling her, like, three or four times a day.  And you know, they subpoenaed her, 
threatening to arrest her if she didn‟t testify.  And she felt scared, and she just wanted to 
be done with it.  Like, she didn‟t want anything to do with him.  She was fine if they 
wanted to go forward with that, but she didn‟t want to be part of it.”   
Knowing that their clients are often treated this way by the district attorney‟s 
office creates an uncomfortable dilemma for victim advocates as they struggle to advise 
victims whether or not to call the police.  “Some women just want it documented so if 
later they want to do something, they have that paper trail.  But then, like, once you make 
the report, it‟s out of their hands.  That‟s one of the hardest things I have to explain is 
that, next time, if you really don‟t want anything to happen, maybe not making that 
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report.  Having to do that kind of talk with her so you don‟t get harassed by the DA‟s 
office or by the police because you know what‟s the safest thing for you.”  Advocates 
lamented that victims truly have no clear path with respect to reporting.  If they report, 
but do not want to prosecute or participate in the prosecution, they are harshly judged by 
members of the criminal justice system, but if they do not report, they are also criticized 
by those same members down the road if they ever do decide to come forward.   “You 
hear victim blaming from [not reporting] …‟well, why didn‟t she report all those other 
incidents that took place?‟”   
Advocates were particularly aggravated by the fact that victims have very little 
voice within the system.  In other words, they are given very little authority to determine 
the best course for their lives.  While no woman wants to be abused, it is not always a 
clear-cut solution to simply remove the perpetrator from their homes.  For many women, 
the decision to take that action can be complicated by her financial situation and 
sometimes by the fact that she loves her abuser.  Unfortunately, as it stands now, 
advocates do not feel as though victims are given space within the system to negotiate 
these complexities.  Most frustrating is the fact that the system often makes the decision 
to act without any provision for how she is supposed to manage the fall-out.  “You know, 
many of those women didn‟t want the guy arrested in the first place or didn‟t want 
anything to happen, and it‟s out of their hands, basically.  And now, he‟s been asked to 
move out, right?  And there he is on probation and she‟s in the house by herself having 
the pay the rent and having to take care of the kids on her own and is calling.  I mean, the 
probation officers get very frustrated that victims call them all the time asking them to 
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drop the “no contact” orders and asking them to let them have contact with the offender.  
And I think again, that whole piece is missing for [probation officers] around why would 
a woman do that?  …and I‟m like, she really needs him to help her pay the rent and take 
care of the kids.”   
The criticism that victims do not have a voice in the criminal justice system was 
echoed repeatedly throughout the advocate focus groups.  By not giving victims a voice, 
the system not only deprives them of the opportunity to chart the course of their own 
lives, but it also completely disempowers them, much like their perpetrators did.  Victims 
often come away feeling used by the system, involved only to the extent that it serves the 
needs and objectives of the system.  “The victims don‟t really have a voice in the 
criminal justice system. Like, they make a report and then it‟s whatever the officer 
decides to put in that report.  And she can talk to the DA, but the DA‟s gonna do 
whatever they want.  I mean, really, the only time that she can really openly speak is 
when he‟s sentenced and having a victim impact statement.  And that‟s really frustrating 
for survivors because they want a say in what‟s going on, and they want to know what‟s 
going on, but nobody‟s really paying [attention], [the DA] just want[s] to keep her on 
board.  That‟s all they want.  They just want her to participate.”   
As suggested in the quote above, advocates‟ concerns extend beyond bullying and 
disempowering clients.  They are aggravated by what they perceive as a lack of 
communication between the “system” and victims, demonstrated by the fact that victims 
often have no idea what is happening with their own cases.  They do not know what their 
perpetrators have been charged with and they frequently do not know or understand why 
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some charges are dropped and others are added.  Advocates suggested that the system 
needs to be more engaged with victims, involving them throughout the process. “I don‟t 
think women know, often, going in, sometimes they‟re told.  But I think other times, they 
have this expectation that he‟s going to be charged with what he was arrested for.   And 
then charges get dropped, he pleads out, so he may have been arrested, and he was 
arrested for assault 4 and strangulation and whatever, like menacing.  And then it gets 
dropped to menacing or harassment.  Or sometimes the DA‟s office will choose to 
prosecute on a crime that‟s not even DV related because it can get him more time, like 
burglary or something like that.  So then there‟s no accountability for domestic violence 
or it‟s just a plea down to a level where he gets probation and that was not what she 
thought she was walking into.  At the very least, let the woman know up front that this is 
the way that it is probably going to happen.” As a result of this poor communication, 
victims often experience alienation and confusion.  For example, advocates explained 
that victims are often just told “no” in response to a request to drop a “no contact” order, 
but they are not told “why”.  “I think the most important thing is that it‟s articulated to 
her in a thorough manner, why the probation officer doesn‟t feel like it‟s safe for him to 
lift the „no contact‟ order.  So that it is explained because I think in some cases what gets 
frustrating is a survivor being told, „No, no, no, no.  That‟s not possible.‟ or „This is the 
way things are.‟ but not told why.  Or sort of given a reason why.”   
Advocates then suggested that enhancing communication between system 
partners and victims could really enhance the efficacy of the intervention.  Not only 
would victims feel better served by a system designed to protect and provide for them, 
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but these conversations might provide system stakeholders with vital information.  As an 
example, several advocates felt that it would be advantageous for batterer intervention 
program facilitators to speak to the partners of the men participating in their programs in 
order to get their perspective on the changes that may or may not be being made as a 
result of the groups.  “I think it makes a really big difference if the counselors in the 
program specifically speak to survivors.  If they‟re just hearing the man‟s side of the 
story, then they may also be really manipulated by him.  I just feel like it‟s really 
important to speak to survivors too about what‟s happening at home.”   
 According to the advocates I interviewed, a truly victim-centered approach would 
not involve bullying victims to participate in prosecuting their perpetrators if they do not 
want to be involved, would not deprive them of a voice, and would not ignore them or 
avoid communicating with them throughout the process.  It would be focused on 
achieving their safety, maintaining that safety by insuring they either have the resources 
to live independently or can navigate the necessary hoops and programs to get them.  
“Ideally, it would be consistency in terms of a victim-centered response.  So that you‟re 
looking at what‟s going to be safest for her.  And not only what‟s going to be safest for 
her, but how it‟s going to be possible for her.  Because it‟s not only fear of escalation in 
terms of, like, why women don‟t testify.  It‟s also other reasons, like financial reasons.  
So if she doesn‟t have any resources and he‟s been the one bringing home the money and 
her options are him going to jail or her not be able to pay the rent or buy food.  I think for 
most of them, the choice is obvious.”  In other words, according to advocates, a victim-
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centered response would be sensitive and responsive to the fact that often victims simply 
do not have the resources to leave their abusive partners.   
Concurring with police and probation officers, victim advocates repeatedly 
suggested that the effectiveness of the current domestic violence intervention system is 
negatively impacted by rampant victim blaming.  According to their testimony, victim 
blaming (i.e., holding victims responsible for their own abuse) by the police and 
probation departments as well as the courts is distressingly prevalent and is both a 
symptom of and contributor to the pervasiveness of domestic violence.  “I think there‟s a 
lot of victim blaming.  We talk about it a lot, and we see it a lot.  Like, we hear women 
say a lot that they‟re blamed by different systems.  And I think again, as long as the 
woman‟s being blamed, then there less of a need, I think the system feels less of a need to 
jump in and help because they see it as her fault and like, „she‟s not helping herself, so 
why should we help?‟”  Advocates reported regularly hearing comments revealing that 
critical stakeholders in the system believe that victims should be doing something 
differently in order to stop the violence, and that fundamentally they are responsible for 
their own experiences of abuse because of their poor choices.  “I‟ve had several women 
say that they‟ve been told that they just don‟t know how to choose men.” Others agreed 
and offered similar examples, “Their picker is broken.”  “Yeah, even by counselors or 
therapists saying, „you lack the skills to make safe choices for yourself around 
relationships.‟ Rather than addressing that there are so many unsafe people out there.” 
Advocates were particularly frustrated by the way these stakeholders focus on the 
victim‟s poor choices, rather than the perpetrator‟s poor choices.  “Like maybe child 
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welfare blaming her for not keeping her kids safe, rather than looking to who‟s really the 
danger to them.”  
In a particularly disturbing example of victim blaming, one advocate reported that 
not only does she hear that victims make poor choices by selecting batterers, but that they 
make these choices because they enjoy the abuse.  “I hear some pretty horrendous victim 
blaming statements on a weekly basis.  I recently was talking to a probation officer who 
was referring a victim to me and she was going to have to go in and have brain surgery 
because of the assaults that had happened, that he had done to her.  And the PO told me 
that this woman obviously feeds off this abuse and being treated this way.  Like, nobody 
feeds off of that.  That‟s not [laughs], it‟s just not the deal.” 
Advocates pointed out that when victims are “blamed” by the system, the 
comments they hear often mirror, and subsequently in a sense, confirm abusive 
comments they heard from their batterers. “Many of those factors that people are using to 
determine sort of who gets great services and who gets really not so great services are 
those same issues of oppression that batterers have already been telling them. „No-one‟s 
going to believe you.  You were an addict for 20 years.‟  And then she walks into the 
courthouse and it‟s “Miss So and So, you were an addict for 20 years.‟ So it just plays 
true and survivors will so often really be able to articulate, like, just what he said was 
going to happen, happened.  And that's heartbreaking because he‟s saying that.  We know 
why he‟s saying that, but there is no excuse in my mind for other systems to say those 
very same things.”   
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According to victim advocates, the end result of these oppressive victim -blaming 
attitudes is that victims are not being appropriately served.  If victims are blamed for their 
abuse, it takes the onus off the system to do something about it.  “So stuff‟s not getting 
done.  Survivors are not getting treated with the respect and dignity that they deserve and 
abusers are not being held responsible or accountable for their actions because there‟s 
just this general sentiment like it‟s not that big of a deal. „If it was that big of a deal, she 
would leave anyway.  I don‟t know what her problem is. She seems blankety, blankety, 
blank.‟  Whatever those kinds of things are, and therefore she‟s less deserving of safety, 
respect, dignity, whatever that is.  And that pervades all of our systems.  And I think, 
probably, the domestic violence advocacy system as well, if we are honest with 
ourselves.” 
Finally, advocates described how more and more frequently victims are arrested 
for crimes they commit while defending themselves, echoing comments by police and 
probation officers.  “I‟m thinking of things like the police responding to a call and the 
woman being the one who is arrested because she maybe struggled to get away from him 
or whatever.  But maybe she even smacked him or something because he was assaulting 
her and she was trying to get away.  And so he‟s got a mark and so she gets taken away.” 
Invisibility of perpetrators.  It is interesting that while advocates expressed 
frustration towards others in the system for blaming victims and not holding men 
accountable enough, they were equally guilty of having no ideas or suggestions for what 
to do with abusive men.  In response to my question, “what strategies or interventions do 
you wish were available for domestically abusive men?” The rooms became very quiet, 
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and then there was a little laughter.  Finally, someone said, “I don‟t know.  It‟s a hard 
question for me.  I feel like I don‟t know enough about that part of the system to know 
what else to try or whatever would work.”  As I suggested earlier with respect to the 
police and probation officers, I believe this resistance effectively translates into victim 
blaming.  By choosing to not focus on “what to do with abusive men”, the focus 
inevitably shifts primarily to abused women. 
In sum, victim advocates offered multiple candidates to account for the limited 
effectiveness of current domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men, most 
of which can be loosely grouped within two umbrella categories: insufficient and 
ineffective accountability for perpetrators and insufficient support for victims.  Victim 
advocates felt strongly that current sanctions for men were neither intense enough nor 
effective.  For example, they expressed great disappointment regarding the lack of 
punishment or accountability for perpetrators as evidenced by paltry criminal justice 
consequences.  Furthermore, they suggested that arrest, prosecution, short sentences and 
attendance in batterer intervention programs may actually cause more harm than good for 
victims. Victims are likely to suffer both physically and financially when their 
perpetrators return home after being in jail for 12 hours, or are issued a “no contact” 
order, or return home after attending batterer intervention groups where they bond and 
receive tacit approval from other abusers or become angry about paying the program fees.  
Advocates also expressed concern that the criminal justice response is not consistent 
across perpetrators and crimes, with some men receiving lighter sentences than others.   
Advocates were particularly distressed by their perception that victim safety and 
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empowerment is not paramount within the current response and that victims are not given 
a voice within the system.  Finally, they spoke at length about the prevalence of victim 
blaming and the many ways in which these attitudes and beliefs within the criminal 
justice and department of child welfare systems limit the effectiveness of domestic 
violence intervention.   
Victims/Survivors 
The victims/survivors that I interviewed were deeply distressed about the current 
state of domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men and were quite eager 
to share their frustrations with each other and with me.  The stories they told resonated 
with the concerns expressed by both officers and advocates, particularly with regard to 
the inability of existing strategies to hold perpetrators sufficiently accountable, the 
absence of successful treatment or rehabilitation for perpetrators, and the lack of a 
fundamentally victim-centered approach.  Although there was substantial consensus 
within each stakeholder group regarding limitations of current domestic violence 
intervention strategies, this phenomenon was particularly evident when I spoke with the 
victims/survivors.  During our conversations, the woman exhibited tremendous solidarity, 
often sharing in unison to get a point across.  In this section I attempt to capture this 
dynamic of cross-talk and support by presenting more of their uninterrupted dialogue. 
Insufficient accountability for perpetrators.  Unquestionably, victims/survivors 
lodged their most articulate and disturbing complaints against the police.  Their 
frustrations centered primarily on the fact that the police either did not respond to their 
calls for help or responded in such a way as to worsen the situation.  “Every time that I 
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called the police with my ex, they wouldn‟t do anything.  He‟d always talk them around it 
and say that it was all my fault.  So I stopped calling the police.  I stopped calling the 
police for years and years.  I finally called them once about ten years later.  It didn‟t do 
anything so I stopped calling again.  They don‟t do anything when you call most of the 
time.  If they do arrest him, they‟re out within anywhere between an hour and 12 hours 
and they‟re back at your door and they‟re doing the same stuff to you again.  And it‟s 
worse for you.”  Others concurred, offering several statements in support of the idea that 
the police either do not arrest perpetrators after arriving on the scene or if they do arrest 
them, they are released so quickly that they are able to easily and swiftly retaliate.   
“When we call, it makes it worse.  And they release them and they let them go back.  And 
it pisses them off more and it makes them hurt us more.  And the police don‟t care.  
That‟s the biggest issue.  Police don‟t care.”    
Victims/survivors went on to describe several incidences where police officers 
either failed to protect them or appeared to make questionable decisions about how to 
proceed given the presenting circumstances.  “There were two different incidences in my 
home where the police came to the scene and they saw him reach in his pocket and 
immediately ran over [and put] cuffs on him.  And in his pocket was a pocket-knife.  You 
know, these domestic violence guys, they‟re survivors.  And what, and they‟re gonna, 
they‟re not gonna go to jail.  And, you know, police were really mad that he‟d stuck his 
hand in there and then found a pocket knife in there, but they didn‟t do anything about it.  
After he calmed down, they just took the handcuffs off [laughs] and just told him, „You 
need to leave.  Get your clothes.  You‟re out of here.  You‟ve got five minutes.‟”  
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Clearly, the victim/survivor who shared this story was surprised that the police did not 
arrest her perpetrator given the concealed weapon and her allegations of abuse.   
Another woman described how when the police arrived on the scene they asked 
her and her children to leave their home as opposed to asking her abuser to leave, despite 
the fact that he was not a resident of her home or on the lease.  “I called the police on my 
children‟s father and he was at my home and I called and they came out and don‟t you 
know, they were gonna make me and my children leave my home and let him stay there?  
I thought that was just wrong, you know?  That‟s my home.  He wasn‟t even on the lease 
or anything and they were gonna make me and my children leave my home and let him 
stay there.”   
In another haunting tale, a victim/survivor recounted how her perpetrator verbally 
threatened a police officer when he responded to her distress call and instead of calling 
for back-up, the police officer left her alone with her abuser.  “He told the police office 
he needed to take his a-s-s and get back on his motorcycle and leave.  He said [to do it] 
before he find himself lying on the pavement … and I just knew right then and there [the 
officer] was gonna call for back up and they were gonna take [my abuser] to jail.  The 
officer got on his motorcycle and left.  I couldn‟t believe it.  He talked so crazy to that 
police officer, and I just knew he was gonna call for back-up and he didn‟t.  He got on his 
motorcycle and left.”    
I selected these three examples because they typify the complaints registered by 
the victims/survivors I spoke with: police officers either down-playing the seriousness of 
domestic violence by allowing perpetrators to leave the scene rather than arresting them, 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
165 
unjustly burdening victims by asking them to flee with their children rather than 
removing perpetrators, and finally abandoning victims to endure the violence and abuse.  
In sum, according to the victims/survivors I interviewed, part of reason domestic violence 
intervention strategies with abusive men are not more successful is because officers do 
not make arrests when they should and they do not protect the rights of victims.  It is 
worth noting that the women who shared these particular tales were African American.  It 
is quite possible that the police indifference they experienced was partially attributable to 
their race.  As was reported earlier, police have a long history of responding less ardently 
to the complaints of lower-working-class African American women (Messerschmidt, 
1993; Young, 1986) 
The message that victims/survivors receive loud and clear is that their safety and 
well-being is not a priority for the police.  In fact, not only can contacting the police be 
dangerous for them with respect to retaliation, but when they call the police, they also run 
the risk of being arrested themselves.  At one point, as a way of summarizing, I reflected 
back to the group “so most of the time they‟re not arresting, is that what I‟m hearing?”  A 
resounding “NO” echoed from the group.  After a brief pause, they informed me that 
actually it is even worse than “no”, because instead of arresting perpetrators when they 
should, the police are often arresting victims who defend themselves. “Or they‟re taking 
the woman away.”  Several women went on to talk about the fact that they‟ve had friends 
who have called the police, seeking protection from their abuser and have been arrested 
instead.  “It‟s the woman who calls, [yet] she‟s the one who gets hauled off and they 
leave the kids with the abuser.” 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
166 
Given the role of “no contact” orders within a coordinated community response, I 
asked specifically about their enforcement and was told, “They‟re not enforced.”  If 
victims complain to probation officers, they are told, “Well, he won‟t do it again.  We‟ll 
talk to him.”  One victim reported that her perpetrator calls her all the time and when she 
reports it to the probation officer, she is told, “Well, he‟s not supposed to.”  These 
victims/survivors shared the resignation expressed by the police and probation officers 
about law enforcement‟s ability to enforce the orders.  “They can‟t catch him in it; 
they‟re not gonna do anything about it.”  Victims also spent time talking about how 
restraining orders also do not actually protect them since their perpetrators can torment 
them and stay within the law.  “Your perpetrator can sit across the street from your house, 
but because it‟s a public street, it‟s okay.” Another participant agreed. “Yeah, they‟re not 
coming onto your property, so it‟s okay.  They‟re within the law.”   
Victims/survivors‟ frustrations with the criminal justice system did not end with 
the police and probation department.  They were also significantly disturbed by their 
interactions with the district attorney‟s office and with the impotency of the courts.  Of 
particular concern was the fact that charges do not appear to be pressed against 
perpetrators as often as victims/survivors are led to believe that they will be.  “District 
attorneys, they don‟t file.  They never file against them.  That‟s the problem. They never 
file against them.”  Apparently, victims/survivors are often told that charges will be filed 
but then later are informed that due to insufficient physical evidence, they actually cannot 
proceed. “I‟ve had police officers, some of them will come out and be like, „well, what 
happened ma‟am?‟ and I‟ll give the report, „Oh, yeah, he beat me up la da da.‟ and they‟d 
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be like, „Okay, well do you want to press charges?‟ „Yeah.‟ They‟ll be real sympathetic 
and then they‟ll call you back, „Well, we can‟t press charges because there‟s no bruising.‟ 
And I‟m like, „You know what, you just sat there and felt my head, felt the lumps on my 
head, and you‟re gonna tell me you have no evidence?‟” Others agreed. “Yep.  I had the 
same problem.”  Victims/survivors were particularly frustrated by the seeming lack of 
clear or honest communication from the district attorney‟s office, a challenge also noted 
by victim advocates.  “The district attorney will tell you that, „I don‟t need you to file 
charges.  I can do it myself, and I can make happen it.‟ Never happens.”   
Of course, pressing charges is not necessary a pathway to deliverance according 
to the victims/survivors I interviewed because once their case reached the courthouse, 
they were often displeased with the outcome.  “It takes about a year to go through the 
thing.  Then they finally go to court and he wants a jury trial and the last minute it says 
on the piece of paper that you need to be aware that if this does go to court, the jury can 
find you guilty.  Then [the perpetrators] go, „Oh my god, no.  That can‟t happen, so I‟m 
not gonna contest the charges, but only if you dismiss all the charges but one.‟  So then 
the district attorney and the judge, they dismiss all the charges so that he will say, „I‟m 
not going to contest the charges.‟  That‟s ludicrous.  You go through a whole year of this 
crap, go through the court system, you go through… the restraining order, you press the 
criminal charges and then the judge and the district attorney dismisses the charges.  And 
nothing gets on his record. It makes no sense.”  In the eyes of the victims/survivors I 
spoke with, it appears as though when the case finally does reach the judge, their 
perpetrators are able to plead to such nominal charges that the severity of what they did 
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dissipates and the victim is left feeling frustrated and confused.  It seems to particularly 
aggravate victims/survivors that decisions to reduce the charges are made by the DA and 
the judge.    
Victims/survivors were further discouraged by the fact that perpetrators seemed to 
be able to deceive the court and evade taking any personal responsibility for the violence 
they committed.  “And I didn‟t see one changed person in all the times I‟ve been to the 
courthouse.  And I‟ve been to the courthouse a lot of times.  None of those people are 
humbled, none of those people are changed and none of those people are telling the truth.  
My husband didn‟t and every person I‟ve talked to has told me the same thing, they don‟t 
tell the truth.  They get up there and just go through the motions.”  Others agreed, 
expressing disappointment with the fact that the system does not require perpetrators to 
publically accept responsibility for their actions. “During this whole process, the abuser 
doesn‟t have to stand up and say, „I‟m an abuser.  I hit her‟ because the criminal has 
rights.” “And the victim doesn‟t [another woman interjected].”  One victim/survivor 
suggested that “maybe the judge could ask the batterer, ask the batterer, „do you realize 
that you did something wrong?‟  Make them held accountable and let them know that this 
is a serious thing.  They are not letting the general public know and the batterers that this 
is serious.”   
As evidenced by this last comment, victims/survivors are ultimately left to 
conclude that the crime of domestic violence is not taken very seriously by the criminal 
justice system.  “It‟s just not taken serious….  It‟s just like, „Oh, you shouldn‟t have done 
that.  Now you‟re bench probation for a year.  Stay away from her. You can still see your 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
169 
son, you know?”   The revelation, by victims/survivors, that the crime of domestic 
violence does not appear to be taken very seriously by the criminal justice system was 
extremely painful and the women frequently became tearful when sharing specific 
examples.  For example, one victim/survivor talked about how her perpetrator caused her 
near fatal injuries and yet did not go to prison.  Another talked about how the court failed 
to follow through with a lengthy prison term even when it warned her particular 
perpetrator that he would receive the maximum sentence if he harmed her again.   “The 
judge said to him that the next time he committed a new crime that he‟s looking at the 
max of 17 years.  And [I] go back to court in front of the same judge, not but two months 
later, he only gets 23 months in the pen.  That‟s it.”   
Of course, according to victims/survivors, securing longer prison sentences might 
not necessarily solve the problem.  Echoing concerns expressed by officers and victim 
advocates, victims/survivors suggested that placing perpetrators in jail with other men 
who have abused their partners can sometimes be more harmful than helpful.  “It is not 
helpful to have them incarcerated [with] other men who think the same way, act the same 
way.”  Others agreed and were particularly concerned that perpetrators learn how to be 
better perpetrators when they interact with each other. “They are just learning new ways 
of doing it, new manipulation ways.”  Finally, they expressed concern that while in 
prison, their abusers are not receiving the treatment that they need, particularly with 
respect to drug and alcohol treatment.  “And they‟re just being put in this place and not 
having special treatment for it, you know?  They need to get drug and alcohol treatment.”   
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One size fits all.  In identifying that some of their perpetrators might need 
specialized treatment, such as therapy for drug and alcohol abuse, victims/survivors 
seemed to partially agree with police and probation officers regarding the need for 
individual assessment and corresponding response to perpetrators.  However, victims 
were primarily concerned that the one-size-fits all approach by the criminal justice 
system does not hold men accountable enough for their specific crimes. “You know, the 
judge, you go into the courtroom and it‟s filled with all these people, you know?  And 
you have all these restraining orders stacked up and the judge says their little speech, you 
know?  And it is pretty much the same thing every time and every case.” They discussed 
the fact that the court‟s response to perpetrators appears standardized and in most cases 
insufficient. “They put them all in a mold, so when they go into… and the judge says, 
„oh, it‟s standard.‟ You know?  Go on probation, go to your domestic violence 
counseling.  Go to this for six weeks, whatever it might be.  They‟re just like, „oh, slap on 
the wrist.‟”  It appears as though victims/survivors assume that a more individualized 
response might translate into more punishment or longer sentences for their perpetrators. 
The trouble with treatment.  Paralleling critiques offered by officers and 
advocates, victims/survivors expressed a sense of hopelessness about the system‟s ability 
to change their abusers, either through the process of arrest, adjudication, prison or 
through mandated batterer intervention treatment.  When I asked them whether or not 
they felt perpetrator treatment worked, they expressed uniform disappointment with the 
efficacy of these programs, responding with “NO”, “NO”, “Oh, god no.”, “Not even 
close.”, “Are you kidding?”  One problem with batterer intervention identified by 
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victims/survivors is that their abusers do not take the programs seriously.  “They get 
ordered to batterer intervention, they go through the classes just so it doesn‟t get on their 
record.  It‟s a joke to them.”  They mused together about what could actually be sufficient 
punishment or significantly uncomfortable for their batterers to instigate a change.  Some 
suggested that the problem may be that treatment does not feel like enough of a burden or 
enough punishment to be taken seriously and suggested that perhaps the mandate to 
attend treatment should be coupled with additional requirements, such as community 
service.  “Included with batterer intervention, have community services tacked on 
because that‟s more like a sentence.  That‟s more like a judgment has been [made].”  
Victims/survivors were very clear that their perpetrators know how to manipulate 
the system in order to not get caught and that these skills are often enhanced by attending 
batterer intervention programs.  “They know how to manipulate us and they also know 
how to manipulate them so they don‟t get themselves into much of a predicament, 
because they know how to weasel through.”  When I asked them to clarify whether they 
were talking about manipulating their batterer intervention program facilitators or the 
men in the group, I was told “from both.”  Others expressed grave concerns about the fact 
that from group they learn how to become better manipulators.  “They learn how to be 
better abusers.  They learn how to get away with more.  They learn how to manipulate the 
situation to their benefit.  Punching your back, underneath your clothing. Pulling you by 
the hair.  They learn to go with you to the hospital to make sure… that they‟re in the 
hospital room with you, to make sure that you don‟t tell on them.  So you don‟t say 
anything.  And the doctor‟s like, „Would you like them to be removed?  And they‟re 
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looking at you like, „Bitch, don‟t even.‟ Because you know you have to go home with 
them sooner or later.”  Others agreed and added “but it isn‟t just the physical stuff, 
though.  They learn manipulation through those classes like how to come home and 
expect their dinner, expect their clothes, expect all this stuff and they can belittle you or 
expect you to be in bed when they want and how they want, you know?  And not just the 
physical.  That‟s pretty easy to learn.  But the manipulation of mental and emotional is 
something that they don‟t always know, and I think they learn to fine tune it a little 
more.”  Clearly, it was the experience of these victims/survivors that not only did batterer 
intervention programs fail to change their perpetrators for the better, but in fact, they 
actually made them more sophisticated abusers.   
Ironically, despite these criticisms of batterer intervention programs, some 
victims/survivors felt they should be longer. “I think they need to go for a longer period 
of time and there needs to be interaction with that person so they can find out what kind 
of personality this person is.” “and they should have to check in every so often for several 
years.”  It was unclear whether or not they felt longer programs would somehow 
ameliorate their other concerns or if they were simply trying to suggest something that 
might work better.   
The current response is not sufficiently victim-centered. Resonating with concerns 
articulated by police and probation officers as well as victim advocates, victims/survivors 
lamented that at a fundamental level, current domestic violence intervention is not 
sufficiently victim-centered.  In particular, victims/survivors were disturbed by the 
preponderance of victim blaming they endure and by the lack of clear and honest 
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communication they receive.  Victims/survivors were especially passionate while 
describing the victim blaming comments and attitudes they encounter when interacting 
with police officers.  “I‟ve had a police officer tell me, „Hey, that‟s what you get if you 
choose to be with him.‟”  The attribution of blame by police officers frequently escalated 
to the point where victims/survivors reported being asked point blank what they did to 
instigate the abuse. “How‟d you initiate it?  What‟d you say to him?  What did you do to 
piss him off?”   
In an effort to try to explain why the police treat them this way, one 
victim/survivor sparked an intense dialogue when she speculated that “I think some of the 
police officers are abusers themselves.” Others agreed. “Yeah” “Because if they‟re 
talking to you that way in regards to why he‟s doing it, I feel like they‟re abusers 
themselves.  And it‟s been proven in this state that cops have been arrested because 
they‟re beating on their women.  That they‟ve killed their wives. You know?  So, a 
majority of them out there, I believe are abusers themselves.”  Another offered, “I think 
their opinion is that women that are in domestic violence are all dogs.  I think they just 
put you in a category no matter who you are. No matter what kind of person you are or 
what your opinion is, they put you in a category or number you, and that‟s where you‟re 
gonna stay.  And they know nothing about you.  Kind of like their bedside manner or it‟s 
like their real personality comes out when they come into your home.  You can see it in 
their attitude, you can see it in their body language.”  “It isn‟t what they say.  It‟s the way 
they treat you.  They talk down to you.”   
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It was not only the blatant victim blaming that disturbed the victims/survivors, but 
also the general insensitivity to their plight.  With a great deal of passion and cross-talk, 
one group discussed how a minor change in policy could result in a far more effective 
intervention.  “When you call the police and they come to your house and it‟s a domestic 
violence and they know that a man and a woman are involved, or a husband and wife, a 
woman officer should be with the man.” “Yes.  I agree with that” chimed another 
participant.   A third woman offered, “because you need to show your bruises or where 
he‟s hit you and I wasn‟t about to take off my clothes or lift up my shirt and show them. 
Because men are..”, “they‟re pigs [a fourth woman interjected].” “Exactly!” exclaimed 
the first speaker, “because in that situation, you don‟t want to be around another man, 
afterwards.”  The third speaker added, “It‟s even worse trying to show another [man] 
what that man had just done to you.”   
 In addition to identifying victim blaming attitudes and insensitive policies as a 
limitation of current domestic violence intervention strategies, victims/survivors were 
equally dissatisfied by the poor communication they receive from representatives of the 
criminal justice system.  Victims/survivors reported that they are frequently discouraged 
by the lack of information or attention they receive, particularly with respect to the 
criminal courthouse.  “You are given the run around.  You keep getting hung up on.  
You‟re transferred and transferred and finally hung up on, and you finally give up.”  
Often it seems, victims/survivors thought they were taking the necessary action to 
pursue filing charges, only to learn later that there were other steps they needed to 
complete.  “I went and I thought I was filing charges against him and I didn‟t know you 
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had to go to the district attorney‟s office and file charges.”  Another woman shared that 
she had been similarly confused by the process.  “In my situation, I would have pressed 
charges had I been informed correctly that I did not have to involve my child in the 
process of pressing charges.  That was not explained to me.   I was told that if I pressed 
charges, I had to put my eight year old on the stand.  I refused to do that.  No-one 
explained to me until it was all said and done and he got his three years of probation that 
to get more time I‟d have to put my son on the stand.  As long as you got on the stand, he 
would have got his 25 years.  To me, 25 years in prison and three years probation is a big 
fricking difference.”   
It was clear from their statements that victims/survivors frequently felt betrayed 
by the district attorney‟s office.  Not only did they report receiving inadequate or 
inaccurate information, but they often felt blatantly deceived.  “They lie to you.  They 
totally lie to you.  They go in there and they dismiss all the charges.  They lie to you all 
the time.”  I was so distressed by their stories and the pervasive sense of hopelessness 
that I finally asked, “Aren‟t there advocates here in town that do support you through the 
process?”  Their responses shocked me. “No” “Not really” “No”  “No.  I was supposed to 
have [advocate‟s name] from [DV program‟s name].  She was going to come out to my 
house and everything.  She kept saying that.  She never came.”  These women clearly fell 
through the cracks of the system, failing to receive support and guidance either from the 
criminal justice system or from victim advocates.   
In sum, when asked what limits the effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention with abusive men, victims/survivors discussed the inability of the criminal 
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justice system to protect or empower them, expressed cynicism with respect to the ability 
of batterer intervention treatment programs to improve their batterer‟s behavior towards 
them, and described their dismay with regard to the victim blaming attitudes and beliefs 
they regularly encounter.  It was clear from their comments that most victims/survivors 
feel as though the criminal justice system is not working on their behalf, primarily due to 
insufficient accountability for perpetrators and pervasive victim blaming/alienation.  
Encounters with the police regularly involved inadequate or inappropriate responses (i.e., 
not arresting when indicated or arresting women/victims for defending themselves) 
followed by incredibly short imprisonment which frequently lead to escalating violence 
when their perpetrators return home.  Victims expressed utter confusion and frustration 
regarding the district attorney‟s office and the courts.  In general, they felt isolated in the 
process, not understanding what charges were being filed, their role in filing and 
prosecution, and the decisions to drop charges.  Their opinion of the effectiveness of 
batterer intervention programs was equally grim, citing the damage that is often done 
when their perpetrators spend time bonding with and learning from other perpetrators.  
Specifically, victims/survivors noted that their abusers frequently learned how to better 
manipulate the police, probation officers, program facilitators and other service providers 
(such as emergency room physicians/nurses, etc.) from their fellow group participants.  
Overall, it was clear that victims do not feel as though their safety is paramount within 
the system and frequently experience being blamed for their abuse and then 
disempowered by poor or limited communication with representatives from the domestic 
violence intervention system. 
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Batterer Intervention Providers  
Batterer intervention providers eagerly offered candidates when asked to describe 
what limits the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention with abusive men.  
Interestingly, their responses differed from those of police and probation officers, victim 
advocates and victims in that they spent significantly less time talking about insufficient 
accountability for perpetrators, challenges and drawbacks of a “one size fits all” 
approach, and the pervasiveness of victim-blaming and much more time talking about the 
specific barriers they encounter when trying to change men‟s attitudes and behaviors.  
For example, batterer intervention providers discussed the impact of persistent violent 
and sexist societal attitudes on their ability to change men‟s attitudes and behaviors in 
group.  They also spoke about unresolved tension and concern they have over the primary 
intent of the intervention (i.e., whether to punish or rehabilitate), and they spoke with 
great emotion about the impact of the vilification and invisibility of perpetrators on their 
ability to do their jobs effectively.   
More than any other stakeholder group, batterer intervention providers discussed 
the challenges to success created by weaknesses in the local coordinated community 
response, challenges such as scarce resources which make it difficult for them to fulfill 
state standard requirements and make it difficult for probation officers to adequately 
monitor their probationers.  They also talked at length about the problematic impact of 
high turnover, variability in terms of job performance, knowledge, and training, and 
spoke with great frustration and sadness about the lack of teamwork they experience 
when trying to collaborate with probation officers.  For the sake of organization and 
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clarity, I‟ve decided to group their comments about the CCR with other similar comments 
addressing Research Question Four.  However, given the fact that they spontaneously 
discussed them in response to my questions about what limits the effectiveness of 
domestic violence intervention strategies, I felt it was important to acknowledge them 
here. 
Societal attitudes do not support successful intervention. Batterer intervention 
providers were quick to point out that the success of domestic violence intervention is 
limited by societal attitudes that essentially endorse violence, power over conflict 
resolution, and misogyny and that these pervasive attitudes and beliefs make it difficult to 
shift individual men‟s attitudes and beliefs during group.   “Our society, speaking 
particularly of America, is so pervaded with violence.  TV, shock radio, newspapers.  It 
doesn‟t matter where you go or what you look at.  It‟s just violence.  And it is „who is the 
biggest‟, „who is the baddest‟ that‟s gonna win, and winning is all that matters.  There is 
no idea of state craft, not trying to bring in political stuff, but there‟s no idea about, we do 
not teach our kids how to talk to each other.  It is win or lose and they pick that up very, 
very little.”    
Providers lamented that even though a more enlightened conversation about 
gender roles has been occurring for decades now, they see very little translation of these 
conversations into the attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of the young men entering their 
programs. “The younger people are being taught better about equality and so the 
expectation and theory would be we‟d see fewer younger people and that they‟d be 
moving away from battering and more toward quality based relationships, but the young 
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people we get coming into our program have the same attitudes, same beliefs, same 
behaviors, and it‟s not changed.  And they may talk something, but the belief, the 
sociological change hasn‟t happened.”  Another provider concurred and explained that 
misogyny persists in the populations that he serves.  “I think there is a lot of support for 
misogyny.  I do groups with cowboys and farmers and they have a lot of sexist attitudes.  
They really just think they‟re the head of the household, king of the castle and that‟s how 
it should be.”  Batterer intervention providers went on to acknowledge the challenge that 
these oppressive attitudes present to the work they are trying to do with perpetrators, 
asserting that they unquestionably limit the effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention.   
Punishment versus rehabilitation. Batterer intervention providers, echoing 
comments offered by police and probation officers, talked about the tension that they 
experience in the field with respect to whether or not domestic violence intervention 
should focus on punishing perpetrators or rehabilitating/treating them.   
They suggested that while punishment might serve to impact behaviors in the short term, 
long term attitude change requires treatment or therapy. “I don‟t think a punitive, 
authoritarian approach to people really works as a way to create attitude change.”  For 
many providers, attitudinal changes require therapy and in order for therapy to be 
successful, establishing a sincere, non-punitive, connection with the client is necessary, 
since it can often be difficult for people to engage the material if they feel resentful and 
coerced.   “To tell the person, „Ignore your friends and listen to me even though you‟re 
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gonna resent anything, at least initially, that I present because you‟re arm is being twisted 
behind your back to be here‟[is difficult].”  
Providers spent a great deal of time talking about how important it is for them to 
separate the person (or man) from their behaviors in order to establish a positive 
connection.  The Christian tenet, “love the sinner, hate the sin”, was repeatedly echoed.  
Many felt it was critical to avoid objectifying men who batter, in part, because a great 
deal of the work they do involves stopping these men from objectifying their partners.  
“When we categorize people, put them in a box, what kind of role model are we being for 
men who want to put women in a box and say, „Oh, they‟re all like this.‟  It‟s the process 
of objectifying that allows so many individuals to do behaviors.  I can‟t objectify my 
client and if I call him a batterer, then he becomes an object.  I have to individualize.  I 
have to find the human being there.”   
For some providers, believing batterers‟ can change is central to their ability to 
work as providers.  “I remember the first training that I went to I was told that there was a 
zero effectiveness rate.  Zero.  And I remember that I asked, „Well, so why do you do this 
work?‟  and the person responded back, „Because I get to tell these guys something that 
nobody else gets to tell them‟ which sounded kind of like a power play in and of itself.  I 
couldn‟t do this work if I didn‟t believe that a person could change.”  Another described 
how important it was from a therapeutic perspective to hold out hope for the men.  “I‟m 
trying to present that hope, you know? Say „in order to be here, you can‟t do these 55 
[things],‟ you know?  „We have to work at what‟s your goal?  Do you want a healthy 
marriage? Do you want a healthy relationship?‟  It could be looked at as colluding by 
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other perspectives, but what else do we have?  „You‟re hopeless.  Come sit for a year 
while we discuss your emotions.‟”   
There was one provider who spoke up in opposition to the idea that batterer 
intervention programs should resemble therapy.  This provider articulated that he works 
under the belief that domestic violence is a choice and therefore education is a sufficient 
response.  “Well, I certainly agree that there are those with mental health issues just as 
any populations can have those with mental health issues. But it‟s my opinion anyway, 
that the preponderance of the folks are not mentally ill.”  This provider went on to 
explain that this is why his program chooses to focus on educating men about the choices 
they have made, rather than providing treatment or therapy.   
Despite the preponderance of concern expressed about the impact that coercion 
might have on therapy, providers were not advocating for less punishment for 
perpetrators from the criminal justice system.  In fact, they talked a great deal about how 
police and probation officers are failing to hold men sufficiently accountable.  “I do a lot 
of DV therapy in Happy Valley/Clackamas area and I work with a lot of women who are 
abused and their husbands are not taken out of the home and often there‟s conversations 
about calming down and all those things.”   This provider went on to talk about how in 
these communities, children call to report domestic violence and nothing happens.  
Providers attributed these failings to insufficient resources, specifically training for police 
officers.  Providers then went on to talk about the challenges that result from the 
insufficient resources for probation departments, specifically with respect to adequate 
monitoring, challenges that I‟ll return to fully in response to Research Question Four. 
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Invisibility of perpetrators.  Batterer intervention providers talked at length about 
the tendency within the domestic violence field to ignore or vilify perpetrators, a trend 
that often results in an inappropriate focus on victims.  Echoing my focus group 
experiences with both officers and advocates, one provider observed the following.  “I 
think the quickest way to silence some people is to say, „so what are you going to do with 
the perpetrator?‟  And they don‟t have anything they can realistically say, and I think it‟s 
a great way of silencing them because that‟s the real problem.  You can keep rescuing the 
drowning children from the river, but eventually you‟ve got to go upriver and say, 
„Who‟s throwing them in?‟”   
Providers talked about the fact that, for them, working with the perpetrator is an 
attempt to get to the root of the problem.  “One of my focuses has always been working 
with the batterer.  Because you can work with the woman and work with the woman, but 
if you don‟t work with the batterer, it doesn‟t really matter.  I mean, he‟s gonna go batter 
somebody else.”  Providers reported sometimes feeling shunned for choosing to work 
with perpetrators. “I work with young men.  But what happens is that it‟s not the 
favorable thing to do.  It‟s not the popular thing to do, to work with the batterer. People 
try to shove it under the rug.  I had a huge contract with DHS, but it‟s not favorable to 
say, „I can work with this woman all I want, but this man is not going anywhere.  He‟s 
not in jail.  He‟s gonna still be menacing.  Let‟s try to figure out how to get him help.”  
One provider tried to explain why she believes there is so much resistance to working 
with perpetrators.  “I think the focus on women and the extreme cases of domestic 
violence are sort of making people hate batterers rather than want to work with them.  
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That‟s been my experience about why there‟s resistance to working with men.  Because 
they‟re criminals.”  “And there‟s no hope for them [interjected another group member].”  
The prevalence of the vilification of perpetrators was frustrating to some providers 
because they feel that it really inhibits the efficacy of intervention, particularly when 
these views are expressed by other providers.   
Victim blaming.  For the most part, providers expressed frustration with the victim 
blaming they encounter when working with other system partners, particularly DHS.   
Several specifically noted that DHS places so much responsibility on women for 
maintaining their safety that they essentially refuse to work with perpetrators, an 
approach that providers find short-sided.  “For me, it‟s just been a personal process of 
really getting the whole domestic violence thing, but understanding that we are putting so 
much emphasis on women.  I also had a contract with DHS where so much emphasis is 
put on women, what they had to do in order to stay safe, which didn‟t even make any 
sense.”    
However, some providers clearly struggled with whether or not victims are in 
need of mandated services.  One provider suggested that, “I‟d like to see some victims.  I 
don‟t know if it‟s required or not, but victims need treatment just like guys need 
treatment.  They need treatment for their victim‟s issues.  There are victim‟s issues just 
like there are perpetrator issues.” Another provider disagreed.  “I disagree that they, they 
need some, for some victims it might be beneficial, however it‟s up to them whether they 
need something or not.”  To which the first speaker countered, “is it up to the batterer to 
decide whether he needs it or not?”  But the second speaker argued that “he‟s the one that 
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took action.  The victims haven‟t done anything wrong.”  The original provider 
concluded, “That doesn‟t mean that we should deny them services as well.  I know that at 
this point, you can‟t make them take services, but you can look at things in terms of those 
who have histories of picking more, another abusive man, in line. Any information they 
can get there would be so helpful to them.”   
While most providers seemed to agree that mandating services to victims was 
inappropriate, they also felt that empowering and educating victims was important.  In 
fact, several went on to suggest that educating victims might have a greater impact on the 
effectiveness of domestic violence intervention than either the criminal justice system or 
batterer intervention programs. “Probably after the courts and DHS, the most common 
mandating authority for these men are their partners.  And these are women who have 
really come to understand what abusive behavior is, to some extent at least.  They have 
found, and sometimes, it is hard, but a lot of times it‟s psychologically hard to say, „I‟m 
serious.  You need to do something about this.  I love you, but I will not tolerate this.‟  
And she was able to say it to him in a way that  he can hear it.”  Several additional 
comments seeming to place responsibility for successfully intervening on victims‟ 
shoulders were then offered.  “As we continue to educate and empower women, I think 
we‟re gonna have more and more of them holding their partners accountable, 
encouraging their partners to get the help that they need to, to be different in 
relationship.”  One provider went as far as to suggest that through more calculated 
partner selection, victims could breed out abuse; “Putting responsibility on women to 
breed a non-violent culture of men.” 
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  In summary, batterer intervention providers suggested that domestic violence 
intervention is limited in its success by the pervasiveness of societal violence and rigidly 
proscribed gender roles for men and women, the vilification and invisibility of 
perpetrators, and confusion about what to do with victims.  Providers talked about how 
difficult it is for them to essentially work “upstream”, encouraging the men in their 
groups to challenge traditional ideas about masculinity and femininity, power and 
control, and the use of violence as a negotiating tactic.  They also acknowledged that they 
struggle with the punitive aspect of the current response to perpetrators, suggesting that 
punishing “bad” men is in some ways a quick fix, while rehabilitating men who made 
“bad” choices takes much longer.  According to these providers, lasting attitudinal 
change requires therapy and therapy requires a therapeutic alliance, something that is 
particularly difficult to establish when participants feel coerced into participating.  
Providers then spent a great deal of time talking about the difficulty they experience 
trying to earn respect for the work they do and for the men they work with.  They 
repeatedly recounted the fact that perpetrators are either rendered invisible as human 
beings or shunned as hopeless criminals, attitudes which they find neither productive nor 
helpful.  Despite the fact that they frowned on the fact that key collaborators, such as the 
Department of Human Services: Child Welfare often place excessive responsibility on 
victims, they too struggled with the appropriateness and usefulness of mandating services 
for victims in order to break the cycle of violence. 




In general, perpetrators expressed dissatisfaction with and resentment towards 
current domestic violence strategies and identified several factors limiting their 
effectiveness.  Articulating some of the same concerns described by officers, advocates, 
victims, and providers, perpetrators suggested that the system is over-involved in their 
lives, confused about how to simultaneously punish and rehabilitate them, insufficiently 
tailored to meet their individualized needs, not consistent enough, and not spending 
sufficient time dealing with “the other half of the problem” (i.e., the victims).    
Without a doubt, the dominant theme of our conversations was that the system is 
inappropriately punitive and intrusive, disempowering them and their victims with 
unnecessary “no contact” orders and excessive batterer intervention treatment.  
Perpetrators, like officers and providers, discussed the tension and confusion they 
experience when interfacing with a domestic violence intervention system that seems 
conflicted about whether it should focus on punishing or rehabilitating them?  If designed 
to punish them, perpetrators questioned the utility of that approach, since in their opinion 
punishment is not an effective way to deter or prevent future violence.  If designed to 
rehabilitate them, the men I interviewed were pessimistic about the ability of batterer 
intervention treatment to positively impact their future behavior.  Ultimately, perpetrators 
pointed out that neither approach is likely to be particularly effective, given their belief 
that they will only change if and when they want to.  Perpetrators also suggested that the 
effectiveness of the domestic violence intervention system is limited by two contradictory 
weaknesses:  insufficiently individualized assessment and treatment and insufficiently 
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consistent response from the district attorney, judges, and probation.  Finally, many 
perpetrators were heavily focused on their victims‟ behavior and her unfulfilled need for 
treatment/education.   
The problem with punishment.  Perpetrators overwhelmingly expressed frustration 
with the destructive level of involvement the system has in their lives.  While willing to 
acknowledge they did something wrong, most suggested that the punishment they were 
enduring exceeded their crime.  “I found the system a little overkill.  My crime was 
wrong, but make the sentence fit the crime.  I should have been given a chance.  I taught 
my boys, my children, all their lives that everyone deserves a second chance to prove 
themselves. Not me.  One time and things are going downhill real fast.  And I was wrong, 
man.  I was wrong.  Absolutely wrong. Does my family have to be destroyed?  My life 
destroyed?”  Others agreed that their actions did not warrant the response they received.  
“A lot of us are getting stepped on and kicked around for doing very little.”   
Perpetrators attributed much of this “overkill” to zealous district attorneys, who, 
according to the men I interviewed, rack up false charges in order to pad the case against 
them and insure that they are ultimately convicted of something.  “As far as the courts are 
concerned, the DA, I feel that sometimes they can overstep their bounds as far as how 
many things they can charge you for.  I know they try to go for as many things as 
possible and then you have to negotiate.”  Others concurred and suggested that they 
should only be charged with one crime, rather than stacking up lots of charges to be used 
as chips during plea bargaining negotiations. “I would like to see a little more hard line 
where this is what you‟re charged for, this is the only thing that you should be charged 
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for instead of three other charges that all they‟re gonna do is they‟re just using that to 
negotiate down to whatever you end up with.”   
In part, their concerns mirror comments offered by victim advocates and victims 
who also expressed frustration with the bucket list of crimes that men get charged with 
during arraignment.  The difference, of course, is that victims and advocates were 
frustrated by the fact that often it is the domestic violence charges that ultimately get 
dropped, leaving the victim to feel as though the crimes against her are less important 
than the crimes against her property.  For the perpetrators, the laundry list of charges is 
just another example of how they are victims of a bogus and unfair prosecution process.  
“District attorney gets the report, then they pad it up and then you got a bunch of charges 
against you.” 
Perpetrators ardently recounted how the system‟s involvement was destroying 
their lives.  “As far as I‟m concerned, they tore my life apart.  They tore my marriage 
apart.  And they‟re not allowing me to save my marriage, which I want and which she 
wants.  They‟re not allowing it.”  At times, the men were almost incredulous regarding 
the degree of involvement the system now had in their lives.  One man talked about how 
his probation officer requires that any woman he date call in and report that she has been 
made aware of the fact that he has committed the crime of domestic violence.   “Does 
everyone have to ask their PO for permission to get in a relationship with someone?  
Every time I get a new girlfriend she‟s supposed to call my PO and say, „Yeah, I know 
that he has a domestic violence charge.‟”  The rest of the group expressed shock and 
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disdain for this policy, clearly not appreciating why this man‟s probation officer might 
want to warn his potential partners of his past violence.   
According to the perpetrators I interviewed, the system‟s heavy involvement in 
their lives is often against the will of the victim.  Perpetrators talked about how victims 
are being hurt, either because they are unable to release “no contact” orders when they 
want to or because they are often the ones personally paying for their perpetrators to 
attend treatment.  “There should be something in there that the female could put the 
restraining order on and she can take the restraining order off.  My wife called and called 
and called.  She blew up on my first PO‟s phone.  And then as soon as I got the new PO, 
she blew her phone up, you know?”  Apparently, this man‟s victim/wife repeatedly 
contacted his probation officer requesting that the “no contact” order be lifted.   
Several men commented on the fact that their victims were actually paying for 
them to attend treatment.  The irony of this situation was not lost on the group.  “I have a 
question here: who is the victim?  The state or the person that you victimized?  So why is 
the state getting the money for the victim?  Is the victim being helped out here?  In my 
case, the victim is paying for this class.  Has been since I started.  So how‟s that helping? 
….  The victim is paying for the victimizer.”  It is noteworthy that the men align their 
“counseling” programs so closely with the criminal justice system that they often do not 
realize that they are separate entities.  In the United States of America, batterer 
intervention programs are traditionally independent for-profit businesses that do not 
receive compensation from the state.   
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Punishment versus rehabilitation. Like officers and batterer intervention 
providers, perpetrators talked about the challenges of combining punishment and 
treatment in the effort to change their behavior.  They articulated quite clearly their 
conviction that attitudinal and behavioral change cannot be forced.  One participant 
described the relatively small impact that the criminal justice system (i.e., punishment) 
has on perpetrators of domestic violence, suggesting that interventions such as “no 
contact” orders are useless if someone wants to continue committing violent acts.  “The 
„no contact‟ comes from the judge, okay?  That I don‟t understand because if I‟m gonna 
go and hurt my wife, then I don‟t need a „no contact‟.  And a „no contact‟s‟ not gonna 
help anyways… You can tell me no contact all you want, but if I want to kill the bitch, 
she‟s dead.  See what I‟m saying?”   
There were so many comments shared about the ineffectiveness or pointlessness 
of the criminal justice system that at one point I felt compelled to ask, “So you don‟t 
think that arrest, probation or jail time would impact or stop someone who has a pattern 
of domestic violence from doing it again?”  “NO!” (According to my co-moderator, 4 or 
5 other men also said no and shook their heads “no”.)  Although clearly in the minority, 
one group participant shared that for him the criminal justice system did make a 
difference.  “If I wouldn‟t have had police interaction and me go to jail over the situation, 
I wouldn‟t change.  I‟d still be the same person I was before and I know I‟d be divorced.  
I know that I‟d still be the same person who wouldn‟t have learned about how to be able 
to control myself and how to deal with, take ownership for my interactions with other 
people.” 
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Perpetrators overwhelming reported that in their experience, the system is only 
interested in punishing them rather than rehabilitating them.  As an example, perpetrators 
pointed out that probation officers used to be there to help probationers and now are just 
focused on punishing them for violations.  “Years ago they would help, that‟s what the 
probation officer was for, to help.  Help you get a job.  Now they‟ve got a sign that says, 
„I‟m not here to help you, I‟m here to watch you.‟”  Another participant agreed, “Yeah, 
right.  [My probation officer told me] „I‟m not here to be your friend. I‟m not here to help 
you. If you mess up, that‟s what I‟m here for.”  “I‟m here to catch you [interjected 
another group member].”  The men communicated a distinct sense of victimization, 
explaining that they are not being encouraged or helped to change their abusive behavior.  
Instead, they are being excessively and destructively punished.  “I think that what they‟ve 
done has taught me a lesson.  Right.  Because it‟s not rehabilitation for me.  This is a 
destruction.  I was wrong, yes.  Punish me. Does it have to go this far?  I think that it‟s 
overkill, it‟s really bad.”   
I was curious whether this sentiment carried over to their impressions of batterer 
intervention programs and so I directly asked them if they thought the treatment program 
was rehabilitative?  I was told quite clearly “No”.  It seems as though a great deal of their 
resentment towards the group treatment is linked with the fact that they feel it is a 
punitive and excessive sentence. “I‟m being forced to do this and because there‟s such 
stiff penalties for this, I spent six months in jail before I even stepped foot in this class.  
Because I yelled at my wife.  Six months in jail because I yelled at my wife.  Not a bruise 
on her.  She told the cops I didn‟t touch her.  You would think my punishment was done 
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after six months in jail.  Hell no.  So, am I angry?  Yeah.”  The length of the batterer 
intervention programs was definitely a hot button for many of the men.  One man 
commented that, “We all need skills. And this class does give us some skills, but a lot of 
us really need [only] a few skills.  A lot of us don‟t need 48 weeks plus three months 
worth of skills.”   
In addition to being excessive in length, many perpetrators expressed frustration 
over the fact that in their opinion the classes are completely useless.  “In reality, you do 
nothing except for sit here for 48 weeks and pay 60 bucks.”  Not everyone agreed; one 
participant argued ardently that the classes were tremendously helpful for him.  “I don‟t 
know what he is talking about.  I changed my life since I‟ve been here.”  Still determined 
to make his point about the pointless nature of the classes, the original speaker 
questioned, “Okay, maybe you changed your life, but was it going to jail or was it this 
class that made you change your life?”  The first man responded that going to prison 
made him realize that he needed to change his life, but the class gave him the tools to 
change his life.   
 In the end, the one thing perpetrators seemed to really agree upon was the idea 
that the system (whether punitive or rehabilitative) could not make them change.  “Til 
you‟re the one to accept it, then you‟re not gonna get fixed.”   Change was something 
they had to want.   “Until you want to make it better for you, not because I almost killed 
my wife, not because I almost lost my children and everything, but because I care about 
me [you aren‟t going to change].”  Perpetrators confirmed statements made by officers, 
victim advocates and victims that it is possible for them to simply go through the motions 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
193 
of intervention.  In order for it to make any difference at all, they had to choose to engage 
the material, choose to change.  “Domestic violence [intervention] is not more successful 
because deep down you have to want to change your life.  And if you‟re not willing to 
step up and say, „okay‟.  Because I do learn stuff in this class. I learned that I did  have 
thinking problems that caused me to drink.  You know?  They, and then I went down the 
wrong road.  And so I had to look deep inside myself and say, „well, do I want to change 
these things that I now see are in my life?‟  And if you don‟t want to change those, you 
can go through the motions, show up to class, pay your sixty bucks, sit there, take off and 
come here and not learn crap, go back out and say, „well, I just wasted my time for 10 
months, 15 months and I‟m not gonna change anyway.‟”   
Due to the boundaries of the project, I did not spend a great deal of time trying to 
discern what might inspire them to change, however they did hint at the idea that a 
positive therapeutic relationship with their program facilitator can make a difference.  
Confirming comments made by batterer intervention providers, they discussed the 
importance of having someone hold a “hopeful” vision of them.  “[Facilitator name] 
makes us feel where I‟m important enough to change for my choices.  So my choices can 
be different.”  One group in particular identified that their facilitator‟s lack of negative 
judgment (i.e., vilification) opened them to the process of change.  “[Facilitator name] 
looks at, I think, more from a clinical point.  I mean, he‟s not judgmental.  He wants to 
help you understand why you did this so you can better get a grip on not ever doing it 
again.”         
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One size fits all. Most perpetrators were outraged by the lack of individual 
assessment and correspondingly appropriate treatment for domestic violence.  The 
popular opinion was that the punishment (i.e., a 48 week BIP with 3 months of aftercare) 
was too severe for their crimes.  According to the men I interviewed, there might be some 
men who need 48 weeks of treatment, but they didn‟t.  “48 weeks for a one time mistake 
is kind of extreme compared to 48 weeks for somebody that beats his wife every week.”   
It is clear that the men I spoke with believed that an individually tailored response 
would benefit them.  In other words, perpetrators were lobbying for more individuation 
because they felt it would reduce, as opposed to lengthen, their sentences.  They 
explained that they were suffering the consequences of the system needing to protect 
itself from the possibility of truly devastating crimes. “I think we all get put into the 
category. They got a couple of instances where guys came back and ended up killing the 
person they were with and well, it seems like we are all put into that category.”    
Perpetrators suggested that it was particularly important to consider the nature of 
the initial crime they had committed, believing that each person‟s crime warrants a 
different response.  “I think it‟d be the best thing for this program if they looked at 
everybody‟s cases and individual cases rather than going, grouping us all into one big 
group and saying, „okay, this is the way we‟re gonna do it.‟  Each person has a crime, 
each person has something that they did and they need to go and take each person‟s case 
and treat them accordingly.  Not everybody deserves to be here for 48 weeks, you 
know?”  They went on to suggest that there is a big difference between someone who is a 
habitual offender, committing extremely violent crimes, and someone who makes a one-
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time mistake. “I think it might be a good idea for the system to put more emphasis on the 
indiv[idual], on discerning what‟s a pattern and what was an isolated thing.”  One man 
recounted his relief and appreciation when his facilitator finally asked him about the 
incident that got him arrested, explaining that “There‟s reasons for that initial action and I 
think that would help distinguish the people that are habitual domestic violence and 
something that happened at that moment which was wrong.  ….  I think that would help 
by asking that question at least during evaluation to try and determine who is really the 
wife beater and then who made a one-time mistake.”  In addition to frequency of abuse, 
perpetrators suggested that the intensity or severity of the abuse should be considered as 
well, with more severe crimes leading to lengthier sentences. “I moved mine [my partner] 
two inches against her will, but yet we‟re all treated like we were the guy that took her 
out back and kicked her ass.” 
In critiquing a “one size fits all” approach, perpetrators, like police and probation 
officers, were concerned about the ramifications of not taking each individual situation 
into consideration, particularly with respect to the issuance of “no contact” orders.  “If 
you‟ve got someone that‟s the primary bread-winner, okay?  And there‟s no other 
resource for the other half.  And they‟re forced to be separated by a „no contact‟ order.  
That could cause a huge degree of difficulty.  I mean, everybody‟s situation is different.  I 
think the idea is that if there‟s been a battering involved here, well, does she have other 
resources.”  The implied concern here is that uniform issuance of “no contact” orders 
might actually cause more harm than good for some victims and that the system should 
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consider the assets and resources of the individual victim when determining whether to 
issue a “no contact” order. 
Ironically, their frustration over the absence of individually tailored punishment 
was paired with a slightly lesser frustration that probation officers are arbitrary and 
inconsistent in their treatment of perpetrators. So, on the one hand they strongly rejected 
the notion that a consistent response/punishment for perpetrators of domestic violence is 
appropriate and yet yearned for more consistency from probation officers.  “I think they 
need to go back and make sure that the probation officers have a set rule of guidelines to 
follow too so that way, there‟s no fluctuation.”  Another participant concurred and asked, 
“Why isn‟t everything on an even par?  Say, your PO is not on the same scale as my PO.  
My PO allowed me to go back home as soon as I started this class.  I didn‟t even go to 
one class.  Boom.  I don‟t have to go and check in with her.  I‟m on probation for three 
years.  I‟ve got a felony assault from this, and I don‟t have to check in with her.  So I‟ve 
got the gravy train with my PO and I‟m a felon.  He‟s got a misdemeanor charge and he 
can‟t see his children.  Why don‟t PO‟s have to be accountable and be on the same par 
and say, „Okay, you‟re gonna do for one, do for all.‟”  One participant suggested that this 
type of inconsistency was evident in the courtroom as well. “I‟ve seen variable different 
types of justice served to different people in the courtrooms.” 
It is interesting to note that perpetrators shared the concerns of police and 
probation officers about the challenges of a uniform response, both in terms of lack of 
individuation for perpetrators and what it can mean for victims when “no contact” orders 
are issued without consideration of the financial impact on the victim and they resonated 
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with the concerns articulated by victim advocates and victims about the inconsistency 
that can occur with probation officers and in the courts.   
Victim Blaming.  Perpetrators clearly felt as though their victims were partly if not 
equally responsible for the abuse and that they should also be mandated to receive 
treatment.  “Only half the problem is getting solved with only one of the domestic 
violence partners getting treatment.” “Absolutely!” chimed in another perpetrator. A third 
offered, “Maybe the girl didn‟t beat up the guy, but she still needs to go to some kind of 
class to understand what happened.  Otherwise only half the problem is getting solved.”  
For some, it was as simple as the fact that it takes two people to fight and while they 
might need some intervention/counseling for their role in the fight, the other person needs 
help too.  “There was two people in the argument and domestic violence, okay.  I‟m 
gonna have to go through the 43, 48, you know, but it took two people to fight, and the 
other person obviously needs a little counseling too.”  Some perpetrators expressed 
confusion over the fact that they were being asked to focus on their bad behavior or bad 
choices, but there was no attention paid to what their intimate partner might have done.   
“I still feel a little bit uncomfortable or frustrated when I come to the classes because I 
feel like our teachers or instructors have the tendency to dismiss the behavior of the other 
person, the bad behavior.  I understand that my bad behavior or somebody‟s bad behavior 
doesn‟t justify my actions.  I understand that completely, but I also, I don‟t know.  It 
seems to me that the bad behavior of the other person should be taken into consideration, 
you know?”  For others, it is a matter of prevention.  If their partners are made aware of 
acceptable versus unacceptable behavior, then they may be less likely to endure future 
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abuse.  “I think the point is, I almost killed my wife.  She was offered help, but never 
received it.  I mean, she didn‟t take it.  If I quit coming to these classes ever in my life, 
then I‟m gonna use everything I learned here to abuse her again in the future.  And if 
she‟s not educated also and made to educate, because oftentimes our wives tend to do is 
get back on our side.  We‟re back with them.  They‟re back on our side, trying to just 
pretend like it never happened.  So I think the education and stuff needs to go both ways.  
It‟s not necessarily even in a disciplinary fashion, but in a forced hand.  Because often 
time we don‟t know what‟s good for ourselves.”  This particular perpetrator‟s comments 
bear a close resemblance to the concerns expressed by police and probation officers, as 
well as batterer intervention providers, with respect to encouraging victims to receive 
educational counseling so that they can avoid or avert abuse in the future.      
 In summary, perpetrators of domestic violence were skeptical of the value of a 
punishment based system for intervening with their abusive behavior.  Despite the fact 
that their overwhelming critique of domestic violence intervention is that the response is 
excessive, most also suggested that criminal justice sanctions are not sufficiently 
prohibitive.  In other words, if someone wants to hurt his intimate partner, the threat of 
arrest or a probation violation (i.e., violating a “no contact” order) would not stop him.  
Almost universally they suggested that perpetrators have to want to change and that for 
most men, neither arrest nor intervention programs can make one want to change.  
Perpetrators were particularly frustrated with the fact that the system appears to have a 
“one size fits all” approach to sentencing and treatment, despite the fact that their 
individual histories and crimes vary tremendously.  They argued that habitual and or 
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extremely violent offenders deserve a more intense response from the criminal justice 
system than someone who commits a one-time mistake or a minor crime.  Ironically, 
while most perpetrators expressed a desire for a more differentiated response, a few 
expressed annoyances with the lack of consistency they witness in the courts and by 
probation officers.  Finally, perpetrators suggested that responding only to them, as 
opposed to providing intervention services for their intimate partners as well, is 
misguided because “it takes two people to fight”.     
Summary Research Question Two 
In general, key stakeholders in the domestic violence intervention system agreed 
with each other regarding the challenges to effectiveness faced by the system, primarily 
citing insufficient accountability and ineffective treatment, confusion and tension 
between the goals of punishment and rehabilitation, absence of an individually tailored 
response, and lack of a victim-centered response, signaled, in part, by rampant victim 
blaming.   
Not surprisingly, perpetrators were the only ones who did not suggest that 
insufficient accountability was to blame for limited effectiveness; in fact they insisted 
that the system holds them too accountable.  However for the majority of stakeholders 
queried, the current system is not adequately holding perpetrators accountable for their 
abuse.  They are not arrested often enough, jailed for sufficiently long periods of time, 
prosecuted consistently and effectively, or forced to participate in effective batterer 
intervention for long enough periods of time.  Interestingly, for some stakeholders these 
“accountability” limitations were described in tandem with their concerns that criminal 
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justice system sanctions or “punishments” are limited because they are not rehabilitative.  
In other words, not only is the system not adequately interrupting domestic violence, but 
it is not succeeding in preventing future abuse because perpetrators are not being 
rehabilitated.  Officers, providers and perpetrators were particularly articulate about the 
limitations of coercing men to change.  According to these stakeholders, coercion may 
lead to a short term interruption in abusive behavior; however, lasting attitudinal changes 
require compassion, hope, internal motivation and effective therapy.   
Paralleling the conversation regarding the need to balance punishment and 
rehabilitation for perpetrators, stakeholders expressed equal anxiety about the domination 
of the “one size fits all” approach to criminal justice sanctions and batterer intervention 
programs.  Officers and perpetrators were clear that the same administration of 
punishment and treatment may not be well suited for each individual abuser and asserted 
that better assessment of the individuals involved and the incident/relationship context 
might enable a more specific and effective response.  Victims and advocates were also 
concerned about the prevalence of a “one size fits all” approach to perpetrators and, 
resonating in some ways with the concerns of perpetrators, expressed frustration with 
what they perceived to be both a lack of consistency within the criminal justice system 
and the fact that sanctions do not appear to correspond to the seriousness of the threat.   
Finally, each stakeholder group discussed the fact that current strategies are not 
sufficiently victim-centered.  For officers, advocates, victims, and providers this absence 
primarily manifests itself in rampant victim blaming and the inappropriate allocation of 
responsibility for the abuse and for intervening in the abuse on the shoulders of victims.  
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Victims and advocates were particularly incensed about the poor treatment that victims 
receive at the hands of the criminal justice system and the DHS: Child Welfare, noting 
that they are not sufficiently conferred with or communicated with throughout the 
process.  Almost every stakeholder group lamented the fact that current strategies do not 
provide victims with the necessary resources (i.e., housing, childcare, employment) to 
make safer choices for themselves and their children and noted that this dearth of 
resources is particularly problematic given the fact that many of the accountability and 
containment strategies for perpetrators exacerbate the financial burden on victims and 
subsequently place them in an untenable position of deciding between their physical 
safety and their financial security.  Despite these concerns and observations, officers, 
advocates and providers in some ways reinforced victim blaming within the field by 
failing to identify or strategize about what else could be done with abusive men and went 
as far as to tentatively agree with perpetrators who suggested that victims could benefit 
from education and treatment.   
Research Question Three:  
How do key Portland Coordinated Community Response stakeholders make sense 
of any discrepancies between theorized antecedents for men’s domestic violence and 
 the current intervention strategies? 
As posed, this question was extremely difficult for participants to answer.  The 
question asked stakeholders to hold in their minds two abstract concepts (theorized 
antecedents for men‟s violence as well as current intervention strategies) and then not 
only talk about the gaps or discrepancies they observed between them, but make sense or 
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explain those discrepancies.  Only a few participants offered direct responses to this 
question.  Police and probation officers, victim advocates and batterer intervention 
providers attempted to answer the question as it was posed, though even these groups 
were more apt to identify and describe rather than explain and discuss the gaps.  
Subsequently, in order to discern how stakeholders made sense of any discrepancies 
between theorized antecedents for men‟s domestic violence and current intervention 
strategies, I found myself taking material provided in response to one question and 
juxtaposing it with material provided in later sections.  In other words, stakeholders 
would talk about the most widely endorsed explanations for men‟s domestic violence 
against women in response to discussion guide question #1 and then when responding to 
discussion guide question #3, they would often indicate that part of the problem with 
current strategies is that they are not responding to all aspects of the defined problem 
(i.e., a gap exists).    
As explained in Chapter Four, focus group discussions are rarely linear and I was 
not interested in trying to force participants to speak about the material in a sequential 
order as dictated by my discussion guide.  I preferred to allow the conversation to flow 
among the participants, often gravitating towards the subjects that most interested the 
participants.  Obviously, I tried to cover all of the topics on my discussion guide with 
each focus group; however, they were often addressed “out of order” in an effort to 
maintain the conversational nature of the data collection method.  This was particularly 
the case for research questions three and four, both of which required significant 
abstraction and therefore were often initially deflected.  As mentioned previously, I chose 
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to not even pose discussion guide questions 4 and 5 in the second perpetrator group and 
in either of the victim/survivor groups after witnessing the frustration and confusion it 
created in the first perpetrator group.  I felt it was imperative that the stakeholders remain 
empowered as informants and I quickly discerned that these particular questions proved 
disconcerting for the “non-professional” groups.  So for these groups in particular, I drew 
upon material that they provided in response to other questions.   
In general, there was some agreement among participants about the gaps between 
theorized antecedents for men‟s domestic violence and current intervention strategies, 
though diverse responses were offered by each group.  All three professional groups 
identified discrepancies between individualized intervention efforts and the social 
“causes” of domestic violence, suggesting that a greater emphasis on prevention and 
social change is necessary.  Police and probation officers, victim advocates and victims 
also noted that while the reasons any particular man might be abusive or violent are 
diverse, current intervention strategies are not necessarily responsive to this diversity.  
Victim advocates and victims went on to speak passionately about the fact that the system 
appears to hold victims accountable for the abuse they experience rather than holding 
their perpetrators accountable for the abuse they perpetrate and noted with great dismay 
that victims are not provided with sufficient resources in order to make safer choices for 
themselves and their children. Batterer intervention providers talked primarily about the 
challenges inherent in employing the criminal justice system to respond to perpetrators, 
suggesting that the consequences it can implement may not be perceived by their clients 
as sufficient deterrents.  Perpetrators were adamant that ignoring the abusive or 
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problematic actions of their victim constitutes a major gap, relayed that for them 
domestic violence was not a pre-meditated choice, but rather an impulsive, uncontrolled 
behavior.  Additionally, perpetrators suggested that the current strategies for intervening 
with abusive men are counterproductive as they increase, as opposed to decrease feelings 
of anger, potentially leading to more domestic violence.   
Police and Probation Officers 
 Police and probation officers articulated a couple of distinct discrepancies 
between theorized antecedents for men‟s domestic violence and current intervention 
strategies.  Specifically, they discussed the fact that given the multiple antecedents for 
men‟s violence, current strategies are insufficient to address the diverse, individualized, 
and often life-long issues that “cause” a man to be intimately violent.  “I don‟t think we 
are a one-stop shop for everybody.  I think each situation is individual in itself and may 
need something different.” Additionally, they noted that, “It seems like we send people to 
batterers‟ intervention every day.  It‟s what we do.  And they can go, but I mean, it‟s sort 
of a learned behavior from childhood.  A lot of times they‟ve witnessed it, they‟ve seen 
it, they‟ve experienced it, and we can send them once, and I just think sometimes that‟s 
just not enough because they really have to approach, change their whole way of being.” 
In other words, officers suggested a gap exists between the diverse antecedents for men‟s 
violence and the somewhat uniform criminal justice/batterer intervention response.  
Specifically, they suggested that there is a gap between a pattern of behavior that may 
take a lifetime to form and an intervention strategy that usually involves 2 hours a week 
for 48 weeks.   
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
205 
Probation officers likened domestic violence to alcohol abuse and noted 
regretfully that the same level of service or treatment offered to alcoholics is not offered 
to perpetrators of domestic violence.  “So people who have an issue with alcohol, if it‟s a 
severe issue, which I would certainly call domestic violence a pretty severe issue for our 
country, people with an alcohol issue, if they‟re wanting to get help, can seek an in-
patient program for X number of days and really work through changing thinking… 
There isn‟t any program, I think, that is sufficient enough or, or time intensive enough to 
make a change in thinking that might then change behavior.  And I don‟t know of 
anything like that, that might result in a different outcome, long-term, for the batterer.” 
Several police and probation officers talked about the currently insufficient focus 
on prevention and children as a disturbing gap or discrepancy.  “I don‟t think there‟s any 
education at all for domestic violence in the schools, or even sexual violence.  Kids grow 
up and they see their father, you know, abusing and controlling their mother, and they 
think it‟s normal.  That‟s where it, I mean, like I said, it comes from that.  And there‟s 
none of that in the schools at all.  And, you know, that‟s a big gap.”  Officers talked about 
the benefits of starting programs as early as pre-school and continuing throughout 
elementary school.  “I don‟t know how much kids actually get at this point, but at least 
they‟re hearing the same message over and over from the time they‟re really little.  
Maybe it will impact later.”  In addition to proposing primary preventative education 
programs for all children beginning in pre-school in order to address the gap they 
perceive between the root causes of domestic violence and current intervention efforts, 
officers expressed concern over the insufficient services provided to children who have 
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witnessed domestic violence.  Officers talked about the need to intentionally intervene 
with these children if we want to break the cycle of violence.  “It seems like really to 
intervene, it might have to be done, with those kids that are witnessing it and kind of, just 
control the adults and work with the kids.”   
Victim Advocates 
 Victim advocates identified some of the same gaps or discrepancies between 
theorized antecedents for men‟s violence towards women and dominant intervention 
strategies as the police and probation officers.  For example, they noted that while 
familial, community and societal forces are recognized as contributing to domestic 
violence, current intervention efforts tend to primarily focus on individuals.  “I just think 
there needs to be a continuum, like the public health model.  Where it has the individual 
level, but there is also the relationship level, the community level, the societal level.  We 
might be doing a „fine‟ job, maybe, maybe on an individual level, but those other areas, I 
just don‟t see, I just don‟t see very much happening.”  Victim advocates also noted a lack 
of preventative efforts.  “We‟re not focusing on the bigger issues.  Like even as advocates 
we‟re responding to women‟s crisis, and it just feels overwhelming to try and address 
those bigger things.  There isn‟t a lot of funding for domestic violence, so it just feels like 
we‟re doing what we can by responding to these immediate things, but it‟s not probably 
helping the overall issue.  Like, it‟s not prevention.”  Finally, they noted that insufficient 
attention is currently being paid to intervening in the cycle of violence by working more 
directly with children who have witnessed abuse. “The children of those men that were 
battering them, they‟re the batterers now.  So I think we need to look at everybody.  We 
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need to look at the children, the women and the men because otherwise it‟s going to 
continue.  Because the kids are always left over here, so this child over here is the abuser 
in 20 years, you know?”   
 By far, the most significant discrepancy discussed by victim advocates was the 
fact that although most theorized antecedents for domestic violence involve the 
perpetrator, much of the responsibility for stopping the abuse within the current system 
appears to be placed on the shoulders of victims.  “I think that the system is depending a 
lot on survivors to hold abusive men accountable.  I mean, again, that‟s just another way 
that instead of focusing on the abusive men, we‟re focusing on the women.”  On the most 
basic level, “we aren‟t able to make him leave and stay away, so our efforts always have 
to be on supporting her leaving.”  Advocates lamented that it is not enough for a victim to 
leave.  If she wants justice and or safety, she has to actively participate in holding her 
perpetrator accountable.  They then spoke about how the criminal justice system depends 
on their participation despite how terrifying it can be for victims to go to court and face 
their abusers. 
 Advocates noted that not only are victims targeted inappropriately by the criminal 
justice system, but also that they are inappropriately targeted by the Department of 
Human Services: Child Welfare.  “We have a case right now where there‟s abuse going 
on and the mom was a victim, the child was a victim.  The child was removed and then 
she [sic: the victim] has to do a bunch of hoops, hoop jumping to get her child back.  But 
she wasn‟t the abuser.  She‟s not the abuser, she wasn‟t the abuser, but she, you know, 
she can see her child once a week.  She has to pay because she let it happen and because 
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she didn‟t call the police and because she didn‟t do this.  Not that he hurt the child.  Not 
that he didn‟t call the police.  So nothing about him.  It‟s all, again, put on her.”   
Advocates were incensed over the fact that the system holds victims accountable 
for leaving, for prosecuting, for staying away, and for protecting their children, and yet 
the critical resources needed to do any of these things are not available to survivors.  
They reminded me that if we theorize that women often stay in abusive relationships out 
of financial necessity, then greater financial resources need to be made available if we 
expect them to leave, prosecute, and protect their children.  The fact that they are not 
available is a gap that many victims simply cannot overcome.  “I feel like the biggest 
thing that I‟m seeing right now, with the victims I work with, is financial stuff.  I mean 
they need housing.  They need somebody to help pay their child care.  They need 
somebody to help them raise their kids because their partner is gone.  And I feel like for 
survivors, that‟s the biggest gap I see is the lack of resources and poverty.  I‟ve had a 
number of women say flat out, „the reason I‟ll go back, I‟ll tell you right now, is because 
he‟s gonna help me pay my rent and he‟s gonna help me take care of the kids.‟”  
 Advocates in both focus groups offered a suggestion for improving current 
intervention strategies that alludes to an interesting discrepancy.  If patriarchy and 
societal pressures, norms, and values linked with patriarchy are implicated in men‟s 
domestic violence against women, they suggested that perhaps it is a mistake to put 
perpetrators with other similarly influenced men.  “I don‟t see how he can be changed [in 
batterer intervention groups] because he don‟t feel like he is minority there. … When he 
sit[s] in a group of men like he is, the same, all of them have the same opinion[s].  Maybe 
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they don‟t show it to facilitator, but they do think the same way.  And when he talks, he 
feels like a hero.  I don‟t think that groups like this can change him.” As described earlier 
in response to what limits the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention with 
abusive men, advocates found it disturbing and problematic that perpetrators meet with 
other like-minded individuals as part of the current intervention strategy.  Instead, they 
feet as though perpetrators might be more apt to change if they participated in groups of 
men who were not abusive.  Perhaps without the subversive agreement from fellow 
batterers about his victim‟s role in the violence, perpetrators would be more motivated to 
change. 
Victims/Survivors 
 The question of making sense of discrepancies between theorized antecedents for 
men‟s domestic violence and current intervention strategies was not directly asked of 
victims.  Even so, it was evident in their comments that they perceived several 
discrepancies.  In particular, they echoed comments made by their advocates and 
expressed rage, frustration, and disbelief over the responsibility placed on them by other 
stakeholders in the system for the abuse they have suffered and for intervening in the 
abuse.  “It‟s our responsibility to make it better.  The victim is responsible for making it 
better.”  Their frustration did not stem merely from the discrepancy that if men are 
responsible for their abusive behavior then logically intervention strategies should target 
men more directly, but also from their experiences of being re-victimized by the very 
system that proclaims to be protecting them from victimization. “It‟s kind of like the 
abuse starts over again because in an abusive relationship, you‟re held accountable for 
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every action that your abuser takes upon you.  And it‟s almost like, with everything that 
they make us do, that accountability is still on us, because we have to go through all the 
hoops.  What are the guys having to do?  They‟re not made accountable for what they do, 
but we‟re made accountable for what we endure.”  Victims felt violated by current 
intervention strategies, particularly when it seems as though their abusers are off the 
hook. “They don‟t dwell up[sic] the abuser‟s past.  They dwell up our past.  They dwell 
up our childhood.  They dwell up what we went through in our lives and what made us 
choose an abuser.  But they don‟t dwell up the man‟s past, his whole life history.”   
Victims‟ sense of being inappropriately targeted by intervention strategies was 
particularly acute with respect to the Department of Human Services: Child Welfare.  
Echoing concerns described by advocates, victims repeatedly discussed being punished 
by DHS for crimes that their perpetrators committed.  “What about a double jeopardy law 
for victims?  We pay for this shit every day.  Repeatedly.  We are tried and convicted 
daily.  Especially for our kids.  We have to pay for it.  They don‟t.  You know?  We‟re 
the ones that have to work our asses off just to get our kids back.”   
It was interesting to me that victims/survivors shared advocates‟ concerns about 
the wisdom of placing perpetrators together in a room with other perpetrators for 
treatment or intervention.  As described earlier, victims questioned this feature of batterer 
intervention, suggesting that  they learn from one another how to be better, more skilled 
and manipulative perpetrators.  Some felt that it might be more effective to surround 
them with men who do not share their attitudes and values.  “They need to be in a place 
where they‟re around guys that don‟t do it and learn something from them.”  The gap or 
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discrepancy implied by this critique is that domestic violence is a behavior that is learned 
or emulated.  Subsequently, it may be misguided to place perpetrators of domestic 
violence together with other perpetrators in the hopes of intervening in their abuse. 
Finally, victims and survivors briefly echoed comments made by police and 
probation officers that each abuser is unique and that perhaps current interventions should 
recognize and more appropriately respond to this diversity.  “Each of my batterers were 
[sic] different.  Completely 100 percent different.” 
Batterer Intervention Providers 
Batterer intervention providers expanded on several of the discrepancies between 
theorized antecedents for men‟s domestic violence and current intervention strategies 
discussed by officers and advocates.  Echoing concerns expressed by advocates, they 
noted that despite wide-spread recognition of the role that Patriarchy plays in domestic 
violence, current intervention strategies are doing little to directly influence societal 
attitudes about male and female gender roles or male privilege.  One provider offered this 
thoughtful reflection, which, based on the vigorous head nodding that followed, appeared 
to resonate with other members of the focus group.   “I think changing societal attitudes 
about male gender roles and female gender roles is a big part of the solution, and I don‟t 
know what we‟re actively doing about that.  I mean, I think there‟s been a shift, and 
gender roles have become much less rigid and much less traditional, and there‟s been 
more support for equality between women and men over the last 40 years or so.  And 
that‟s all good, but what are we actively doing to promote that?  I really can‟t put my 
finger on anything, so that‟s where I would see the gap.”   
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In trying to explain this lack of attention or focus on social change, providers 
suggested that it was an issue of assigning resources, particularly in a field where you 
often have to choose between responding to an immediate and dangerous crisis and 
taking micro-steps towards changing the larger society.  “There could definitely be more 
done on the prevention side of things… how we raise our children and what society looks 
like.  You know that social change piece often gets lost in the desire to address the 
immediate crises that are going on right now.”  Some suggested that it simply was not 
lucrative to focus on prevention and social change.  “For providers, it‟s a financial 
expense to do prevention work.  It does not generate any immediate income and so I 
think that it‟s easy for providers to simply do the work directly that they‟re getting paid 
for, which is the work with abusive men, and to do relatively little preventive work or 
other kind of community outreach work because it doesn‟t immediately generate 
income.”  Others suggested that it was not merely an issue of resources, but also an issue 
of priorities.  “I think in general our culture isn‟t big into prevention because there aren‟t 
immediate rewards.  So I think that‟s an issue on a broader level.  There‟s no immediate 
benefit to educating teens about dating violence.  There‟s delayed benefit, but when 
you‟ve got to prioritize, that gets pushed off to the side.”   
 Supporting the notion that social change efforts lag behind the current need, 
batterer intervention providers overwhelmingly agreed with police/probation officers and 
victim advocates that current prevention efforts are insufficient.  They argued that if we 
theorize that abusive men are primarily responsible for domestic violence, then it makes 
sense to directly target boys and men with prevention information.  Unfortunately, 
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providers reported encountering challenges when trying to do prevention work with boys 
and men.  One provider talked about how she was actively discouraged from working 
with men by the Department of Human Services: Child Welfare. “I tried to suggest to 
DHS that we needed to do therapy with men, but that was a „no-no‟.”   
In trying to explain why prevention efforts lag behind the need, providers talked 
about how educating the community about domestic violence can often ruffle feathers 
and make men, in particular, uncomfortable.  “If you attempt to water down the male 
privilege with teaching them to be sensitive or teaching them to be aware of the other 
forms of abuse, rather than the physical abuse, you are really gonna impact their ego.  
And once you attack someone‟s ego, it‟s not going to be acceptable.”  Providers lamented 
about how challenging it can be to get men and boys to embrace the idea that male 
privilege is partially responsible for domestic violence and that they may be unwittingly 
colluding in a system that is at least partially to blame for the victimization of countless 
women and girls.   
Moving beyond the discussion of prevention and social change, several providers 
hinted that the currently heavy dependence on the criminal justice system to intervene in 
men‟s violence towards women inadvertently creates discrepancies.  Some suggested it 
was simply an insufficient response in light of the population we are trying to reach. 
“We‟re looking at a crime where it‟s basically an inability to regulate or monitor feelings 
effectively.  These people are gonna be the least likely ones to actually be able to think 
about, „Gee, I might be punished for this.‟”   Other providers went on to suggest that the 
threat of criminal justice sanctions may not only fail due to undeveloped reasoning skills, 
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but also due to the positive allure the prison system may hold.   “It‟s a very difficult 
population to try and get to turn a corner.  The culture that some of them, that come in 
actually could see going to jail as a good mark on their record amongst their friends, and 
where do you go with that?”  In other words, the threat of criminal justice sanctions may 
not be seen by some perpetrators as a negative consequence.   
Additionally, providers noted that domestic violence constitutes an array of 
behaviors that come together in a pattern of power and control, most of which are not 
illegal.  Subsequently, over reliance on the criminal justice system to intervene 
necessitates that much domestic violence goes unchecked.  “There‟s been an excess of 
focus on physical abuse as a primary type of violence, when in fact, really the vast 
majority of domestic violence, in my opinion, is non-physical abuse.  And, I think that we 
lose a tremendous number of the people who are being affected as we focus on the more 
striking and extreme examples.  We‟re focusing way too much on the criminal justice 
system as the intervention.  Because, again, when you move away from the physical 
abuse, you move away from the illegal abuse.  Emotional abuse is much more widespread 
and it‟s probably not going to be very easy to pass laws against it.”  
Perpetrators 
  Across the board, perpetrators in the first focus group did not answer the question 
as phrased and I did not ask it directly in the second group.  Both groups did however 
offer several distinct concerns about current intervention that speak effectively to 
discrepancies between theorized antecedents for men‟s domestic violence and current 
intervention strategies.  Perpetrators identified at least three disconnects between how 
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they understand the causes of domestic violence and current intervention. First and 
foremost, many of the perpetrators suggested that domestic violence is transactional (i.e., 
it takes two people to fight) and yet they feel as though the intervention focuses solely on 
the role of the perpetrator of the physical violence.  They expressed concern that if the 
behavior of both parties is not addressed, the pattern is likely to continue in future 
relationships. “Evaluate both people.  Sit down here in different classes. You were the 
one that hit, but you just didn‟t walk up to her all, „oh honey, I love you‟ and hit her, you 
know? It isn‟t like she did something that she deserved to be hit by, because you don‟t 
deserve that, but it takes two people to fight and the next relationship that she‟s gonna go 
into, she may repeat the same things.” 
Perpetrators also expressed frustration about the disconnect between the 
assumption that domestic violence is a pre-meditated planned, controlled behavior and 
their experience of NOT wanting to have hurt their partner, not wanting to have ruined 
their lives.  “I mean, last thing I want to do is, you know, choke the woman of my dreams 
and, you know, cancel the wedding and everything.  And I think that‟s probably the way 
that everyone feels.  Or most people feel.  I mean, why do you want to hurt the one you 
love, and all of a sudden it happens.”  
Finally, they suggested that it was ironic that the intervention for domestic 
violence actually produces feelings of anger, powerlessness, and frustration – all feelings 
that they linked with a greater, not lesser, likelihood of domestic violence.  “It‟s, it‟s just 
crazy that we‟re sitting here now and you know, people that didn‟t do it are accused of 
doing it, and they‟re having to go through hell for it.  That will cause hurt feelings.  That 
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will cause anger.  And yet, we‟re sitting here told to deal with what we did as „be calm, 
be peaceful, think of happy things‟.”   
Summary Research Question Three 
 Despite the fact that as originally phrased this question was challenging for some 
of the stakeholders, all of the groups identified gaps and discrepancies between current 
intervention strategies and theorized antecedents of men‟s domestic violence.  While 
there were important overlaps in the responses provided by each group, specifically the 
fact that officers, advocates and providers appeared to agree on the need for greater 
prevention and social change efforts in order for our intervention efforts to align more 
directly with our theories about what causes domestic violence, several noteworthy 
distinctions emerged.  Police and probation officers talked about the fact that the current 
response does not adequately accommodate the diverse reasons that men are abusive.  
Victims and victim advocates talked with anguish about their perception that victims are 
held responsible or accountable for the violence they endure, and for stopping or 
intervening in the violence.  They also questioned the wisdom of placing abusive men 
together during treatment as opposed to surrounding them with men who do not share 
their abusive beliefs and attitudes.  Batterer intervention providers talked about the 
dangers inherent in relying so heavily on the criminal justice system to intervene with 
abusive men given that this system holds appeal for some boys/men and the fact that 
most acts of domestic violence are not crimes, thereby leaving much abuse ignored.  
Perpetrators, standing in striking contrast to advocates and victims, suggested that their 
partners are ignored by the system with respect to culpability and that this strategy is 
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discrepant with their interpretation of the antecedents of domestic violence.  Finally, 
perpetrators noted that their experiences of violence are dissonant with theories 
suggesting that their abuse is premeditated and then mused that the current intervention 
system seems to work at cross purposes in that it inspires them to feel angry, as opposed 
to calm and in control of their emotions and actions. 
Research Question Four:  
How do key Portland Coordinate Community Response stakeholders make sense of any 
discrepancies between the Duluth model of coordinated community response and  
current intervention strategies for domestically abusive men? 
Each stakeholder group was asked to make sense of or explain any differences 
between their understanding of an ideal Duluth Coordinated Community Response 
(CCR) to domestic violence and their perceptions of the CCR within the Portland Tri-
County area.  I asked this question towards the end of each focus group discussion, after 
participants had spent time identifying limitations of the current system.  Therefore 
participants in most groups were able to successfully move beyond pure description of 
discrepancies and speculate about why differences existed.  Of course, in many cases, the 
description of the discrepancy and the explanation for why an ideal model has not yet 
been achieved were one and the same.  For example, if stakeholders identified a lack of 
financial resources for victims as a shortcoming of the CCR in the Portland Tri-County 
area, this lack is both a description of the discrepancy and a potential explanation for why 
a more ideal model is not operating.  It is important to note that while the professional 
stakeholder groups were able to answer this question without further explanation of CCR, 
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the victim and perpetrator focus groups were unfamiliar with the term and frequently 
asked me to define or explain what it meant.  I answered in the most general terms, 
usually saying something to the effect of, “A coordinated community response is the idea 
that the entire community should work together to protect victims and hold perpetrators 
accountable.  It is the idea that police, probation, batterer intervention programs, victim 
advocates, DHS, and the courts should be working together in order to best intervene in 
domestic violence.”  Even with my description, victims and perpetrators were still 
relatively unresponsive to the discrepancy portion of this question.   Fortunately, as with 
Research Question Three, they were so forthcoming about concerns with the current 
system that some of their responses speak directly to the issue of a gap or discrepancy 
between what is traditionally idealized for the CCR and what they experience.  It is these 
comments that I have drawn upon for my analysis. 
While each stakeholder group identified unique gaps or discrepancies, there were 
some common observations and explanations offered across the groups.  In trying to 
make sense of why an idealized system for coordinating agencies and resources in the 
intervention of domestic violence is not currently achieved, stakeholders identified a 
shortage of financial resources, the fact that policies and procedures are implemented by 
people, not systems, and therefore are subject to human variance in application, and 
finally that the groups or organizations that are supposed to be working together approach 
domestic violence from different perspectives and vantage points and that sometimes 
these differences spawn mistrust and miscommunication.  
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
219 
Police and Probation Officers 
When asked to explain or make sense of any gaps they experience between the 
Duluth model CCR and the one they work within on a daily basis, police and probation 
officers focused on three primary areas: the challenges that are inherent to successfully 
intervening in domestic violence due to its complexity, the strain created by insufficient 
financial resources (both for clients and for police and probation departments),  and the 
difficulties that exist when organizations who approach the problem of domestic violence 
from different perspectives attempt to come together and collaborate. 
Complex domestic violence dynamics.  More than any other stakeholder group, 
police and probation officers discussed the impact domestic violence dynamics have on 
their ability to successfully carry out their responsibilities within the coordinated 
community response, resulting in a gap between what they idealize for a CCR and what is 
currently achievable.  Specifically, they discussed the challenges that complex domestic 
violence dynamics pose on making appropriate arrests, remaining compassionate and 
understanding about the cycle of violence while working with victims, and navigating the 
murky waters of “no contact” orders.   
Officers talked about the unique difficulties police face attempting to determine 
what infractions, if any, have occurred when they respond to domestic violence calls.  A 
probation officer offered the following description of the difficulties police encounter that 
make it challenging for them to uphold their role in the coordinated community response.  
“I know from speaking to some friends in law enforcement, it‟s very difficult to make a 
decision on DV.  Because you get a call, there‟s you know, a noise complaint at the 
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neighbor‟s house or whatever and they go there.  Victim is crying, they‟re both drunk, 
there‟s no marks on her at all.  He‟d look her up and down.  „Do you have any marks?‟ 
„No, no, but he, slammed me against the wall and did this and that,‟ and he says, „I don‟t 
know what you‟re talking about.  She‟s drunk and she‟s making things up.‟ What do you 
do?  Do you make an arrest based on what she‟s saying? She‟s intoxicated, you know?  
He‟s on the other saying, „I wasn‟t even here.  I was down the street.‟  The guy down the 
street says, „Yeah, he was at my house.‟ It‟s difficult for a police officer to make, unless 
there are marks on her body to where it is kind of a no brainer to where she‟s got a black 
eye, you know.  It‟s sometimes not as clear cut as it may seem. I mean, the woman can be 
victimized all day long, every day, but you know, these batterers are not stupid.  They‟re 
gonna do it in a way that there‟s no, there‟s no marks.”  As evidenced by this quote, not 
only do police officers sometimes struggle to untangle what actually transpired when they 
arrive at the scene of an alleged domestic violence incident, but they struggle knowing 
that sometimes when they are unable to make an arrest, it is because they are being 
manipulated by a perpetrator.   
Police and probation officers also talked quite a bit about their struggle to remain 
understanding and supportive in the face of exigent interactions.  “I honestly don‟t know 
how the police do it.  Because I know a lot of them go to calls for me, to help with my 
people, night after night, and it‟s the same residence and they‟re getting the same story 
and the same run around.  And I know that‟s just part of the whole domestic violence 
thing, but it‟s hard to remember that sometimes because you get frustrated.  And I can 
only imagine how frustrating it must be to actually be doing the work out there when 
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people‟s emotions are really high.  It must be frustrating to be out there night after night, 
alone with emotions being that high and not getting the cooperation that you want, or 
someone saying that you‟re lying.”  Officers acknowledged the cyclical course of 
domestic violence and appeared aware of the reasons why they might be “getting the run 
around” or why a victim might appear to be uncooperative, but this awareness seemed to 
only partially mitigate their frustration. “Everybody gets frustrated and even in advanced 
academy, we try to reiterate and deal with the frustrations and talk about barriers a lot just 
to try and refocus on „okay, this is why this person is going back or not cooperating or 
changing their story‟”.   
It seemed to especially upset officers when their integrity or honesty was 
questioned; for example when victims insinuate that a police officer lied on a report.  “I 
can give a prime example just from a case recently that we were involved in.  There was 
a police report that said, you know, X, Y and Z happened and then the police officer went 
back and the victim said, „no, the police officer lied in that report.  That didn‟t happen.‟  
That basically the police officer made it up.  The police officer got very upset because the 
victim was insinuating that the officer lied, when we obviously know that‟s not the case.”  
Adding to their frustration is the fact that when victims change their minds or accuse 
police officers of lying, the district attorney is often unable to prosecute.  “Often, we‟ll 
have a victim for, on our side, helping us with prosecution for about 24 hours and then 
after that the story is like the police lied or we can‟t find him or they‟ve changed their 
mind or.. and then it‟s hard for the DA‟s office to, unless it‟s a super great case, it pretty 
much is out the window.”  For police officers, knowing that their efforts might be futile 
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appears to increase their frustration, and may in some cases impact their implementation 
of arrest, thereby hindering achievement of an ideal coordinated community response.   
With respect to both knowledge and understanding of domestic violence 
dynamics, as well as degree of frustration with the trying aspects of working with 
domestic violence victims and perpetrators, officers identified a great deal of variance 
among their co-workers. They suggested that while on the one hand things are improving, 
“I think we‟ve noticed in the last few years that the people coming through seem a lot 
more educated about domestic violence”, participants assured me that there will always 
be some officers who struggle to be compassionate with victims/survivors and 
appropriate in their interpretation of the laws.  The officers I spoke with were clear that 
this variance negatively impacts the community‟s ability to achieve successful 
coordination of accountability.  “With so many deputies in the country and police officers 
in the country, there‟s that bell-shaped curve where you still have people who haven‟t, 
officers who haven‟t, who don‟t get it.”  The real issue appears to be when officers who 
“don‟t get it” are in positions of power and are able to taint their underlings.  “The issue 
comes when you have new people who have gone through the training and can speak the 
language and then they hit the street and you‟ve got coaches that, you know, „god, I been 
here every day for the last ten years and I‟m just sick of it, you know?‟”  Apparently, this 
type of informal training or indoctrination regarding the challenges of working domestic 
violence cases can negate the impact of more formalized domestic violence education and 
training, a key component of the Duluth model of coordinated community response. 
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 Police and probation officers talked at length about how the complexity of 
domestic violence makes it particularly difficult to use a standardized practice with each 
situation, particularly when the strategy involves separating victims and perpetrators 
through the use of “no contact” orders.  Because domestic violence involves an intimate 
personal relationship, as opposed to a bar fight, it is often much more difficult to separate 
the parties involved.  In discussing how victims feel about “no contact” orders, officers 
reported that, “they want to be safe, and that‟s all good, but they also want this person 
that they love fixed.  It‟s hard to keep people apart, so sometimes we just have to try to 
keep them safe while they‟re together.”   Others concurred with the futility of trying to 
keep two people apart that want (for whatever reason) to be together. “I think people are 
going to be, want to be together, it‟s gonna be hard to stop them unless you lock one of 
them up.  And then they still contact each other, so I really don‟t know what you do.  Sort 
of the reality of our world is if people want to be together, they‟re gonna be together and 
even if I have them on electronic monitoring with the GPS device, it seems they can get 
around it.”  Probation officers seemed quite clear that victims‟ desire to have contact with 
perpetrators makes it difficult for them to enforce and implement their responsibility 
within the coordinated community response.  They may be charged with enforcing the 
“no contact” order, but if victims, not to mention perpetrators, are going to find ways to 
undermine the program, it makes successfully fulfilling their role challenging at best.   
 This is not to say that probation officers were “pro-contact”.  In fact, probation 
officers talked with great consternation about the tremendous strain and responsibility 
they feel when faced with making decisions about the appropriateness of contact.  “There 
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is nothing that I encounter in doing this job that is fraught with more anxiety and stress 
than the re-questioning, re-evaluating, re-questioning, getting feedback, staffing, then that 
issue of allowing either a person to return home or just to allow them to meet in public.  I 
mean, it is a huge liability.  I mean there is the institutional liability and all the civil, legal 
liabilities.  I think about that stuff so much less than I think about how I would feel 
personally if, because I said, „John, you can go home to live with Susie,‟ that something 
horrific would happen.  It‟s a huge responsibility.  And often times in the midst of it I 
think, „Screw it, I‟m never doing this again.‟”  For this particular probation officer, the 
stress of navigating the terrain of whether or not it is safe to advocate for or support 
releasing a “no contact” order is so great that it negates any potential value to his client.  
In other words, this particular officer would prefer to allow the “no contact” order to 
stand, despite any hardships it created, rather than assume the responsibility if something 
were to go wrong. 
Money.  According to police and probation officers, the issue of contact or no-
contact is significantly impacted by the lack of sufficient resources for both victims and 
perpetrators.  “Funding is always a big issue.  Funding for women so that they can be 
independent, you know?  Because that‟s a big issue with the whole scheme of domestic 
violence is the woman a lot of times „that‟s why they stay‟ it‟s, they stay and they call 
you and they call me, and as the PO, trying to get me to drop the order because they want 
the man back home.  Don‟t matter how much violence is in the home because „they pay 
the bills‟.”  Officers were clear that their role in the system, to achieve separation and 
perpetrator accountability, is complicated by the fact that victims often need resources 
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that their perpetrators can provide.  Separation may stop the violence, but it often creates 
other victimization experiences for the survivor such as not having enough money for 
food and rent.  The fact that the coordinated community response is not currently able to 
provide victims with sufficient resources to live without their batterers translates into less 
than idealized implementation of the coordinated response.   
Officers explained that insufficient resources are not only an impediment to 
achieving safety for victims, but are a barrier for many men who often do not have 
sufficient resources to pay for treatment or for housing.   “They don‟t have the money to 
pay for treatments, so they don‟t go and then they get arrested and back to court and, you 
know? As probation officers, we try to provide as much assistance as we can, but the fact 
of the matter is that in an ideal world, we‟d have a place for them to stay.  We have some 
places for people to stay, but not everybody.”   
The identification of insufficient resources to explain the discrepancy between an 
idealized coordinated community response and the current response was greeted with 
great enthusiasm, particularly with respect to the impact it has on their ability to monitor 
or supervise domestic violence cases. “Well, we can‟t, definitely, follow up on all the 
cases that come through just because of person power.  Budget cuts and all that.”  When I 
asked what specifically that meant in terms of what types of cases they did not follow-up 
with, an animated conversation erupted.  A police officer explained, “All the incidents 
that come through and all the non-arrests that come through that there could be PC 
[probable cause] for that we just don‟t have the people to go out and make the arrests.” A 
probation officer jumped in and agreed.  “That would be the same on our side.  We don‟t 
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even supervise a lot of cases.”  “We don‟t supervise menacing cases” another officer 
offered. “We don‟t supervise VRO‟s [violation restraining orders], do we?” a third officer 
questioned.  One probation officer attempted to provide some history to explain why 
there were so many types of cases that didn‟t receive supervision.  “It‟s evolved over the 
years because we were carrying caseloads of 85 to 100 individually and, which is pretty 
intense for domestic violence.  And in order for them to get our caseloads manageable in 
the 50‟s and 60‟s, they had to say, „We‟re not going to supervise certain things. You‟re 
not going to provide the money for it, we‟re not going to do it.‟”  
In addition to not being able to supervise all the cases that they feel would be 
appropriate to supervise in an ideal coordinated community response to domestic 
violence, probation officers talked about not having enough resources to sufficiently 
supervise the cases they do have. “If I wanted to call in the Calvary and have a police 
officer go to my guy‟s house every single night, I could do that, if I really wanted to.  But 
you know, like I said, is that wasting law enforcement time and effort?  Is that gonna be 
beneficial or harmful?  To have police officers going over every night or me going to 
everybody‟s house every single day is just impossible.” Another officer agreed, “I‟ve got 
65 people.  Can I monitor them all?  No, but I can pick the top 15 and really focus on 
that.  Or, like the other night, I can keep my eyes open when I‟m driving home from work 
and when I see him come by in the car with her, I can call the police and take care of it 
that way.  For me, it is just a recognition, there‟s no way that I can monitor everyone, 
that‟s all I would do.  Batterer‟s intervention would be out the window, compliance and 
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money would be out the window, work and employment tracking out the window?  I 
would just tail people around all day to see if they‟re seeing their partner.” 
Collaboration challenges.  Finally, officers talked about the challenges posed by 
the fact that the various entities within the collaboration approach domestic violence from 
different lenses or perspectives and are sometimes even working towards different goals.  
“I think from the probation perspective, sometimes we work at odds with law 
enforcement or the DA‟s office because really it is their goal to keep people apart and 
keep people safe.  Whereas, we have these people for so long and sometimes it becomes 
the goal to get the family back together safely.”  Officers then went on to express some 
frustration over the fact that their perspectives or their opinions appears to be unimportant 
to some members of the coordinated response.  “The treatment community around 
domestic violence kind of doesn‟t want to listen. At least that is what I‟ve heard.  They 
don‟t want to listen to the probation officers.”   
It is noteworthy that in the midst of the discussion acknowledging how difficult it 
is to blend or meld these different perspectives in order to offer a unified response to 
domestic violence, officers involved with DVERT reported a more encouraging 
experience. “I think it‟s really great here that everybody‟s housed in the same building.  
There‟s a lot of access to various counterparts right here because you‟ve got hotline folks 
and you‟ve got the DV unit and there are DA‟s that are readily accessible or available 
anyway.  The advocates are right next, sitting next to the officers up there and that‟s 
great.  I don‟t know how many places do that, but I think it sure is helpful in the 
education piece for both ends, because I think it‟s lacking on both sides.  That you can 
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really learn a lot from sitting next to somebody who does a different job.  If you are going 
to work together and hopefully towards a similar goal.  Some of the tactics and strategies 
might be different, but you‟ll come to understand why somebody is doing a certain thing 
that you didn‟t really have an understanding for, so I think that‟s really important.” 
In summary, police and probation officers identified several explanations when 
discussing discrepancies between an idealized CCR and current intervention strategies for 
domestically abusive men.  They described the multi-faceted challenges that police and 
probation face when managing the complexity of domestic violence cases (e.g., the fact 
that victims may change their minds immediately after arrest or during prosecution, the 
fact that one policy may not work for all cases and the fact that individual officers vary in 
the degree to which they understand these complex dynamics and are able to remain 
compassionate and effective).  In addition to these challenges, officers identified 
insufficient financial resources as a challenge for victims (who may request that 
prosecution or “no contact” orders be suspended because they are unable to afford to live 
without the financial support of the perpetrator), perpetrators (who have trouble paying 
for intervention and honoring “no contact” orders when they have no other place to live) 
and for themselves (there is simply not enough time for probation to appropriately and 
thoroughly monitor all of the cases they are assigned, much less all of the cases that are 
currently sent to bench probation).   Finally, probation officers admitted that they often 
find themselves at odds with other members of the CCR when it comes to the long-term 
goals for the family and that this difference, along with the fact that sometimes their 
voices are not respected by others within the system, often inhibits genuine collaboration.   




When asked about gaps between a Duluth Model of coordinated community 
response and their experiences working in the Portland Tri-County area, advocates often 
laughed or employed other non-verbal forms of communication before sharing their 
frustrations regarding the discrepancies they perceive.  It was not unusual for advocates 
to respond with sly, almost “knowing” smiles and furtive glances to other participants in 
the room.  At one point I tried to record this non-verbal behavior by saying the following, 
“Any gaps between what you wish the coordinated community response was and what it 
is in actuality?  Candidness is important.  Your sneaky little smile, I can‟t record that!”  
When pressed to articulate their experiences of the gaps or discrepancies, they talked 
extensively about how in an ideal CCR, victim/survivor safety and well-being would be 
priorities.  Additionally, they talked extensively about the challenge of achieving genuine 
collaboration when stakeholders approach the problem of domestic violence from such 
different perspectives and when agencies are comprised of individuals who have vastly 
different degrees of compassion, training and experience when it comes to working with 
victims. 
The current response is not sufficiently victim-centered. Advocates discussed the 
fact that while an ideal Duluth model of CCR prioritizes victim safety, achieved in part 
through perpetrator accountability, the reality in the Portland Tri-County Area is far from 
ideal.  As discussed in response to Research Question Two, advocates suggested that the 
current CCR actually places victims/survivors in great danger.   Not only are perpetrators 
not contained long enough for victims/survivors to achieve any degree of safety, but 
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sometimes the very fact that the CCR intervened can exacerbate the violence.  “[In one 
example], they did arrest him and he ended up getting out and was on probation and then 
he assaulted her even worse because she got him on probation.  Well, the system didn‟t 
keep her safe.”   
Victim advocates‟ ambivalence with respect to the role of the criminal justice 
system in the CCR emerged in several comments, particularly with respect to how the 
criminal justice system is perceived within communities of color.  “I feel like we talk a 
lot about how in the African American community, young black men are imprisoned at a 
much higher rate, generally.  And so, the woman in the community don‟t want to send 
their guys to jail, right?  So I feel like you have all these different ways that people can 
have bad experiences with law enforcement.”  Others agreed.  “Sometimes people in the 
community will say, „I don‟t get why she just doesn‟t call 911,‟ you know?  Driv[ing] 
down the street late at night and seeing the police officer drive next to them, is a real 
source of comfort for some people.  And for some people it‟s „I‟m about to get pulled 
over‟.”   
The criminal justice system is not the only partner in the CCR that according to 
these advocates is met with skepticism by some victims.  “It‟s the same with child 
welfare.  I‟ve worked with a tiny number, a few women who have called child welfare for 
help with parenting, wanting to get some support and what a different lens that is, and 
what different life experiences she must have had to see that system as a potential source 
of support.  Which ideally, it should be.  Whereas we know for so many people, it‟s a 
really scary thing.  „Those are the people that take my kids away.‟”   
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Advocates were particularly animated as they explained that not only are victims 
not safer as a result of the current system, but that more and more frequently they are the 
ones being held “accountable” or punished by the system, (i.e., they are the ones being 
arrested).  “I‟m sure a lot of people around the table could give examples, but I‟m 
thinking of things like the police responding to a call, and the woman being the one 
who‟s arrested because she maybe struggled to get away from him or whatever.  But, 
maybe she even smacked him or something because he was assaulting her and she was 
trying to get away.  And so, he‟s got a mark and so she gets taken away.”  In other words, 
according to advocates, both insufficient containment for perpetrators and inappropriate 
“accountability” for victims within the CCR in the Portland Tri-County represent major 
gaps between an ideal CCR and the one currently in operation.    
Advocates were also dismayed by how difficult the system is for their clients to 
navigate, and that these hurdles discourage women from pursuing assistance.  “I think 
having a survivor have to deal with so many agencies just to make ends meet or to get all 
the hoops jumped through is really overwhelming and even people within their own 
agency don‟t communicate and so that‟s really frustrating for survivors.  There isn‟t a lot 
of communication and it‟s hard to get people to call you back or call the survivor back.  
And she gets really frustrated and she doesn‟t want to participate.  Just know, another 
reason why they go back is they just can‟t get to all the places that they need to go.”  
Advocates acknowledged that they see it as their job to help women negotiate these 
hurdles, but lamented that they were needed in this capacity, given that some survivors 
might seek this information on their own.  “As an advocate, I‟m able to really, sort of, 
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help the woman I‟m working with navigate the system, which is great.  And it‟s part of 
why I do what I do.  I enjoy that part of it, but I think that‟s what sucks about it too, is 
that knowing there‟s loads of survivors who are seeking those same information or same 
resources that aren‟t able to access them because they don‟t have the language.  It‟s like a 
secret code and you have to have the language to get what you need.  It needs to be 
available regardless if someone has an advocate or not.”  In their minds, an ideal CCR 
would be more accessible and user friendly to victims, the primary clients of domestic 
violence intervention.   
Finally, they discussed the notion of safety and empowerment and acknowledged 
that determining how to provide safety is not always clear cut. “And that‟s controversial 
too because what makes a woman safe?  Like, holding him accountable regardless of 
what she wants?  I mean, it‟s a complicated issue.” Another agreed and shared that the 
women she works with are very ambivalent about having their perpetrators arrested, 
taken out of the home and forced to pay for batterer intervention programs.  “For 
example, [client will say], „If I complain to police, he will go to classes and they will take 
our income away‟.  She sees it like it actually was punishment for her because money 
was taken away from the family.  Same like many women, man is in jail, they don‟t want 
him really in jail because they want him to pay child support.”  The advocates discussed 
with some outrage the small role that victims‟ voices sometimes occupy within CCR.  
“Multnomah County pretty much looks at what victim wants.  Clackamas County or 
Washington County, especially Washington County, they never listen to women.  They 
always do what they feel is right.”  As described in response to Research Question Two, 
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if there were better communication between some of these agencies and victims, victims 
might not feel as disempowered.   
 Money.  Echoing concerns expressed by police and probation officers, advocates 
identified insufficient resources available for victims as a factor contributing to the 
discrepancy between the current CCR and an ideal model.  According to advocates, an 
ideal victim-centered empowerment model would more adequately address survivors‟ 
long term viability and financial stability.  A system that increases her physical safety at 
the expense of her ability to feed, clothe and house herself and her children is taking 
almost as much as it is giving.  “I think the financial piece is so huge for women.  So 
even within the civil piece of law, like the restraining order, women can ask for this 
emergency monetary assistance.  But I tell every person I work with, you can ask for it 
and the judge may order it, but it‟s impossible to enforce.  It‟s pretty rare that men pay 
that.  Sometimes, depending on the judge, different judges won‟t even sign off on it for 
different reasons.  So I just feel like, again, that puts her in this bind.  Enforcing the 
emergency monetary assistance and restitution during criminal cases and enforcing child 
support, all of those things I think would be helpful in terms of her being able to be 
financially independent.”   
Collaboration challenges.  Resonating with police and probation officers, 
advocates frequently cited collaboration related challenges in attempting to explain or 
make sense of discrepancies between an ideal Duluth Model of CCR and the current 
implementation in the Portland Tri-County area.  One advocate began the conversation 
by alluding to these challenges and inviting her colleagues to provide specific examples.  
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
234 
“I can say what I feel like it [the CCR] means in theory [laughs] and then I can say what I 
think it means in practice [there was a lot of shared laughter in the room].  I feel like in 
theory it means that we are all sort of on the same page and we are all working together 
to respond to domestic violence in a way that is going to increase the safety of survivors.  
I feel like that would include advocates and law enforcement and the parole and 
probation office and child welfare and DHS and any other community system that is 
interacting with survivors or abusive men.”    
In responding to her challenge for others to chime in, two principle collaboration-
related challenges were described.  Advocates talked about the difficulty that often occurs 
when agencies that have different priorities or foci try to work together and they cited the 
fact that collaboration between systems or agencies is dependent upon individuals, 
individuals who vary in their knowledge and compassion about domestic violence 
dynamics.  One advocate was quite honest in discussing her reticence to share 
information, a key component in the Duluth Model of CCR, with other partner agencies if 
she doesn‟t trust they will prioritize victim safety and well-being.  “To be quite frank, if 
another system I‟m working with has a completely different perspective on domestic 
violence and a way of responding to survivors, I feel like as an advocate it‟s really 
difficult for me to decide how to work with that system and how much information I‟m 
going to share with that system.  To be honest.  Because if I think that the information, 
that there‟s a chance that it‟s going to be used against the survivor I‟m working with or 
that  it‟s, I don‟t know, just not going to be received well (laugh).  When you have two 
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very different perspectives about what domestic violence is and where it comes from, I 
feel like that makes it really hard to have a community collaborative response.”   
Others agreed and offered specific examples of collaborating with agencies that 
have different priorities and values with respect to victims can be problematic.  “I feel 
like a really good example is, I can think of a survivor who has been working with our 
agency for a little while who also has a case at child welfare.  Child welfare is very aware 
that she‟s worked with us and rather than involve us when something came up, they just 
immediately were pretty punitive to this woman.  And I feel like they could have invited 
us to the table and everybody could have come together to talk about what would be the 
best way to respond to what happened and to talk to the survivor about what she wants to 
have happen.  And you know, to me, that‟s what good corroborative [sic] community 
response looks like and it just doesn‟t feel like it happens.  Unless, I guess, I feel like I 
have a connection to somebody specific within a system, that I know I can contact who 
kind of gets it, who‟s gonna work, you know, that we work well together.  Then it, that 
works well, but it‟s not the same as just being able to contact a system and knowing that 
you‟re going to come together and that they‟ll contact you, because I think that‟s 
important too.  I feel like we don‟t often get recognized as experts in the field and people 
that they can come to for information and to be included in processes.”  Several distinct 
issues are raised in this quote.  First, the fact that collaborating agencies often fail to 
involve victim advocates while working with victims.  Second, the fact that collaboration 
is often dependent upon the individuals involved.  If a relationship has been established 
and trust has been earned, then collaboration and information sharing is possible, but 
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until that point, it is difficult for advocates to work openly with other collaborators for 
fear of negative ramifications for their clients.  Finally, advocates often feel ignored as 
experts, despite their vital role in working with victims and spearheading the movement 
to end domestic violence.    
I specifically questioned the advocates who participate in the DVERT (Domestic 
Violence Emergency Response Team) program to see if they felt differently.  “I was 
gonna say, it‟s a little bit different with us because we bring the case, we‟ll bring a case to 
the table.  And all those other agents, a lot of those other agents will be at the table.  
We‟ll pretty much have DHS and child welfare, legal aid and police, the DA‟s and the 
PO‟s.”  In questioning to see if those advocates participating in DVERT felt more 
respected by their system counterpoints, I was assured by some that they were.  However, 
another member of the focus group offered this less positive comment about the equality 
of all members of DVERT. “I have to say, I‟ve sat on DVERT.  I haven‟t been on 
recently, and I‟ve also sat on the SART [Sexual Assault Response Team] teams before, 
so wherever it might be, my experience has been that, as an advocate, with other 
advocates in the room, I‟ve noticed that we don‟t speak up as much and that there is 
definitely, just from my experience, an underlying tension and, and a definite knowledge 
that we‟re coming from different places.  And that sometimes I felt like people who had 
positions of more power, like police officers or PO‟s or whomever, had a lot more space 
at those meetings and did a lot more of the talking.  And my experience with those 
corroborative meetings are that they can be really helpful, and I‟ve definitely felt like 
there were times when we were all sharing things and able to communicate really openly.  
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But then I also feel like there were definitely times where that was not happening.  And 
it‟s something that some of us would talk about a lot, but was always something that I felt 
like we would just, I really wished we would just put it out there, you know, with 
everyone present and be like, „this just, for me, feels like we‟re not all communicating, 
like what can we do and how can we acknowledge that maybe it‟s not always functioning 
like it‟s supposed to be and how can we move towards that?‟.”  Another focus group 
member, not currently serving on DVERT agreed and offered her own experience of the 
way in which advocates and victims were disempowered by the collaboration.  “I‟m not 
on DVERT anymore, but when I was, it was the people that had more power made a lot 
of decisions for the survivor and then dumped it on the advocate to make it happen and 
convince her that she needed to do these things.  So we had to get her on board to 
prosecute or we had to get her to move when she didn‟t want to.”    
Despite their many reservations, advocates did not perceive the challenges 
presented by these differing goals and perspectives to be completely insurmountable.  
One advocate suggested that the more honest they can be with each other, the better off 
the CCR will be.  “I feel like the times that it really works well are when we‟re also really 
honest about so, „this is my role‟.  Like when I‟m talking to a PO and I say, „okay, so I 
get that your goals is this,‟ and like, „but here is my role and my goal, like, so where can 
we come together?‟  I feel like those are really important things to talk about because it is 
true that we have some different roles and even if we‟re coming, even if we‟re on the 
same page, sort of theoretically, our roles are still a little different and the goals we are 
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hoping to achieve are a little bit different.  And I think being able to talk about that 
openly is important.” 
Human Variance.  The importance of individual relationships was clear.  When 
advocates formed a positive working relationship with a stakeholder in another agency, 
the collaboration between the two agencies worked more smoothly.  Similarly, when 
advocates encountered an individual within a collaborating agency that does not “get it” 
and is consistently working at the detriment of victims/survivors, the collaboration falls 
apart.  “The problem with any of those systems is that there are people who make up 
those systems, right?  So it‟s not the police, it‟s individual officers, and those officers 
carry the same beliefs about domestic violence or about violence against women that the 
general population does.  So when you‟re having systems that we look to as, like, system 
response, but really it‟s individuals.  And you hear from survivors that two women‟s 
experiences are so different.  Not because of the system, or because of the rules or the 
policies or the procedures, but because of the individuals that are a member of that 
system.”   
Advocates were enraged that individuals who consistently re-victimize their 
clients are permitted by collaborating agencies to continue to work with them.  “There 
needs to be a point where people can‟t work with survivors anymore because they‟re not 
okay to be working with survivors, you know?  Like there‟s a certain point where 
someone in a position of power, who has a lot of interactions with survivors or a lot of 
interaction with batterers and is consistently being blameful and disrespectful and putting 
her safety and her life and her kids‟ lives in jeopardy and is still in that position, is still a 
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member of our coordinated community response [gets sanctioned].”  Another advocate 
agreed and offered this example.  “Yeah, definitely, there was an example that we talked 
about at our last direct services meeting about a worker, a DHS worker who said 
something really, a couple of really heinous things to a survivor and I just thought, if 
that‟s not a fire-able offense?  Like it seemed shocking to me that it could, I mean not 
totally shocking, but I mean the things that she said were sort of beyond what I would 
have ever expected someone to respond to anyone who was hurt by their partner.  And so 
I think that is true, that individuals respond and individuals make up these different 
systems.”   
Advocates were not convinced that additional training was always the answer 
either.  They suggested that some people carry such harmful beliefs that no amount of 
training is going to transform them into a person who is able to empower and support 
clients.  “They sent this person to additional training and then she became the domestic 
violence person [for the office].  It‟s not that she doesn‟t know about domestic violence.  
Like you said, it‟s your personal attitude.  I don‟t see what this additional training will do.  
Will it make her sensitive to the needs of survivors?  Will she change after she receives 
training?  Will she be totally different?  So it depends a lot on individuals.”   
Advocates then provided examples of how victim blaming limits the 
collaboration‟s effectiveness.  “I notice that sometimes a parole or probation officer has 
information that would be really helpful to a survivor, and they won‟t give it to her.  I‟ve 
had a probation officer say things to me like, „well, I don‟t really know her yet, and I 
don‟t know what her intentions are, and I don‟t really trust her.‟ And it‟s like, she‟s not 
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the one that‟s on probation.  She‟s the victim.”  This particular advocate went on to 
describe a situation where a victim was interested in learning the location of her 
perpetrator from his probation officer so that she can avoid those parts of town and the 
probation officer was unwilling to share that information because he was suspicious of 
her motives.   
In reflection, victim advocates were extremely forthcoming about perceived 
discrepancies between the Duluth model of CCR and current intervention strategies for 
abusive men.  There was clear consensus that while in theory the CCR prioritizes the 
survivor and her future safety, in actuality, this is not fully the case.  Victims are often 
dismissed and marginalized by other stakeholders within the system, as well as  
mistakenly arrested as the primary aggressor.  Additionally, the CCR often places the 
victim in greater danger since dismal prosecution rates and short jail sentences frequently 
mean that the victim faces greater physical consequences for engaging the CCR than if 
she did not contact the police.  Most frustrating, perhaps, is the fact that the system is not 
equipped to truly help victims separate from their abusive partners.  There are not the 
financial resources available to them for housing and child-care which would allow them 
to effectively and safely walk away. Victim advocates also spoke extensively about two 
major collaboration challenges that are partially responsible for the discrepancy between 
an ideal CCR and their current experience of the CCR.  First, the fact that advocates and 
other stakeholders approach domestic violence and victims from such disparate reference 
frames makes information sharing difficult for advocates.  They fear that information will 
be used to harm, rather than help victims.  Second, collaborations do not exist between 
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systems, but rather between individuals.  When an individual in a collaborating agency is 
either ignorant of domestic violence dynamics or fundamentally unsympathetic to 
victims, it is almost impossible for effective collaboration to occur.     
Victims/Survivors 
 Although victims did not immediately identify with the term “coordinated 
community response”, when I gave them a brief explanation and asked if they thought the 
model was working well, they described several discrepancies, many of which were 
consistent with gaps identified by police and probation officers as well as victim 
advocates.   
 The current response is not sufficiently victim-centered. Like their advocates, 
victims‟ noted the fact that often they are the ones being persecuted by the criminal 
justice system for defending themselves.  “I see a lot more girls going to jail when [there 
is] a domestic violence call. You know?  And if you don‟t have no bruises on you or 
anything and somebody says something about you, you‟re the one normally going to 
jail.” Others agreed and described how victims can even get arrested for making a false 
accusation or a “false call”. “Yep”  “This is a false call.  I‟m taking you to jail.”  The 
conversation became extremely animated at this point with participants speaking almost 
on top of each other in order to express their opinions and experiences with this issue.  
“The woman calls, she‟s the one who gets hauled off to jail because they look at the scars 
on the man.”  “Yep”  “I‟ve had quite a few friends that have been taken off.” “Yeah” 
“And they leave the kids with the man.”  “Right.  They leave the kids with the abuser.”  
Moving into a partial justification for why victims might sometimes look like 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
242 
perpetrators, one woman explained that “Well, after you get your ass whupped and you 
go on back at him and hitting him, you‟re doing something.  You‟re trying to say, „Hey, 
you can‟t do this to me.  I‟m not going to allow it no more, and I‟m done.‟” 
Complex domestic violence dynamics. Victims then alluded to the complexities of 
domestic violence and speculated that police officers often do not know who to believe 
when they arrive at a scene.  “The cops don‟t know who to trust.  They think you‟re both 
lying.”  In trying to explain about why it might be confusing for officers, victims 
acknowledged that some victims will lie or will cover up the evidence of an assault.  
“And they don‟t even know who was actually the one that‟s telling the lies.  There‟s a lot 
of women out there that defend their beaters, and that‟s why some police officers, it‟s 
hard for them to believe some women.”  Other participants agreed and offered additional 
examples of how victims‟ behavior might be confusing to tease out.  “I know a couple 
girls who would do that.  Who will be like, „Oh no‟ called me up, talking about „Oh, he 
just cut my hand.  I‟m bleeding everywhere.‟  Cleaned up the spot and by the time I call 
the police, the police are over there, „Oh no, everything‟s okay.‟”  Victims clearly 
acknowledge that when women are dishonest about abuse that has occurred, it interferes 
with police officer‟s successful implementation of the CCR. 
Interestingly, victims suggested that police officers may not only be confused by 
domestic violence cases, but may be fearful of them. “Police are scared, you know?”  “I 
think police, in general, are scared of walking into a domestic violence situation because 
you don‟t know what‟s going to happen.  Who‟s gonna come out with a knife or a gun or 
what you‟re gonna get caught up in.  But, I mean, you know, that‟s why they need special 
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units for that.  Because that is a war zone you are walking into as a cop.”  It is interesting 
to speculate whether victims are projecting their sense of fear and helplessness onto 
police officers because their experience with the criminal justice system has not 
persuaded them that they can be kept safe from their abusers or whether they are simply 
accurately interpreting police officers‟ fears in the moment.  Regardless, they seem to be 
suggesting that this fear impacts police officers‟ abilities to successfully intervene as 
members of the CCR. 
Money. Victims acknowledged that one of the reasons the system may be failing 
to protect them adequately, and subsequently failing to live up to an ideal coordinated 
community response is a lack of resources. “I just think there‟s so many cases and there‟s 
not enough money.  There‟s not enough judges.  There are not enough courtrooms.  They 
have to figure out to do something that isn‟t going to cost money.”   
Human Variance.  Reinforcing what officers and advocates described, victims 
also recognize that the response they receive is often dependent on the individual they are 
interacting with.  “It depends on the person, I guess.  They‟re all different.  Some people 
don‟t care, some people act like they care and you know, it doesn‟t really matter to 
them.” 
In summary, although victims were uniformly unaware of the Duluth model of 
CCR or even what the CCR was in practice, they were extremely consistent in describing 
a discrepancy between their experiences and what they think should be happening to 
intervene with domestically abusive men.  Most saliently, victims agreed with police and 
probation officers that complex domestic violence dynamics interfere with an idealized 
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response from police and in the worst case scenario lead to victim arrests.  Additionally, 
victims went on to note that a lack of sufficient resources, particularly for the courts, may 
explain why the system is not operating more successfully.  Finally, they commented on 
the fact that collaborations depend on individuals and that this can sometimes be 
problematic if the individuals involved are not sincerely invested in helping victims 
achieve safety.   
Batterer Intervention Providers 
 Of all the stakeholders I interviewed, batterer intervention providers were most 
apt to directly answer my question requesting reasons for any perceived discrepancies 
between a Duluth model of the CCR and what they participate in currently.   Participants 
were very familiar with the Duluth model and also quite frustrated about their 
experiences with its sub-par implementation.  Their explanations resonated with those 
described by police and probation officers, victim advocates, and victims, though they 
tended to highlight or emphasize gaps specific to communication and collaboration 
between the various entities within the CCR.  So while they discussed the impact of 
complex domestic violence dynamics and insufficient financial resources on the CCR, 
they spent most of their time talking about how they are dismissed or ignored by other 
stakeholders, how the differing perspectives held by each agency make partnership 
challenging, how dependent the success of partnership is on individuals and subsequently 
how challenging it can be to maintain those partnerships in light of the high turnover 
rates.  
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Complex domestic violence dynamics.  Like officers and victims, Batterer 
intervention providers talked about how the complex nature and expression of domestic 
violence can challenge the effectiveness of the CCR.  Specifically, they discussed how 
difficult it must be for police officers to determine who the primary aggressor is and 
make appropriate arrests when there is confusing evidence. “They go to a home and it 
looks like they‟ve been mutually abusive and she‟s left marks on him but he didn‟t leave 
marks on her, but she gets arrested because, you know?  And if you have someone trained 
to tease out who‟s the, truly the primary aggressor, that‟s a big difference.”  As suggested 
in the above quote, providers hinted that sufficient training may be the key to untangling 
the conflicting stories or evidence.  “I can imagine, as a police officer, going into a 
situation.  It‟s really confusing because, you know, you have the survivor who probably 
looks like she‟s totally rattled and upset and disheveled, and he‟s really calm and saying, 
„Well, I have to kind of work on calming her down,‟ and the kids are saying, you know, 
whatever they‟re saying to keep themselves safe.  …Domestic violence is not an easy 
thing to understand.  It‟s so hard and I don‟t think there‟s an understanding exactly how 
much training people need.”  Others concurred and suggested that “it can really show 
within the same county, from city to city, the lack of training that they have around issues 
of domestic violence.”  In order to clarify how insufficient training translates into a 
discrepancy between an ideal CCR and the one currently in place, I asked, “So what are 
the consequences of them not being as educated?”   Providers responded, “Making poor 
choices and carrying beliefs without realizing that those beliefs are putting a victim in 
danger.”   
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Despite these comments indicating the importance of training in order to 
overcome the difficulties created by the sophistication of this phenomenon, providers also 
suggested that training alone may not be sufficient.  They acknowledged, just as other 
stakeholders had, the impact that co-workers can have on even newly trained officers. 
“[Name of trainer] came to Clackamas County and did a training on what they do in the 
academy, what training she gives them.  And one of the things that she said that I thought 
was interesting is that, even though you get that domestic violence piece for the training 
of these new people, so to speak, then they go out, and they‟re out in the field with the 
person, the police office that‟s been doing it for years.  He‟s been doing it forever.  So 
this new person goes right along with the old stuff.  So all the new training goes out the 
window.”   
Money.  Interestingly, batterer intervention providers barely touched on the 
impact of limited or scarce resources, though they did indicate that the absence of 
sufficient funding is at least partially responsible for their inability to completely uphold 
their responsibility within the CCR.  “We have to co-facilitate groups, but we‟re not 
getting any more money to do that.  I mean that‟s one of my biggest issues managing the 
program.  I understand that you [State of Oregon] wanted us to do this, but we‟re not 
getting anything extra to do it.  And I can see the benefits in it, definitely, but, you 
know?”  Additionally, they acknowledged that if probation departments had more 
resources and each officer had fewer cases to monitor, perpetrators would certainly be 
held more accountable.  “I think the other issue is that we bring people into the criminal 
justice system and they are loosely monitored.  Probation officers have huge caseloads 
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and some of the men I‟ve worked with kind of have the belief that „oh, this is kind of a 
joke.  I‟ve been processed.  All I have to do is sit in this classroom.  I‟ll get out and as 
long as my P.O. knows that I‟m going to the class and the therapist or counselor or group 
leader doesn‟t write me a bad report, I‟ll get through.‟  I think if P.O. caseloads were 
lower and P.O.‟s could have more contact with the guys and sort of impress up on him 
that we‟re taking this seriously, we‟re watching you, that might make a difference.  I 
think P.O. caseloads are a big problem.” 
Collaboration challenges.  Batterer intervention providers were most interested in 
laying responsibility for the perceived failures of the CCR on issues directly related to 
collaboration.  In fact, their dismay over the current state of collaboration was sometimes 
so grim that I received responses such as, “I guess I would say, what coordinated 
community response?”  When I asked them to elaborate, I was told, “I now have three 
guys who are on bench probation, which means that there is now a DV coordinator 
appointed by the court.  She sees him once every three to six months….  And these guys 
are not doing minor crimes, you know?  They‟re violent with their spouse or their 
girlfriend or whoever, threatening murder and with weapons and the whole nine yards, 
and we‟re kind of going, „Why are you on bench probation?  Why are you not being 
watched?‟ And then there‟s now the new L.L. R.R.T..  It‟s Low Level Recidivism Risk 
Team that the P.O.‟s have.  And what they‟re gonna tell you [is that] unless he commits a 
new crime, I don‟t want to hear about it.  He‟s not coming to group, he‟s still using, I 
don‟t want to hear about it.  Unless he‟s committed a new crime, I don‟t want to hear 
about it.  And I‟m quoting verbatim what I was told at a meeting with them.”   
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
248 
Readily apparent was the fact that providers do not feel there is synergy between 
the work they are doing in group with perpetrators and the probation officers who are 
supervising these men.  More specifically, they do not feel supported by or in partnership 
with probation officers.   “I see a disconnect between the P.O.‟s and at least my program.  
There are times that I say, „This guy is really acting out in group.  Would you meet with 
him?‟  Doesn‟t happen. „We need another hammer here besides group.  Would you talk 
to this guy?‟  It doesn‟t happen.  All of a sudden a guy will be, he‟ll be in the program for 
six months and he‟s gone. Where‟d he go? „Oh, well, I decided he was doing well 
enough, so we just, you  know, I talked to the judge and he‟s now off probation.‟  What‟s 
going on here?  Where is this coordinated approach?  Where‟s the feedback?  Where is it 
you asking me my professional opinion about whether this guys is ready to get off?  
Whether this guy has made any progress, whether the attitudes have changed, whether the 
behavior has changed?  And it‟s like we‟re functioning over here and doing our own 
thing.  We‟re just something that you have to send guys to.”   
This experience of being ignored or disregarded by other stakeholders was echoed 
by several providers.  “This is one of my biggest issues with the system.  If I‟m a 
domestic violence therapist and that‟s my specialty and I say to the police, „this is a 
dangerous situation.  This woman is in hiding.  These kids are traumatized by the last 
situation where he threatened to kill them.‟ I give the police all that information with the 
mom‟s support and permission and the police still don‟t listen.  That tells me that my 
opinion is not valued.  So to me, these meetings are all great, but then when I look at 
really who runs it, it doesn‟t really matter how much we talk.  I guess that is the 
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frustration I have.  It doesn‟t matter how much we all talk.  There‟s meeting after meeting 
after meeting and yet, the people on top will make the decisions.”  For providers, the fact 
that the men in their groups are not adequately supervised by probation, coupled with the 
fact that they are directly ignored or dismissed by police and probation officers when they 
try to share information or concerns represents a significant departure from an idealized 
version of CCR. 
Providers went on to explain that genuine collaboration among stakeholders in the 
CCR is challenging, particularly when it involves the bringing together of different 
perspectives, different resources, in order to reach a common goal.  “We can all be fine as 
long as we‟re all agreeing.  But if somebody throws something out there that‟s different, 
then they‟re either shunned or ignored.”  “I think the frustration in coordinating 
community response is that while we all come to the table, sometimes the disagreements 
that people have create conflict.  And so there‟s some who will be more outspoken and 
those who will keep silent because they don‟t [want to] get caught in conflict.” In trying 
to explain why it may be difficult for stakeholders to successfully navigate these different 
perspectives or views within meetings, one provider explained that it may have 
something to do with the attempt to communicate across different professional cultures.  
“I think that there‟s language issues and cultural issues going on in coordinating 
community response.  We have response advocates out-stationed at the police bureau and 
let me tell you, it feels like we‟re speaking two different languages even though it‟s the 
same goal.  And I think that the same could be true with batterer‟s intervention programs 
and victims‟ advocates.  So when we get together to do coordinated community response, 
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings   
 
250 
..we need to realize that we are speaking different languages and that we come from 
different perspectives.” 
Human variance.  Batterer intervention providers suggested that the success of 
bridging these professional differences in order to collaborate is often dependent on the 
specific individuals involved.  It works if the partners trust each other, but it falls apart if 
they do not.  “There is a lack of trust, I think…  I mean, we know the good people to call, 
is how we sort of look at it, and we‟re nervous about what everyone else has to say.  And 
that‟s why you need more training at all levels.”  Others agreed that the degree of 
collaboration, as well as the success of the CCR in general, varies based on the particular 
players involved.  “It‟s inconsistent depending on the P.O., depending on the judge, 
depending on the provider or a person within the agency, depending on philosophy.”   
  One provider suggested that this individual variance impacts more than just 
traditional members of the CCR or criminal justice system, but rather extends to mental 
health professionals, faith leaders, and community members who through their 
knowledge of domestic violence or their ignorance can have an impact on the success of 
the CCR.  “A couple other gaps between the way the coordinated community response is 
and the way we‟d like it to be.  One, just basic one, is ignorance.  Do people understand 
the relevance of domestic violence in their own professional lives?  Most therapists are 
ignorant to domestic violence.  They don‟t see it.  I mean, it can be looking them right in 
the eye and they don‟t see it because they don‟t understand what it is.  And we can see 
that with the faith community, for example.  Um, it‟s also a significant issue within other 
cultural communities.  It‟s a very common thing within many, um, cultural communities 
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is, is when you ask them about domestic violence, they say, „Well, that‟s not a problem 
here.  We don‟t have that problem like you all do,‟ and of course they do.  They just don‟t 
understand it yet.” 
 Providers suggested that some of the individual variance negatively affecting 
collaboration is related to the secondary trauma that some stakeholders experience 
working so closely with victims of domestic violence.  “The most hostility and anger I‟ve 
experienced in my professional career of 15 years with this has been from advocates and 
some providers.  And my explanation for that, what I really think is going on, is I think 
it‟s enormously traumatizing to be working with victims.  I think it is, because you‟re so 
helpless.  I mean, you‟re helpless, your helplessness is even greater than her helplessness 
is, you know?  And, I mean, it‟s so painful to be doing great work, and she‟s doing great 
things, you know?  And then he comes in and he completely undercuts all of that.  And so 
I understand very much because I have worked, I have and do work with victims. I 
understand how they can become, and I think it leads to a lot of burnout.  So I think a 
significant thing that fuels a lot of this anger and hostility, um, is, is burnout.”  
Obviously, according to this provider, burnout and hostility between partners in the CCR 
negatively impacts the success of those partnerships. 
Finally, batterer intervention providers talked about the impact that rapid turnover 
has on not only their ability to establish and maintain successful relationships with other 
stakeholders, but also for the system to function optimally. “This is not easy material to 
learn.  It is sophisticated.  It makes sense, but it certainly takes longer than an hour.  
Turnover is a huge barrier.  So, part of the justice system is probation and when you get 
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brand new, when you get these guys bouncing around from PO to PO or the POs are three 
months in and they stay for six months and they leave and get somebody else.  That 
doesn‟t work as well as when you‟ve got a PO that‟s had a DV caseload for years and 
knows his stuff well.  You don‟t have to keep training them.  They‟re trained, they know 
it well, they‟re getting a more sophisticated concept of what this stuff is.  I think it‟s true 
with police officers or anybody within the criminal justice system.  Turnover really 
compromises the quality of the response.” 
In general, batterer intervention providers expressed a lukewarm response to the 
existing CCR.  Most providers expressed frustration with the discrepancies they perceive 
between an ideal model of coordination and their experiences of the current response.  
Although certainly not the focus of their concerns, they, like officers, advocates, and 
victims attributed some of the discrepancy to the complexity of domestic violence 
dynamics and the lack of sufficient resources.  Providers primarily attributed 
discrepancies to dismissive responses by other members of the system, cultural divides 
among the system stakeholders, human variance, and turnover.  Providers were infuriated 
about the degree to which their opinions regarding perpetrators are ignored by police and 
probation.  They also discussed with great detail the fact that each set of stakeholders 
comes to the table with a unique perspective or culture and that blending or 
compromising among those perspectives is often more difficult in actuality than in 
theory.  They were especially clear that the CCR is a practice implemented by individuals 
and subsequently there is a great deal of variance based on the individual probation 
officers, judges, advocates, and batterer intervention providers involved.  Finally, they 
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spoke about the need for continued and expanded training for stakeholders, a process 
which is often complicated by the rapid turnover within many of the collaborating 
institutions (e.g., victim advocacy, DHS, police and probation).  
Perpetrators 
Like victims/survivors, perpetrators were unfamiliar with the term coordinated 
community response, though several of the critiques they offered pertaining to the 
domestic violence intervention system can be understood as discrepancies between an 
ideal model of collaboration and the one they experience.  Like other stakeholders, 
perpetrators discussed the challenges posed by the complex nature of domestic violence, 
particularly their perception that victims regularly lie about their victimization and that 
the system is not set up to detect this type of manipulation.  They also discussed the 
significant financial challenge or burden they (and their victims) experience due to the 
high costs associated with attending batterer intervention programs.  Finally, they 
discussed the fact that their experience of the intervention or response is strikingly 
different depending on the specific individuals, primarily probation officers, who interact 
with them. 
Complex domestic violence dynamics.  Several of the perpetrators I interviewed 
expressed frustration over the fact that women lie about their abuse and they did not 
understand how the police and the criminal justice system could so easily be manipulated.  
“I won‟t name names, but when the police come and they talk, how can they discern 
whether your [the victim‟s] word is better than your [the perpetrator‟s] word. „I believe 
you.  You‟re a liar.‟ Some of us, you know, have vindictive partners who have made up 
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broken bones, all this kind of stuff down the road trying to get you in deeper and deeper 
and deeper.  How can a court just take their word as gospel?”  These perpetrators 
suggested that victims are regularly untruthful about their victimization and they felt a 
weakness of the intervention (or the coordinated response) is the fact that not only are the 
women believed without substantial evidence or proof (such as lie detectors), but that 
often the DA will proceed with a case even when a victim has shown no interest in 
pursuing.  “And why can‟t, why can‟t, I know lie detectors aren‟t admissible in court, but 
in a lot of these cases in here, the other partner says what they want to say, they take the 
report, they don‟t show up to court, but the DA says, „I‟m gonna take it off of this 
paperwork.‟  So now, this person there, they‟re out of it.  They said what they wanted to 
say out of a vindictive nature, out of an anger situation that happened that night, they 
don‟t even have to be around anymore.  The DA will pick it up and from what was said 
that night on that paperwork.  Go put on a lie detector.  Make them prove that is what 
happened.  Because it‟s always two different stories.  Make them prove that‟s what 
happened.  Yeah, some may have bruises, black eyes or bleeding.  That‟s obvious proof 
that something happened.  But in the case of an argument or no physical violence at all 
and they show up and believe their word as gospel and you‟re gone.  No matter what you 
say, you‟re, you‟re, you‟re done.”   
The men clearly presented themselves as victims of a system that takes their 
freedom and their money because their spouse/partner happened to call the police first.  
“When a cop shows up at the house, because the cops are called… they come in to make 
sure that everybody‟s okay.  So they don‟t need a search warrant to come in.  So they 
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come in and make sure that everybody‟s okay and then, like you said, they take whoever 
called‟s word, you know? „this happened‟ okay, good you‟re going.” Others in the group 
agreed, “Whoever calls first, wins.”  “Yeah.  And so, now, now they, they don‟t know 
what happened. They just take in the word of whoever called, you know?”  One 
participant went on to suggest that one of the reasons they are unjustly “victimized” is 
because the criminal justice system benefits financially from their lengthy participation in 
batterer intervention treatment.  “[The DA] knows we can get money on this sucker 
because we can throw him in the class where he‟ll have to spend 48 weeks and if he 
screws up, well, we‟ll just keep him in the system, keep rolling and rolling.” 
Money.  The men were particularly emotional about the cost of batterer 
intervention programs and suggested that the high fees prevent them from fully engaging 
in the programs.  “I think for me, the reason that I‟m not able to really concentrate and all 
that [in group] is the stress of all the money.  I have no money.  Can something be done 
to help us cut the cost, my god, you know?”   Others agreed and questioned why the 
programs are so expensive. “I don‟t understand why they charge so much.  I mean, some 
of us, just kills us to have to pay for this class.  And if we don‟t take the class and don‟t 
do the class, back to jail we go.”  Perpetrators were curious why there is not more 
government funding for these programs.  “There should be more funding for this.” 
“Yeah.  More funding.” “To help reduce the stress so I could learn more.”  “If we are one 
of the biggest problem areas in this society, which they say statistically we are, there 
should be funding for it.  You know?”  If the goal of the CCR is to reduce recidivism by 
holding men accountable and mandating attendance in batterer intervention programs, 
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perpetrators seem to be suggesting that an ideal implementation of the CCR would 
involve reducing treatment costs so that they could more fully engage and absorb the 
material.    
Human variance.   Echoing comments made by every other stakeholder group, 
perpetrators asserted that tremendous variance exists within the system response as a 
function of the individuals involved.  They were particularly clear about the impact of 
this variability with respect to probation officers, though they alluded to it with respect to 
police and treatment providers.  “You either got a good P.O. or you don‟t it seems.” 
“Why is one PO say, „nope, nope, nope‟ and the other PO says, „Let‟s do this.‟” 
 One gentleman spoke in great detail of the differences he experienced between 
probation officers and the impact that these different officers had on his relationship with 
his children. “I asked my PO to please at least call [my son] and tell him what the „no 
contact‟ order is.  My boy‟s 14, he doesn‟t understand what‟s going on and it‟s been 
almost a year.  And I‟ve lost one of my boys, no doubt.  He‟s so full of angry after this 
long and not being able to talk to him.  We never got a chance to heal.  Or at least try to 
heal together as a family, as a unit.  You know, my heart aches.  You know, to be a 
perfect probationer and follow all the rules, I have literally given up my boys and it 
breaks my heart that the system will not at least send my boy a birthday card for me.  
Now I got a new [PO] and it‟s unfortunate that she‟s going [location removed to preserve 
confidentiality], but right away I found out my son broke his collarbone.  I left one 
message on her phone and she got back to me the next day and told me she‟d talked to 
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him and he‟s doing all right.  And I tell you what.  For me, it was incredible.  I just think 
that is what helps a family.  Because that phone call to him, he knew I was trying.”   
Obviously, a “good” probation officer clearly made a difference for this man.  
Similarly, perpetrators implied that a good treatment provider or counselor can make a 
difference.  “There‟s nobody as far as counselors and I‟ve been involved with counselors 
since probably I was like six that has the unique outlook and the characterism [sic] that X 
(facilitator‟s name) has.”   
In sum, perpetrators had minimal to nonexistent knowledge of the CCR and 
therefore were unable to directly respond to a request for perceived discrepancies with 
current intervention strategies.  However, a few of their comments in response to other 
questions appear to speak to discrepancies.  For example, they were distressed over the 
fact that there seems to be no safeguard to protect them from vindictive partners who lie 
about their abuse.  Additionally, they were extremely frustrated about the exorbitant costs 
associated with batterer intervention, suggesting that they would be better able to focus 
on the material of the course if they were not so strained by the fees.  Finally, they 
discussed the fact that the system responds to men differently depending on the probation 
officer or the treatment provider assigned.   
Summary Research Question Four  
In responding to the question of discrepancies between the Duluth model of CCR 
and current intervention strategies for domestically abusive men, Portland stakeholders 
shared some striking similar observations.  Police and probation officers, victims and 
perpetrators identified that the complexity of domestic violence, and the resulting 
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confusion about how to attribute blame and responsibility, contributes to a discrepancy 
between ideal and actual practice.  All five stakeholder groups pointed to a lack of 
sufficient financial resources when trying to make sense of the gap between an idealized 
CCR and the one currently operating in the Tri-County area.  For example, if the victim 
advocacy community was able to offer victims true financial independence, more women 
might be able to successfully leave their abusive partners. Additionally, if police and 
probation departments had sufficient resources, more domestic violence cases might be 
more closely supervised.  Finally, if batterer intervention programs were less expensive, 
perpetrators might struggle less to complete their programs.   
It is noteworthy that all five key stakeholder groups recognized and expressed 
frustration over the fact that while the CCR may be a system with idealized policies and 
procedures, it is a system implemented by individuals.  Consequently, the actual 
performance is often dictated by the competence, attitudes, and policies of specific 
individuals within the system.  The professional stakeholder groups also discussed the 
extreme challenge posed by working across cultural domains or perspectives (i.e., the 
perspective of victim advocates is different than the perspective of probation officers 
which differs from the perspective of batterer intervention programs).  In addition to 
issues of trust, information sharing and goal setting, working across disciplines presents 
challenges with respect to honoring the specific expertise and authority of the “other” 
groups.  It is noteworthy that each professional stakeholder group expressed 
disappointment and frustration over the fact that they feel as though their voices are not 
respected by other members of the CCR.    
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Research Question Five:  
What do key Portland Coordinated Community Response stakeholders believe the role of 
community should be in domestic violence intervention with abusive men? 
Although stakeholders interspersed opinions regarding the role of community in 
domestic violence intervention throughout each focus group, I concluded each discussion 
with a direct question designed to elicit additional insights.  Most stakeholders provided 
rather straightforward responses, often focusing on the need for additional training for 
religious and medical personnel in order to improve screening for domestic violence, 
increased availability of resources addressing basic needs for victims and perpetrators, 
and enhanced prevention education efforts in the schools and the community at large.  A 
handful of innovative ideas were also shared.  It is interesting to observe that stakeholders 
rarely explained how any of their suggestions/ideas might be achieved.  In other words, 
while most agreed that resources such as housing, employment and child care are needed, 
no one described exactly how these resources might be provided by the community.  This 
truncation might indicate that stakeholders spend comparatively little time thinking about 
how community resources could be better utilized in order to ameliorate some of their 
critiques/concerns with the current strategies or it might simply be a function of the fact 
that it is challenging to fully describe opportunities that have not yet been realized.     
Police and Probation Officers 
 When discussing the ideal role of community in domestic violence intervention 
with abusive men, police and probation officers primarily focused on the need for 
enhanced screening and services as well as increased prevention education within the 
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schools.  Officers specifically singled out faith organizations and the medical community 
with respect to better screening.  They pointed out that faith organizations are frequently 
approached by victims and perpetrators for relationship/marriage guidance and implied 
that if religious leaders were adequately informed, these leaders could have a positive 
impact on the safety of their congregations.   “Instead of pastors counseling, „oh, well, 
obey your man or your, your husband.  He‟s the head of the household,‟ just be more 
aware of domestic violence issues and education there.”  Officers also suggested that 
better, more accurate domestic violence screening by agents of the health care 
community could make a difference.  For example, the following was offered in response 
to my question about what they would like to see with respect to increased community 
involvement, “A greater level of understanding, education among health care providers.  
Emergency room, you know, those kind of first line.”  Their responses with respect to the 
faith and medical community were not very descriptive or detailed.  The conversation at 
this point involved a lot of cross talk in that someone would say, “faith organizations” 
and another participant would say, “That‟s what I was going to say.” A third participant 
would chime in, “That‟s what I was going to say too.”  Most often, participants did not 
explain in great detail what faith organizations or the health care industry should 
specifically do differently with respect to current intervention strategies, just that their 
role should be enhanced. 
Police and probation officers pointed out that while raising community awareness 
about domestic violence is important, it is not always easy.  In fact, one group spent quite 
a bit of time talking about the futility of a recent attempt to share information at a local 
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community event.  “Well, we had a booth at the family fun festival.  I don‟t know if you 
know about the fun festival, but it was created around domestic violence or family 
violence.  The gal that created it asked our victim advocate to get up there and speak and 
she probably spoke for like five, seven minutes and it was really brief, but it was direct, 
to the point.  She‟s a great speaker, but it was very unwelcomed.  There were guys 
standing clear in the back, shaking their fists and making comments.  There were a lot of 
women getting up and leaving and telling the coordinator that this was not an appropriate 
place.”   
Obviously resistance and denial within the community pose challenges to raising 
awareness about domestic violence; however, police and probation officers believe these 
challenges are worth addressing if communities, and specifically neighborhoods, are 
going to play a role in preventing and intervening in men‟s abuse.  “Neighborhood 
groups could become a part of the solution.  Since there has been sort of historically, a 
„not my house, not my problem‟, or „well, you know, they‟re married, that‟s his wife.‟  
I‟m not sure how I would see that exactly, just more of a complete support from 
everybody on your block.”  Officers went on to suggest that neighborhood support, 
particularly in the form of community-based drop-in programs, might really help children 
who are struggling with violence in the home.  “If there were more community-based 
programs where kids were being drawn into, more community based programs for sports 
or science, just different things that kids could, on a free basis, because a lot of kids aren‟t 
going to be able to afford it.  And so they‟re seeing positive things [too] and maybe 
developing some hope, I guess.  That‟s not the word I‟m searching for, but… a desire to 
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improve oneself.  …  That gives them a way to see how, maybe, people can treat each 
other differently in a relationship and a more positive role model.” 
 One issue that was discussed with great passion was the absence of sufficient 
community resources for perpetrators of domestic violence, particularly in the form of 
housing, “Some of our guys are in a situation where they get arrested, and say it‟s their 
wife and they‟ve been living together for ten years and they have three kids, right.  Well, 
that man, may or may not have a job, may or may not support the family, and a lot of 
times they don‟t.  They have substance abuse and they‟re in and out of work, and the 
main provider is the victim.  So now they can‟t live at home anymore.  Now they have to 
live somewhere.  Where that is, you know, we don‟t know.  Sometimes they have no 
resources.  Sometimes the people that they have to go live with are not good influences.  
So a lot of it, to me, is housing.  This is more than just the DV issues.  It‟s all the 
criminogenic issues here.  We‟re talking about housing, we‟re talking about substance 
abuse, all the stuff to where now they‟re forced to function as a normal adult and they 
have to find a clean and sober place that‟s not supported by the victim.  And that causes 
all kinds of problems when they can‟t support themselves.  They go back to the victim‟s 
house.  They get caught there, they get arrested.  As probation officers we try to provide 
as much assistance as we can, but the fact of the matter is in an ideal world we‟d have a 
place for them to stay.”  Essentially, officers were suggesting that to sufficiently 
intervene in domestic violence, perpetrators might require an umbrella of resources, 
resources for their drug and alcohol dependency, resources for their unemployment, for 
their homelessness, etc.  In other words, these men might require resources that are 
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beyond the scope of what has traditionally been addressed by dominant domestic 
violence intervention strategies and which would require substantially more community 
involvement. 
 As has been reported in response to earlier research questions, officers were 
convinced that enhanced prevention education, specifically within the schools, is critical.  
“I think another gap is the schools.  Like I don‟t think there‟s any education at all for 
domestic violence in the schools, or even sexual violence.” For officers, primary 
prevention education is important not only to teach boys how to appropriately behave in 
intimate relationships, but also to teach girls what they should expect in relationship.  
“And it‟s not just educating young men or boys that this is not appropriate behavior, but 
the girls too, who live in the environment and see their mom being treated this way and 
getting normalized to the chaos and the stress in the family so that when they get older 
and get into relationships themselves, they don‟t feel comfortable unless they are in a 
situation like that.”  Officers were confused and frustrated as they recounted their 
perception that there is administrative resistance to offering this kind of valuable and 
perhaps life-saving information to students.  “There is one local batterer‟s intervention 
provider who‟s very committed in this work, for years trying to get into schools and 
encounters nothing but resistance from boards.  Teachers want it, students were 
interested, local principals, „please come speak at our school.‟ Always the administration 
will put some sort of roadblock in place that just wouldn‟t make it possible.” 
 In summary, police and probation officers suggested a few ways in which the 
community‟s role in the intervention of domestic violence might be enhanced or 
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expanded, principally involving greater screening and awareness building for religious 
leaders and medical personnel, neighborhood policing, free drop-in youth programs, 
additional resources for perpetrators, and increased preventative education in the schools. 
Victim Advocates 
 Victim advocates offered similar suggestions to police and probation officers 
regarding how they would like to see the community involved in intervening in men‟s 
abuse, particularly enhanced screening efforts, augmenting basic need services for 
clients, and preventative education for youth, as well as proposing a few innovative ideas 
for how the community might be better engaged.   
Advocates shared police and probation officers‟ desires for enhanced domestic 
violence screening. “I feel like educating almost any system about domestic violence is 
helpful in responding to men‟s violence.”  They discussed how damaging it can be when 
opportunities for intervention, particularly within the medical community, are lost as a 
result of absent or insufficient screening. “In [one] particular case, she wasn‟t able to go 
to the hospital without his escort.  And when she went into the room, she was making up 
all kinds of reasons why she was there, trying, you know, saying she was, had a 
miscarriage.  Well, she had three big old, melon sized bruises on her arm and leg that the 
doctors had to have seen, but never questioned and never asked the offender to leave the 
room.”   
Advocates also reasserted their earlier claims that housing and other financial 
resources are often what clients need most.  “I feel like the biggest thing that I‟m seeing 
right now with the victims I work with is financial stuff.  I mean, they need housing.  
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They need somebody to help pay their child care.  They need somebody to help them 
raise their kids because their partner is gone and I feel like for survivors, that‟s the 
biggest gap I see is the lack of resources and poverty.”  Unfortunately, neither the 
advocates nor the police/probation officers offered specific proposals for how the 
community might make these resources more available to their clients. 
Victim advocates also agreed that the community has a tremendous responsibility 
to better educate and inform young people about healthy relationships.  “I think before 
men become abusive it would be nice to have some more preventative stuff happening 
with kids that are school aged.” Advocates pointed out that kids are entering relationships 
at young ages and that it is never too early to begin teaching them how to establish 
healthy interaction patterns. “Healthy relationship courses sooner in school.  I think that 
even fifth grade going down to elementary level and then continuing it, because I think 
the kids are starting relationships really, really young.”   
  Victim advocates went on to offer several additional suggestions beyond those 
offered by police and probation officers for the ideal role of the community in domestic 
violence intervention.  Specifically, they discussed the potential benefits of a large scaled 
community awareness building campaign, engaging former perpetrators in the fight to 
end domestic violence, and creating some form of batterer registry.  Advocates suggested 
that a large scale campaign, similar to the highly successful Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (M.A.D.D.) campaign might be effective in engaging community bystanders in 
the prevention and intervention of domestic violence.  “I just think about, like drunk 
driving.  Like when M.A.D.D. was created where before M.A.D.D. existed, there was no 
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language around designated drivers.  There was no bystander skills that could be taught 
in terms of taking someone‟s keys, saying „I‟m driving you home.‟ You know? And, and 
yes, there are still way too many drunk drivers, and lots of people are killed every year 
from it, but it has decreased so much, and it‟s more part of the public discourse in a way 
that violence against women is not.  And I think that there needs to be something like that 
[laughs].”  In other words, advocates were suggesting that in order to truly engage 
community members, a new set of tools (e.g., bystander skills) might need to be 
developed and widely publicized.  Advocates also suggested that it might be helpful to 
distribute awareness building material in non-traditional locations, particularly locations 
that are frequented by men. “More DV in the traditionally male places.  Whether it‟s a 
sports arena or I don‟t know even a bar, just talking about DV.  Reaching out to where 
they will find the men. If that‟s who we‟re trying to educate, that‟s where we need to 
reach out and there needs to be more role models in those fields.”   
The idea that men need to be better engaged in domestic violence awareness 
building within the community gained quite a bit of momentum within one of the focus 
groups.  In brainstorming about how to best accomplish this task, advocates suggested 
that first it might be necessary to de-gender the issue.  “And I think it also needs to be 
expanded from this idea of like a women‟s issue into, like, a human rights issue so that 
it‟s not just about women.  It‟s about society.  It‟s about men.  I just think it gets sort of 
stuffed into this corner and called a woman‟s issue.”   
Advocates next agreed that men might be most impacted by listening to other 
men, particularly former batterers.  “When women talk about domestic violence, people 
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say, „oh yeah, yeah, it‟s women issues,‟ but when man talks to men about this issues, I 
think it‟s more impressive.  I just remember that we had one guy that was an abuser.  Our 
client‟s husband and then he changed.  He changed his attitude and [he would go] around 
and speak about domestic violence.  And I remember he was effective.   And I think it‟s a 
good idea to involve not only women, but more men.”  The idea of involving more men 
in domestic violence intervention was highly appealing.  Advocates discussed the power 
that men have to influence each other either in positive or negative directions with respect 
to treatment of their romantic partners.  They went on to suggest that if the male 
community could shift in its tolerance of degrading or abusive behavior, perpetrators 
might be more inclined to shift as well. “What I‟m thinking of when you say that is just 
this idea, again, the sort of societal norms, and I think on a sort of individual and 
community level like of other men and women, but I‟m thinking of men in particular of 
that not being acceptable.  So that being shameful and that not, that not being something 
they could boast about, that you can dominate your wife, you know?  Or the idea of even 
sort of warning signs of jealousy and stalking behavior and that sort of thing, of that 
being disapproved by sort of the general population.  So his buddies aren‟t going to 
collude with him and you know maybe that‟s hoping for too much [laughs], but like, just, 
you know other people in his community are not gonna accept his behavior.” 
 Ultimately, advocates suggested that the community needs to be involved on 
multiple levels.  It needs to intervene with individual men and individual women, it needs 
to offer support, guidance, and resources to victims and perpetrators and it needs to shift 
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on the societal level, perhaps through the use of an effective media campaign. “I think 
media has a big role that it can play to create public opinion about this issue.” 
It was noteworthy however, that similar to the police and probation officers, when it 
came to specifics, few were offered.  More often, general statements were made with 
little expansion on what it would look like for the community to be more involved.  For 
example, “I just think there needs to be a continuum, like the public health model.  Like 
the individual men, they need to be prevented from doing this to her and the kids, but also 
to his next partner.  While we know will probably happen.  But then there‟s the next 
level.  There‟s the relationship level.  She needs to be supported.  Her friends and family, 
his friends and family, his children, you know, every sort of those responses.  The 
community level, the societal level.  It needs to happen at all of those.”   
One specific suggestion that was offered by advocates involved the development 
of a community registry for perpetrators of domestic violence to better protect victims 
and future victims.  “Because we know these guys re-offend so much and have new 
victims, some way of being able to spread the word about the guys, quite honestly, is 
something ideally I would love to see.” “Some way of saying, look, this is the third time 
he‟s been charged, so we‟re gonna put him on this list or whatever.”   
In reflecting on how they would like the community to be involved in domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men, victim advocates moved beyond discussing the 
need for enhanced screening, resources and services for clients, and prevention education 
to articulate the benefits that could be achieved by a large scale community awareness 
building campaign equal to M.A.D.D. , the importance of shifting the public perception 
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of domestic violence from a women‟s issue to a human rights issue thereby better 
engaging men and former perpetrators to the cause, and finally the possibility of creating 
a community registry for perpetrators of domestic violence so that women might be able 
to better avoid men who have been abusive in the past.    
Victims/Survivors 
 Victims concurred with many of the suggestions offered by officers and advocates 
for the role of community in the prevention and intervention of domestic violence as well 
as describing several new ideas, including the development of in-patient programs for 
perpetrators, summer camps for children who have witnessed abuse in their homes, 
engaging the workplace community, and challenging the media to reduce the amount of 
violence against women depicted on television.   
Improving the community safety net for victims and perpetrators by enhancing 
screening efforts, particularly within the medical field, was discussed with passion as 
women shared their own “missed opportunity” stories. “I think there should be more 
training.  Definitely more understanding for not just police officers, but even in the 
hospital, you know?  I was giving birth to my son and the [nurse excused herself].  She 
said, „Well, I can see you guys are having difficulty.  I‟ll leave.‟ Instead of staying [and 
intervening in the abuse by perhaps saying], we‟re not married, he can‟t be here, you 
know?  She left.”  Victims wondered why medical personnel are required to respond or 
intervene if they suspect violence against children, but not if they suspect violence 
against a woman.  “Well, they say that a hospital is automatically supposed to call CPS 
[Child Protective Services] or whatever if they even suspect any type of abuse.  So why 
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shouldn‟t it be the same for an adult?  You know?  A woman‟s gonna go in there, and 
she‟s not just gonna sit in there right away and say, „oh yeah, you know, he beat me and 
I‟m here.  I need help.”  They suggested that ongoing training was necessary so that 
personnel would be primed to recognize the signs of abuse. “Not just sensitively training 
once a year.  Something that‟s continuous, that refreshes their mind, you know?  They get 
refreshers on what a drug user looks like or what an alcoholic looks like.  Why not 
domestic violence person?”  
Victims also agreed with police/probation officers and victim advocates in 
thinking the community could do more to prevent domestic violence by educating young 
people.  “I think the schools could do better too.  Teach how to treat women with respect.  
You hear on the news of some kid beat up somebody else or kids spanking other girls or 
whatever.  It sounds really stupid, but it‟s just the beginnings of crap.”  “And that‟s where 
they could actually make a difference and say, „That‟s not tolerated.‟ You know?  
„Nobody tolerates that.  You wouldn‟t like it if your dad went to work and did that to the 
secretary or something, would you?‟ And the kids‟ gonna say, „No, that would be weird.‟ 
Okay, then why are you doing it, you know?  I think that‟s a big opportunity there to 
prevent it before they get to be adults.”   
Finally, victims confirmed that often basic resources are what they need the most 
in order to keep moving forward and to keep safe. “I‟m a disabled person and I needed 
resources because I had no money.  I had no oil.  I had no heat.  I had no toilet paper, no 
food.  It was horrible.  So I needed resources.”   
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Like the police and probation officers, victims also mused about how additional 
community resources might benefit perpetrators.  An interesting dialogue emerged when 
one victim suggested that the community should offer treatment centers for perpetrators.  
“A treatment center for men that abuse women.  They need something like that because 
that way they‟re teaching them, hey, this is not okay behavior.”  Victims liked the idea of 
an intensive in-patient domestic violence abatement program so much that they suggested 
it might be useful as a way of interrupting the cycle of violence with future perpetrators.  
“Do they have camps or somewhere where the kids can go in the summertime?  Like 
church camps that are already there that the batterer can pay the fee for the kids to go 
there to learn to not be batterers?” 
Moving beyond the suggestions offered by officers and advocates, victims talked 
at length about engaging the workplace community and enlisting the media in the 
prevention and intervention of domestic violence. Victims suggested that training for 
employers might be helpful.  One victim talked about how she was essentially stalked at 
her place of work by family members of her abuser, but her employer felt powerless to 
intervene.  With better training, he or she might have known what steps or actions could 
have been taken to more appropriately protect his or her employee.  “The law says that as 
long as your abuser‟s family, friends or associates don‟t say anything to you, they can 
come and be by you.  ..I work in a grocery store.  I‟m a cashier.  His sister and his brother 
come and stand at the end of my check stand and just stand there and stare at me.  But 
because they don‟t say anything to me and it‟s public property.  But it states in the 
contact, „no contact‟ order, it states in my restraining order, no third party intimidation.  
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No thoughts of intimidation and all of that crap.  I‟m sorry, it‟s intimidating for me, you 
know, it‟s very hard to be efficient, friendly with your customers when you‟ve got 
somebody that you just want to strangle at the end of your check stand, and you want to 
turn around and go, „Fucking go to hell.‟  I tell my employer.  I tell security.  They can‟t 
do anything.  They cannot remove them because my restraining order is not on them.” 
 Victims speculated that better training for employers might not only help with 
screening for and subsequently protecting victims, but might also be highly effective as a 
prevention and intervention tool for perpetrators.  A lively discussion ensued in one 
group as one woman suggested that perpetrators would be significantly impacted if 
abusive behavior at home started to affect their professional life. “I think if they have an 
employer, I think their employer should get involved because that‟s going to hold them 
accountable.” A second woman added, “Oh yeah, because if that mess spills over onto 
their job, you better believe [it would make a difference].”  The other women in the group 
concurred and offered the following rapid-fire comments. “That‟s their livelihood.” “Yes, 
yes, I like that.” “Their job, their friends.” “Yes.”  “You better believe you‟ll see some 
changing then.”   
Victims were very excited by the idea of publicly labeling and perhaps 
humiliating their perpetrators, not only in their place of employment, but in social 
settings.  “Where they like to hang out at, hang up a picture that says, „batterer‟ 
underneath it.”  “Their churches, their spiritual worship, family, friends.”  Like victim 
advocates, victims felt that a batterer registry would be an effective way for the 
community to help prevent and intervene in domestic violence.  “Why can‟t we start 
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listing batterers like we do sex offenders?” “Register them in a national register.  This 
human male is a batterer.  This is what he did to so-and-so woman.  He is moving into 
your neighborhood.  Put them on the web site.” 
 Victims were greatly disturbed by the sheer abundance of violence against women 
depicted on television and once again engaged in a lively dialogue about not only the 
disturbing programming, but the lack of positive relationship role modeling, particularly 
for their children.  “Oh, God.  I think, if you watch any amount of TV, there‟s so much 
violence against women on television.  I mean, Law and Order SVU?  I can‟t watch that 
show because it‟s, it, and Criminal Minds?  Oh!  And it‟s always violence against 
women.  Seldom is it against men.  Sometimes it‟s against children.” “Just the thought of 
it gives me goose bumps.” “Right, I know.  You know?  I mean, for one thing, change the 
programming.  Get more programs that celebrate women, men and relationships as 
working well.” “Yeah.  I have boys at home, and I keep it on channel ten most of the time 
because there‟s too much violence on TV…” “Towards women.” “It‟s way too much.  
And it‟s like, why can‟t, now that needs to be regulated.  Those people should be called 
on the carpet or accounted for.” “Yeah.” “Why do you have all this violence against 
women?  „Oh, it‟s the ratings.‟  Well, gee, thanks.  You just gave another jerk an idea of 
how to hurt his, uh, supposed loved one.”   
 In sum, victims concurred with several of the suggestions offered by officers and 
advocates, specifically the need for greater screening and training for medical 
community, enhanced resources and services for victims and perpetrators, and increased 
prevention education in the schools.  Additionally, they highlighted the potential benefits 
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of actively engaging workplace communities to better protect victims and possibly hold 
perpetrators more accountable as well as enlisting the media in prevention and 
intervention efforts by reducing the amount of violence against women that is currently 
portrayed on television. 
Batterer Intervention Providers 
Echoing the potential opportunities described by officers, advocates and victims, 
batterer intervention providers identified the importance of the community‟s role in 
screening for domestic violence and the subsequent need for more preventative education 
and awareness building.   Providers also spent a great deal of time talking about what 
they, as providers, were doing to engage the community and how an engaged community 
might better hold perpetrators accountable for their abuse.  Providers then asserted that 
not only should the medical, employment and religious communities be educated so that 
they can better screen and intervene in domestic violence, but the community at large 
needs to be educated and enlisted.   
Providers were adamant that appealing to, and engaging, community leaders is 
essential, as they are frequently in a position to persuade victims and perpetrators to get 
the help they need.  “Getting people who have positions of authority outside of the 
domestic violence community, getting them to begin to come on board and call the men 
on things.  And they don‟t have to know it all and all the complexities, but at least have 
the basic knowledge and to know where to send them.”  Reaching leaders within 
religious communities was identified as particularly important.  “We‟re specifically 
trying to get into various church systems, religious communities and talk to people from 
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that perspective.  Let‟s talk about what‟s going on in your congregation that you‟re not 
looking at.  What are you saying to your women?  What are you saying to your men?  
Trying to invite leadership to education workshops.”   Providers suggested that these 
leaders are important not only because of the sheer number of people they can influence 
on a regular basis, but because their influence can be uniquely powerful, particularly in 
terms of holding perpetrators accountable for changing their abusive behaviors.  “They‟re 
also showing that pastors, when they mandate men to go into programs, that not only do 
the men go, but they complete, because they actually hold them in higher respect level 
than judges and probation.”  Providers talked about the success they‟ve experienced 
when they train religious leaders.  “It‟s a big deal to go in and do training for church 
leaders and have them afterwards come up and tell you, „Wow, I‟ve been doing a lot 
wrong, and I‟m going to change how I respond to this.‟”  The idea that some religious 
leaders might have been misguided in their advice did not surprise providers who 
lamented that frequently when people seek support or advice from their religious leaders 
about domestic violence, they do not get the appropriate assistance.  “Studies are showing 
that pastors are the number one place people go, and also number one least helpful.”  
Providers proposed that not just leaders, but really everyone, within the 
community can play a role in stopping domestic violence if s/he is made aware of abusive 
relationship dynamics and then chooses to hold perpetrators accountable and offer help to 
victims.  “To me the coordinated community response is this idea that every member of 
the community, and the various roles that they play, being aware of what it means to be 
domestically violent and doing what they can to hold those individuals who are doing it 
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accountable, and providing support for those who are being victimized.  So what am I 
doing in my line of employment?  What am I doing within my own family?  What am I 
doing within my neighborhood?”  Reflecting on the success of the Mother‟s Against 
Drunk Driving (M.A.D.D.) campaign, providers fantasized about how a similar effort 
with respect to domestic violence could be truly effective in better engaging the 
community.  “And I think drinking and driving is perhaps a nice illustration of a 
forerunner, where now I think you see a pretty decent coordinated community response 
around drunken driving.  It‟s friends talking to friends, it‟s talking within your parishes, 
it‟s employers, it‟s bartenders, it‟s cabbies.  And you see many different elements of the 
community all doing what they can to help intervene with drinking and driving compared 
to 30 years ago when almost nobody did.  And I think that‟s to me the broader concept of 
coordinated community response which would be necessary to really help stop domestic 
violence.” 
Like the police/probation officers, advocates, and victims, providers 
enthusiastically expressed that one critical role the community needs to fill with respect 
to intervening in domestic violence is to provide increased prevention education to young 
people through the school system.  “There could definitely be more done on the 
prevention side of things.  How we raise our children and what society looks like.  The 
social change piece often gets lost in the desire to address the immediate crises that are 
going on right now.  I think there‟s a lack of response to the prevention aspects.  Are we 
in the schools?  Are we talking about how people should treat each other?  Are we talking 
about gender-based violence?  Are we talking about the wider social concerns?  I think 
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there are some efforts to make that happen, but they‟re definitely overshadowed by the 
need for intervention and what we see are the results of the violence” Some of the 
providers tried to explain why the larger social concerns, as they relate to domestic 
violence, are left largely unaddressed within the schools.  “I see that there is an awareness 
of prevention and education and need for social change, but there is this huge resistance 
towards that that stops you at the door, especially the school system.  When I was 
wanting to do teen dating violence prevention in the school, it was so hard just to get into 
the school.  I had teachers and secretaries that were like, „oh, yes, this will be great,‟ and 
principals that were like, „back off‟ and superintendents were like, „no, no can‟t do it.‟”  
Other providers concurred.  The general sentiment was that there are only a handful of 
prevention programs currently operating.  “There are a few, and I mean a very few 
prevention programs trying to get into junior high and high schools and talk to kids about 
how they treat one another.  Not only date rape and stuff like that, but how do you treat 
one another with respect.  But there are very, very few.  Very, very rare.” 
Providers, like victims, were frustrated by the media and how domestic violence 
is depicted by the media.  Providers talked primarily about the lack of appropriate 
labeling of abusive behavior and the fact that the media is underutilized for public service 
announcements. “Looking at the media, there have been some really horrible articles 
lately.  There was a man who ran over his wife with a Lincoln Navigator and domestic 
violence was not mentioned one time in the article.  The way the media responded, „Well, 
I wonder what she could have done to make him so angry.‟ [We need to] really address 
those myths as they come up and make sure that our media are educated.”  Not only 
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would providers like to see more accurate reporting when domestic violence is involved, 
but they suggested ways in which the media could be utilized to inform the community 
about the plight of victims and the culpability of perpetrators.  One provider suggested 
that we need “DV public service announcements on every channel, every day.” Another 
talked about the potential of radio, “what a great venue to get the word about domestic 
violence out there in ways that haven‟t been heard.” Another made a tongue-in-cheek 
suggestion that what we need is a reality show featuring domestic violence.  “Considering 
how our society learns, what you probably need is a reality show put on by a producer 
who knows about domestic violence and where you‟re having that going on.”  
Apparently, there was a violent relationship inadvertently captured on The Amazing Race 
(Doganieri & van Munster, 2001) which got a lot of people talking about appropriate 
versus abusive behaviors within intimate partnerships.  Ultimately, providers mused 
about the need to find a way to talk to the community about domestic violence without 
alienating or discouraging them.  “It‟s finding a way to present the information, because 
domestic violence is so depressing.  [We need to] present it in a way that people won‟t 
just shut off.” 
 In summary, providers echoed comments made by other stakeholders regarding 
the importance of awareness building, screening, and preventative education.  They 
focused most intensely on the importance of engaging the religious community and 
utilizing the media to better educate community members so that they could be 
empowered to hold perpetrators accountable.  




 Perpetrators, not surprisingly, did not spend time talking about how the 
community could be more involved in screening for and interrupting their own abusive 
behaviors.  They did however, talk a little bit about what they needed from the 
community in terms of resources and they talked at length about missed opportunities for 
prevention through school and media based education.   
Perpetrators began their responses by stating what they would have liked to have 
received from the community.  “It would have been nice if I‟d got a little bit of 
tenderness from the community.  Because regardless of whether or not I create or do 
dastardly deeds, I‟m still a human being myself.  And the more that you stomp that 
human being out, the more that people want to trod it down and call you, call me a 
monster and make me feel bad, the more I‟m gonna want to hide behind anger and 
frustration.”  Perpetrators were not just looking for compassion and understanding to 
soothe them, but also opportunities; opportunities that they perceived would result from a 
more compassionate response from the community.  “How do we get the community to 
understand because I have a felony assault now on my record and trying to find a job, it‟s 
harder than hell to try and get a job now, you know?  Because I‟m a person-to-person 
crime.  How do you get the community to understand that, give this guy a chance.  Get 
him a job.  He‟s still got skills that he can give to this, to his community, to the world.”   
Perpetrators, like other stakeholders, mentioned religious organizations when I 
asked about the role of the community.  While their answers were abbreviated, (i.e., 
“Religion, Religion”) a couple of men offered more informative responses. One 
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gentleman suggested that it would have been nice if a religious batterer intervention 
program had been available to him. “I‟m a Christian and I would connect with a Christian 
setting to find peace in my heart versus sitting here and doing this and worrying about 
money.  A Christian atmosphere teaches peace and for someone who is a Christian, it 
takes the hatred and puts peace in your heart.  It really does.”  Another perpetrator 
suggested that religious marital counseling coinciding with batterer intervention program 
might be helpful.  “I think that maybe if you could get a church organization or some 
other organization, you could get some kind of family marriage counseling going on the 
side, that maybe might not suck so much money out of your pocket that could go hand-
in-hand with this.” 
 The idea of having the community offer premarital or marital counseling was 
widely endorsed by perpetrators.  They suggested that with the right information up-front 
or during their relationship, they might have been able to avoid their abusive behavior.  
One man proposed mandatory premarital counseling. “Okay, you want to get married?  
You gotta have one month [of] marriage counseling to see if you guys are gonna make it 
after the sex is over, what‟s gonna be left?  We got to go to a marriage counselor and see 
if you two are going to be compatible down the road.”  Others agreed that providing 
marital or relationship counseling would help, but most felt that the education would have 
been most useful if it had been available to them as youth.  “Education is great, but it 
would have been nice if I‟d have had it in school right along with sex education.”   
Perpetrators quickly jumped on the idea of providing information about healthy 
relationships and abusive behavior in school and a lively interaction ensued.  “You got 
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sex ed in school, why not have some kind of domestic violence seminars in school?”  
Perpetrators went on to suggest that abusive behavior and violence stem in part from 
confusion about how one should behave in relationships, confusion that could be 
ameliorated by preventative education courses in school.  “Maybe somewhere on the 
elementary school level there needs to be some kind of coursework within the health 
classes that touches specifically on male/female expectations.  There needs to be more 
structured education in terms of what‟s acceptable and what‟s not in terms of a 
relationship.  What couples are expected to be like to each other, because on the one hand 
it‟s getting a lot more violent out there, but on the other hand, I also feel like it‟s a lot 
more touchy feeling [sic] than it used to be.”  Perpetrators suggested that while it might 
be possible to learn this type of information from their parents, it would have more 
impact if it came from a paid educator.  “You know mom and dad can talk sex-ed, too, 
but it doesn‟t really hit home to a kid, I don‟t think, until he actually sits in a group 
classroom with somebody that‟s getting paid to tell him, „this is the birds, the bees‟ or 
„this is the rights and the wrongs,‟ or this is, you know?  So I‟m not talking 48 weeks, but 
how long is sex-ed class?  A month?  Three weeks, whatever?  Two weeks?”   
There seemed to be quite a bit of agreement among perpetrators that kids should 
receive ongoing information starting at a young age so that they would be prepared when 
they started to date in high school. “We can have our kids, our young kids, start to go 
through and learn a little bit as they‟re getting, getting up through their adolescence so 
that when they do go out to go and turn around and maybe date in their high school years 
or, you know, whatever, go out on the dating scene. They, they understand how to 
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consider other people‟s feelings.”  Without this kind of information or education in 
school, perpetrators felt that youth would simply learn by trial and error. “They go out 
and they learn on their own, and they learn by their mistakes.” Several suggested that this 
is somewhat akin to what happened to them.  They engaged in abusive behavior because 
they did not know it was abusive, they did not know what constituted domestic violence.  
“Like you said, you didn‟t know that yelling was domestic violence.  A kid‟s not gonna 
know that yelling is domestic violence unless somebody sits there and tells him 
beforehand that, you know, you can get a charge from the cops, I mean, this is the letter 
of the law.  We can send you to classes for 48 weeks, you know, and if you‟re telling 
your kid in school, somebody‟s getting paid, has seen it on the other side saying, you 
know, „you yell at them, you move them two inches, it‟s kidnapping. You do this, you do 
this.  These are all charges that they will make stick.‟  You know? It‟s called don‟t have 
sex, unprotected sex because you can get AIDS.  That‟s fear, you know?  They‟re putting 
the fear of AIDS into a kid.  Put the fear of going to jail into a kid.  Do not yell at 
somebody because it‟s domestic violence.  You wouldn‟t want them yelling at you?  
Don‟t yell at them.  You can go to jail.  If the cops are called, and you‟re yelling, you‟re 
gonna go to jail.  It‟s gonna stick.” 
 Perpetrators were equally animated when they discussed the impact that the media 
could have in preventing and intervening in domestic violence.  “Fix it for the 
generations coming, the „just say no to drugs‟, and „the more you know stuff‟ on TV.  
That‟s the same type of thing that could help so that people are more socialized to have 
fair fighting rules, and I, that‟s, that‟s the wrong term because when you are in a 
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relationship, it‟s not supposed to be fighting.”  It was particularly interesting to hear that 
they felt the media would have been an effective tool because it comes directly into their 
homes, into their living rooms. “Well, in my case, if I‟d have known that what I was 
doing was domestic violence, I might not have done it.  So let‟s say I watched some 
commercials.  They throw commercials at you, buy everything in the frickin‟ world.  
How about we have a commercial where the guy‟s yelling and then a public service 
message comes underneath?  We know we need help, but we‟re not going to seek it.  
Therefore, it is coming to me.  It‟s being brought into my house in front of my face and 
now I can see it.  Public service message and domestic violence and different styles.   
Domestic violence isn‟t just physical.”  Others agreed and suggested that it would have 
been particularly helpful for them if they had seen commercials that more accurately 
depicted their abusive behavior, most of which was non-physical. “Yeah, because they 
used to have those commercials where the woman was all beat up and black and blue.  
We‟ll I‟m not here for beating up my wife black, so when I see that commercial, I was 
like man that guy needs some help.  He needs some help and I never realized that I need 
help.  I need help for yelling.” Perpetrators felt that these commercials or PSAs would be 
effective if aired during shows traditionally viewed by men, “like in the middle of a 
football game, some public service messages.” Another perpetrator suggested the use of 
pop-ups on the internet to capture people‟s attention. “Pop ups on the internet, I‟m sure 
everybody‟ll know about it then.” 
In summary, perpetrators, like other stakeholders, felt that raising community 
awareness would be extremely helpful in the prevention and intervention of domestic 
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violence, primarily because it might have taught them how to act in their relationships 
and also helped them recognize that they had a problem sooner.  Concurring with 
sentiments expressed by all of the other stakeholder groups, perpetrators felt this type of 
awareness building was particularly essential for young people in school.  Finally, in 
some sense echoing the need for greater services/resources identified by police and 
probation officers, perpetrators were interested in receiving more compassion from the 
community at large, particularly with respect to extending job opportunities to men who 
have been convicted of person to person felonies.   
Summary Research Question Five 
In general, stakeholders‟ responses to the role of the community in domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men were more similar than different.  Officers, 
advocates, victims and providers pointed to the need for enhanced training and screening 
efforts within religious organizations, the health care system and the community at large 
and every stakeholder group pointed to the enormous untapped opportunity within the 
school system to provide primary preventative education.  Additionally, most 
stakeholders also felt that the media was a largely untapped market for PSAs targeted at 
raising awareness and identifying abusive behavior.  Advocates and providers 
specifically referenced the success of the M.A.D.D. campaign against drunk driving as a 
useful model for what is needed on a community level to galvanize citizens in the 
prevention and intervention of domestic violence.  Victims and providers were also 
interested in seeing more accurate media coverage of domestic violence cases and fewer 
glorified incidents of violence against women.  A number of creative suggestions for 
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enhancing the community‟s role in domestic violence intervention were articulated -- 
neighborhood policing, free youth drop-in programs, enlisting men and former 
perpetrators to help shift community attitudes regarding women, in-patient treatment for 
perpetrators, on-line registry for perpetrators, requiring perpetrators to pay for their 
children to attend special summer camps where they can heal and hopefully break the 
cycle of violence, engaging workplaces to better protect victims and hold men more 
accountable for their abusive behavior, and finally mandatory pre-marital counseling.   
Negative Case Analysis 
In order to enhance trustworthiness in the findings, I concluded my investigation 
by conducting a negative case analysis.  A negative case analysis involves searching for 
and then discussing comments or ideas within the data that contradict or differ from 
generalized patterns.  It is an important step in building confidence in the integrity of the 
findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Patton, 1990).  I began by scouring each focus group 
transcript for comments that stood in opposition to the summaries I had created.  I 
specifically looked for comments that disagreed or differed from the rest of the group and 
which I had not already discussed or described within my findings.  When I found such a 
comment, I typed it up and then grouped it by stakeholder.  What follows are the results 
of this process.  My intention is not to demonstrate how these comments diminish the 
previous findings, but merely to accurately document the range of opinions that were 
shared, thereby illuminating the boundaries or limits of the phenomenon.  The fact that 
only a handful of divergent comments emerged lends support to the appropriateness of 
my analysis.   
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Police and Probation Officers  
Within the police and probation officer focus groups, there were three outlying 
comments not otherwise incorporated within my report.  One involved a positive 
comment about batterer intervention treatment programs working. “I think it does work, 
eventually.  I mean, sometimes people have to hear stuff more than one time, but I think 
it does work”.  Another involved an officer who suggested that the CCR  in Multnomah 
County was working better than if there was no collaboration, “at least we know who to 
call and, we know who we‟re talking to and pretty much what their response is going to 
be.”  Finally, in contrast to the many comments made about the fact that scarce financial 
resources impact men‟s ability to attend treatment,  one officer shared a story about a 
client of hers who sleeps under a tarp by the train tracks and collects bottles every day in 
order to afford his treatment.   
Victim Advocates 
For the most part victim advocates were unenthusiastic about the success of the 
CCR; however there were a couple of comments that suggested that some advocates felt 
positive about the collaboration, particularly in Multnomah county.  “In Multnomah 
County, there‟s a pretty strong relationship, at least with the DV probation officers and at 
least our agency… which I think is really important for survivors and batterers too.”  
Another advocate agreed, “I think it‟s good, especially in Multnomah County.  They have 
a good response.”  There were no other outlying comments found in the victim advocacy 
groups.  This truncated range may be a result of the smaller sample size (9 total 
participants).   




 The only significant outlying comments in the victim focus groups involved two 
women who reported that the criminal justice system had served them well.  In response 
to a direct question from me about whether or not “anyone in the room had had a positive 
experience where police or arrest or batterer‟s intervention actually did make a difference 
and create greater safety for you and maybe made a change for your perpetrator?” two 
women spoke up.  The first talked about how her father pulled his life together after 
losing his family, getting divorced, moving out of state and attending classes.  “My, 
father, my parents were together for 21 years before they got divorced.  My mom finally 
got fed up with it.  Even though he went to anger management, went to batterer‟s 
intervention and my mom even paid for it, like, hopefully it will work.  But, at first it 
didn‟t start working because he really didn‟t care until he lost his family.  My mom got a 
divorce from him and then he started really working with it, working with it even though 
they were not getting back together.  And it worked for him after that.”  Another woman 
chimed in and said, “Yeah.  I had one too.  Since the night that the call came in about a 
year and a half ago, I‟ve been through a lot, but they have changed my life.  The police, 
the state.  I‟ve been safe for a year and a half.  He‟s gone and I have my kids and I‟m 
clean and sober.  So I believe it works.”   
Batterer Intervention Providers 
A couple of providers took issue with the idea that the relatively high recidivism 
rates following batterer intervention suggest that the programs are not working.   Instead, 
they reasoned that the programs are at least as effective as other similar programs for 
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drugs and alcohol, sex abuse, etc. and that perhaps it takes several therapeutic attempts 
before lasting attitudinal and behavioral changes can be achieved.  These comments are 
not exactly outliers in that comments specifically contradicting this sentiment did not 
exist, but they were unique in that most stakeholders were content to buy into the context 
of my study (i.e., that domestic violence intervention strategies are limited in some 
ways).   “I think the assumption that batterer‟s intervention, that the recidivism rate is 
terrible or something like that needs to be put in perspective with other forms of 
treatment, whether it‟s alcohol and drug.  What I‟ve heard is that people make several 
attempts to stop drinking or using drugs before they finally make a successful long lasting 
attempt to stop using, you know?  And if you look at people‟s follow through, you know, 
people go to the doctor for diabetes treatment, the doctor tells them what to do.  And a 
large percentage of people don‟t follow doctor‟s orders and you know die from diabetes 
or have heart problems.  So, our success rate may not be any worse than other forms of 
public health intervention that we do in our culture.”   
Perpetrators 
There were several outliers in the perpetrator focus groups, principally involving 
perpetrators not agreeing with their cohorts that the criminal justice system, batterer 
intervention programs and facilitators do not help them and there was one perpetrator 
who consistently called the other group members on their victim blaming.  Contrasting 
the general sentiment about the police as angry, unhelpful and “out to get them”, one 
gentleman commented that the police will treat you the way that you treat them.  A 
handful of perpetrators discussed the ways in which the criminal justice system helped 
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them. “In my case in particular, I think it was a good thing that it happened.  It sucks that 
it‟s lasted this long, but I‟ll get through it.  You know?  And now I‟m a better person after 
the fact.”  Another offered, “I feel the same way because there was things [sic] that I 
didn‟t realize about myself… so it‟s helped me see the things that I need to change in my 
life, you know.”  Finally, a third gentleman disagreed that the district attorney makes up 
charges during arraignment. “That‟s a crock, man.  „Cause I never been charged with 
nothing I didn‟t do.”  One man consistently challenged his fellow group members when 
they tried to shift the focus to the “bad” behavior of their victims.  “I would have to 
disagree with you…  It just shows how far along in your program that you are [because] 
of the answers that you just gave because we‟re here to focus on us, not on anybody 
else‟s part in what happens to them.”  I have to note that in my opinion, the gentleman 
who made these corrective comments was enjoying the power his “knowledge” and 
“understanding of the material” gave him in the group.  In other words, his comments did 
not seem completely other-serving.  Interestingly, of the five stakeholder populations, the 
greatest range or diversity was expressed within the perpetrator groups.  This may be a 
reflection of the fact that the men had been attending their respective batterer intervention 
programs for varying lengths of time and subsequently might have been at different 
stages of denial and acceptance with respect to their abusive behavior and the benefits of 
intervention.  In other words, it may be that men who had been in the program longer 
were less resentful of the intervention and the groups and more capable of acknowledging 
the ways in which it was serving them.   




The fact that these “outlier” comments were expressed provides some reassurance 
that the participants in the focus group discussions felt safe enough to disagree.  It is 
noteworthy that most of the outlying comments refer to the ways in which the system is 
working.  Given that the project focused specifically on identifying limitations to the 
systems‟ effectiveness and that participants were prompted by my questions to identify 
the shortfalls of current strategies, it is not surprising that there were few comments 
offered in support of the success of domestic violence intervention with abusive men.  In 
fact, many of the comments reported in the negative case analysis were made in response 
to direct questions not on the discussion guide soliciting positive support for the efficacy 
of intervention.  In the victim and perpetrator groups in particular, the sentiment of 
despair was so intense that as an applied researcher I felt compelled to shift the tone of 
the discussion before concluding.  I was concerned about the negative impact of the 
evaluation if we only talked about the failings of the intervention.  The fact that when 
requested supportive comments were offered is heartening and suggests that participants 
may have been able to provide examples of how domestic violence intervention strategies 
with abusive men are working successfully if they had been systematically asked to do 
so. 
Advisory Group Response to My Initial Findings 
 On May 8, 2009 I met with four members of my advisory group and my 
dissertation chair to discuss and review my initial observations and preliminary findings.  
In advance of the meeting I shared a copy of my summary statements for each research 
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question by stakeholder group.  I also shared a copy of the direct quotes and paraphrases 
that I initially culled and typed up when preparing each summary statement.  The meeting 
lasted for close to two hours and was tremendously reassuring.  The assembled group 
members were energized by my initial findings and expressed excitement and 
anticipation about reading my final results.  They informed me that my findings resonated 
with their own observations, insights, and experiences within the field.  It is particularly 
noteworthy that during the course of the meeting the representatives present (one from 
probation, two from the victim advocacy community and one from batterer intervention) 
reenacted many of the agreements and tensions that I observed during the focus groups, 
lending additional credibility and validity to the material upon which I have drawn.   
Applying a System’s Lens to Synthesize the Findings 
In order to synthesize the vast amount of material collected, I enlisted a systems 
approach to identify the key elements or subunits that according to stakeholders are 
working together to manifest the quality, “limited domestic violence intervention 
effectiveness” within the Portland Tri-County area (Lendaris, 1986).   More specifically, 
I invoked Linstone‟s (1999) technical, organizational and personal perspectives to assess 
the material.  Engaging multiple perspectives to create a final framework is 
recommended from a system‟s approach, as one viewpoint is rarely considered sufficient 
when assessing complex socio-technical systems.  As described earlier, once the 
stakeholders by research question summary statements were finished, I created a TOP by 
research question matrix (see Appendix L).  To do so, I focused on stakeholder responses 
that pointed to concrete, tangible or quantifiable limitations of domestic violence 
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intervention with abusive men when invoking the technical perspective (T).   I attended 
to processes, power dynamics, value struggles, and cultural differences when invoking 
the organizational perspective (O), and I attended to responses that focused on the mental 
processes of individuals, intuition, and feeling, when invoking the personal perspective 
(P).  In order to further synthesize the material I then condensed the presentation by 
collapsing ideas from across the five research questions and created a new table (See 
Table 1).  In other words, I grouped together all of the technical factors impacting 
successful intervention, all of the organizational factors, and all the personal feelings and 
thoughts.  This table includes twenty-seven ideas that according to key stakeholders in 
the Portland Tri-County area contribute to limited effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention with abusive men.  





Limitations of current domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men viewed 
through a technical, organizational and personal lens (Linstone, 1999). 
 
Technical Lens Organizational Lens Personal Lens 
 
1) Insufficient or 
inappropriate arrests 
2) Short prison 
sentences 
3) Insufficient resources 
to respond 
appropriately and 
prosecute every case 
4) Insufficient resources 
to  monitor 
probationers 
5) Ineffective and 
potentially harmful 
BIP 
6) Insufficient resources 
to train CCR 
members about DV 
dynamics and victim 
blaming 
7) Insufficient resources 
to provide for victim 
and perpetrator needs 
(housing, child care) 
8) Insufficient attention 
directed at 
prevention  
9) Insufficient time and 
resources to change 




1) Stakeholders are 
conflicted and at odds 





2) Stakeholders are 
frustrated and unsure 
about the costs and 
benefits of a “One size 
fits all” approach to 
perpetrators 
3) The absence of victim-
centered approach, 
coupled with rampant 
victim blaming 
exacerbates tension 
between stakeholders  
4) The “invisibility” of 
perpetrators (e.g., no 
one knows what to do 
with them) contributes 
to victim blaming and 
isolates providers from 
other stakeholders 
5) Teamwork within the 
CCR significantly 




6) Lack of respect and 
trust among 
stakeholders makes 
information sharing  
difficult. 
 
1) Victims - The system 
doesn‟t prioritize their 
safety.  They are 
abused by police and 
ignored by DAs, 
probation officers, etc. 
2) Victims - Frustrated 
that current 
intervention strategies 
often make situation 
worse – arrest, 
probation and BIP can 
increase rather than 
decrease abusive 
behavior.  
3) Victims - Extremely 
frustrated by the 
amount of 
responsibility placed 
on them by the CCR 
for the abuse they 
endure and for fixing 
it. 
4) Perpetrators - System 
is too involved in their 
lives, disempowering 
them and their victims. 
5) Perpetrators - DV is 
transactional and yet 
intervention focuses 
solely on them. 
6) Perpetrators – 
Disconnected from the 
idea of DV as pre-
mediated and 
controlled because they  
experience themselves 
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7) Stakeholders hold 
different values and 
long term goals with 
respect to perpetrators, 
victims and families, 
straining collaboration 
8) There is wide 
variability in the 
system response due to 
human variance 
9) An over emphasis on 
physical DV and the 
CJS leads contributes 









7) Perpetrators - 
Intervention makes 
things worse as they 
are more angry and 
frustrated and feel 
more powerless which 
leads to greater levels 
of domestic violence. 
8) Perpetrators – 
Frustrated by high 
costs of BIP.  The 
financial strain 
interferes with their 
success. 
9) Stakeholders feel 
dismissed, disrespected 
and sometimes 
betrayed by other 
stakeholders in the 
CCR. 
 
Technical Lens Organizational Lens Personal Lens 
 
Technical 
Viewed through a technical lens, nine primary concerns or limitations surfaced.  
Insufficient or inappropriate arrests, short prison sentences, inadequate prosecution, 
insufficient monitoring of probationers, ineffective batterer intervention programs, 
insufficient training for CCR members about domestic violence dynamics, insufficient 
resources to provide for victim and perpetrator needs (e.g., housing and child care), 
insufficient attention directed at prevention, and insufficient time and resources devoted 
to changing social attitudes and values were all identified as barriers to optimal domestic 
violence intervention with abusive men. 




Viewed through an organizational lens, nine limitations impacting current 
domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men surfaced.  Stakeholders are 
conflicted and at odds over how to balance punishment and rehabilitation.  They are 
frustrated and unsure about the costs and benefits of a “one size fits all” approach to 
perpetrators.  They are alarmed by the pervasiveness of victim blaming and the absence 
of a victim-centered approach.  They noted that the “invisibility” of perpetrators (e.g., no 
one knows what to do with them) contributes to victim blaming and isolates batterer 
intervention providers from other stakeholders.  They acknowledged that teamwork 
within the CCR is significantly impeded by different professional standpoints and 
cultures, different long term goals with respect to clients, lack of respect and trust among 
stakeholders making information sharing difficult, and inconsistencies in the system 
response due to human variance.  Finally, an over-emphasis on physical domestic 
violence and the criminal justice system contributes to the marginalization of other 
community resources (e.g., mental health, religious institutions). 
Personal 
Viewed through a personal lens, nine different limitations with current domestic 
violence intervention strategies surfaced, most of which reflect the thoughts, feelings, and 
experiences of victims or perpetrators.  Given that they are the intended beneficiaries and 
targets of the intervention, their perspectives are especially important to capture with this 
lens.  Victims/survivors articulated three primary concerns.  They feel as though the 
system does not prioritize their safety because they are abused or abandoned by police 
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and ignored by DAs and probation officers.  They are frustrated that current intervention 
strategies often make their situation worse; arrest, probation and BIP can increase rather 
than decrease abusive behavior.  Finally, victims/survivors were extremely disturbed by 
the amount of responsibility placed on them by the CCR for the abuse they have endured 
and for doing something to stop it.  Perpetrators articulated five distinct concerns.  They 
feel as though the system is too involved in their lives, disempowering them and their 
victims.  They believe that domestic violence is transactional and are frustrated that the 
intervention appears to focus solely on them. They feel disconnected from the theory that 
domestic violence is pre-mediated and controlled because they experience themselves as 
being “out-of-control” when they are abusive.  They also suggested that current 
intervention strategies can make things worse because they feel angrier and more 
powerless than before the intervention.  Finally, perpetrators expressed a great deal of 
frustration over the high costs of batterer intervention programs, suggesting that the 
financial strain they experience interferes with their success in the programs.  Officers, 
advocates, and providers all shared one additional personal perspective limitation.  They 
reported feeling dismissed, disrespected and to some extent betrayed by other 
stakeholders in the CCR.   
Seven interacting features of current domestic violence intervention strategies that 
interact to produce limited effectiveness of the system 
Synthesizing and condensing the material into twenty-seven technical, 
organizational, and personal limitations allowed me better to scan the findings in search 
of overarching or summarizing themes.  Seven primary or dominant themes emerged. 
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These seven interrelated challenges to the system‟s effectiveness encapsulate the 
previously described twenty-seven limitations as well as the extensive findings reported 
earlier.   
According to key stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County area, it appears as 
though seven interacting features may limit the effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention strategies with abusive men.  Those seven subunits are: 1) attempting to 
simultaneously punish and rehabilitate perpetrators, 2) dominance of a “one size fits all” 
approach, 3) insufficient accountability within the system for abusive men, 4) rampant 
victim blaming, 5) barriers to effective collaboration, 6) confusion created by complex 
domestic violence dynamics, and 7) reactivity instead of activism and prevention (see 
Figure 5). 





Lendaris‟ (1986) definition of a system applied to the study findings.   
 
 Environment = Domestic Violence Movement 
(Goal of eliminating violence against women) 
System (A level) = Domestic Violence Intervention 
Attribute: Limited effectiveness 
Subunits (B Level) = Units that operate together 
to manifest the limited effectiveness of  
domestic violence intervention 
Attempting to simultaneously 
punish and rehabilitate 
Confusion created by  
complex DV dynamics 
Reactivity instead of proactivity 
Barriers to Collaboration 
Victim blaming 
Insufficient accountability  
“One Size Fits All” 
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Attempting to simultaneously punish and rehabilitate perpetrators.  Stakeholders 
expressed concern about how best to integrate the goals of punishment and rehabilitation 
with domestically abusive men.  In particular, they mused about the efficacy of utilizing 
punishment to rehabilitate men, the negative impact men‟s resistance or resentment to 
punishment has on the efficacy of treatment, and finally the difficulties stakeholders 
encounter when they try to perform both functions simultaneously.   
Police and probation officers articulated that punishment, particularly 
incarceration, does not equate to rehabilitation, especially since most men become more 
violent, as opposed to less violent, when they spend time in prison.  Batterer intervention 
providers agreed and suggested that while punishment might lead to short term change, 
sustained or meaningful change (i.e., rehabilitation) requires therapy.  Advocates and 
victims were similarly skeptical about the rehabilitative potential of criminal justice 
sanctions and postulated that when abusive men are placed in groups of other similarly 
minded men, whether in prison or in batterer intervention programs, they are not likely to 
change their destructive attitudes and beliefs about women.  Most of the perpetrators I 
interviewed confirmed these suspicions and explained that for them, arrest, conviction, 
probation, incarceration and batterer intervention programs serve as a form of 
punishment, not rehabilitation.   
Despite their ambivalence about the effectiveness of punishment in the service of 
rehabilitating abusive men, victims/survivors and victim advocates were almost 
unanimously in favor of intensifying punishment for perpetrators, whether through the 
use of the criminal justice system (i.e., more arrests, prosecutions and incarcerations) or 
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through the use of community sanctions (e.g., embarrassing them at their place of work 
or recreation). It is a bit unclear whether they were lobbying for intensifying criminal 
justice sanctions because they believe more punishment is a positive outcome in its own 
right, or because they believe that punishment, if applied more ardently, might 
rehabilitate perpetrators.    
Each stakeholder group expressed concern about the impact of punishment on the 
efficacy of treatment.  Batterer intervention providers and perpetrators were especially 
clear about the challenges presented when men are coerced by the criminal justice system 
to participate in treatment, though all stakeholder groups including victims/survivors and 
advocates acknowledged that in general perpetrators are extremely resentful about being 
forced to attend treatment and that this resentment interferes with the effectiveness of the 
programs.  Victims/survivors and advocates specifically detailed how this resentment can 
translate into abuse when perpetrators return home from group angry about being forced 
to attend and take their frustrations out on their intimate partners.  This dynamic was in 
some ways confirmed by perpetrators who noted with irony the fact that the groups often 
make them angrier.   
The abusive men I interviewed repeatedly conveyed a sense of victimization at 
the hands of an unjust legal system.  Even those few men who openly acknowledged that 
they had committed a crime, felt as though their sanctions or sentences were 
inappropriately excessive.  When a couple of perpetrators disagreed and insisted that they 
would neither have stopped their abusive behavior nor had the skills and knowledge to 
change if they had not been “forced” to participate in treatment, these men were 
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challenged by their fellow participants in the focus group.  In the midst of one of these 
disagreement about the costs and benefits of being mandated to treatment, one man tried 
to distinguish between being encouraged to attend and being forced to attend.  “Pushed 
on you is one thing, but being forced on you, jammed down your throat is another.”  The 
image created by this statement, the image of having something “jammed down your 
throat” represents the sense of victimization that most of the perpetrators expressed with 
respect to the domestic violence intervention system.   
Not only did stakeholders worry that blending these two orientations (i.e., 
punishment and rehabilitation) might be ineffective for perpetrators, but probation 
officers and providers acknowledged that it was sometimes difficult for them to perform 
both functions simultaneously.  Officers noted that it is challenging to draw upon more 
“social worky” skills to encourage their clients to embrace their treatment when most of 
their job involves utilizing the threat of punishment to coerce men into adhering to their 
probation requirements.  Providers similarly discussed the negative impact blending these 
two orientations can have on their ability to establish a productive therapeutic 
relationship with their clients.  The “punishment” discourse dominating current domestic 
violence intervention strategies goes hand in hand with a vilification of perpetrators, 
which according to batterer intervention providers negatively impacts treatment, 
particularly when it comes to feeling good about the work they do and establishing a 
positive therapeutic alliance with their clients.  One provider talked about how her role in 
the CCR would seem pointless if she did not believe that abusive men could change.  The 
group then discussed how difficult it can be to maintain this hope in the face of 
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stakeholders (including other providers) who are primarily interested in “punishing” 
abusive men.  It is noteworthy that perpetrators‟ comments suggest that they are in fact 
sensitive to whether or not their program facilitator views them as redeemable and that 
when their facilitator holds out hope for their ability to change, they, too, believe it is 
possible and are more inclined to do the work. 
Dominance of a “One size fits all” approach.  Paralleling stakeholders‟ concerns, 
regarding how to balance punishment and rehabilitation when responding to abusive men, 
were their concerns about the “one size fits all” approach.  Most stakeholders were quick 
to acknowledge that each perpetrator has a unique history as well as a unique familial, 
social, and societal context and that the same response might not be effective for each 
man who wields abuse.  If sanctions and treatment were more specifically tailored to the 
individuals and crimes involved, victims might feel as though their unique plights were 
better taken into consideration and perpetrators might be more willing to embrace the 
consequences of their actions.  As it stands now perpetrators are in some ways invisible 
within the system, disregarded as unique individuals within unique contexts, and are 
instead reduced to their crimes.   
Police and probation officers, as well as perpetrators, were clear that each victim 
and each perpetrator possesses unique characteristics and is embedded in unique 
circumstances.  They went on to suggest that if these differences are overlooked or 
ignored, not only is the response less effective, but it might actually be harmful.  For 
example, victims suffer when they are inappropriately arrested for defending themselves 
against their primary aggressor (as a result of mandatory arrest policies) or when their 
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abuser is arrested, prosecuted, mandated to attend batterer intervention programs, or 
issued a “no contact” order regardless of their wishes or needs.  According to the 
testimony provided by perpetrators, it appears as though victims and the community at 
large also suffer when abusive men are able to point to the lack of specificity in sanctions 
or treatment and use that as a reason to not acknowledge their offenses.  For example, 
perpetrators were enraged to report that in their opinion they are all treated as though they 
are “real” abusers, when in fact they only yelled at their partner or “moved her two inches 
against her will”, a crime yes, but not on par with someone who regularly beats his wife.   
According to stakeholders, the inadequacies of a “one size fits all” approach are 
particularly evident when considering the needs of men who are traditionally 
marginalized within U.S. mainstream culture, such as men of color or men living in 
poverty.  Current strategies almost exclusively rely on the criminal justice system, an 
institution that continues to treat minority men disparagingly.  As one provider explained, 
“I think we probably would all agree that our criminal justice system is quite bigoted.  
It‟s classist, it‟s racist, it‟s sexist, you know?  And so when you rely on it, you pull more 
strongly for targeting more people of color.  You‟re targeting the working class folk.  So I 
think one critique is that we are disproportionately targeting people who are already 
being oppressed in other ways.”   
According to advocates and victims/survivors, the dominant “one size fits all” 
approach to domestic violence intervention not only fails to adequately respond to the 
diverse needs of perpetrators, but to victims as well, who either because of their 
marginalized status or their desire to preserve their relationship find themselves choosing 
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to circumvent the criminal justice system.  Advocates were clear that women of color are 
often less comfortable contacting the police, given their awareness of what it means to 
involve the CJS in their lives or the lives of minority men.  Additionally, advocates were 
clear that the current system is not set up to extract or accommodate the preferences of 
victims.  Knowing that once a victim contacts the police she is essentially turning control 
over her life to the criminal justice is enough to dissuade some victims from enlisting 
support.   
Insufficient accountability within the system for abusive men.  Almost 
unanimously, stakeholders expressed disappointment in the degree of accountability that 
perpetrators of domestic violence face with current strategies (Perpetrators were the only 
ones who did not attribute limited effectiveness of domestic violence intervention to 
insufficient accountability.).  According to officers, advocates, victims and providers, 
abusive men are not being appropriately arrested when victims call the police for help, 
and when they are arrested they are being incarcerated for extremely short periods of 
time.  These truncated prison stays greatly endanger victims when perpetrators return 
home and retaliate against them.  Additionally, according to stakeholders, they send a 
disturbing message to victims, perpetrators, and the community at large about the 
“wrongness” of domestic violence.   
Victims/survivors also noted that it takes an incredibly long time for their cases to 
be processed and they are frequently confused and alienated by the actions of the district 
attorney‟s office.  They are rarely consulted regarding the charges brought against their 
abusers, and are frequently left bewildered when charges do not seem consistent with the 
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crimes committed.   Even perpetrators reported being confused by the fact that they 
frequently found themselves facing charges that did not resemble their crimes.  
Advocates explained that in an effort to secure more convictions through plea bargaining, 
district attorney‟s offices often manipulate the charges, sometimes choosing to pursue 
offenses not related to domestic violence.   
According to stakeholders in the Portland Tri-county area, the outcome, once a 
conviction is secured, is not especially encouraging.  Due to insufficient funds, probation 
departments find themselves completely unable to adequately supervise their clients, 
resorting to “bench probation” for most perpetrators.  Unless these men commit 
additional crimes and get arrested for them, they are not monitored.   
Lastly, batterer intervention providers expressed frustration over the disconnect 
that exists between their programs and the rest of the accountability system.  Providers 
shared that they struggle to enlist the support of probation officers to mandate attendance 
and lamented the fact that they do not receive vital information from victims that could 
confirm or dispel evidence of men‟s change or improvement.   
Rampant victim blaming.  Stakeholders within the Portland Tri-County CCR 
reported a disturbing level of victim blaming.  Officers, advocates, victims/survivors and 
providers talked freely about the fact that many stakeholders blame women for the abuse 
they experience and hold them primarily responsible for stopping it, either by leaving, 
pressing charges, or participating in prosecutions.  According to stakeholders, not only do 
victim blaming statements and attitudes limit the effectiveness of current intervention 
strategies by contributing to poor decision-making with regard to perpetrator and victim 
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accountability, but sadly when victims reach out for help and are met with insensitive and 
blaming comments, they are far less likely to reach out again.   
It was evident that victims/survivors in this study felt completely abandoned by 
the criminal justice system – ignored and blamed by police, district attorneys, and 
probation officers.  Advocates and victims/survivors recounted multiple examples of 
victim blaming statements made by police officers, DHS workers, and probation officers, 
including some that went so far as to  suggest that victims enjoy and directly instigate the 
abuse.  Officers agreed, and reported being discouraged by the fact that despite training, 
their colleagues often operate within a victim blaming paradigm, particularly when 
children are involved.   
Disturbingly, this rampant victim blaming persists side by side with insufficient 
resources.  Advocates repeatedly noted that the critical services, such as housing, child 
care, employment, health care, that might enable victims to make safer choices for 
themselves and their children are not readily available.  So at the same time that victims 
are denied access to these vital services, services which are often being provided by their 
abusive partner, they are blamed for the fact that they have not done more to leave the 
relationship.  
It was interesting that police and probation officers, victim advocates, and 
providers all expressed a sense of hopelessness about changing perpetrators, and instead 
indicated that they would prefer to expend energy helping victims.  I believe that this 
“invisibility of perpetrators” within the system translates into victim blaming because it 
ultimately places responsibility for ending the abuse on victims.   
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Barriers to effective collaboration. Police and probation officers, victim 
advocates and providers were quick to acknowledge that one of the ways that current 
intervention strategies are limited is their failure to achieve the intended coordination of 
services for victims or perpetrators designated by the Duluth Model.  Stakeholders 
identified several distinct barriers to optimal functioning including: the impact of value 
differences on trust and information sharing, a lack of professional courtesy and respect, 
and the variability among the actual individuals who represent collaborating partners.   
Stakeholders pointed out that it is challenging to fully partner when collaborating 
agencies approach domestic violence from such different perspectives and hold vastly 
different goals and attitudes (i.e., reunification versus separation, victim blaming) with 
respect to clients.  These standpoint differences make trust and information sharing 
difficult.  For example, victim advocates pointed out that they are uncomfortable sharing 
information with DHS workers or probation officers knowing that they often harbor 
victim blaming attitudes and beliefs and may use any information advocates share to the 
detriment of their clients.   
Additionally, several stakeholder groups admitted that they regularly feel 
dismissed or ignored by other, usually more powerful, stakeholders within the CCR and 
that when these stakeholders refuse to integrate their expertise, successful intervention is 
significantly hampered.   Police and probation officers reported that batterer intervention 
providers do not seem interested in listening to their input, just as providers lamented the 
fact that their advice is often blatantly ignored by police and probation officers.  For 
example, providers reported having attempted to reach out to probation officers with 
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concerns about a particular perpetrator and being told that the officer was not interested 
in hearing from them unless they violated their probation (i.e., unless they broke the law 
and needed to be “punished”).  Providers also reported that perpetrators have sometimes 
been pulled by probation officers from their programs for “good behavior” without any 
input from them about how they are doing in group. Obviously, this type of 
communication breakdown leads to a serious lapse in accountability for perpetrators.   
Advocates expressed similar frustrations, suggesting that DHS workers and 
probation officers frequently fail to solicit their input or assistance when working with 
their clients.  However, it is encouraging to note that advocates who work as members of 
DVERT teams reported better communication and relationships, though power 
imbalances between members of the criminal justice system or DHS and advocates were 
noted.     
A final challenge to the CCR mentioned by every stakeholder group is the fact 
that policies and procedures are not implemented by agencies or organizations, but rather 
they are carried out by individuals.  Officers, advocates, victims/survivors, providers and 
perpetrators all identified human variance as a factor that limits the success of current 
intervention strategies.  Given the complexity of domestic violence dynamics, 
stakeholders reported that insufficient training and rapid turnover mean that clients can 
receive vastly different responses from within the same system (i.e., police and probation 
officers vary, DHS workers vary, advocates vary, BIP facilitators vary).  This variance 
can be confusing to clients and frustrating to fellow collaborators.  
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Confusion created by complex domestic violence dynamics. Most stakeholders 
were clear that the dynamics involved with domestic abuse are uniquely complicated and 
that the criminal justice system is ill-equipped to manage the ambiguous context of 
domestic abuse.  Assigning responsibility and blame is particularly challenging for law 
enforcement officers when they arrive at the scene and hear two very different accounts 
of what has transpired.  While adequate training can mitigate confusion, the fact remains 
that the answer may not be as simple as “he is the perpetrator and needs to be punished” 
and “she is the victim and needs support services”.  Domestic violence is unique from 
stranger assaults in that the participants are likely to remain in contact with one another, 
either because they want to repair their romantic relationship, are financially 
interdependent, or because they share children.  This difference complicates the question 
of whether to focus on punishing or rehabilitating offenders.  Perpetrators were 
particularly angered by the fact that the criminal justice system and batterer intervention 
treatment programs do not appear to acknowledge that “it takes two people to fight” and 
subsequently their victims are culpable as well.  
According to the stakeholders I interviewed, the confusion caused by complex 
domestic violence dynamics does not stop with police officers.  Participants reported that 
probation officers are often vexed by the actions and decisions of victims, particularly 
their unwillingness to immediately exit abusive relationships, their hesitancy or 
unwillingness to press charges and participate in prosecution and their interest in having 
“no contact” orders lifted.  Officers were honest in reporting the fact that even though 
they understand the cycle of violence and the fact that it takes a woman “on average 
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seven times to leave her abusive partner”, they find themselves frustrated when victims 
do not leave.   
Reactivity instead of activism and prevention.  When asked to reflect on what 
limits the effectiveness of domestic violence intervention with abusive men, every 
stakeholder group I interviewed pointed to the fact that current strategies are reactive as 
opposed to preventative.  Instead of focusing on how to stop abuse from occurring in the 
first place, the system is focused on how to interrupt and punish violence that has already 
occurred.  There were four primary layers to this critique.   
First and foremost, stakeholders discussed the fact that very little is being done to 
shift attitudes and beliefs at the societal level.  Participants explained that despite the fact 
that antecedents of domestic violence are identified primarily at the societal level, few 
efforts directly target this level of analysis.  This absence was primarily attributed to a 
scarcity of resources, though some stakeholders acknowledged that it reflects an 
orientation and prioritization within the field.  Domestic violence advocates, in particular, 
discussed the fact that they barely have the resources to meet the immediate crisis needs 
of their clients and subsequently are unable to focus attention on advocating for social 
change.  Providers noted that there is no tangible reward (i.e., they do not get paid) for 
doing community outreach or activism.  Sadly, stakeholders noted that until substantial 
shifts in gender roles, masculinity and femininity, conflict resolution, and power tactics 
occur on an institutional or societal level, the movement to end domestic violence will be 
limited in its success. 
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Second, stakeholders expressed that there are important prevention opportunities 
that are currently unexercised, particularly providing prevention education within the 
schools, increasing training for the workplace, medical field, and religious institutions, 
and raising awareness through the media.  The fact that prevention education is not 
common within the schools was a great source of consternation for stakeholders.  
Perpetrators in particular could not understand why courses on relationships and domestic 
violence are not regularly offered.  They suggested that if they had received information 
in school about acceptable versus unacceptable behavior and the consequences for those 
behaviors, they would have made different choices (i.e., abuse would have been 
prevented).  Officers and providers lamented the fact that efforts to provide this type of 
programming are often met with resistance, particularly by local school boards.   
Providers, advocates and victims/survivors were particularly interested in 
enhancing the training provided in workplaces, the medical field and within religious 
organizations suggesting that training could translate into more effective screening and 
directly prevent future violence.  Stakeholders also talked about the untapped potential of 
the media.  Advocates, providers and perpetrators suggested that by using the media in 
the form of PSAs, commercials, and reality shows many people who might ordinarily not 
have contact with the domestic violence movement could learn to identify, seek help, and 
prevent abuse.  Victims/survivors in particular were interested in lobbying television 
executives to reduce the amount of violence against women regularly depicted on popular 
shows, suggesting that these shows might actually provide perpetrators with new ideas 
about how to hurt women.  
Chapter Five: Analysis and Findings 312 
 
 
Third, stakeholders, particularly victim advocates and probation officers, 
discussed the fact the system was neglecting a critical prevention opportunity by not 
focusing more explicitly on remedying the shortage of vital resources for women, 
particularly housing, child care, and employment.  According to these stakeholders, far 
too many women are forced to stay in abusive relationships because their other options 
are simply unacceptable (i.e., homelessness or not being able to feed their children).  If 
more time and attention was devoted to lobbying and securing vital basic needs and 
services for all women, the system might be able to spend less time intervening in the 
crises that ensue in their absence. 
The final critique with respect to reactivity involves stakeholders‟ concern that 
heavily reliance on the criminal justice system, with its‟ focus on “punishing” individuals 
after they have committed a crime, cements this emphasis within the field.  The issue of 
probation violations is a perfect example.  Probation officers, providers, and perpetrators 
were clear that the system is not designed to assist in the avoidance of violations, merely 
to hand out sanctions in response to them.  According to providers, probation officers do 
not want to hear from them if their probationer is struggling in group.  They are only 
concerned if probationers have done something that violates the conditions of their 
probation and subsequently warrants a CJS response.  Probation officers agreed and were 
equally frustrated to report that in their opinion the system is not set up to help their 
probationers avoid violations.  In fact, the system seems to set men up to fail by requiring 
them to pay for expensive treatment and issuing “no contact” orders even when they 
create substantial hardships for the family.  Perpetrators appeared keenly aware that the 
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system (e.g., probation officers) is watching for their slip-ups, not helping them to avoid 
infractions. 
Summary.  In reflecting on the findings produced during this inquiry, it is clear 
that soliciting input about what is limiting the effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention with abusive men from key stakeholders within the Portland Tri-County 
CCR was worthwhile.  Not only were stakeholders eager to provide insight and 
information about specific ways in which current strategies fail to meet their 
expectations, but they were able to discuss gaps between theorized antecedents for 
domestic violence and current strategies, discrepancies between an ideal model of CCR 
and what they experience, and provide suggestions for how they would like to see the 
larger community engaged in domestic violence intervention.  In the next chapter, I 
bridge connections between the seven themes that emerged from stakeholders‟ responses 
and the existing literature on domestic violence intervention. I point out the ways in 
which these themes or subunits interact to produce the “limited” effectiveness of the 
system and then outline a few of the theoretical, practical and methodological 
implications of this study.    
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Chapter Six: Discussion 
 Domestic violence is one of the most complex, costly, and critical social problems 
facing our society today (Bancroft, 2002; Healey et. al., 1998; Mears, 2003).   Each year, 
millions of women and children suffer significant emotional, psychological and physical 
trauma as a result of men‟s abusive behavior (Astin et al., 1995; Bufkin & Bray, 1998; 
Campbell et al., 1997; Fantuzzo & Mohr, 1999; McKay, 1994; Moscicki, 1989; Rand & 
Strom, 1997; Straus et al., 1990; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000; Walker, 1991).   Over the 
course of the last three decades, the domestic violence movement has successfully pushed 
the conversation about how best to intervene into mainstream discourse (Lehrner & 
Allen, 2009).  Once considered a closeted, personal tragedy, the plight of domestic 
violence victims has been widely exposed (Carlson & Worden, 2005; Klein, Campbell et 
al., 1997; Schechter, 1982).  Numerous theories have been developed to explain men‟s 
violence against women (Harway & O‟Neil, 1999), support services and shelters for 
victims have multiplied (Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 2003; Schechter, 1982), criminal justice 
sanctions and intervention programs for abusive men have proliferated (Healey et al., 
1998), and research aimed at understanding perpetrators and assessing the efficacy of 
interventions has flourished (Gondolf, 2002).   
Despite this attention, efforts to successfully reduce the incidence of domestic 
violence have not met with tremendous success.  Not only have rates of perpetration 
remained disturbingly high (Bachman, 2000), but rates of recidivism following men‟s 
arrest (Babcock & Steiner, 1999; Schmidt & Sherman, 2996), prosecution (Murphy et al., 
1998), supervision (Rempel, Labriola & Davis, 2008), and attendance in treatment 
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programs (Dobash & Dobash, 1997; Feder & Wilson, 2005) are far from ideal. 
Unfortunately, evaluation studies to date have provided practitioners with little guidance 
about how to improve the success of current strategies as a whole.  Most studies have 
focused narrowly on indentifying individual characteristics associated with increased 
rates of recidivism following contact with one or more intervention component (i.e., 
arrest, prosecution, probation or treatment) (Date & Ronan, 2000; Feder & Dugan, 2002; 
Hamberger & Hastings, 1990; Jones & Gondolf, 2001).  Though a growing number of 
process-oriented evaluations designed to explicate how certain aspects of domestic 
violence intervention are effective now exist (Pandya & Gingerich, 2002; Scott & Wolfe, 
2000; Silvergleid & Mankowski, 2006; Wangsgaard, 2001), few provide guidance on 
how to enhance current strategies collectively.  This project attempted to address this gap 
by engaging a systems approach to study limitations of current domestic violence 
intervention strategies with abusive men.  By attending to context, processes and multiple 
perspectives (Lendaris, 1986) in order to best understand and critique the targeted system, 
a new question was posed, “What theoretical restrictions and intervention 
decisions/characteristics interact to limit the effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention with abusive men?” 
Six key stakeholder populations within the Portland Tri-County area were 
convened in 10 focus groups and asked a series of questions designed to elicit their 
feedback regarding what is limiting the success of domestic violence intervention with 
abusive men in their communities.  Police and probation officers, victim advocates, 
victims/survivors, batterer intervention providers, and perpetrators met in homogenous 
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groups, comprised of between 4 and 12 members for an average of 77 minutes to discuss 
their perceptions of what constitutes current domestic violence intervention with abusive 
men, what is limiting its success, and how else they would like to see the community 
engaged.  Transcripts were analyzed using a constructivist grounded theory approach 
(Charmaz, 1995) and emergent themes and ideas in response to five key research 
questions were reported.   
Major Findings 
Project Goal One 
The first goal of this project was to describe and critically analyze limitations of 
current domestic violence intervention strategies with abusive men.  Fortunately, 
stakeholders were quite eager to offer their perceptions of the limitations of the current 
response and provided compelling descriptions of the multiple ways in which they find 
the present system problematic.   Their descriptions are captured or represented by seven 
emergent themes that operate together to manifest the attribute “limited effectiveness”- 1) 
attempting to simultaneously punish and rehabilitate perpetrators of domestic violence, 2) 
dominance of a “one size fits all” approach, 3) insufficient accountability within the 
system for abusive men, 4) rampant victim blaming, 5) barriers to effective collaboration, 
6) confusion created by complex domestic violence dynamics, and 7) reactivity instead of 
activism and prevention.  Stakeholder comments supporting these seven themes were 
carefully reviewed in the previous chapter.  At this point, it is important to contextualize 
their comments within the existing literature of the field.  As Kidder and Fine (1997) 
contend, researchers have a responsibility to assert interpretive authority over the data, 
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and “advance a theoretical framework around the „voices‟ of informants, to help analyze 
these voices in their historic and current circumstances.” (p. 49).   
Much has been written in the last decade about the problems associated with 
heavy reliance on the criminal justice system to intervene in domestic violence 
(DeKeserdy & Dragiewicz, 2007; De-Leon-Granados, Wells, & Binsbacher, 2006; 
Erwin, 2006; Ford, 2003; Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; Guzik, 2009; INCITE, 2003!; 
Mankowski et al., 2002; Pence, 1999; Romkens, 2006; van Wormer, 2009).  The 
testimony gathered for this project provides clear support for these concerns.  The seven 
emergent themes or subunits that stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County area identified 
as operating together to manifest “limited effectiveness” of the intervention system point 
to four fundamental tensions or challenges linked with utilizing the criminal justice 
system as the primary vehicle to hold perpetrators accountable for their abuse.  These 
tensions or challenges include the difficulty of 1) blending the goals of punishment and 
rehabilitation, 2) balancing consistency with an individually tailored response, 3) 
effectively protecting and empowering victims, and 4) moving beyond reactivity towards 
prevention. 
Blending the goals of punishment and rehabilitation.  Stakeholders in the present 
study were concerned about the effectiveness of current domestic violence intervention 
strategies with abusive men and spoke at length about their perceptions of the challenges 
associated with blending punishment and rehabilitation.  Specifically, they suggested that 
punishment does not equate to rehabilitation; that criminal justice sanctions often produce 
tremendous resentment and resistant in perpetrators worsening the abuse that victims 
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receive at the hands of their perpetrators and interfering with treatment success; and, 
finally, that stakeholders often find it challenging to perform both functions 
simultaneously. 
In trying to disentangle and contextualize their concerns, it may be helpful to 
revisit how the goals of punishing and rehabilitating perpetrators of domestic violence 
became enmeshed in the first place.  In the late 1970‟s, domestic violence advocates 
recognized that providing emergency shelter and counseling services for victims was 
somewhat futile if nothing were going to be done with abusive men (Dobash et al., 2000; 
Pence and Shepard, 1999).  Subsequently, advocates began lobbying for a two-pronged 
approach to perpetrators.  They wanted victims to be recognized as citizens of the state 
deserving of protection by the criminal justice system (Miller, 2001) and they wanted 
perpetrators to receive some form of treatment (Jennings, 1987) so that they might no 
longer pose a danger to current or future victims (Adams & McCormick, 1982; Gondolf, 
1987; LaViolette, 2001).  This push for punishment or criminal justice system-imposed 
accountability on the one hand and rehabilitation or batterer intervention treatment on the 
other became blurred into a singular approach when judges started mandating attendance 
in intervention programs as a condition of probation or as a way to defer conviction 
(Ganley, 1987; Hamberger & Hastings, 1993; Harrell, 1991; Pence, 1999; Soler, 1987).  
In other words, while initially there may have been recognition and appreciation of the 
fact that punishment and treatment are distinct intentions that serve distinct functions, this 
recognition seems to have muddied over time.   
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Once attendance in batterer intervention programs became mandated by the 
criminal justice system, these programs started to fall more under the guise of punishment 
and accountability and less under the guise of treatment or therapy.  This shift was not 
accidental or unintentional; it was initiated by domestic violence advocates who were 
concerned that providing therapy to abusive men conveyed a problematic and disturbing 
message about the root causes of domestic violence (Dutton & Nicholls, 2005; Schechter, 
1982; Straus, 1974; Yllo, 1988).  Mainstream advocates were working tirelessly to  
promote the idea that domestic violence was sanctioned, endorsed and essentially caused 
by Patriarchy, or the political, social, and interpersonal subordination of women by men 
(Pence & Paymar, 1993) and to offer therapy to counter intentional choices that 
individual men exercised was contraindicated (Schechter, 1982).  The appropriate 
treatment for men‟s violence against women was one that involved re-education about 
power and control and gender equity (Babcock et al., 2004; Pence & Paymar, 1993) 
coupled with confrontation in order to hold them accountable for their abuse.  The irony, 
as indicated by the responses of stakeholders in the Portland CCR and supported by 
existing literature, is that neither intention has yet to be fully realized.  Despite significant 
gains in the criminalization of domestic violence over the past three decades (Fagan, 
1996; Gondolf, 2002; Harrell, 1991; Jolin, 2008; Miller, 2004), abusive men are still not 
being sufficiently punished or held accountable as indicated by low prosecution rates 
(Fagan, 1989; Ford, 1993; Ford, 2003; Henning & Feder, 2005) and infrequent 
incarcerations (Hester, 2006).  Additionally, efforts to rehabilitate or reduce men‟s 
propensity to recidivate either through criminal justice sanctions or batterer intervention 
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programs have not met with overwhelming success (Babcock et al., 2004; Buttell & 
Carney, 2005; Feder & Dugan, 2002; Feder & Wilson, 2005; Harrell, 1991; Henning & 
Holdford, 2006).   
Stakeholders in the current study appeared rather conflicted about criminal justice 
sanctions.  On the one hand, almost every group noted that insufficient accountability for 
perpetrators of domestic violence manifesting in the form of missed arrests, dismissed 
charges, unsatisfactory prosecutions and short incarcerations was problematic in that 
victims are not given the protection they deserve and perpetrators are not being 
sufficiently punished.  However, at the same time, stakeholders questioned the 
effectiveness of enhancing these strategies given the fact that they are not rehabilitative 
and can often aggravate the situation and further endanger victims. 
The fact that stakeholders in the present study questioned the rehabilitative 
potential of punishment for perpetrators of domestic violence, particularly in the form of 
prison, should come as no great surprise.  Currently in the United States there is growing 
skepticism regarding the positive impact of incarceration.  When introducing “The 
National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009”, Senator Webb (2009) reminded 
Congress that “despite burgeoning prisoner populations, our communities and 
neighborhoods are not safer” (p. 70).  After noting that the United States imprisons a 
stunningly high percentage of our citizens compared to the rest of the world (the U.S. 
contains 5% of the world‟s population and 25% of the world‟s reported prisoners), Webb 
acknowledges that rehabilitation efforts within prison fall pitifully short.  In other words, 
it is not surprising that stakeholders in the current study were skeptical of the efficacy of 
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punishing perpetrators in the hopes that they will be rehabilitated as there is little 
evidence to support such expectations (Andrews & Bonta, 2006).  “We have been unable 
to find any review of experimental studies that reveals systematically positive effects of 
official punishment on recidivism (that is, there is no evidence that official punishment 
reduces recidivism)” (p. 70). 
More disturbing, perhaps, than the fact that punishment does not seem to 
rehabilitate perpetrators is that fact that, according to stakeholders in the current study, 
criminal justice system involvement might actually make perpetrators more abusive.  
According to officers, advocates and victims/survivors, overnight holds (which are 
common for domestic violence offenses) place victims in a tremendously frightening 
position.  Angry and indignant over being arrested and spending the evening behind bars, 
perpetrators frequently retaliate and the physical consequences for victims can be severe.  
Victim advocates and victims discussed the fact that it seems pointless to engage the 
police, knowing that perpetrators are released so quickly and that “she would get it 
worse”.   
This finding is consistent with other literature suggesting that police intervention 
can sometimes exacerbate the violence (Hovell, Seid, & Liles, 2006).   Schmidt & 
Sherman (1996) reported that arrest for certain populations, particularly the unemployed 
and unmarried, might actually increase the rates of future domestic violence and Fagan 
(1989) reported that men with prior arrests or who had long histories of severe violence 
against their partners were more likely to recidivate if prosecuted.  It is important to keep 
in mind that stakeholders, particularly advocates and victims, did not appear to be 
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lobbying for a reduction in criminal justice sanctions when they talked about the dangers 
of arrest.  In fact, they seemed to be suggesting that the punitive consequences need to be 
greater in order to provide appropriate levels of punishment for perpetrators and 
protection for victims, though it is unclear whether they believe intensifying sanctions 
would translate into a reduction in retaliation.   
Victim advocates and victims also spoke about the retaliation and abuse that can 
occur as a consequence of perpetrators‟ mandated attendance in batterer intervention 
programs.  Victims reported that their partners often return home from group angry about 
being forced to attend and pay for treatment.  These perpetrators often take that anger out 
on their victims, blaming them for engaging the criminal justice system in the first place.  
Additionally, victims and advocates lamented that perpetrators often become craftier as a 
result of their participation in treatment.  It has been their experience that perpetrators 
often learn how to better manipulate their partners and the criminal justice system from 
the other men in the group.  They learn to hit their partners where the bruises will not be 
seen; they learn to accompany their partners to the hospital so that they can control the 
story that gets told to medical personnel and they learn new ways to emotionally and 
psychologically abuse their victims.  In other words, according to stakeholders in the 
Portland Tri-County area, mandated batterer intervention treatment, like other criminal 
justice sanctions (i.e., arrest and prosecution), can sometimes increase the abuse that 
victims receive at the hands of their perpetrators.  These reports are consistent with 
concerns expressed by Scott (2004) and others (Gondolf, 2002; Gregory & Erez, 2002; 
Pollack & MacKay, 2001) about the possibility that while physical assaults or abuse may 
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decrease during batterer intervention programs, other forms of abuse (i.e., psychological 
and emotional) may remain the same or escalate.   
Stakeholders in the current study noted that mandating batterer intervention can 
not only produce feelings of resentment and resistance in perpetrators, which can 
translate into anger and abuse directed at their victims, but they pointed out that this 
resistance can interfere with men‟s ability to engage in treatment.  Officers, advocates 
and victims all noted that men will frequently just “go through the motions” of treatment; 
an impression that was at least partially validated by the testimony of perpetrators.  
According to these stakeholders, perpetrators see it as a punishment they have to endure 
or a hoop they have to leap through, not as a pathway for change or a vehicle for self-
improvement.  It was abundantly clear that the abusive men I interviewed resented the 
fact that the criminal justice system was imposing requirements on them, particularly 
requirements related to treatment.  For most of them, mandated batterer intervention 
constituted punishment, not rehabilitation.  They were being punished; they were being 
forced to attend and pay for treatment and as such they were victims of an unjust system.   
This “victim stance” is not unique to the participants in my study.  A handful of 
recently conducted qualitative explorations reveal that punitive measures can often be 
counterproductive when perpetrators begin to see themselves as victims of the criminal 
justice system as opposed to offenders rightfully charged who need to change (Anderson 
& Umberson, 2001; Eisikovits & Buchbinder, 2000; Guzik, 2009).  After interviewing 30 
perpetrators about their experiences with mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
polices, Keith Guzik (2009) writes that “nearly all the respondents in this study 
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understand their punishments as unfair sanctions meted out by an unjust local legal 
system rather than as a consequence of their own actions” (p. 94).  Guzik goes on to 
stipulate that this victim stance permits and prevents perpetrators from engaging in their 
treatment programs; for if they are victims of an unjust system then they must not be truly 
guilty of their crimes.  “While advocates hope that punishment teaches abusers a lesson, 
often the lesson they learn is that they are victims of an unjust legal system” (Guzik, 
2009, p. 5).   
Guzik notes that the perpetrators in his study attempted to separate themselves 
from “true” batterers, as a way of suggesting that the criminal justice sanctions and 
treatment were not necessary for them.  This framing was rampant in the current sample 
as well.  The men I interviewed did not try to minimize the crime of domestic violence 
per se, but rather attempted to convince me that they had not really committed domestic 
violence.  According to their testimony, mandated treatment makes sense for real 
batterers who beat their partners, but not for men who yell or “move their victims two 
inches against their will”.  When men distance themselves from “true” batterers in 
response to “excessive” criminal justice sanctions, they not only lesson their culpability, 
but they significantly hamper their ability to be engaged and rehabilitated by the 
treatment program.  If they do not see themselves as offenders of violence, but rather 
victims of an unfair system, they may resist absorbing the material presented to them in 
group.   “Definitions of the self as non-violent were central to batterers‟ responses to 
criminal justice interventions.  To the extent that counseling challenges this definition of 
the self, participants may resist participating in the programs” (Guzik, 2009, p. 176).  
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This type of resistance was evident among the perpetrators I interviewed, with most of 
them claiming to not need the techniques or skills provided during group. 
It has also been suggested that the confrontation or “punishment” stance adopted 
by most batterer intervention programs (Milner, 2004) might actually contribute to men‟s 
resistance to the material (Chovanec, 2009; Murphy & Baxter, 1997; Wexler, 2000).  
“The coercive nature of many interventions (e.g., court orders) can complicate the change 
process, particularly the initial decision to change” (Day, Chung, & O‟Leary, 2009, p. 
210).  This hypothesis is supported, in part, by a growing body of work suggesting that 
different processes of change (Pandya & Gingerich, 2002; Scott & Wolfe, 2000; 
Silvergleid & Mankowski, 2006; Wangsgaard, 2001) may be more or less effective with 
perpetrators depending on which stage of change they are in (Chovanec, 2009; Daniels & 
Murphy, 1997; Murphy & Baxter, 1997; Scott, 2004).  Murphy & Baxter (1997) were 
among the first to suggest the application of the transtheoretical model of change 
(Prochaska & DiClemente, 1984) to batterers‟ intervention.  There are three organizing 
principles or dimensions within the transtheoretical model: stages of change, processes of 
change and levels of change.  The stages of change represent sequential, temporal 
markings describing when an individual must complete certain tasks if sustained behavior 
change is to be achieved.  Certain processes of change may be more effective in 
facilitating change during certain stages, and this “matching” has significant implications 
for work with batterers (Daniels & Murphy, 1997; Lehmann & Simmons, 2009).   
Based on research with other behaviors, Daniels & Murphy (1997) assert that 
experiential processes, such as consciousness-raising, dramatic relief, environmental 
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reevaluation, social liberation and self-reevaluation are more effective when clients are in 
the early stages of precontemplation, contemplation and preparation for action, while 
behavioral processes, such as helping relationships, stimulus control, counter-
conditioning, reinforcement management, and self-liberation are more appropriate in the 
later stages of action and maintenance and can in fact be counter-productive if used in the 
early stages.  It may be that coercing (through punitive criminal justice sanctions) and 
confronting men when they are in the early stages of pre-contemplation is 
counterproductive to rehabilitation (Beesley & McGuire, 2008) in that it increases 
resistance to change.   
Finally, stakeholders discussed the challenges they personally face when trying to 
navigate the goals of punishment and rehabilitation with men in order to fulfill their 
responsibilities within the CCR.  Probation officers discussed how difficult it can be for 
them to simultaneously be responsible for forcing men to attend treatment and punishing 
them if they do not attend while also serving as “counselors” to them, advocating for 
them to really embrace the program material.  Likewise, batterer intervention providers 
discussed how it can sometimes be difficult for them to be effective as therapists while 
operating within the dominant “punishment” orientation of the CCR.   The focus on 
punishment within the CCR promotes the notion that perpetrators are “bad” men in need 
of sanctions, as opposed to “mad” men in need of treatment (Mankowski, et al., 2002) 
and presents a challenge for batterer intervention providers.  If abusive men are “bad” 
men, the possibility of rehabilitation is precluded. If they are “bad” men, then there is no 
hope that they can change.  Providers insisted that for therapy to be effective, establishing 
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and maintaining hope is critical.  It enables them to feel positive about their role in the 
CCR and it is necessary in order to establish a productive therapeutic relationship with 
their clients.  Perpetrators‟ comments suggest that they are in fact sensitive to whether or 
not their program facilitator views them as “bad” or “mad” and that when their facilitator 
holds out hope for their ability to change, they too believe it is possible and are more 
inclined to do the work.  As a side note, I observed that men who explicitly identified 
their facilitator as having “hope” for their redeemability were more engaged, less 
resentful, and far more appreciative of the value of treatment than the perpetrators who 
did not share this impression of their facilitator. 
The importance of both a positive therapeutic relationship and “hope” within 
therapy has been well documented.  Miller, Duncan, and Hubble (1997, 2004) and others 
(Lambert & Barley, 2001; Lambert & Ogles, 2004) have summarized the pantheoretical 
factors of change and have noted their importance.  Lehmann & Simmons report that 
“40% of the change variance [is due] to the client‟s extra-therapeutic factors (such as 
strengths, resources, coping skills, motivations, where they live, social support, and so 
forth); 30% to the client/therapist therapeutic relationship (this includes the quality of the 
client‟s participation in the therapeutic relationship); and 15% to the therapist‟s attitude in 
conveying a sense of hope to the client” (p. 20).  Their conclusions support the concerns 
of local providers and perpetrators and suggest that labeling men as hopeless and “bad” 
likely interferes with treatment effectiveness. 
In conclusion, it seems clear that domestic violence intervention strategies with 
abusive men initially intended to address both punishment and rehabilitation.  Over time 
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the balance between these two objectives blurred and shifted to the point that punishment 
(and the criminal justice system) is clearly privileged.  It may be helpful for the domestic 
violence movement to reconsider the primacy of “punishment” in dealing with men who 
perpetrate abuse and critically reflect on how to better integrate or utilize best practices 
from both the criminal justice and the mental health fields.  Given stakeholders‟ 
frustrations with overnight holds and short incarcerations, it may be necessary to augment 
some criminal justice sanctions in order to meaningfully hold men accountable and 
provide safety for victims.  At the same time, it may be helpful to divest or better separate 
rehabilitation or treatment from the criminal justice system in order to maximize its 
potential benefits. 
Balancing consistency with an individually tailored response. Stakeholders in the 
Portland Tri-County CCR seemed to vacillate between desiring a more consistent 
response to perpetrators of domestic violence and a more variable or individually-tailored 
one.  More accurately perhaps, they expressed a desire for and concerns about both.  
While consistency was touted for its reliability and uniformity such that all perpetrators 
might be subject to the same sanctions and consequently all victims might receive the 
same protection, variability was lauded for its specificity and appropriateness.  Most 
stakeholders noted that currently, consistency or a “one size fits all” approach, dominates 
intervention strategies with abusive men, and they expressed grave concerns with this 
focus.  In particular, they questioned the effectiveness of relying so heavily on the 
criminal justice system for all perpetrators, given their understanding of the ways in 
which that system operates and is received differently by men of color and men living in 
Chapter Six: Discussion 329 
 
 
poverty.  They also spoke at length regarding the fact that within the criminal justice 
system violence is de-contextualized, resulting in grave consequences particularly for 
women who are arrested for using defensive violence.  Finally, they questioned the 
benefits of a “one size fits all” approach to treatment given the diverse needs of 
individual perpetrators.  Comments in support of the need to enhance consistency were 
also made, particularly with respect to arrests, prosecution and probation requirements.  
As with the tension between punishment and rehabilitation, it seems as though 
stakeholders were ultimately lobbying for better achievement of both intentions; 
enhanced consistency in terms of sanctions or accountability for perpetrators on the one 
hand and increased variability or specificity on the other.   
There has been much written about the fact that current domestic violence 
intervention strategies in the United States are dominated by a “one size fits all” 
approach, as indicated by their fundamental dependence and utilization of the criminal 
justice system to hold men accountable for their intimate abuse (Erwin, 2006; Guzik, 
2009; van Wormer, 2009).  This singularity has been strongly criticized, particularly by 
advocates representing marginalized populations (INCITE!, 2003; Mederos, 1999, 
Ritchie, 2000).  Stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County area echoed these concerns, 
observing that minority men are treated disparagingly by the criminal justice system.  
They are more likely to be arrested, prosecuted and incarcerated for domestic violence 
than white or wealthy men (Ruttenberg, 1994; Cahn, 2000; Coker, 2001).  As such, 
stakeholders suggested that they are likely to have a different response to the threat of 
criminal justice sanctions than less targeted populations.  For example, the “victim 
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stance” that many perpetrators in the current study adopted with respect to sanctions is 
likely to be exaggerated for men who are able to point to statistical and anecdotal 
evidence in support of their claims that they are unfairly treated by the criminal justice 
system.  A slightly different, but related, concern was raised by providers, who suggested 
that instead of serving as a deterrent, the threat of sanctions may actually serve as a 
“badge of honor” for some young men, with incarceration functioning as a desirable 
outcome.         
Stakeholders suggested that heavy reliance on the criminal justice system to 
intervene with abusive men is equally complicated for women of color and women living 
in poverty.  They resonated with much of what has been written in the field regarding the 
internal conflicts that arise for these women when considering whether or not to call the 
police or press charges (Erwin, 2006, INCITE!, 2003; Miller, 1989; Ms. Foundation for 
Women, 2003; Richie, 1996; Williams, 1998).  While there is some evidence to suggest 
that women from minority groups may be more likely to contact the police (Hutchinson 
et al., 1992), many have suggested that marginalized women may be reticent to engage 
the criminal justice system for fear they will be harshly judged by their communities 
(Danis, 2003), be deported (Rasche, 1995), or be unable to provide for their children if 
their perpetrator is incarcerated (Iovanni & Miller, 2001; Jordan, 2004).  “Law and order 
approaches to violence are ill suited to the needs of a diverse range of marginalized 
women (e.g., women of color, poor women, lesbians) who have historically been 
inadequately served by police intervention” (DeKeseredy & Dragiewicz, 2007, p. 880).  
Stakeholders in the current study unanimously pointed to the fact that criminal justice 
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sanctions carry vastly difficult consequences for poor women and many suggested that 
awareness of these consequences frequently dissuade victims from utilizing these 
strategies.  Victims may refuse to call the police, refuse to testify or request that “no 
contact” orders be lifted in order to insure that their perpetrators remain under the same 
roof, providing essential financial support, despite the fact that they are then subject to 
continuing violence.   
Heavy reliance on the criminal justice system is both a representation of and a 
codifier of a “one size fits all” approach.  Depending on the criminal justice system, to 
the exclusion of other approaches for intervening in men‟s domestic violence, represents 
a singular approach.  Additionally, utilization of the criminal justice system has itself 
reinforced the primacy of a “one size fits all” approach through adoption of mandatory 
arrest and prosecution policies coupled with its gender-blind, decontextualized view of 
crime.  Mandatory arrest laws were originally designed to protect victims from police 
officers who would frequently minimize the violence, side with the perpetrator, or 
attempt mediation (Buzawa & Austin, 1993).  Unfortunately, one unintended outcome of 
this “equalizing” practice is that women are now being arrested at an alarming rate 
(Erwin, 2006; Miller, 2001), a phenomenon that greatly concerned some stakeholders in 
the current study.   The CJS is “incident driven” such that officers focus on the incident 
or dispute at hand, rather than on the context or history precipitating the conflict (Heany, 
2006).  As a result, primary victims acting in self defense are more and more frequently 
being arrested as the primary aggressor or in tandem with the primary aggressor in the 
case of “dual arrests” (Miller, 2001; Muftic, Bouffard, & Bouffard, 2007).  Research 
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reveals that women now constitute 20% of those arrested for domestic violence (Henning 
& Renauer, 2005; McMahon & Pence, 2003) and there is evidence indicating that over 
half of these women may be primary victims (Henning, Renauer, & Holdford, 2006).   
Stakeholders in the current study lamented this trend and the devastating impact it has on 
individual victims.  Not only are victims who are arrested as a consequence of mandatory 
arrest laws subject to the humiliation of criminal justice sanctions, but, according to 
Portland CCR stakeholders, the repercussions can be devastating in terms of decreased 
future employment and housing opportunities.  Furthermore, advocates and victims 
pointed out that knowing that they might be arrested can dissuade victims from seeking 
police protection.     
The criminal justice system‟s “one size fits all” approach to domestic violence 
mistakenly assumes that domestic violence is a singular phenomenon; that it manifests in 
a similar pattern for all perpetrators and victims.  Research suggests that intimate 
violence may actually manifest in at least two different patterns (Erez & King, 2000; 
Melton & Belknap, 2003).  Specifically, studies have shown that domestic violence can 
be exhibited in the traditionally conceived pattern of abuse (e.g., intimate terrorism) or in 
a more mutually engaged form of violence (e.g., situational violence or common couple 
violence) (Johnson, 1995).  It is reasonable to conclude that mandatory arrest laws and 
the decontextualization of individual incidents have led to arrests of women and men 
engaging in common couple violence under the application of laws originally designed to 
protect women from men‟s patriarchal terrorism (Guzik, 2009).   
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Perpetrators in the current study would certainly concur that treating all incidents 
of domestic violence in the same manner is problematic.  Many of them insisted that they 
were arrested for a one-time mistake and subsequently their violence was fundamentally 
different from men who regularly beat their wives.  Their primary complaint was that the 
system treats all perpetrators the same regardless of their crime (whether in the context of 
common couple violence or intimate terrorism).  They were particularly outraged to 
report that despite variations in their crimes or histories, they all received the same 
sanctions and are forced to participate in the same length of treatment.  Guzik‟s (2009) 
data lend some credibility to their assertions.  He notes that in his sample of 20 
perpetrators, “intimate terrorists and situationally violent offenders experience[d] similar 
outcomes from the criminal legal system” (p. 95).   
Of course, it remains to be seen whether different responses from the criminal 
justice system are warranted for different patterns of abuse.  As Zorza (2010) points out, 
it may be difficult to definitively determine whether a “situationally violent” man is on 
his way to becoming an “intimate terrorist” or if his act of violence really represents a 
“one-time” incident.  Furthermore, should the crime of strangulation be treated less 
seriously just because the perpetrator has never been violent or abusive before?  Equally 
vexing is the challenge created by the fact that the criminal justice system can currently 
only punish physical violence, making it difficult to sanction many of the actions and 
behaviors that traditionally characterize intimate terrorism (Stark, 2007). 
This challenge was hinted at by several stakeholder groups and expressed directly 
by batterer intervention providers.  Providers noted that when we focus heavily on those 
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acts or crimes that are “punishable”, most acts of domestic violence are ignored.  Given 
that domestic violence is traditionally defined as a pattern of coercive behaviors, most of 
which do not involve physical violence, many perpetrators of domestic violence and their 
victims fall through the cracks.  “The equation of abuse with physical force in 
relationships has helped the domestic violence revolution access a range of professional 
and political agendas.  But it has failed victimized women in critical ways” (Stark, 2007, 
p.85).  Most forms of domestic violence are not illegal.  By ignoring or casting aside the 
complexities of domestic violence and attending to only one manifestation, many women 
have been left without intervention options.  
Clearly, the criminal justice system as a “one size fits all” approach to domestic 
violence struggles to meet the diverse needs of perpetrators and victims.  As will be 
discussed more fully in the implications section, perhaps alternative restorative justice 
approaches such as victim-offender conferences, family group conferencing, healing 
circles and community reparations might better accommodate their unique and varied 
needs (Braithwaiute & Daly, 1998; Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; van Wormer, 2009; Ptacek, 
2010).   
When discussing the drawbacks of a “one size fits all” approach to perpetrators of 
domestic violence, stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County CCR were particularly 
concerned about the lack of specificity with respect to treatment.  Their concerns parallel 
a growing recognition within the field that enhanced intervention success might be 
achieved through the adoption of a more tailored treatment.  “There would appear to be a 
need to develop more differentiated service responses determined by a detailed 
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assessment of the nature and causes of the offense, as well as the severity and risk of re-
offending occurring” (Day, Chung, & O‟Leary, 2009, p. 210).  Stakeholders, particularly 
police and probation officers, observed that the reasons why any particular man is 
abusive vary and that to ignore this diversity seems unwise.  They hypothesized that 
interventions might be more successful if detailed intake assessments were conducted and 
corresponding treatment assignments made.  
Unfortunately, as a result of the wide-spread adoption of state standards (Austin 
& Dankwort, 1999), batterer intervention programs may not be equipped to respond to 
the diverse needs of perpetrators.  Similar to mandatory arrest policies, state standards 
were initiated in order to promote consistency and prevent men who committed similar 
crimes from being sent to radically different and potentially dangerous treatment 
programs (Bennett & Piet, 1999; Gelles, 2001).  The result is that despite the range of 
theories that have been advanced to explain men‟s violence towards women, theories that 
observe the impact of physiological and biological forces (Green, 1999; Janssen, 
Nicholls, Stefanakis, Spidel, & Simpson, 2005; Rosenbaum et al., 1994), mental illness 
and psychopathology (Dutton, 1995; Ehrensaft, Moffitt & Caspi, 2004; Jasinski, 2000), 
substance abuse (Johnson, 2000; Langhirichsen-Rohlin, 2005; Quigley & Leonard, 2000; 
Schafer, Caetano & Cunradi, 2004; Stuart, Moore, Kahler & Ramsy, 2003; Tolman & 
Bennett, 1990), skill deficits, destructive relationship patterns (Anderson & Scholossberg, 
1999; Cook & Frantz-Cook, 1984; Neidig, Friedman, & Collins, 1995) and culture, race 
and class (Sanchez-Hucles & Dutton, 1999), most batterer intervention programs do not 
attend substantially to these issues.   
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This trend towards uniformity in batterer intervention programs has not been 
without critics.  Many have suggested that too little is known about what works in 
batterer intervention to force adherence to guidelines (Buttell & Carney, 2005; Corvo & 
Johnson, 2003; Fagan, 1996; Feder & Wilson, 2005; Holtzworth-Munroe, 2001; 
Lehmann & Simmons, 2009), while others have suggested that the dominant model being 
endorsed is problematic (Dutton & Corvo, 2006).  Gelles (2001) nicely summarizes these 
two concerns. 
There are two compelling arguments against the evolving trend of standards for 
intervention programs for men who batter.  The first argument is the simplest and 
least controversial: We simply do not know enough about which treatment 
programs are effective, for which men, and under what conditions to mandate 
standards for such programs.  The second argument is more complex and 
infinitely more controversial: The standards that are being called for, developed, 
and applied, represent a particular ideological commitment of those who work on 
behalf of battered women and are less tied to a therapeutic theory of philosophy 
(Gelles, 2001, p. 14). 
The ideological position that Gelles is referring to is the “patriarchy as cause” theory that 
mainstream domestic violence advocates have advanced to explain men‟s violence 
(Pence & Paymar, 1993; Schechter, 1982).  The argument that Gelles and others (Dutton 
& Corvo, 2006) have put forth is that while a socio-political analysis of domestic 
violence may be appropriate, it has limited therapeutic value.  As discussed in the 
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“punishment and rehabilitation” section, batterer intervention programs might need to 
focus more attention on first determining and then responding to how men change.   
  Stakeholders‟ impulse to try and match perpetrators with appropriate 
intervention programs appears to be supported by preliminary research suggesting that 
pairing perpetrators profiles with specific treatment strategies may enhance effectiveness.  
For example, Saunders (1996) randomly assigned 218 men to either a Feminist-
Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment (FCBT) model or a Process-Psychodynamic Treatment 
(PPT) model.  His results indicated that anti-social, substance-abusing men were far less 
likely to recidivate when assigned to FCBT (36%) as opposed to when they were 
assigned to PPT (53%).  Men with dependent personalities demonstrated the reverse 
pattern, such that they were more likely to recidivate when assigned to FCBT (52%) than 
when assigned to PPT (33%).  Similarly, Williams (1995) evaluated the impact of 
culturally focused batterer counseling on 41 African-American men in Minneapolis-St. 
Paul and reported that men in the culturally focused programs felt less isolated, were 
more comfortable engaging with the other participants, and had more positive feelings 
towards their counselors than men in conventional programs.  These findings suggest 
important advantages that culturally specific programs might have over mainstream 
batterer intervention programs for marginalized men.  Attending to perpetrators‟ drug and 
alcohol issues also appears promising (Stuart et al., 2003).  O‟Farrell & Murphy (1995) 
demonstrated a significant decrease in marital violence among perpetrators who ceased 
drinking following behavioral martial therapy alcoholism treatment in comparison to 
perpetrators who did not stop drinking following the treatment.  The real question 
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becomes how to provide consistency within and across programs while simultaneously 
attending appropriately to the diverse needs of batterers.   
In conclusion, stakeholders in the Portland CCR struggled to disentangle the 
benefits and drawbacks of consistency and variability with respect to perpetrators of 
domestic violence.  While most expressed reservations about the primacy of the “one size 
fits all” response and heavy reliance on the criminal justice system, they were not 
uniformly in favor of less consistency, particularly if the resulting variability equates to 
less accountability for perpetrators.  It may be that similar to the punishment and 
rehabilitation quandary, an optimal solution involves simultaneously enhancing both 
consistency and variability, a strategy that might require enhancing current strategies 
while engaging alternative approaches for intervening in men‟s domestic violence. 
Effectively protecting and empowering victims. Stakeholders in the Portland Tri-
County area expressed skepticism about the criminal justice system‟s ability to 
simultaneously protect and empower victims of domestic violence.  More accurately, 
they expressed dismay over the degree of disempowerment that victims experience in the 
name of “protection”.   They described how victims are essentially thrust into a 
relationship with the criminal justice system that bears a striking resemblance to the one 
they experienced with their abusive partners; one in which they are deprived of the 
authority to make decisions about their lives, bullied into participating in the prosecution 
of their abusers, and blamed for the abuse they endure.   
The grassroots domestic violence movement of the 1970‟s was focused on 
protecting and empowering battered women (Schechter, 1982).  Early mainstream 
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advocates sought to achieve women‟s protection through underground shelters 
(Schechter, 1982) and by challenging the criminal justice system to assist battered 
women (Pence & Shepard, 1999).  However, victim empowerment was equally 
paramount (Schechter, 1982).  “Battered women‟s rights to self-determination, including 
the decision to leave or stay with their husbands, were to be respected; if sexism robbed 
women of control over their lives, Women‟s Advocates would work on methods for 
returning it (Schechter, 1982, p. 63).   
Unfortunately, achieving a constructive balance between protection and 
empowerment for victims has been challenging under the rubric of current domestic 
violence intervention strategies.  Heavy reliance on and engagement of the criminal 
justice system to provide protection for victims has significantly hampered empowerment 
for individual women (DeKeserdy & Dragiewicz, 2007; DeLeon-Granados, et al., 2006; 
Erwin, 2006; Grauwiler & mills, 2004; Gulik, 2009; Mills, 1998, 1999; Romkens, 2006; 
van Wormer, 2009).  When advocates enlisted the criminal justice system on behalf of 
victims, they consciously engaged an institution that had been instrumental in 
maintaining social inequalities with the hope that by advocating for domestic violence 
victims‟ rights and subsequently changing the criminal justice response towards them, 
much needed institutional change would be achieved (Pence & Shepard, 1999).  Over 
time, it has become clear that engaging the criminal justice system on behalf of battered 
women has created a tension between “institutional advocacy” on the one hand and the 
desires of individual women on the other hand (Pence & Shepard, 1999). While some 
could convincingly argue that the “rights” of battered women as a whole are served by 
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advancing zero tolerance policies such as mandatory arrests and no-drop prosecution, 
according to local stakeholders the authority and power of individual women are 
regularly compromised by these very policies. 
Victims/survivors, advocates and perpetrators in the current study confirmed that 
victims have little say in whether arrests are made, charges are pressed, prosecutions are 
pursued, or “no contact” orders are released.  In other words, many of the criminal justice 
practices, (i.e., mandatory arrests, no-drop prosecutions and “no contact” orders issued by 
the courts), originally advanced in the service of protecting victims (Jordan, 2004; Mears 
et al., 2001; Orchowsky, 1999; Weisz et al., 1998) have not only failed to provide 
security, but they have fundamentally alienated and disregarded victims (Belknap, 2007; 
Burford & Adams, 2204; Buzawa & Austin, 1993; Ford, 2003; Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; 
Guzik, 2009; McDermott & Garofalo, 2004; Mills,1998; Ms. Foundation for Women, 
2003; Orchowsky, 1999).  Most disturbing, perhaps, is the realization that these policies 
have confined victims in ways that are all too familiar to them. 
The strong alliances between the domestic violence movement and the police  
replicates, on a societal level, the relationship between the battered woman and 
her abuser…. [sic] The woman turns to a powerful man for protection from a 
hostile and frightening world, yet this domestic sanctuary increasingly closes in 
on her, restricting her range of movement (Mankowski et al., 2002, p. 191) 
This assertion, that current practices have replicated an abusive relationship for 
victims, was thoughtfully articulated by Linda Mills‟ in her 1999 article, entitled Killing 
her softly: Intimate abuse and the violence of state intervention. In it, Mills details the 
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disturbing nature of the relationship between victims and the state, suggesting that 
mandatory domestic violence policies and practices actually inflict emotional violence on 
victims by depriving them of respect and empowerment.  It is interesting to note that in 
1993, Buzawa & Austin interviewed 80 domestic violence victims about their 
experiences with the police and reported that one of the factors that best determined 
whether or not victims were satisfied with the criminal justice system‟s response was the 
degree to which their preferences regarding arrests were honored (regardless of whether 
their preference was to arrest or not to arrest).  In other words, what mattered most was 
whether a victim was treated as an agent of her own life, an equal partner, capable of 
making safe and rational choices about her safety.  Buzawa & Austin cautioned that 
wide-spread adoption of mandatory arrest policies would ultimately eliminate victim 
discretion. 
Victims/survivors in the present study were particularly frustrated by the fact that 
they had little or no say in the prosecution of their batterers.  They explained that they 
were not consulted or even communicated with by the district attorney‟s office and were 
frequently confused about how best to secure their desired outcome.  Participants testified 
more than once that they thought they had taken the necessary steps to prosecute their 
abusers, only to find out later that they had not.  Clear and accurate communication was 
difficult for victims to secure; they reported getting the “run-around” or not being able to 
get a straight answer from representatives at the courthouse.  Victim advocates in the 
Portland Tri-County area confirmed these experiences and expressed distress over the 
fact that the system is so difficult for clients to navigate.  Similar frustrations have been 
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reported by victims in other communities (Grauwiler, 2007).  Peggy Grauwiler conducted 
multiple, in-depth semi-structured interviews with ten women who had had various 
contact with the domestic violence system in New York City.  Among many other 
frustrations, these women reported “the run around effect” (p. 315).  These women noted 
that they would receive conflicting answers to the same questions and were subject to 
“apathy, indifference and inadequate response amongst criminal justice personnel (i.e., 
judges, police and court staff)” (p.315).  
Ironically, mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies may actually serve 
to increase rates of domestic violence when victims avoid contacting the criminal justice 
system out of fear that they will no longer be in control.  Several advocates in the present 
study pointed out that knowing that once a victim contacts the police she is essentially 
turning over control over her life to the criminal justice system is enough to dissuade 
some victims from enlisting support from dominant domestic violence intervention 
vehicles altogether. This unintended consequence has also been articulated by others in 
the field.   
It has been argued that mandatory arrest undermines women‟s autonomy and even 
violently disempowers them because they are forced onto a trajectory that might 
be against their own wishes and interests.  The prospect of invoking a full-fledged 
criminal justice intervention where the victim has to testify against her abuser can 
make women reluctant to call the police, thereby depriving them of protection 
(Mills, 1998, 1999) (Romkens, 2006, p. 160).   
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Of course, victims are not always “ignored” by the criminal justice system.  In 
fact, according to stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County area, they are often bullied into 
participating in prosecution of their perpetrators even if they want nothing to do with the 
case.  Whether they want distance from the case for emotional, psychological or physical 
safety reasons, their wishes are regularly disregarded and they are frequently coerced into 
participation.  One advocate described how one of her clients was essentially stalked with 
multiple threatening phone calls by the district attorney.  According to Ford (2003), this 
type of behavior is becoming commonplace among prosecutors. 
It has become increasingly common for prosecutors to use [sic] coercion on 
victims: Victims are forced to participate in criminal justice proceedings under 
threat of criminal sanctions.  In some jurisdictions, victims are told that they must 
participate and that if they fail to appear, they will be subject to arrest” (p.669).   
Clearly coercion by the criminal justice system deprives the victim of control, just as she 
was deprived of control in her violent intimate relationship (Ford, 2003; Mills, 1997).   
The most common manifestation of victim disempowerment reported by 
stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County area was the rampant proliferation of victim 
blaming.  Every stakeholder group, except perpetrators, identified wide-spread victim 
blaming within the system.  According to stakeholder testimony, victims are blamed for 
choosing abusive partners, for staying in the relationship with abusive partners, for not 
calling the police, for calling the police too often, for not pressing charges, for not 
participating in prosecution, for allowing their abusers to violate “no contact” orders and 
for reconciling with their abusive partners.  Police and probation officers were candid in 
Chapter Six: Discussion 344 
 
 
acknowledging that regardless of their training and experience and despite the fact that 
most of them are aware of the fact that contextual factors such as lack of sufficient 
housing, childcare, and employment often force women to choose between their physical 
and financial safety, they are often guilty of blaming the victim for her situation, 
especially if there are children involved.  Unfortunately, this type of victim blaming is not 
confined to Portland police and probation officers.  Grauwiler (2008) reports that 
“participants stated that they were frequently treated as though they were the „criminal‟, 
or that the violence was their fault by responding police officers, judges and other court 
personnel” (p.315).   
Why, after 30 years of activism and education around domestic violence, is victim 
blaming still so prevalent?  Social psychologists explain the phenomenon of victim 
blaming as stemming from defensive attributions and a belief in a just world (Aronson, 
Wilson, & Akert, 1994).  People want to believe that the world is a safe place where 
people get what they deserve.  The logical extension of this belief is a tendency to 
attribute crimes or tragedies to deficits in victims‟ abilities or characters.  In other words, 
bystanders tend to “blame the victim” for their situation (Burger, 1981; Lerner & 
Simmons, 1966; Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966).   
By using this attributional bias, the perceiver does not have to acknowledge that 
there is a certain randomness in life, that an accident or criminal may be waiting 
just around the corner for an innocent person – like oneself.  The belief in a just 
world keeps anxious thoughts about one‟s own safety at bay (Aronson et al., 
1994, p. 191).  
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It is reasonable to assume that stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County area may be 
attributing blame to victims in order to protect their belief in a just and safe world.   
However, for many of the stakeholders I interviewed, their inclination to blame the 
victim also seemed linked with their own feelings of impotence with respect to 
successfully intervening in domestic violence.  They reported feeling helpless to protect 
women and frustrated when women did not appear to help themselves, as well as 
hopelessness about the potential to rehabilitate perpetrators.  It may be psychologically 
easier for members of the CCR to make internal attributions (Heider, 1958) about the 
character failings of victims and perpetrators rather than accept ownership for the ways in 
which the system (of which they are a part) is failing.  
Balancing the goals of creating institutional change for battered women, while 
simultaneously providing protection and empowerment for individual women, has 
become increasingly difficult within a domestic violence intervention system that relies 
so heavily on the criminal justice system.  Testimony collected from stakeholders in the 
Portland Tri-County area suggests that the costs for individual women for depending 
almost exclusively on the criminal justice system to respond to abusive men are great.  
The fact that increasing engagement of the state on behalf of domestic violence victims 
has not been more successful in equalizing power and agency for female victims will 
likely not surprise radical feminists (Brown, 1995).  As Catharine MacKinnon (1989) 
illuminated in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, the liberal state is fundamentally 
sexist and “the rule of law – neutral, abstract, elevated, pervasive – both institutionalizes 
the power of men over women and institutionalizes power in its male form” (p. 238).  In 
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other words, it may have been misguided for advocates to depend so heavily on a state 
institution to intervene in domestic violence given that they theorize intimate violence 
against women to be both a symptom and illustration of patriarchy.  In the immortalized 
words of Audre Lorde (1984), “the master‟s tools will never dismantle the master‟s 
house” (p. 110).  
Moving beyond reactivity towards prevention. Stakeholders in the Portland Tri-
County CCR suggested a fourth tension that heavy reliance on the criminal justice system 
to intervene in men‟s domestic violence exacerbates: the tension between reacting to an 
individual man‟s violence against an individual woman and developing strategies to 
prevent men‟s violence against women.  Community psychologists differentiate between 
these two strategies, labeling the first, “tertiary prevention,” (Fried, Reppucci & Woolard, 
2000) in that it is geared at preventing destructive behavior in people who have already 
exhibited it, and the second, “primary prevention,” in that it is oriented towards groups, 
occurs prior to the actual problems and is aimed at securing or strengthening the mental 
health of those who are not yet affected (Cowen, 1996).  Stakeholders were disturbed by 
the fact that current efforts almost exclusively target individuals who have been abusive, 
a clear illustration of tertiary prevention, despite the wide-spread acceptance of a socio-
political analysis of the root causes of domestic violence which suggest that prevention 
should target institutional levels of analysis.  They were vexed by the fact that a 
disproportionate amount of resources are currently devoted to “crisis” management rather 
than prevention education or provision of vital basic resources.   
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Stakeholders noted that despite the dominance of societal level theories linking 
patriarchy to men‟s violence towards their intimate partners (Dobash & Dobash, 1992; 
Pence  & Paymar, 1993), current strategies for intervening with men‟s violence rarely 
focus on societal or institutional levels of change.  They attributed this lack of focus to a 
shortage of resources, though a few suggested that while scarce resources certainly 
contribute to or enable this focus, the reality is that the current attention to tertiary 
prevention reflects a choice or prioritization within the field.  As reviewed in Chapter 
Two, Lehrner & Allen (2009) and others (Erwin, 2006) have suggested that this shift in 
focus from a more explicitly political analysis of domestic violence to a fundamentally 
individual level analysis may be attributable to the dominance of the criminal justice 
system.  “Although the early days of the battered women‟s movement explicitly linked 
violence and gender subordination, this understanding has been transformed by 
increasing criminal justice intervention that introduces gender-neutral legal standards” 
(Erwin, 2006, p. 199). The tenet of this argument is that alignment with the criminal 
justice system, with its propensity to evaluate individuals divested of context or 
circumstance, has prompted a shift away from examining and addressing influencing 
factors at the socio-political level (factors such as patriarchy, racial and class oppression).   
Historically, domestic violence advocates sat outside of the CJS and offered a 
critique of its policies and practices.  They were among the first to identify the culpability 
of the criminal justice system in the victimization of women at the hands of their intimate 
male partners (Hovell et al., 2006; Schechter, 1982), and to subsequently demand, insist 
and lobby for policy shifts (Shepard & Pence, 1999). Today, the situation has changed 
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and victim advocates are far more likely to work in collaboration with the CJS 
(McDermott & Garofalo, 2004).   
As a result of movement agencies‟ dependence on public dollars and of the 
opportunity to collaborate with powerful system stakeholders, movement veterans 
argued that leaders and agencies have begun to “pull their punches” to remain 
viable.  Although movement agencies need government funding to survive, some 
argued that survival has come at a cost to the movement‟s social change agenda 
(Lehrner & Allen, 2009, p. 666). 
It has been argued that victim advocacy has in some ways become co-opted by 
powerful system stakeholders like the criminal justice system (Erwin, 2006; Lehrner & 
Allen, 2009; McDermott & Garofalo, 2004; Pence 2001).  It has even been suggested that 
advocates have lost their passion for social change as a result of the many improvements 
over the past twenty years in the CJS‟s response to domestic violence (Lehrner & Allen, 
2009).  Of course, others continue to successfully contend that engaging the criminal 
justice system on behalf of battered women represents a societal level strategy 
(McDermott & Garofalo, 2004; Pence & Shepard, 1999); however, participants in the 
current study seemed more inclined to view the CJS as a strategy directed primarily at 
individuals.   
Despite the suggestion that victim advocacy has become institutionalized 
(Shepard, 1999) with many advocates now viewing domestic violence as a “depoliticized, 
degendered phenomenon” (Lehrner & Allen, 2009, p. 662), this does not appear to be the 
case among Portland advocates.  The women I interviewed were clear that a socio-
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political analysis was appropriate in order to understand domestic violence, but lamented 
that due to the “crisis-oriented” nature of their work, their day-to-day activities are 
primarily reactive and focused on helping individual women survive.  Advocates and 
providers acknowledged that if they weren‟t so focused on tertiary prevention, they might 
be able to more fully participate or engage in primary prevention efforts, particularly in 
the form of training for medical and religious and prevention education in the schools.   
The most ardently discussed missed prevention opportunity raised by stakeholders 
involved providing vital basic needs such as housing, child care, and employment for 
both perpetrators and victims.   Stakeholders were quite clear that until these basic needs 
are fulfilled, domestic violence will continue to plague their communities.  Officers and 
advocates pointed out that focusing on enhancing or improving criminal justice sanctions 
without attending to these vital human rights is woefully short-sided.  Victims will not 
choose to engage sanctions if the end result means that she cannot feed or house her 
children.  “U.S. best practices such as increasing law enforcement responses or 
aggressive prosecution polices often fail to take into account or respond to the numerous 
needs of women who are battered, including long-term housing, economic support, or 
child care” (Erwin, 2006, p. 199).  Additionally, stakeholders suggested that perpetrators 
will be unable to respect and abide by the sanctions (e.g., attendance in mandated BIPs 
and honoring “no contact” orders) if they do not have critical resources such as housing 
and employment. 
In conclusion, it appears as though stakeholders feel stuck reacting to domestic 
violence, rather than preventing it.  Their personal dilemmas illuminate a larger challenge 
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or tension facing the field.  Relying on the criminal justice system to intervene in men‟s 
abuse has supported and endorsed strategies focused on the individual level of analysis, 
rather than preventative and activist strategies which would more directly target the 
societal or institutional level of analysis.  Elizabeth Pleck (1987) comments on this 
phenomenon in her review of the development family violence social policy.  
Specifically, she acknowledges the de-politicizing impact that coalitions with federal 
state institutions have had the domestic violence movement.  “No social movement 
survives the process of community acceptance with all of its radical ideas intact.  The 
battered women‟s cause had been considerably tamed by the coalitions and compromises 
it made in order to receive state and federal funding” (Pleck, 1987, p. 199).  It may be 
that as activists critically reflect on the costs associated with some of the coalitions that 
have been forged, revitalized activism and prevention efforts will return to center stage.   
Summary. Thanks to the enthusiasm and willingness of key stakeholders in the 
Portland Tri-County CCR to share their opinions, the first goal of this project was readily 
achieved.  A number of limitations affecting the effectiveness of domestic violence 
intervention with abusive men were described during the focus group discussions.  
Drawing on a systems approach to synthesize and organize their comments, seven 
thematic challenges that operate together to manifest the attribute “limited effectiveness” 
of the system were identified.  These seven challenges illuminated four fundamental 
tensions or dilemmas that are created by heavy reliance on the criminal justice system to 
intervene in domestic violence: the difficulty of 1) blending the goals of punishment and 
rehabilitation, 2) balancing consistency with an individually tailored response, 3) 
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effectively protecting and empowering victims, and 4) moving beyond reactivity towards 
prevention.  Continuing to critically reflect on these tensions or dilemmas will likely 
create opportunities for enhancing intervention efforts with abusive men.   
Project Goal Two 
The second goal of this project was to identify and describe additional 
opportunities for engaging community resources in domestic violence intervention with 
abusive men.  It is noteworthy that, when asked, key stakeholders within the Portland Tri-
County CCR described an intervention response limited primarily to the criminal justice 
system.  Every group referenced police responding to crisis calls and making arrests, 
district attorneys prosecuting perpetrators, and courts assigning probation and mandating 
attendance in batterer intervention programs.  Advocates, victims, and providers also 
acknowledged the role of the Department of Human Services: Child Welfare, while 
officers, advocates and providers briefly mentioned the existence of victim services and 
community outreach to the religious and medical communities.   
When asked directly about resources in the community that they would like to see 
involved in intervening in men‟s violence against women, stakeholders suggested missed 
opportunities at the institutional/organization level, the social/group level and the 
individual level of analysis (see Figure 6).   









INSTITUTIONAL/ORGANIZATION LEVEL SUGGESTIONS 
 
 Enhance domestic violence training and screening for religious 
organizations, health care system and community at large 
 Launch a campaign similar to M.A.D.D. to galvanize citizens and promote 
better bystander behaviors 
 Provide prevention education, particularly within the schools 
 Utilize the media in the form of PSAs and Internet Pop-ups to raise 
awareness about domestic violence and what constitutes abusive behavior 
 Reduce the amount of violence on TV, particularly violence against 
women 
 Engage the workplace to better protect victims and hold men more 
accountable for their abusive behavior 
 Increase availability of resources addressing the basic needs of victims 
and perpetrators  
 Augment community compassion for perpetrators; particularly with 
respect to providing employment opportunities 
 
SOCIAL/GROUP LEVEL SUGGESTIONS 
 
 Neighborhood policing 
 Free drop-in youth programs 
 In-patient treatment programs for perpetrators 
 On-line registry of perpetrators 
 Enlist men and former perpetrators to help shift community 
attitudes towards women 
 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SUGGESTIONS 
 
 Require perpetrators to pay for their children to 
attend special summer camps in order to help 
break the cycle of violence 
 Mandatory pre-marital counseling 
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At the institutional/organization level, stakeholders discussed the benefits of enhanced 
training for religious and medical personnel, the exciting possibilities linked with 
launching a campaign similar to M.A.D.D. in order to galvanize citizens and promote 
better bystander behaviors, and the critical need to provide prevention education, 
particularly within the schools. Most stakeholders also suggested that the media could be 
better utilized to dispel myths about domestic violence, provide facts and basic 
information in order to raise awareness about what constitutes abusive behavior, and help 
decrease the community‟s tolerance of violence towards women.  Victims also discussed 
the advantages of engaging the workplace in order to better protect them and help hold 
abusive men accountable for their behavior.  Finally, every stakeholder group noted the 
importance of increasing the availability of vital resources in order to better meet the 
basic needs of victims and perpetrators, with perpetrators specifically suggesting that they 
would benefit from community compassion in the form of employment opportunities.   
At the social/group level of analysis, stakeholders suggested the creation and 
utilization of neighborhood policing, free drop-in youth programs, in-patient violence 
abatement programs for perpetrators, and an on-line registry of abusive men that would 
be accessible to the public.  Providers and advocates also suggested enlisting men and 
former perpetrators to help shift community attitudes regarding women.  At the 
individual level of analysis, victims suggested having perpetrators pay for their children 
to attend special summer camps in order to help break the cycle of violence and 
perpetrators discussed the potential advantages of mandating pre-marital counseling. 
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Stakeholders‟ suggestions for how to better engage the community were creative, 
diverse and spanned multiple levels of analysis.  The fact that their suggestions were 
relatively undeveloped in terms of specific details, in comparison to the rest of their 
comments, may be a function of their allegiance and involvement with current strategies, 
or it may simply reflect the fact that it is far easier to critique existing modes of 
intervention than to provide specifics regarding ideas that in their minds have yet to come 
to fruition.  It is exciting to observe that their suggestions seem to coincide with emerging 
practices in the field, examples of which may provide some of the missing detail.   In 
particular, there is growing awareness of the prevention and intervention opportunities 
that exist within health care settings, the educational system, and the workplace.  
The health care system has been a popular recent target of domestic intervention 
efforts due, in part, to the fact that so many victims of domestic violence seek medical 
help either in emergency rooms or primary care settings (Murphy & Ouimet, 2008).  The 
National Institute of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2000) 
estimates that each year approximately 480,000 visits are made to emergency rooms as a 
result of domestic violence.  Unfortunately, despite wide-spread support for universal 
health care screening in order to identify and provide vital support to victims (Murphy & 
Ouimet, 2008; Thackeray, Stelzner, Downs, & Miller, 2007), this practice has not yet 
been fully actualized.  Thackeray et al. (2007) reported that in their sample of 140 self-
identified victims, less than 40% were screened by a health care professional for 
interpersonal violence and only 1% of those screened received information about relevant 
resources.  This finding resonates with statements made by victims/survivors in the 
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current study who reported that they were not asked by medical personnel about violence 
despite strong evidence suggesting that they might have been abused.   
Several barriers to universal screening have been identified, many of them linked 
to concerns that health care providers have about exacerbating the violence or alienating 
their patients because they believe they lack the skills to appropriately deal with victims 
of violence (Allen, Lehrner, Mattison, Miles, & Russell, 2007; Sugg, 2006).  It may be 
that innovative strategies are needed if universal screenings are to be more successfully 
implemented.  For example, Murphy and Oimet (2008) have proposed that social workers 
collaborate with health care settings and provide on-site assessments, interventions and 
referrals in order to mitigate some of the concerns described above. Others have 
suggested the use of technology in order to address barriers. Hawkins, Pearce, Skeith, 
Dimitruck & Roche (2009) reviewed a large scale project to “wed” technology with 
health care professionals‟ knowledge and skills in order to expedite screening and 
intervention for domestic violence.  They concluded that: 
Increased electronic sharing of information reduced redundancy in screening for 
domestic abuse and neglect and in collection of health information.  Not only did 
technology reduce time in responding to patients at risk, but it also reduced the 
stress on patients created by having to repeat their stories to several health care 
providers (p. 65).     
It is likely that as these and other innovations are explored and adopted, the resources of 
the health care system can be better optimized to intervene in domestic violence. 
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The educational system has also been a popular target for primary prevention and 
to some extent intervention efforts (Wekerele & Wolfe, 1999).  Paralleling comments 
made by local stakeholders, Wolfe & Jaffe (1999) report that school-based awareness and 
skill development programs provide an important venue through which to reach children 
and can be effective in reducing future incidents of domestic violence.  They document 
the following key elements for a successful school-based program: 
Identifying relationship violence as a form of societal violence; acknowledging 
that domestic violence is an abuse of power and control; creating a high enough 
level of trust so that children can disclose exposure to domestic violence and 
teachers can make appropriate referrals; teaching safety skills about what to do 
when domestic violence occurs; and encouraging the development of social skills 
such as anger management and conflict resolution as alternatives to violence (p. 
139).   
Initial evaluations of the effectiveness of school-based dating prevention programs reveal 
that students not only increase their knowledge about dating violence, but experience 
positive attitudinal changes with respect to abuse and relationship conflict.  Furthermore, 
there is some evidence to indicate that participants self-report less “offending” behaviors 
after completing programs than do control subjects (Wekerle & Wolfe, 1999).   
In addition to traditional school-based prevention programs that involve 
essentially “mini-trainings” to students and teachers, there is a growing trend towards 
providing support groups within schools for targeted individuals.  In programs of this 
nature, students who are identified by school officials as being “at risk” for violence 
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either because of their family histories or their own personal dating histories are invited 
to attend a weekly support group facilitated by counselors from local domestic or sexual 
violence agencies.  Expect Respect, a teen dating violence prevention program, is an 
example of this type of effort (Ball, Kerig, & Rosenbluth, 2009).  Initial results from a 
qualitative exploration of this particular program suggest that students learned new 
communication and anger management skills, while also increasing their knowledge 
about healthy relationships and the warning signs of abuse within dating relationships.  
Additionally, students reported becoming more aware of their own abusive behaviors 
(Balll, Kerig, & Rosenbluth, 2009).  Clearly, these preliminary evaluation findings 
suggest that stakeholder‟s impassioned requests to augment domestic violence prevention 
education within the schools warrant continued consideration. 
 Discussions regarding the spillover or impact of domestic violence on the 
workplace, as well as the opportunities for prevention and intervention that lie therein, 
have surged in recent years (Mankowski, Galvez, Rollins, Hanson, Perrin, & Glass, 2009; 
Swanberg, Logan, & Macke, 2005; Swanberg, Macke, & Logan, 2007).  Research reveals 
that between 36% and 75% of victims are harassed by their abusers while at work 
(Shepard & Pence, 1988; Swanberg, Macke & Logan, 2005) and murder by a current or 
former intimate partner accounts for 20% of women‟s workplace deaths (US Department 
of Labor, 1997).  Additionally, victims are often absent (46%) or experience reduced 
productivity (71%) as a result of the violence in their lives (Swanberg, Macke & Logan, 
2005).  In the face of these sobering statistics, workplace policies are becoming 
increasingly common.  Swanberg et al. (2005) suggest that workplace domestic violence 
Chapter Six: Discussion 358 
 
 
policies focus on prevention, protection and assistance by including the following 
strategies: Prevention can be enhanced through the adoption of zero tolerance policies 
with regard to violent behavior.  Protection can be augmented by establishing 
confidential avenues through which employees can reach out for assistance and by 
offering regular training about the signs and indicators of violence.  Finally, victims can 
be greatly assisted by the development of personnel policies that accommodate the 
specific needs that victims frequently have – such as paid time off, flex-time or 
workplace relocation.   
There has been less written about the ways in which the workplace can be 
mobilized to hold perpetrators of domestic violence accountable, a strategy that was 
advocated for by local stakeholders.  However, a recent survey of perpetrators 
participating in batterer intervention programs throughout Oregon revealed that the 
majority of their employer‟s (79%) were aware of their violence (Mankowski et al., 
2009).  Mankowski et al. (2009) suggest that with adequate training and information 
about local resources, employers could be empowered to assist and intervene with both 
victims and perpetrators. 
 It is rewarding to realize that not only were stakeholders able to identify and 
describe multiple innovative opportunities for engaging community resources, but they 
specifically advocated for opportunities that are authenticated by burgeoning practices in 
the field.   
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Project Goal Three 
The project‟s third goal involved creating opportunities for key stakeholders 
within the domestic violence system to dialogue about its limitations and in doing so, 
facilitate possibilities for action and change.  Drawing on the field of action research 
(Burman, 2004; Dobash & Dobash, 1988; Sullivan, Bhuyan, Senturia, Shiu-Thornton, & 
Ciske, 2005; Stringer, 1996), I speculated that using focus groups might ignite shifts or 
changes.  My hope was that by bringing stakeholders together in a safe environment to 
discuss their concerns about domestic violence intervention, ideas about how to improve 
the system would emerge and that these same stakeholders might then take it upon 
themselves to initiate change consistent with these ideas.  Unfortunately, participants 
were so eager to name and describe limitations of the current system that conversations 
about how these limitations could be redressed did not occur during the groups.  As will 
be discussed in the limitations section, it might have been helpful to structurally create 
space for this purpose, perhaps in the form of a question about what focus group 
participants might do to improve current strategies.  
This project did, however, meet the objective of facilitating opportunities for key 
members of the domestic violence intervention system to critically reflect on their 
practices.  Reflecting in this way on the challenges and limitations associated with current 
domestic violence intervention strategies very likely invoked internal changes.  Johnson 
(1998) refers to this time of utilization as process use, where behavioral and cognitive 
changes occur in persons involved in the evaluation as a result of their participation.  It 
was clear, based on their exuberance, that participants enjoyed having the opportunity to 
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share their thoughts and reflections with one another and with me.   Victims and 
perpetrators seemed particularly impacted.  In one of the survivor focus groups, the co-
moderator and I unsuccessfully tried to “end” the group when the allotted time was 
reached, only to find the participants unwilling to release the space.  They wanted to keep 
sharing their stories with us and with each other.  Similarly, in one of the perpetrator 
groups, a gentleman shared that the focus group experience was the best session of his 
treatment program because I was really listening to him and soliciting his input.    
I am confident that once a final executive summary is shared, a new level of 
dialogue or enlightenment (Johnson, 1988; Weiss, 1998) about the collectively perceived 
barriers to more effective domestic violence intervention with abusive men will occur.   
Participants repeatedly commented about their eagerness to hear what other stakeholders 
had to say with respect to the questions I posed.  Their interest in the study findings is 
further indicated by the fact that 64% of the professional stakeholders requested that I 
mail them a copy of the executive summary, despite the fact that to do so meant they had 
to provide me with contact information that I had not previously solicited due to 
confidentiality concerns.  Finally, my advisory committee members remain quite anxious 
to receive a project summary that they can circulate, believing that it will prompt useful 
dialogue within the Portland Tri-County domestic violence intervention communities. 
Limitations of the Project 
Before discussing the implications of this research, I want to acknowledge several 
design limitations that likely restrict the impact of my study.  First and foremost, it 
became abundantly clear after conducting just a handful of focus groups that key 
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stakeholder populations were missing.  Restricted resources prevented me from 
broadening my initial sample; however, I suspect that much would have been learned if I 
had also been able to solicit input from district attorneys, judges and social workers from 
the Department of Human Services: Child Welfare.  These three stakeholder groups were 
repeatedly identified by participants as key members of the CCR and were frequently 
targeted as problematic with respect to successful intervention.  Future explorations may 
want to include their reflections.  Additionally, it may have been useful to gather data 
from stakeholders outside of the traditional CCR (i.e., religious leaders, employers, 
medical personnel).  It is possible that organizational representatives not involved with 
the CCR may have been able to provide provocative feedback, particularly with respect 
to how the larger community can better be utilized to intervene with abusive men.   
Additionally, a few characteristics of the actual study informants need to be 
acknowledged and recognized for the impact they may have on the material that I 
gathered and analyzed.  For example, many of the victims who participated in the focus 
groups were actually mandated by the Department of Human Services to attend victim 
support groups.  The trend to mandate support services to victims is a rather new and still 
controversial one, and I was quite surprised to learn how many of the women I 
interviewed were participating in their support group because of a mandate from DHS.  It 
is likely that these women felt somewhat coerced by the “system” and their bitterness and 
negatively towards current domestic violence intervention strategies may have been 
exacerbated as a result.   Additionally, most of the women I interviewed were likely still 
dealing with the emotional scars of their victimization.   It is possible that had I 
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interviewed women who were five or more years into their survivor-hood, less frustration 
and disappointment may have accompanied their accounts.   
As I mentioned earlier, the victim advocacy groups were far smaller than I think 
would have been ideal.  It was extremely challenging to get adequate representation.  I 
speculate that this was either due to the intense workload of these professionals or 
because advocates chose not to prioritize research on intervening with abusive men.  
Regardless of the reason for the smaller sample size, it is conceivable that those women 
who did carve out the time to participate in the focus groups were more likely to have 
significant concerns about the present system than those advocates who chose not to 
participate.  In other words, it is possible that there are advocates in the Portland Tri-
County community who feel quite favorable about current intervention strategies with 
abusive men and consequently did not feel compelled to participate in the research.   
It is also important to contextualize the comments of the perpetrators.  The men 
who participated in the study were currently in the throes of completing their mandated 
programs.  It is reasonable to suspect that if I had interviewed men who had successfully 
completed their programs or men who were arrested, but perhaps not convicted and sent 
to intervention programs, different opinions and perspectives with respect to current 
strategies may have emerged.  The men I interviewed were certainly more likely to find 
the topic of limitations of current strategies highly emotionally charged.  I don‟t believe 
that any of these sample characteristics diminish the relevance or importance of the 
findings; however, it is important to remain cognizant of their potential impact. 
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While focus groups were highly appropriate given the purpose of the project and 
are uniquely capable of capturing emergent discourse among participants, I found them 
more limited in their ability to secure in-depth information than one-on-one interviews.  
For instance, it was sometimes difficult to follow-up on individual comments made 
during the discussions because of the animated and lively exchanges occurring.  
Participants were often so excited to provide additional support for an idea offered by a 
colleague that I struggled to probe more deeply.  For example, when brainstorming about 
how else to involve the community in intervening with abusive men, participants rapidly 
listed institutions such as religion or the medical field, and before I could ask how they 
envision these institutions being more fully engaged, another participant would concur 
and offer a similar list. Future research might include opportunities to conduct follow-up 
interviews with focus group participants in order to more deeply explore topics that were 
either marginalized or only cursorily addressed.   Another set of challenges for this 
project stem from the research questions themselves.  To begin with, I asked participants 
to think in atypical ways about domestic violence intervention.  Traditionally in this field, 
evaluation questions have been orientated towards assessing the efficacy of a specific 
component or program.  Rarely have stakeholders been asked to describe and evaluate 
what is not working on a systemic level.  It proved a slightly more difficult task for 
informants to constructively critique domestic violence intervention as a whole, rather 
than to point out ways in which specific components of the intervention are failing to be 
properly implemented.  In addition, I twice asked participants to hold two ideas (one of 
them abstract) in their minds and discuss the gaps or discrepancies between them.  This 
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proved to be a challenge for many of the participants.  Future research interested in 
garnering similar information might spend more time prepping and guiding the 
participants.  For example, if I had used a flipchart to record their responses regarding the 
causes of men‟s abuse and another flipchart to record their reporting of the limitations 
impacting the efficacy of domestic violence intervention with abusive men, it might have 
been easier to guide participants through a discussion of the gaps or discrepancies 
between their responses.   
Finally, my inability to more fully document achievement of my third project 
goal, facilitating possibilities for action and change by creating opportunities for key 
stakeholders to dialogue about the limitations of domestic violence intervention with 
abusive men, reflects a flaw in the project‟s design.  While I was able to speculate about 
the ways in which the focus group discussions empowered stakeholders based on the 
comments they made during and after our meetings, a more formalized assessment tool 
would have enhanced my ability to identify specific intentions.  Future research hoping to 
instigate a similar outcome would benefit from the addition of either follow-up interviews 
or a follow-up survey with participants to solicit tangible examples of how they were 
compelled to action as a result of the focus group discussions.  Additionally, it might 
have been helpful to add a question specifically targeting possibilities for action.  So 
much of the conversation focused on what was not working that participants really did 
not have an opportunity during the focus group to reflect or brainstorm about what they 
could do to improve current strategies. 




Implications for theory 
Despite the limitations described above, this project presents exciting implications 
for theory, practice and research.  With respect to theory, the project endeavored to ask 
one primary question: Has the domestic violence movement fallen victim to the 
ecological fallacy?  Testimony provided by stakeholders in the Portland Tri-County CCR 
suggests that the answer may be “yes”, for in order to avoid the ecological fallacy 
(Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974), the levels of analysis between our problem 
definition and our interventions must align.   
Stakeholders in the current project identified antecedents for men‟s domestic 
violence on multiple levels of analysis.  They discussed institutional forces such as 
patriarchy, restricted gender roles, culture, race and class.  They described social or group 
level forces such as peer modeling, the intergenerational transmission of violence, and 
destructive couple dynamics and they noted the influence of individual level forces like 
drugs and alcohol, skill deficits, impulse control, and mental illness.  With respect to 
intervention strategies however, stakeholders identified a primarily individual level 
response, one that depends heavily on the criminal justice system to hold individual men 
accountable for their abuse by arresting, prosecuting, and mandating that they attend 
batterer intervention programs.  So while stakeholders defined the problem of domestic 
violence (i.e., they identified antecedents for men‟s violence) on multiple levels of 
analysis, they reported that current strategies are focused primarily on the individual 
level.  This mismatch results in a clear demonstration of the ecological fallacy and may 
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partially account for the limited effectiveness of current domestic violence intervention 
strategies.    
Stakeholders seemed well aware of missed opportunities to better align 
intervention strategies with antecedents of men‟s violence.  As reviewed in response to 
Project Goal Two (see Figure 6), they noted that intervention opportunities abound at the 
institutional level (i.e., within religious organizations, the health care system, the schools, 
and workplaces), at the social or group level (i.e., enlisting men and former perpetrators 
to help shift community attitudes, neighborhood policing, on-line perpetrator registries) 
and at the individual level (i.e., by attending more specifically to victims‟ and 
perpetrators‟ specific histories and basic needs).  It seems reasonable to conclude that if 
the coordinated “community” response were to better expand beyond the criminal justice 
system to incorporate some of these opportunities, the ecological fallacy would be 
avoided and the system might experience enhanced effectiveness.  
It may be helpful to revisit why multi-level intervention responses have not been 
more fully explored and implemented.  It seems clear that the theoretical constriction 
within the field, namely the strong endorsement of a simplified version of “patriarchy as 
cause” to explain men‟s violence, has focused activists and practitioners on interventions 
that target individual men‟s choices rather than targeting schools, religious organizations, 
the state and federal government, or the media as institutions responsible for upholding 
patriarchal values.  Once the “patriarchy as cause” explanation for men‟s violence 
became reduced to the issue of “choice”, the intervention focus turned to holding men 
“accountable” for that choice (Haaken, 2010).  If domestic violence is a choice, then the 
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best way to stop men from making that choice is to hold them “accountable” for their 
choices by imposing sanctions that remind them and everyone else that choosing abuse of 
an intimate partner will not be tolerated.  Until mainstream discourse about the 
antecedents of domestic violence shifts from this narrow translation of “patriarchy as 
cause” to a more encompassing one, one that is better equipped to incorporate the 
intersectionality of race and class (Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 1994; Haaken, 2010; 
Ritchie, 2000) as well as the influence of group and individual level forces, intervention 
options will be stunted.  Feminist activists initially hoped that a political analysis of 
men‟s violence would position them to lobby on a variety of fronts for women‟s civil 
rights and it is disheartening to realize that the dominant translation of their analysis 
seems to have obscured this potential.   
Of course, theoretical constriction is only partially responsible for the limited 
intervention strategies evident in the Portland Tri-County area.  Over the years, anti-
violence activists have marginalized certain approaches because they were deemed 
dangerous or problematic (Adams, 1988; Bogard, 1974; Edleson, 1985; Schechter, 1982; 
Yllo, 1988).  For example, providing mental health services to abusive men was 
considered inappropriate given the lethal consequences for victims when therapists 
blamed them for their abuse or engaged couples counseling without taking appropriate 
measure to enhance their safety.  However, despite the historically appropriate motives 
guiding the decisions to exclude certain intervention strategies, the resulting restriction 
has contributed to misalignment and fulfillment of the ecological fallacy.  It may be that 
as the movement embraces a more paradoxical definition (Rappaport, 1981) of men‟s 
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violence against women (e.g., one that allows for both a socio-political and mental health 
explanation), responses that appear to defeat or contradict each other (i.e., substance 
abuse treatment and criminal justice sanctions) will become less aversive (Phillips, 2000).   
Multi-level theories explaining men‟s violence towards women (Harway & 
O‟Neil, 1999) appear to be gaining momentum, at least within the Portland Tri-County 
CCR community and it is reasonable to assume that domestic violence intervention 
strategies will become more effective when multi-level policies in response to these 
theories (Phillips, 2000) are similarly embraced and adopted.   
Implications for practice 
Several exciting implications for practice are indicated by the study results.  As 
reviewed earlier, the findings appear to support previously named limitations associated 
with heavily relying on the criminal justice system to intervene in domestic violence 
(Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; Guzik, 2009; Mederos, 1999; Mills, 2003; Ms. Foundation for 
Women, 2003; Pence, 1999; van Wormer, 2009).  More specifically, they illuminate four 
fundamental tensions or challenges accentuated by this dependence.  It might behoove 
practitioners to critically reflect on how interventions can respond to the following 
questions that are suggested by these tensions.  For example, 1) How can domestic 
violence intervention strategies better balance the intentions of punishment and 
rehabilitation for perpetrators? 2) How can strategies be both consistent and “fair”, and 
yet attend to the individual variation? 3) How can strategies be enhanced to better protect 
and empower victims? And finally, 4) How can current strategies move beyond reactivity 
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towards prevention?  While I certainly do not presume to have the answers to these 
questions, a few possibilities are worth exploring. 
Despite the limitations associated with the criminal justice system, I share Guzik‟s 
(2009) contention that the domestic violence movement should not turn its back on this 
response or the multiple gains that can be attributed to the criminalization of domestic 
violence.  “It seems irresponsible to abandon the state as an ally in the fight against 
domestic violence.  Without an adequate security alternative to replace the police, 
abandoning the state is tantamount to abandoning women to endure intimate violence 
alone” (p.187).  By enlisting the criminal justice system, advocates within the movement 
successfully pulled the horror and trauma of domestic abuse out of the closet and into the 
public domain and a truly impressive chink in the armor of Patriarchy was achieved.  
This said, it is clear that during the past decade, voices expressed in opposition to its 
primacy have grown louder and once marginalized critiques (INCITE!, 2003) have 
flooded into mainstream discourse.  It is vital that the movement respond to these 
critiques.   
The results of my project suggest five primary opportunities for intervention 
enhancement.  1) Continue to refine the criminal justice response, 2) improve the efficacy 
of batterer intervention treatment, 3) attend more explicitly to collaboration barriers, 4) 
fervently build the capacity of alternative approaches, and 5) focus on advocacy and 
prevention. 
Refine the criminal justice response. If we listen to the stakeholders queried, there 
are key issues that need to be addressed if the criminal justice response to domestic 
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violence is going to be more effective.  Unfortunately, these key issues and consequently 
their recommendations appear somewhat contradictory.  Stakeholders almost uniformly 
requested greater accountability for perpetrators of domestic violence in the form of 
arrests, prosecutions and incarceration, and yet they simultaneously expressed grave 
reservations regarding the dangers of and lack of rehabilitative potential of these 
sanctions.  Additionally, their requests for increased accountability were offered in 
tandem with testimony lamenting the disempowerment that victims often experience in 
the face of policies specifically designed to enhance accountability (i.e., mandatory arrest 
and no-drop prosecution). 
Obviously, there is not a singular solution to these contradictory 
recommendations.  However, after listening closely to stakeholders in the Portland Tri-
County CCR and revisiting the initial goals of the domestic violence movement, one 
thing seems very clear to me.  The criminal justice system must do a better job listening 
to, empowering, and protecting current victims.  While institutional advocacy advanced 
in the name of “future” victims is to be applauded, it cannot come at the expense of 
victims who are already suffering.  These women must be better supported and their 
voices solicited and incorporated.  Mills (1999) proposes a “Survivor-Centered Model” in 
order to shift from the currently abusive relationship that many victims have with the 
state towards one that promotes acceptance, respect, reassurance, resocialization, 
empowerment and liberation.  She suggests that officers of the state view every 
interaction they have with a victim as an opportunity to model and reinforce healthy 
patterns of relating.  This might mean that officers spend more time at the scene 
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determining the history and context of any particular assault and the ramifications or 
implications of their actions, or that district attorneys spend more time establishing a 
trusting relationship with clients so that they can take action in partnership, or that 
probation officers and judges engage victims in honest conversations about the costs and 
benefits of releasing “no contact” orders.   Current and marginalized members of the 
coordinated community response must strategize together to determine about how best to 
engage and empower victims.  It is quite possible that perpetrators will be held more 
accountable if victims are heard and honored with respect to the sanctions that get 
imposed.   
Additionally, if the criminal justice system is going to continue to play a 
productive role in the interruption of domestic abuse, then it will be important to 
challenge the system to embrace the unique dynamics inherent in interpersonal violence.  
Whether that means broadening the crime to include coercive control as Stark (2007) 
suggests or limiting the crime to patriarchal terrorism as Guzik (2009) suggests is 
unclear.  What is clear is that the current incident-focused approach is not adequately 
serving victims.  Victims of patriarchal terrorism are not served when the absence of 
physical abuse translates into a refusal of the system to intervene on their behalf and 
victims of common couple violence or situational violence may not be best served when 
arrest, probation, “no contact” orders and treatment strain their family‟s ability to survive 
financially.  Additionally, as long as the criminal justice system insists on dichotomizing 
those involved as either perpetrators or victims, much will be lost.  Victims will lose the 
chance to fight back or defend themselves for fear of getting arrested and perpetrators 
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will lose the opportunity to be seen as whole human beings struggling with their own 
experiences of victimization, worthy of compassion, and capable of change.    
 Improve the efficacy of batterer intervention treatment. Strong endorsement of an 
oversimplified “patriarchy as cause” explanation for men‟s violence and the criminal 
justice system as the best vehicle for interrupting men‟s violence has led to a problematic 
“blurring” for providers of batterer intervention.  Standards for best practice were 
adopted primarily on theoretical grounds, rather than on the basis of evidence (Maiuro, 
Hagar, Lin & Olson, 2001; Renzetti, Edleson, & Bergen, 2001).  Subsequently, it might 
be worthwhile for batterer intervention providers return to the drawing board and be 
given the freedom and flexibility to try alternative models for changing abusive men 
(Lehmann & Simmons, 2009).  Lehmann & Simmons (2009) recently compiled a 
collection of essays in their book entitled, Strengths-Based Batterer Intervention.  In it, 
they call for a paradigm shift to occur, one which recognizes the heterogeneity of 
batterers, moves away from the manualization of BIP programs (which assume a “one 
size fits all” population), focuses on the processes of change, and finally turns away from 
a confrontational model in favor of  a “strengths” or assets based model.  Given the 
relatively high rates of recidivism following batterer intervention programs, rates which 
are not consistent with crime rehabilitation rates more generally (Andrews & Bonta, 
2006), it seems premature and inappropriate to advance one program model over others.  
Batterer intervention providers should be encouraged to develop and advocate for models 
based on theory, practice, and evaluation. 
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Attend more explicitly to collaboration barriers.  Stakeholders in the Portland Tri-
County CCR were clear that while important strides have been made in the name of 
coordination, ideal collaboration has yet to be achieved.  If domestic violence strategies 
are to be more effective with abusive men than issues of trust, information sharing, 
professional respect, and communication need to be better resolved.  Stakeholders were 
clear that each agency or organization approaches the issue or client from a unique 
position and that it is not possible, nor desirable, to operate from a singular viewpoint.  
Rather, it was suggested that a more honest level of dialogue about these differences 
needs to be embraced.  Instead of holding collaborative meetings where various 
stakeholders come to the table and merely discuss a situation or a specific case, 
conversations about the barriers to trust, information sharing, and respect among partners 
need to be more directly engaged.  Naming these challenges to collaboration and holding 
frank discussions about how they can best be managed will likely be an important step 
towards greater optimization.  It seems clear that until all stakeholders are valued for their 
unique perspectives and their advice solicited and, when possible heeded, collaboration 
will be in name only and lapses in accountability for abusers and support for victims will 
continue.  
It is noteworthy that stakeholders participating in DVERT programs were more 
inclined to report positive collaborative experiences, particularly when stakeholders were 
co-located.  In other words, when advocates were physically stationed within police or 
probation units, both entities reported benefits.  It is likely that proximity breeds greater 
“institutional empathy.”  Banks, Dutch, & Wang (2008) reviewed collaboration issues 
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that surfaced during and after implementation of the “Greenbook” project which targeted 
the relationships between the child welfare system, batterer intervention providers, and 
domestic violence advocates.  They reported the importance of developing “institutional 
empathy” or an understanding of the context and environment influencing how a 
partnering agency approaches issues.  While it is likely infeasible for every collaborative 
partner to place representatives within every other collaborative partner‟s office, a system 
or process of shadowing may be possible and given the intensity of the stakeholders when 
explaining their concerns, likely warrants consideration.   
Build the capacity of alternative approaches. Stakeholders‟ multifaceted and 
substantial critiques of current intervention strategies with abusive men make it 
abundantly clear that alternative approaches to the criminal justice system must be more 
vigorously developed and utilized.   There are exciting trends within the field to embrace 
responses that better incorporate victim and perpetrator voices, have the flexibility to 
acknowledge and accommodate the complexity of domestic violence dynamics, and are 
less likely to discriminate and alienate based on race, culture, and class.  For example, the 
use of restorative justice models (Braithwaite, 2003) has been widely suggested. Though 
not without complications for victims (Coward, 2000; INCITE!, 2003), some argue that 
restorative justice practices create the possibility for greater satisfaction for the parties 
involved (Grauwiler & Mills, 2004; Ptacek, 2010; von Wormer, 2009).    
James Ptacek (2010) recently published a collection of essays on this topic in his 
book entitled, Restorative Justice and Violence Against Women (2010).  In it, authors 
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describe several exciting community-based models being tested across Canada, Australia 
and the United States, models such as the Community-Based Interventions Project.   
This demonstration project seeks to develop, pilot test, evaluate, document and 
distribute a replicable comprehensive alternative community-based approach to 
violence intervention.  This approach is aimed toward expanding the capacity of 
oppressed communities to end and prevent violence by equipping its most 
accessible resources – family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, and others toward 
whom persons in need first turn – with the models and tools to effectively 
intervene (Kim, 2010, p. 207).   
Given how frequently scarce resources were identified as a hindrance for victims and a 
strain for perpetrators, it is likely that drawing more substantially on local or community 
level resources may better meet their needs than relying primarily on state or federal 
assistance.    
For years, advocates traditionally marginalized by the mainstream domestic 
violence movement have been calling for and responding to the need for intervention 
models that more adequately and appropriately address their specific issues of 
marginalization.  Recognizing that many victims choose to remain with their partners for 
religious, cultural or financial reasons, Grauwiler & Mills (2004) offer a compelling 
argument to advance the use of restorative justice in the form of Intimate Abuse Circles 
(IAC).   
IACs are a culturally sensitive alternative to the criminal justice system response 
to domestic violence as the content of the conferences is tailored to the parties 
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involved.  The Intimate Abuse Circle model seeks to honor the partners‟ choices 
to remain together despite the violence.  The IAC model achieves this goal by 
establishing circles of support within the couple‟s community that foster healing 
within their cultural context (p. 65).   
The Cultural Context Model (Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999), described in 
Chapter Two is another example of an alternative model of batterer intervention that 
better acknowledges and responds to a man‟s unique cultural community.  Unlike 
traditional models, the CCM targets multiple levels of analysis.  Men involved in CCM 
do individual work, couple work, family work and community outreach.   It is 
particularly noteworthy that the CCM engages men from the community who have not 
been abusive in their relationships to function as sponsors, permits couple therapy once a 
batterer has proven the ability to accept responsibility for his actions, requires family 
therapy and culture circles with children and adolescents in order to break the cycle of 
violence and engages graduates to provide community outreach.  As suggested in Chapter 
Two, I believe that the mainstream movement can learn a great deal about how to 
effectively engage the community and address antecedents at multiple levels of analysis 
by observing these models.   
Focus on advocacy and prevention. Finally, the domestic violence movement 
must revitalize its focus on prevention and activism.  Heavy reliance on the criminal 
justice system has gone hand and hand with a professionalism of the movement, a trend 
that has been blamed for diminishing the passion and capacity for social activism among 
advocates (Lehrner & Allen, 2009; McDermott & Garofalo, 2004; Shepard, 1999).  
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Attention must be refocused on the societal and social contributors to domestic violence.  
Advocates and others within the movement must continue to provide prevention 
education targeting gender roles, masculinity/femininity, conflict resolution, equity and 
coercive uses of power and this prevention education should not be limited to school-
aged children.   
A massive media campaign, similar to M.A.D.D., is an intriguing possibility 
because of its focus on bystander behavior.  The brilliance behind the M.A.D.D. 
campaign is that it sought to mobilize average citizens within the community in order to 
stop a destructive behavior.  Slogans such as “Friends Don‟t Let Friends Drive Drunk” 
gave community members specific tools so that they could intervene successfully.  It has 
been shown that bystanders are more likely to get involved in sexual violence prevention 
if they have been given specific skills related to particular situations (Banyard, Plante, & 
Maynihan, 2004).  It is reasonable to suspect that friends and neighbors may be more 
likely to intervene in domestically abusive situations if they are informed of ways in 
which interpersonal violence manifests and if they have been equipped with user-friendly 
tools, tools akin to assigning a designated driver, collecting keys at the start of a party, or 
stopping a friend from getting in the car through the use of a caring slogan.   
Focusing prevention efforts on the development of these types of bystander skills 
may be beneficial particularly in light of research suggesting that victims of domestic 
violence are more likely to seek support from informal helpers (i.e., friends, neighbors, 
family members) than from professional helpers (Fugate, Landis, Riordan, Naureckas, & 
Engel, 2005; Gondolf, 2002).  After interviewing 491 abused women about their help-
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seeking behavior, Fugate el al. (2002) report that “informal helpers were the largest 
source of support to women in this study” (p. 307) and conclude that, “an informed 
caring community of support would greatly enhance a woman‟s ability to evaluate her 
situation and decide what assistance she needs” (p. 307). 
Providers in the Portland Tri-County CCR noted that educating the community 
about domestic violence, particularly the social and societal antecedents of domestic 
violence, can often produce defensiveness.  One participant observed that, “if you attempt 
to water down the male privilege with teaching them to be sensitive or teaching them to 
be aware of the other forms of abuse, rather than the physical abuse, you are really gonna 
impact their ego.  And once you attack someone‟s ego, it‟s not going to be acceptable.”  
Consequently, it may be necessary to better engage male participation in community 
outreach efforts.   Advocates in the study agreed that it can sometimes be difficult for 
them as woman to get through to male audiences and suggested instead that male batterer 
intervention providers and former perpetrators may be successful reaching audiences that 
might otherwise turn a deaf ear to the “angry feminists”.    
It may also be helpful for stakeholders in the domestic violence intervention 
community to challenge popular ideas of masculinity and femininity within the context of 
romantic love, particularly as it is portrayed in the media.  I was recently curious about 
the cult-like popularity of the series called The Twilight Saga by Stephenie Meyer.   I 
picked up the first book entitled Twilight and was immediately distraught to discover that 
the relationship being idolized by millions of teenage girls (and their mothers) across the 
United States is a fundamentally violent one.  Edward Cullen is a strong and powerful 
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vampire in love with a girl who he wants desperately to “eat”/ kill.  Bella Swan is an 
accident prone girl in love with a dangerous vampire, who would rather risk dying at his 
hands than live without him.   
Even as he called to me with sharp-edged fangs, I feared for him.  And in that I  
had my answer.  I didn‟t know if there ever was a choice, really.  I was already  in too 
deep.  Now that I knew [that he was a vampire] –if I knew – I could do  nothing about 
my frightening secret.  Because when I thought of him, of his  voice, his hypnotic 
eyes, the magnetic force of his personality, I wanted  nothing more than to be with 
him right now.  Even if…[he might kill me]  (Meyer, 2005, p. 139). 
 I‟ve had heated exchanges with adult friends over the risks of exposing young 
girls and boys to this message.  Being repeatedly told that Bella and Edward love each 
other and Edward does not want to hurt her is no reassurance.  Domestic violence is a 
complex phenomenon.  Victims are often deeply in love with their perpetrators and 
perpetrators are often extremely conflicted about their violence.  Advocates must 
continue to illuminate these complexities and the problematic portrayals of romantic love 
that pervade mainstream culture.  
In conclusion, it may be that balancing the intentions of punishment and 
rehabilitation for perpetrators involves improving accountability for abusive men by 
better empowering victims, enhancing collaboration, and enlisting alternative models of 
justice.  Similarly, it may be that enhancing rehabilitation for perpetrators involves better 
attending to their diverse individual needs and enlisting alternative models of treatment.  
Finally, better protecting victims might involve increasing some aspects of “punishment” 
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for perpetrators, as well as a resurgence in prevention efforts.  Just as the seven sub-units 
identified by stakeholders operate together to manifest the attribute “limited 
effectiveness” of current domestic violence intervention systems (see Figure 5), the four 
fundamental tensions or challenges they illuminate with respect to heavy reliance on the 
criminal justice system are interwoven.  It seems only logical then to assume that 
resolving or responding to these tensions will involve interlocking or overlapping 
strategies. 
Implications for research 
With respect to methodology, it is clear that invoking a systems approach to the 
study of domestic violence intervention with abusive men enhanced and deepened what I 
was able to discern, and subsequently may warrant consideration by other researchers.  
By embracing the context in which individual components of the intervention operate and 
attempting to critique the system as a whole, much was learned.  Rather than merely 
developing a critique of the challenges created for victims by mandatory arrests or the 
way a “one size fits all” approach to treatment impacts efficacy, an integrated discussion 
of the systemic challenges was possible.  In other words, asking stakeholders to express 
their concerns across the multiple components produced a more holistic analysis and 
allowed for the identification of unifying candidates, such as the tension that exists 
between consistency and variability with respect to the current “one size fits all” 
approach within the criminal justice system and batterer intervention programs. As others 
have observed, elements of the domestic violence system (i.e., arrest, prosecution, 
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probation, batterer intervention programs, victim services) do not operate in isolation and 
it vital that we not evaluate them as if they do (Gondolf, 2002; Tolman, 2001).   
Another key advantage of engaging a systems approach to evaluate domestic 
violence intervention is that I was directed to attend to the processes or the interactions 
within the larger unit.  Rather than simply presenting salient themes sequentially, I was 
able to explore and present the interrelations among the challenges described by 
stakeholders.  While it may be illuminating to point out that stakeholders identified a lack 
of prevention education as a candidate for why intervention is not more successful, it is 
perhaps more helpful to explore this critique in conjunction with their concerns about the 
criminal justice system.  Future research examining the multiple ways in which these 
subunits operate together and impact one another will likely produce additional 
candidates for improving effectiveness.   
The decision to use focus groups for gathering material was rewarded in that 
interactions, agreements, and disagreements among the participants enabled me to 
develop a richer understanding of how stakeholders felt.  If I had chosen instead to 
conduct interviews, I would not have been privy to the disagreements that perpetrators 
and providers had with one another.  It was often in response to comments made by 
fellow participants that the most thorough and provocative material was shared.  
Participants pushed each other to provide better explanations of their frustrations and to 
justify any comments made that differed from the general consensus of the group.  
Additionally, conducting focus groups enabled me to detect a group narrative.  For 
example, I was able to observe the “victim” stance that ironically both victims/survivors 
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and perpetrators have adopted with respect to the criminal justice system, a narrative that 
might not have emerged during one-to-one conversations.  Evaluators who are similarly 
interested in capturing group narratives with respect to domestic violence intervention 
strategies might want to consider utilizing focus groups for data collection. 
Finally, by soliciting multiple perspectives on the unit of study (Lendaris, 1986; 
Linstone, 1999), a more thorough and accurate understanding of the system was possible.  
While it would have been informative to interview perpetrators about their experiences 
with domestic violence intervention, their responses in isolation would have painted a 
skewed picture of the criminal justice system.  For example, I might have been led to 
believe that current strategies are overly severe and that victims are more than adequately 
protected by CJS sanctions.  It is only when I held their accounts in concert with the 
accounts of victims/survivors, advocates, officers and providers that a more nuanced and 
valid description was possible.  Each stakeholder group offered a slightly different 
analysis of the challenges or limitations of the system.  Comparing, contrasting, and 
merging what each group had to say illuminated a more complete picture.  Given the 
striking contrasts that emerged between and among stakeholders in the current study, 
particularly between the accounts of perpetrators and victims, it may be important for 
future endeavors to similarly incorporate multiple perspectives in order to accurately 
represent the range of experiences that people have with the domestic violence 
intervention system.   
This exploration demonstrates that it is possible and profitable to view and assess 
the domestic violence intervention system as a whole. Doing so enabled me to embrace 
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the context in which the subunits operate, highlight and extract the processes and 
interactions among the subunits, and finally enlist multiple perspectives to illuminate and 
analyze the findings.  It is important that future explorations avoid codifying a narrow 
focus within the field, whether it is by studying components of the system in isolation, 
ignoring the ways in which various subunits influence and impact each other or viewing 
the system through one lens at a time.  Researchers must strive to mirror the complexity 
of domestic violence dynamics and the strategies that are possible to intervene in those 
dynamics with our methodology; failing to do so may only exacerbate the constrictions 
that presently inhibit effectiveness. 
Summary 
 The domestic violence movement has made extremely impressive strides towards 
reducing the incidence and trauma of domestic violence (Gordon, 1988; Haaken, 2010; 
Jolin, 2008; Pleck, 1987.  Once considered normative and acceptable behavior, men‟s 
abuse of their intimate partners is no longer morally or legally sanctioned in the United 
States (Gordon, 1988; Pleck, 1987).  It was a momentous occasion when the first laws 
criminalizing domestic violence were enacted for it signaled a judgment by society that 
the privacy granted to the family by the state did not include turning a blind eye towards 
men who beat their wives.  Similarly, when police officers refused to enforce the new 
laws and legal action was taken in the form of class action law suits (Fagan, 1996; Jolin, 
2008; Pleck, 1987) an impressive victory against institutionalized gender oppression was 
achieved.  Likewise, when inconsistent application of the laws and inconsistent 
sanctioning of perpetrators in the courts was observed, a progressive model of 
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coordination and collaboration was developed, funded and widely adopted (Pence & 
Paymar, 1993).  It could easily be argued that the success of the domestic violence 
movement to this point can be attributed to activists‟ willingness to modify existing 
practices and policies in response to realizations and recognition that they weren‟t yet 
optimal.  The strength of the domestic violence movement will continue to lie in its 
ability to advance new policies in response to information describing opportunities for 
growth and improvement.    
I embarked upon this journey with the hope that by turning a critical and 
evaluative eye towards current strategies, places of conflict would emerge, and 
consequently suggestions for how to improve them might surface.  While there is 
certainly no guarantee that the theoretical, practical and methodological implications that 
I‟ve proposed will enhance the efficacy of domestic violence intervention strategies, I 
believe that they are worth considering given the testimony of stakeholders in the 
Portland Tri-County CCR which echoed growing concerns in the field.   
Drawing once again on a systems approach, it may be helpful to conceptualize the 
study implications as suggested subunits that when operating together might manifest the 
quality “improved effectiveness” of the domestic violence intervention system (see 
Figure 7).  In other words, if the field were to advance and embrace more multi-leveled 
theories and police responses, refine the CJS response by better engaging victims and 
embracing the complexities of domestic violence, improve the efficacy of batterer 
intervention by experimenting with alternative approaches and moving away from  a “one 
size fits all” model, attend more directly to collaboration barriers through honest dialogue 
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and increased institutional empathy, build the capacity of alternative approaches such as 
restorative justice and intimate abuse circles, focus on advocacy and prevention, and 
employ systems approach methodology to evaluate current strategies, improved efficacy 
may be possible.  




Lendaris‟ (1986) definition of a system applied to study implications.   
 
 Environment = Domestic Violence Movement 
(Goal of eliminating violence against women) 
System (A level) = Domestic Violence Intervention 
Attribute: Improved effectiveness 
Subunits (B Level) = Subunits that when operating together 
might manifest improved effectiveness of  
domestic violence intervention 
Practice: 
1) Refine the CJS response (better integrate victims and embrace 
complex domestic violence dynamics) 
2) Improve efficacy of BIP (experiment with alternative 
approaches and move away from “one size fits all” model) 
3) Attend to collaboration barriers (hold honest dialogue among 
partners and increase institutional empathy through proximity 
and shadowing) 
4) Build capacity of alternative approaches such as restorative 
justice, IACs, and CCM 
5) Focus on advocacy and prevention (prevention education, 
challenge popular notions of romantic love) 
Theory: 
1) Advance multi-level theories coupled with multi-level policy 
responses in order to avoid the ecological fallacy. 
Research: 
1) Drawn on systems approach for evaluating domestic violence 
intervention (attend to context, processes, and multiple 
perspectives) 
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Concluding Thoughts 
The epidemic perpetration of domestic violence remains one of the most vexing 
social crises of modern times (Bancroft, 2002; Healey et al., 1998; Mears, 2003).  The 
fact that millions of women are injured each year by their intimate partners is for some a 
signal of the pervasive and insidious nature of patriarchy, while for others it signals a 
tremendous lapse in our ability to galvanize communities beyond the criminal justice 
system to intervene. 
What is clear to me after embarking on this journey is that single level theories, 
despite their benefits, are fundamentally inadequate to address the complex nature and 
manifestation of interpersonal violence.  Instead, multi-level models for understanding 
domestic violence (Harway & O‟Neil, 1999) are necessary if we are to avoid some of the 
limitations identified in this project.  When we choose to acknowledge antecedents of 
men‟s violence against women on multiple levels of analysis, we open ourselves to the 
possibility of responding more effectively.  By acknowledging macrosocial influences 
such as racism and classism, socialization influences such as rigidly defined gender roles, 
relational influences such as interaction patterns within couples, and individual influences 
such as biology and psychology, we can expand our intervention efforts to better meet the 
specific and collective needs of victims and perpetrators.  For example, victim advocates 
can better embrace the history of activism that guided and shaped the domestic violence 
movement and once again more directly target antecedents at the macrosocial and social 
level of analysis in addition to helping individual women.  Batterer intervention providers 
might be inspired to more fully draw upon the knowledge and successes of mental health 
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professionals to develop programs that better engage perpetrators as well as participate in 
more community outreach targeted at challenging rigidly defined gender roles, notions of 
masculinity and femininity, and acceptable relationship behavior.  Additionally, 
alternative community based models of intervention might gain momentum and move 
more substantially into mainstream practice.   
Given the constellation of individual, relational, and macrosocial factors that 
interact and contribute to men‟s violence against women, it is unlikely that one best 
solution for how to intervene exists.  Rather, we must strive to draw on the diverse 
strengths and collective wisdom within our communities to advance responses that avoid 
the ecological fallacy and address antecedents of domestic violence at the individual, 
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 Appendix A  
Script for Recruiting Police and Probation Officers, Victim Advocates 
and Program Facilitators at Naturally Occurring Meetings 
 
“Hi, my name is Courtenay Silvergleid and I‟m a graduate student at Portland State 
University.  I‟ve been involved in the domestic violence field for the past 15 years and 
for the past several years have been doing evaluation work on batterer intervention 
programs along with Dr. Eric Mankowski.  Currently, I am interested in exploring some 
of the strengths and limitations of current domestic violence intervention strategies with 
abusive men.  I‟m wondering if your group would be willing to share their thoughts on 
this topic with me at your next regularly scheduled meeting in the form of a focus group.  
The discussion will last for approximately 120 minutes and be digitally recorded in order 
to insure that we accurately capture your opinions.  I will provide snacks during the 
meeting as a way of saying thank you.”  
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Appendix B 
Script for Advocates to use when 
Presenting Focus Group idea to the Members in their Group 
 
“A researcher from Portland State University is interested in coming to one of our 
upcoming group meetings.  She would like to ask you all some questions regarding your 
opinions and experiences with the police, courts, probation and batterer intervention 
programs.  Her goal is to evaluate and improve the current intervention system.  Your 
participation would be of great benefit.  I will not be here for the discussion, which will 
last about 120 minutes and be digitally recorded.  She will take every precaution to 
protect your confidentiality so that your comments are not linked with your name.  
Instead, your comments will be grouped together with comments made by other women 
in other programs.  If the group is willing to participate, then we should select a date for 
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Appendix C 
Script for Calling Police and Probation Officers,  
Victim Advocates, and Program Facilitators  
 
“Hi, my name is Courtenay Silvergleid and I‟m a graduate student at Portland State 
University.  I got your name and number from X (fellow police and probation officers, 
victim advocate, or program facilitator).  I‟ve been involved in the domestic violence 
field for the past 15 years and for the past four years have been doing evaluation work on 
batterer intervention programs with Dr. Eric Mankowski.  Currently, I am interested in 
exploring some of the strengths and limitations of current domestic violence intervention 
strategies with abusive men.  I am wondering if you would be willing to share your 
thoughts on this topic with me.  If you are, I‟d like to invite you to come to a focus group 
with other (police and probation officers, program facilitators, or victim advocates).  The 
focus group will last for approximately 120 minutes and be digitally recorded in order to 
insure that we accurately capture your opinions.  I will provide snacks during the meeting 
as a way of saying thank you.”  
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Appendix D 
Script for Program Facilitators to use when 
Presenting Focus Group idea to the Members in their Group 
 
“A researcher from Portland State University is interested in coming to one of our 
upcoming group meetings.  She would like to ask you all some questions regarding your 
opinions and experiences with the police, courts, probation and here at the program.  Her 
goal is to evaluate and improve the current intervention system.  Your participation 
would be of great benefit.  I will not be here for the discussion, which will last about 120 
minutes and be digitally recorded.  She will take every precaution to protect your 
confidentiality so that your comments are not linked with your name.  Instead, your 
comments will be grouped together with comments made by other men in other 
programs.  If the group is willing to participate, then we should select a date for them to 
come.  If you choose not to participate, then you will simply participate in regular group 
activities. “ 
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Appendix E 
Discussion Guide for Focus Groups 
 
Welcome & Introductions 
Overview of focus group topic 
Review of ground rules:  
- confidentiality 
- treating other members with respect 
Questions 
1. Within the coordinated community response, what do you believe is the most 
widely endorsed explanation for men‟s domestic violence against women? 
2. Locally, what are the dominant strategies for intervening in men‟s violence 
against women? 
3. Despite progress, domestic violence continues to occur.  In your opinion, why 
isn‟t domestic violence intervention with abusive men more effective? 
4. What discrepancies, if any, do you perceive between the dominant 
conceptualization of domestic violence and our current strategies for intervening 
in this violence? 
5. How do you understand or experience these discrepancies? 
6. What is your understanding of the Duluth Model of coordinated community 
response? 
7. What discrepancies, if any, exist between the Duluth Model and current domestic 
violence intervention strategies for abusive men? 
8. How do you understand or experience these discrepancies? 
9. What limitations or unintended consequences, if any, are associated with a 
heavily criminal justice response to domestically abusive men? 
10. What strategies or interventions for domestically abusive men do you wish were 
being implemented in addition to the current strategies? 
11.  What resources in our community do you think should be involved in intervening 
in men‟s violence against women? 
 




(Victim Advocates, Batterer Intervention Providers,  
Police and Probation Officers)  
 
“Evaluating Domestic Violence Intervention with Abusive Men” 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Courtenay Silvergleid, 
M.S. from Portland State University, Psychology Department.  The researcher hopes to 
learn about the strengths and limitations of current domestic violence intervention 
strategies with abusive men.  You were selected as a possible participant in the study 
because you are either a police or probation officer, victim advocate, or batterer 
intervention program provider and therefore have through your professional role had the 
opportunity to develop opinions about these challenges. 
 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to participate in a focus group with other 
probation officers, police officers, victim advocates, or batterer intervention providers 
which will last for approximately 120 minutes and will be digitally recorded.  You may 
not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study, but the study may help to 
increase knowledge about how to improve domestic violence intervention in our local 
community. 
 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be linked to 
you or identify you will be kept confidential to the extent possible by the researcher.  
When the digital recordings of the discussions are transcribed, all identifying information 
including name, gender, place of employment, employment title, etc. will be excluded.  
Your consent form with you name will be kept in a locked file cabinet in Courtenay 
Silvergleid‟s office. There is a small chance that someone else in the group will reveal 
what you share in the group, however this risk will be minimized by emphasizing to each 
member the importance of maintaining confidentiality.  By signing this consent form, you 
are agreeing to protect and keep private what others in the group say.    
 
Your participation is voluntary.  You do not have to take part in this study, and it will not 
affect your relationship with your place of employment or this group.  You may also 
withdraw from this study at any time without affecting your relationship with your place 
of employment or this group. 
 
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your rights as a 
research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review Committee, Office 
of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland State University, (503) 
725-3423.  If you have questions about the study itself, contact Courtenay Silvergleid, 
MS. (503) 465-2025 or her supervisor, Dr. Eric Mankowski at (503) 725-3901. 
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Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the above information and 
agree to take part in this study.  Please understand that you may withdraw your consent at 
any time without penalty, and that, by signing, you are not waiving any legal claims, 
rights or remedies.  The researcher should provide you with a copy of this form for your 




____________________________________________    _____________________ 
Signature        Date 
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Appendix G 
CONSENT FORM  
(Batterer Intervention Program Participants) 
 
“Evaluating Domestic Violence Intervention” 
Courtenay Silvergleid, M.S., from the Psychology Department at Portland State 
University is doing a research study on the limitations of current domestic violence 
intervention strategies with abusive men. 
 
What Will I Have To Do? 
If you decide to take part in the study, you will be asked to share your opinions at one of 
your regularly scheduled group meetings. The meeting will last for approximately 120 
minutes and at the meeting you and the other men will be asked to talk about:  
 Your opinions regarding any problems associated with current domestic 
violence intervention  
 Your views of the criminal justice response to domestic violence 
 Your suggestions for how to improve domestic violence intervention 
 
Are There Any Risks? 
Domestic violence is very personal. You do not have to take part in this study.  If you do 
agree to take part, you may feel uncomfortable, angry, said, guilty, scared or embarrassed 
because of the questions asked or the discussion that ensues.  You don‟t have to talk if 
you don‟t want to.  And if you don‟t want to stay in the meeting, you don‟t have to.  You 
can leave at any time.  If you are upset after the interview and need to talk with someone, 
please contact your program facilitator. 
 
What Will I Get In Return? 
 Knowing that you are helping others, making Amends 
We can learn so much from you.  What we learn may enable policy makers to 
improve the current system and provide better support to men entering 
batterer intervention programs. 
 
What Are You Doing To Protect Me? 
Your privacy is very important to us.  We have done many things to protect you: 
 We won‟t tell anyone if you take part in this study not. 
 You won‟t be asked to say your real name during the meeting. 
 Your name and what you tell us during the discussion will be kept private to 
the extent allowed by law.  (By “kept private” we mean that the names of 
people who take part in the study will not be given to anyone else.  And it 
means that we will only reveal what you say in a way that no one could ever 
guess or know it was you who said it.)  If, in the course of the discussion you 
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disclose that you are, or are intending to, harm yourself or others, we are 
ethically and legally required to notify the appropriate authorities. 
 Only people in the meeting will know what you say.  Nothing you say will be 
reported back to your intervention program or your probation officer. 
 Your name and other personal information, which we need in order to keep 
track of who we talk to, will be kept in a locked file cabinet.  For example, 
this form (which has your name on it) will be kept in a locked file cabinet. 
 When we write or talk about what we learned in this study, we will leave 
things out so no one will be able to tell who we are talking about. 
 
Any Questions? 
If you have any questions about this study, this form, or the discussion, you can talk to 
Courtenay Silvergleid at (503) 465-2025 or her supervisor, Eric Mankowski at 503-725-
3901.  You can also contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee of Portland 
State University about your rights as a research participant (someone who takes part in a 
study).  Hours are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.   The office is located at Portland State 
University, Cramer Hall, Room 111, 1721 SW Broadway, Portland, OR  97201.  The 
telephone number is (503) 725-3423, or send email to: hsrrc@lists.pdx.edu 
 
If I Sign, What Does It Mean? 
This is a consent form.  Your signature below means that: 
 You have read and understand what this form says. 
 You are willing to take part in the study by talking with us in the meeting. 
 You know that you do not have to take part in this study.  And even if you 
agree, you can change your mind and stop at any time.   
 The program where you are enrolled and your probation officer (if you have 
one) will not know whether or not you choose to participate in the study. 




Participant Signature     Date   
 
____________________________________________ 
Participant name, printed 
 










“Evaluating Domestic Violence Intervention” 
Courtenay Silvergleid, M.S., from the Psychology Department at Portland State 
University is doing a research study on the limitations of current domestic violence 
intervention strategies with abusive men. 
 
What Will I Have To Do? 
If you decide to take part in the study, you will be asked to share your opinions at one of 
your regularly scheduled group meetings. The meeting will last for approximately 120 
minutes and at the meeting you and the other women asked to talk about:  
 Your opinions regarding any problems associated with current domestic 
violence intervention  
 Your views of the criminal justice response to domestic violence 
 Your suggestions for how to improve domestic violence intervention 
 
Are There Any Risks? 
Domestic violence is very personal. You do not have to take part in this study.  If you do 
agree to take part, you may feel uncomfortable, angry, said, guilty, scared or embarrassed 
because of the questions asked or the discussion that ensues.  You don‟t have to talk if 
you don‟t want to.  And if you don‟t want to stay in the meeting, you don‟t have to.  You 
can leave at any time.  If you are upset after the interview and need to talk with someone, 
please contact your support group leader. 
 
What Will I Get In Return? 
 Knowing that you are helping others who are in your same situation. 
We can learn so much from you.  What we learn may enable policy makers to 
improve the current system, leading to better outcomes for you and other 
victims/survivors. 
 
What Are You Doing To Protect Me? 
Your privacy is very important to us.  We have done many things to protect you: 
 We won‟t tell anyone if you take part in this study not. 
 You won‟t be asked to say your real name during the meeting. 
 Your name and what you tell us during the discussion will be kept private to 
the extent allowed by law.  (By “kept private” we mean that the names of 
people who take part in the study will not be given to anyone else.  And it 
means that we will only reveal what you say in a way that no one could ever 
guess or know it was you who said it.)  If, in the course of the discussion you 
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disclose that you are, or are intending to, harm yourself or others, we are 
ethically and legally required to notify the appropriate authorities. 
 Only people in the meeting will know what you say.   
 Your name and other personal information, which we need in order to keep 
track of who we talk to, will be kept in a locked file cabinet.  For example, 
this form (which has your name on it) will be kept in a locked file cabinet. 
 When we write or talk about what we learned in this study, we will leave 
things out so no one will be able to tell who we are talking about. 
 
Any Questions? 
If you have any questions about this study, this form, or the discussion, you can talk to 
Courtenay Silvergleid, (503) 465-2025 or her supervisor, Eric Mankowski at 503-725-
3901.  You can also contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee of Portland 
State University about your rights as a research participant (someone who takes part in a 
study).  Hours are 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.   The office is located at Portland State 
University, Cramer Hall, Room 111, 1721 SW Broadway, Portland, OR  97201.  The 
telephone number is (503) 725-3423, or send email to: hsrrc@lists.pdx.edu 
 
If I Sign, What Does It Mean? 
This is a consent form.  Your signature below means that: 
 You have read and understand what this form says. 
 You are willing to take part in the study by talking with us in the meeting. 
 You know that you do not have to take part in this study.  And even if you 
agree, you can change your mind and stop at any time.   




Participant Signature     Date   
 
____________________________________________ 
Participant name, printed 
 















This survey asks for information about you. Don‟t put your name anywhere on this 
survey.  Your answers will not be known to anyone in your program or place of 
employment.  
 
1.   Your age: _________________ 
 
2.   Your birthplace (country): _________________________                                                                      
 
3.   If you were not born in the U.S., how long have you been in the U.S.? (# of years): _____                                 
 
4.   Circle the highest grade of school that you completed (1 means 1
st
 grade and so on):    
 1    2    3    5     6    7    8       9    10    11    12    BA/BS     MA/MS    Ph.D. 
 [Elementary]        [Middle]             [ High School ]  
 
5.   What is your relationship status? (Check one) 
         Single____  Married (or living as married)_____ Separated _____Divorced ______ 
Other (describe)____________ 
 
6.   What is your gender?    M       F 
   
  7.   What is your race? (May check more than one category) 
   White      
   Black or African American   
   Asian  _______________________  
   Spanish/Hispanic/Latino  ___________________     
   American Indian or Alaska Native   Name of Tribe ________________ 
   Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
   Other________________ 
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 8.  My role in the Domestic Violence Intervention System might best be described as: 
 (Check all that apply) 
 
   Participant in a batterer intervention program   
   Victim/survivor of domestic violence, participating in a support group 
   Victim advocate     
   Batterer intervention provider 
   Police officer 
   Probation officer 
    
9. I‟ve been involved in this role for: (please write in the correct number) 
 
  _________ weeks, OR _________months, OR ________ years 
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